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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the process of water sector reform in Botswana, focusing on barriers to 
effective delivery of clean water and improved sanitation services (WSS) to all, and water 
resource management (WRM), in a water insecure country, dependent for surface water on 
international river basin organisations. The study provides a crtitical analysis of policy change 
in progress. The impact of the water reforms on the poor and the process of centralising 
control of WSS, from both tribal and local authorities and the problems encountered are 
addressed. This study first reviews Botswana’s historical and recent performance on WRM 
and WSS and examines the underlying drivers and early outcomes of the recent major 
reform process. 
 
Advocacy Coalition Theory (Weible et al 2009, 2008; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 
1993) provides the theoretical basis to give insights into the processes of policy reform.  The 
research uses documents and observations of government policy planning and 
implementation processes from 2010 to 2013. Insights are also drawn from key informant 
interviews and focus groups from village to national level.   The results show the relevance of 
Advocacy Coalition Theory to Botswana’s history of water sector reform; a struggle between 
a pre-2009 hydro-mission coalition comprised of an elite, grown successful on mining 
revenues and the culture of cattle; to a post-2009 coalition formed broadly around concern 
about water availability and an ecological culture that harks back to the past. Changes 
include new tariff reform policies, which could be seen as running counter to Water Demand 
Management (WDM), as they are mitigated within the Government’s policies of poverty 
eradication. The centralisation of WSS provision under a Parastatal, the Water Utilities 
Corporation, has been completed. 
 
A new Water Policy and Regulator, set to be established, appears to reflect the gradual 
success of the more environmentally focused coalition, seeking stronger water secure 
independent IWRM and WDM policies. This process is still in play and it will require strong 
political will to complete Botswana’s transition to a sustainable water-based political 
economy. Lessons about surmounting the barriers to effective IWRM and National WRM and 
delivery of WSS elsewhere in developing countries could be learned from the policy 
processes in this geographically large, water constrained African country.  
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 1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Water sector reform: a global phenomenon 
 
In 2013, there are still worldwide some 783 million people without access to 
potable water, and 2.6 billion1 people without improved sanitation (UN 2013:42 
& 43; Water Aid 2013:4:7; Green 2012:38). In Sub- Saharan Africa, the 
percentage figures for access to potable water are 61% and improved sanitation 
30% (Water Aid 2012: 8 and 9). The global agenda for water sector reform to 
eliminate these gaps in provision is encompassed in the 2013 proposed UN 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Six (UN 2013:42). The barriers to 
achieving sustainable water management are widely discussed in the academic 
literature (Hepworth 2009; Alhassen 2008; Allan 2003) and are seen as 
threefold: the availability of water resources; the availability of finance to deliver 
the infrastructure to provide access to water and improved sanitation; and the 
processes to ensure that water resources are available, accessed and allocated 
in an equitable manner, affordable and timely. There is a view that the ‘major 
barrier to water sector reform is the poor governance of these processes’ 
(OECD 2011:26). 
  
The processes around decision-making on water sector reform are multi-scalar, 
and involve all levels of management from the village administration up to the 
national state (OECD 2013; Bolding and Wester 2005). Above the national level 
are the impacts of multi-state negotiation over transboundary rivers and 
aquifers. The actors in these processes are also multi-level. They can be 
motivated by altruism to deliver sustainable water resource management 
(WRM) and the universal availability of water and sanitation services (WSS). 
However, they, the actors, may also influence the power-play of control of 
resources of finance and water to ends that may or may not be to the 
advantage of either water resource sustainability or the people reliant on the 
resource (Gilmont 2013a). This thesis poses questions about the processes of 
                                                 
1
 1.1 billion still defecate in the open 
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reform in WRM and its aims to deliver sustainable clean water and improved 
sanitation services (WSS), by examining the process in one country, Botswana.  
   
Botswana is chosen as it was identified as an ‘outstanding performer’ on WSS 
(World Bank [WB] 2012). It was one of the poorest countries in the world at 
Independence in 1966 with a GNI per capita income of $US 50. In 2011, the 
GNI per capita figure was US$ 7,480 (WB 2011). This monetary increase was 
accompanied by the provision of universal healthcare and education at all 
levels. Access to potable water has been claimed to have increased from 40% 
to 98%, and for improved sanitation from 20% to 80% in the same period (WB 
2011). The figures claimed for the rural areas were significantly lower (Table 2.2 
and 2.3: UNICEF 2012). The Government of Botswana (GOB) engaged on 
water sector reforms to improve its performance in terms of equity, affordability 
and efficiency (GOB 2010a). Botswana is unusual in this high claim of provision 
of WSS (AMCOW 2012), and in its plans to become a WRM and WSS provider 
at a similar standard to that of provision in developed countries (GOB 2010a). 
But it was only at the time of the research for this thesis that Botswana began to 
fully address the processes of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
and National Water Resource Management (NWRM) in the understanding and 
long-term planning of sustainable allocation of its water resources. The situation 
in other countries may be different and no common panacea in terms of 
institutional arrangements or water management is universally possible (Ingram 
2013). However, an understanding of the processes of water reform in 
Botswana, analysed in this thesis, whilst context specific, could be of wide 
interest in other developing countries which are similar with respect to water 
availability, culture and institutional frameworks.  
 
1.2 The scope of the study 
 
This thesis outlines the worldwide situation on water reform in the literature 
review (Chapter Two). It uses UN, WB, intergovernmental reports and academic 
analysis, and concentrates on issues related to availability of water resources, 
finance and the processes that cause difficulties in delivering positive outcomes 
in water stressed countries. It then looks at the position of Botswana WRM and 
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WSS through the published sources and data. The period of analysis of policy 
literature dates from the introduction of organised water policy in Botswana in 
the 1920s through to 2013. The main time period for the fieldwork covers 
September 2010 - July 2011, examining the work of the WB for the GOB 
(September- November 2010), a period of consultation with stakeholders on 
Water Demand Management (WDM) and through to the finalising, in June 2011, 
of the water policy detail to go to the GOB Cabinet, with the final policy to be 
decided at the National Assembly (NA) in 2014 (GOB 2012d).  
The WRM approach in Botswana was planned to move from a predict and 
provide, hydro-mission, with a subsidised supply-side approach, to a new basis 
of management of demand. This is to take place through the delivery of 
consumer domestic services of potable water and improved sanitation moving 
from local government and central government Department of Water Affairs 
(DWA), to a centralised parastatal, the Water Utilities Corporation (WUC). There 
has been a progressively staged change from localised, often low capacity, 
managed facilities to a centralised merit-based management. The changes took 
place in tranches of villages over a five year period (2009-13). The movement of 
existing staff and the recruitment of new employees for WUC operations across 
Botswana led to new management and trade union practices. 
 
The research encompasses the roles of regional actors working on 
transboundary water issues, through the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC), based in Gaborone, Botswana, together with the 
interaction of the international donors such as German International Aid Agency 
(GIZ), part-funded for their work in SADC by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), and the Stockholm International Water 
Institute (SIWI). National players, such as politicians, civil servants, civil society 
and the private sector, were also engaged in the processes which sought to 
bring about a centrally directed NWRM, as set out in the National Master Water 
Plan Review (NMWPR) proposals (GOB 2006c) and, at the same time, overlay 
a Botswana IWRM, involving all stakeholders according to international norms 
(GWP 2002). 
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Within the research, voices of the Batswana poor were sought in relation to the 
WRM and WSS processes through six focus groups at different locations and 
levels within Botswana society, held February – June 2011.The overall research 
is in turn placed within Botswana’s historical context over the last 150 years 
since Tswana tribes moved to Botswana.Comparators to the processes in 
Botswana were collected from data and experiences for Namibia and South 
Africa. Central to the data collection for Namibia were meetings with key 
informants in Windhoek in November 2010 and February 2011. Similar 
meetings took place in March 2011 in South Africa around the African 
Ministerial Committee on Water (AMCOW) meeting and a Food and Agriculture 
(FAO) conference that took place in Cape Town to celebrate UN World Water 
Day in 2011.The researcher returned to Botswana during April-May 2013 for 
final fieldwork to test whether the original fieldwork conclusions still held. 
 
1.3 Research questions and thesis structure 
 
The overarching research question addressed in this research is:  
 
The Political Economy and coalitions in Botswana’s water 
sector reform 2009-13: to what extent can the process of 
reform be understood? 
 
The reforms proposed in Botswana were wide reaching and the research 
sought to understand the extent to which a conceptual framework based on 
advocacy coalition (AC) could explain the shifts in consensus around key 
aspects of the ongoing policy reforms in the water sector. A series of sub-
questions were structured to explore several complementary elements of the 
main issue: 
 
 What was the governance of WRM and WSS in Botswana prior to the 
2009 Water Reform process?  
 What were the underlying drivers of water sector reform in Botswana in 
2009-2011?  
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 What were the WRM and WSS reforms 2009-2013 that came under 
consideration and how did they evolve? 
 What are the outcomes of the reform process in terms of institutional 
responsibility for WRM and WSS? 
 What were the impacts on the poor of the water reforms in the post 
Independence AC and the post 2009 AC 
The structure of the thesis to answer these questions is as follows: 
 
Chapter Two: A literature review of the theory and concepts of water and 
sanitation reforms 
  
This provides context to the research questions by reviewing relevant academic 
research across the world and particularly in developing countries. This chapter 
reviews the current critiques of WRM and identifies the working model within 
which regulatory WRM is becoming adopted. The current position of Botswana 
on WRM and WSS is identified in the context of its hydrology, political structure 
and economy, as a starting point for understanding the new water sector 
reforms. 
 
Chapter Three: The Conceptual Framework 
 
This contains an exploration of the concepts that have traditionally framed 
research into WRM. Included is an academic review of the application of theory 
of political economy approaches to WRM and the change resulting from the 
recognition by society of ecological limits. The chapter explores the use of the 
conceptual framework of Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) (Weible et al 2009, 
2008; Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith 1999,1993) in explaining change, and 
particularly, water sector reform processes elsewhere, for example Spain 
(Bukowski 2007), USA (Weible and  Sabatier 2004; Ellison 1998) and Ghana 
(Ainuson 2009). ACT is tentatively suggested as an explanatory framework for 
the processes and decision-making by key players in Botswana.  
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Chapter Four: The Research Methodology 
 
This Chapter details how data have been systematically gathered, based on 
Blaikie’s structure (2012), in order to answer the research questions. Primary 
data came from key informant interviews (KII), a survey and six focus groups 
(FG) covering the range of locations used in the research; the capital, Gaborone 
(2), and Kgatleng District (4:  a peri-urban village, an urban village, a riverine 
village and a cattle post centre). Secondary data are primarily accessed from 
GOB and WB documents. The process of data gathering is outlined here and 
shown in detail in Appendix Three. 
 
Chapter Five: What was the governance of WRM and WSS in Botswana prior 
to the 2009 Water Reform process? 
 
This Chapter is based on a Botswana specific academic literature review and 
GOB sources. The chapter analyses the decentralised and multi-ministerial 
basis on which WSS were delivered in Botswana prior to the reform process 
commenced in 2009. The KIs and FG views of the nature of WSS in the past 
are also analysed. 
 
Chapter Six: What were the underlying drivers of water sector reform in 
Botswana 2009-11? To what extent did the national and international 
perceptions of water scarcity affect WRM decision-making at all levels in 
Botswana in 2010-2011?  
 
Details are given in this chapter of international, regional, national and local 
drivers, including physical, religious, economic, political and social factors, 
expressed in terms of their physical and sociological influence on water 
availability. Analysis of the scale of influence of these drivers becomes integral 
to the thesis. The research demonstrates that a national view of water scarcity 
was ambivalent as demonstrated by KII and FG analysis. The international view 
of Botswana has remained one of a country with regular droughts, and, even in 
years of good rainfall, water scarcity (Hulme 1996). The increasing national 
household water demands, from population increase and increasing standards 
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of living, overlays any theoretical perception of water scarcity. The tension 
between the national and international perceptions is examined. 
 
The Chapter goes on to explore the processes that contributed to the potential 
for change and to examine drivers of change that placed water reform on the 
agenda. 
 
It looks at the processes of post Independence development planning and of 
Vision 2016. It examines the ‘coalitions’ of societal interests, supported by a 
highly trained civil service (Pickard 1987:147) that led to the National Water 
Reviews (GOB 1992 and GOB 2006c). An alternative process for a Botswana 
National IWRM-Water Efficiency (BNIWRM-WE) plan was launched in 2010; 
data on the perceived BNIWRM-WE drivers of change is analysed from 
research conducted at the Maun October 2010 workshop. 
 
Chapter Seven: What were the proposed WRM and WSS reforms during 2009-
2013 and how did they evolve? 
  
The changes included the centralisation of all WRM and WSS within Ministry of 
Mining, Energy and Water Resources (MMEWR) through a new Water 
Resources Council (WRC), with WSS provided by the WUC (GOB 2010a). This 
is traced to the 1991 NWMP, confirmed in the 2006 NWMPR, worked through in 
the WB papers of 2008-10 and carried out from 2009. Analysis is provided of 
the outcomes of the stakeholder consultation meetings and final civil service 
response at the ministerial meeting in Kasane in June 2011. The changes in the 
final Water Policy (GOB 2012d) are examined and assessed against the original 
aim of the reforms. 
  
Chapter Eight: How are the traditional forms of government reacting to the 
change in their authority over land and water brought about by the elected 
government in Botswana? What were the outcomes of the post 2009 reform 
process in terms of institutional responsibility for WSS? 
 
 8 
 
The Chapter examines the changes in Botswana society, with the demotion of 
the role of traditional chiefs (Kgosi) at Independence in 1966 and, with this, a 
reduction in direct power over land and water provision in the villages and rural 
areas. The local institutions responsible for water post independence are now 
with the changes, only advocates for their electorate. The data from KII and 
from FGs is used. 
 
Chapter Nine: What were the impacts on the poor of the water policies: pre and 
post reform? 
 
The position of the Botswana Government on prioritising poverty reduction and 
particularly the use of WRM to achieve these ends is examined initially for the 
period 1966-2009, and then in the water reform period post-2009. The position 
of the San, representing the right to water for indigenous minorities, is analysed 
in terms of the Botswana Appeal Court water judgement of January 2011. Its 
implications for Botswana and beyond are explored in terms of both indigenous 
rights and the broader right to water. This includes the examination of the 
alternatives of the free water policy of neighbouring South Africa and the 
stepped approach adopted by Botswana (and Namibia).  
 
The data on the tariff structures 2009-13 is analysed. The potential introduction 
of the Water Regulator is examined as an attempt to both remove the 
Government from the tariff issue and also to require the Water Utilities 
Corporation (WUC) to address poverty eradication. There follows a data 
analysis of KII and FGs on the different possible impacts of the Water Reforms 
and the decisions of the GOB.The Chapter goes on to examine the extent to 
which the reforms have addressed poverty and equity in the main locations of 
Batswana life: in the villages, at the lands and at the cattle posts. Comparisons 
are made between the original (GOB 2010a) and final water policy proposals 
(2012d) and their impact on the poor. 
 
Chapter Ten: To what extent, has the conceptual framework used in the thesis 
been vindicated? 
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This chapter examines the evidence from Chapters Five to Nine as to whether 
the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter Three of an Advocacy Coalition 
Theory (ACT) is central to understanding the post-1966 WSS hydro mission 
driven WRM approach and now post-2009 a new Advocacy Coalition being 
formed around WDM and IWRM. 
 
The thesis concludes in Chapter Eleven where answers to the Research 
Questions, addressed throughout the thesis, are tentativrely brought together 
and summarised.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Background  
 
2.1 Chapter overview 
 
This Literature Review places the water reforms in the context of international 
Water Resource Management (WRM) and the delivery of Water and Sanitation 
Services (WSS), and Botswana history and culture, politics, economy and 
hydrology. It reviews the current academic theories relating to the 
understanding of the processes and choices behind the management of water 
resources. It reviews the five phase model of WRM (Allan 2003), the 
development of IWRM (GWP 2000), water scarcity analysis (Falkenmark 1990) 
and the issues of alternative delivery mechanisms of centralisation and 
decentralisation for WRM and WSS. The main drivers in water sector reform 
processes are introduced. It then proceeds to ground the discussion of these 
choices within the context of the 2009 proposed water reforms in Botswana. 
The review aims to highlight the main issues and background relevant to 
understand water sector reform in Botswana. 
 
2.2 Water Resource Management (WRM) 
 
There has been a global concern about the failure to deliver potable water and 
improved sanitation to all (UNDP 2006). It has led to the proposed Goal Six of 
the Post 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) (UN 2013: Annex II, 42). 
But while ‘temporal and spatial distribution [of water] can be problematic, it is 
the management of water and water resources, rather than physical availability 
which [is] at its crux’ (Hepworth 2009:11).  
 
Water Resource Management (WRM) has been a contested academic and 
hydrological concept for the past 50 years (Meinzen-Dick 2007). WRM has 
been perceived as having passed through five phases (Allan 2003).The first 
phase was seen as pre-modern (pre-1900), and the second, that of the 
‘hydraulic mission’ to deliver ‘industrial modernity’. From the 1980s, thinking has 
moved, in an age of uncertainty, to one of ‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck 1994) 
based on the ecology movement, and then, a fourth phase relating to the 
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economic value of water. Lastly is a concept of ‘neoliberal modernity’ (Allan 
2003). 
 
The Dublin Principles (ICWE 1992) and the subsequent concept of Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM), based on river basins has been defined 
as: 
   
‘seeki[ng] to address a country's key water-related development 
problems – water for health, for food, for energy, for environment – 
more effectively and efficiently ... Integrated approaches, of course, 
will imply deliberately moving away from fragmented approaches. On 
the natural system front, they might involve integration of land and 
water management, of surface water and groundwater management, 
of quantity and quality, and of upstream and downstream water-
related interests. On the human system front, they might involve 
ensuring that policies and priorities take account of water resource 
implications, that there is cross-sectoral integration in policy 
development, that macro-economic effects of water resource 
development are properly accounted for, ] Inherent in an IWRM 
approach is the recognition that truly sustainable water resources 
management involves managing demand, not just supply’  
(GWP quoted in Grigg 2008:279) 
  
This has led to a developed country consensus around water as scarce, to be 
paid for, within a market economy (Grigg 2008; GWP 2000). IWRM has been 
managed through government regulation and has been seen as yielding 
‘significant societal benefits in Europe’ (Hepworth 2009:11). Concern about 
climate change and its implications for water has led to the view that water is 
going to become even scarcer in some regions, particularly within sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) (UNFCCC 2007). The World Bank (WB) has supported this 
perspective and encouraged the recognition of the economic cost of water 
through the full cost recovery pricing of water and the introduction of the market 
(Swatuk 2008). The WB have also pressed an agenda of water rights, 
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decentralised WRM and the full participation in decision-making by all water 
users, particularly by the poorest in society (Salman and Bradlow 2008:14). 
The combination of a ‘reflexive modernity’ model2 with a full market model in the 
North has not chimed with models endorsed by governments of countries in the 
South and particularly in Africa, which have sought to enable rapid expansion to 
achieve water and sanitation rights for all (UNDP 2006). The high availability of 
water in many parts of Africa has not always meant high levels of access, 
because of the lack of investment in water infrastructure (ibid). WRM in Africa 
has been based on the ‘industrial modernity’ paradigm (Allan 2003), as the 
hydraulic mission of the water engineers has continued to favour delivering 
water to exporting extractive industries and irrigated agriculture. Where these 
latter needs are not high, water is often seen to be within the pre-nineteenth 
century ‘pre-modern’ paradigm, where it is available as a free common good, 
provided out of local streams and boreholes and generally managed locally, 
according to customary rights (Schapera 1971:1938b). 
  
In recognition of the political nature of resource management decisions, IWRM 
was re-designated as Integrated Water Resource and Allocation Management 
(IWRAM) (Allan 2003a). Allocation decisions, it was proposed, were not made 
on ecological grounds, but on political ones, by the elites for their own purposes 
(ibid; Allan 2003b). The principles of IWRM have been criticised for being 
unrealistic (Biswas 2004). The use of river basin systems, which are often 
transboundary for WRM, has been seen as impractical, and a state-based 
WRM within political borders, in the concept of a ‘territorial’ WRM, is the norm 
(Sitorus 2008). It has been pointed out that the Columbia River Treaty is not 
basin based but state based (Giordano and Shah 2013:8).This analysis of WRM 
being driven by political decision making, could lead to the conceptualisation of 
IWRM as being within two competing concepts, the prescriptive ‘Dublin 
Principles IWRM’ based on river basins, and a more pragmatic politically 
deliverable ‘Rio Agenda 21 IWRM’ based on political borders. These two 
concepts from the successive 1992 conferences are shown in Table 2.1.  
 
                                                 
2
 This can be defined as understanding the ecological risk contained within a modern industrial 
society (Beck 1994) 
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Dimension ‘Pragmatic’ Rio ‘Prescriptive’ Dublin 
Economic   
Characterised as 
 Nature of water 
 Priority of economic 
instruments 
 Priority setting 
 Role of private sector 
Developmental 
 Economic and 
social good 
 Economic 
instruments 
balanced by social 
considerations 
 Within national 
economic 
development 
policy 
 Major role for 
government; 
recognition of 
private role 
Washington Consensus 
 Economic good 
 High priority for 
economic 
instruments 
 Stakeholder 
participation; 
economic 
instruments 
 High priority for role 
of private sector; 
limited government 
Institutional, international   
Characterised as 
 Trans-boundary 
approaches 
 Institutionalisation of 
global water 
Multilateralism continued 
 Basin-specific 
approaches 
 United Nations 
system 
Retreat from 
multilateralism 
 River basin 
organisations 
 World Water 
Council outside 
intergovernmental 
domain 
Environmental   
Characterised as 
 Infrastructure 
 Decision-making 
 River basin 
organisation 
Balance needs of people 
and environment 
 Infrastructure 
development a key 
element 
 Effective 
implementation 
and coordination 
required 
 Manage ‘in basin 
context’ 
Ecosystem approach 
 ‘Development’ 
deleted 
 Emphasis on ‘full 
stakeholder 
participation’ 
 River basin 
organisation the 
most appropriate 
entity 
 
Table 2.1 Competing concepts of IWRM (Muller 2011:153) 
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The donor communities favour the former concept but realities on the ground 
tend to show support by political elites for the latter concept (Muller 2011, 
2010a). ‘Implementation is difficult because of institutional barriers... [to] IWRM 
[planning]. Improved governance is required to overcome institutional barriers’ 
(Gregg 2008:279).The Global Water Partnership (GWP) in Southern Africa has 
worked to deliver national IWRM plans in eight3 countries surrounding 
Botswana but ‘implementation is lagging behind’(DWA 2013:33).This thesis 
explores the process of establishing a national plan for IWRM4 in Botswana in 
Chapter Six. The perceived weakness of the concept of IWRM delivering on the 
allocation of waters from transboundary rivers basins and aquifers is 
exacerbated by the lack of agreed legal instruments to enforce such water 
rights (Leb 2013; Speed 2013; Muller 2011). The UN 1997 Convention on the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses codified the rules and 
principles for enabling and sustaining transboundary cooperation. However, it 
has not yet entered into force due to the lack of signatory countries5. 
International law on water sits within the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 2004 
Berlin Rules. However, these two instruments are ‘not legally binding’ (DFID 
2010:14). The 6th Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly has put off the 
negotiation of a Convention based on the International Law Commission’s 2008 
Draft Aquifer Articles (DAA) until 20146. The delay in establishing a UN7 based 
legal arbitrative framework appears to have come from the perception that:  
 
‘it would pose a threat to certain countries’ national interests to 
develop or utilise their water resources and so, in and of themselves, 
these instruments cannot and should not be used as a universal 
motivation for transboundary cooperation’ (DFID 2010:14)  
 
                                                 
3
 Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia (DWA 
2013:31;32) 
4
 Designated IWRM-WE so as to obtain additional funding for water efficiency measures (see 
Chapter Six) 
5
 As at January 2014, there were 33 signatories and 35 were needed. Botswana supported the 
1997 Convention vote at the UN but has not yet become a signatory to the convention. The only 
SADC state signatories are South Africa and Namibia. 
6
 These can be accessed from  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2008/2008report.htm  
7
 The weakness of the umbrella body UN Water has been explored (Baumgartner 2013) 
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‘River basins and watersheds ...encompass different political entities. This 
aspect of IWRM often presents the greatest difficulty ‘(Gregg 2008:289). 
However it has been proposed that the SADC Protocol on Shared Water 
Courses (2003) does provide an incipient water law framework (Van de Zaag 
2009).The validity of this commentary is reflected in the difficult progress on 
TBW sharing in Southern Africa and its deleterious impact on water planning in 
Botswana as outlined in Chapter Five. 
 
Water scarcity 
 
Definitions of water scarcity can be made firstly, on a hydrologically quantitative 
basis, and secondly, on a social basis of how much is needed against a 
socially- constructed demand.The hydrological definition covers both surface 
water and groundwater. The hydrological database for groundwater for Africa 
has been summarised by the British Geological Survey (Macdonald 2012). 
However, the Researcher reflects that the summary is based on low levels of 
data; in the case of Botswana, the questionable data is from 1987 (KII).The 
need for a ‘data revolution’ is recognised (UN 2013:23).There is a lack of 
knowledge on groundwater in SSA (Brawne and Xu 2010:236)8.There has been 
a call for better metrics on water to deal with ‘data difficulties’ (Mason and 
Calow 2012:31). This concern at the lack of data on volume and quality and its 
usage is reflected in KI interviews throughout this thesis. The surface water 
availability is known, but, in the case of Southern Africa, severely constrained: 
the basins of the Orange-Senqu River and the Limpopo River are seen as 
‘closed’ with all the water allocated (Falkenmark 2008; Turton 2008), and those 
of the Okavango River and Zambezi subject to International Agreements. 
The potential impact of climate change on water availability could add to the 
existing variability in Southern Africa arising from a continuing cycle of severe 
droughts (Hulme 1996).This is explored in Chapter Six. The management of 
drought relief for the poor can be contrasted in the approach of Botswana 
(Munemo 2012), compared to the lack of action in other SSA countries (Bailey 
2013). Hydrological water scarcity could be seen as being ameliorated by the 
                                                 
8
 The data base at http://ebmtoolsdatabase.org/tool/waterworld accessed 12th February 2014 
does not include groundwater 
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concept of ‘Virtual Water’. This provides a basis for trade movements of high 
intensity water utilising products from water rich to water poor countries and, as 
a concept, has enabled a discourse analysis both on policies to deal with water 
scarcity and the value of water (Allen 2011; Hoekstra 2005; Earle 2001). 
Botswana uses this concept to prioritise non-agricultural uses of water for 
economic benefit, as will be seen in Section 2.3.3. 
 
On the second definition of social water scarcity,  
 
‘whether or not water is scarce, depends on such varied factors such 
as population and distribution, sanitary habits, water distribution 
systems and customary leisure and amenity uses: scarcity is 
dependent on the “hydro-social”, in addition to the hydrological, 
cycle.’ (Bakker 2003: 29) 
 
In the case of Botswana, this is further explored later in this Chapter (Section 
2.3.4) and in Chapter Six with responses of KIs and FGs. Social scarcity of 
water has led to debate on the universal right to water (Rouse 2013; Gleick 
1998) and the shortfall against the achievement of that right has been 
measured by water poverty indices (Sullivan and Meigh 2006). Water poverty 
can be seen from the unavailability of affordable potable water for human 
consumption (Sullivan 2002) but, despite this, there has been a strong drive for 
a transactional cost approach (Saleth 2005). 
 
Lack of affordable access to water for sustainable livelihoods through 
subsistence agriculture directly impacts on poverty (Kemp-Benedict et al 2011). 
Water productivity on the Limpopo is low where water rights are restricted (ibid). 
This is explored in Chapter Five and again in Chapter Nine in demonstrating the 
impact of the Botswana water reforms on the rural (and urban) poor, both at the 
cattle posts and in the potential expansion of horticulture by the poor on their 
owned masimo9. 
 
                                                 
9
 Botswanan word for the land, originally tribally allocated, now Land Board allocated to every 
Motswana (Botswana citizen) 
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However, effective management of hydrological and social water scarcity may 
not always be pro-poor (Franks and Cleaver 2005). Water has been subsidized 
as a public good in many countries, including Botswana (Chapter Nine). Water 
regulation has explicitly incorporated various social policy goals such as income 
redistribution, employment generation and regional equalisation (OECD 1999), 
but the application of the principle of economic equity is undermining this 
practice in most industrialised countries (ibid). There is a view that this pricing of 
water is part of the adoption of a neo-liberalist philosophy towards Water and 
Sanitation Services (WSS) with ‘a shift in the policy goal towards one of 
efficiency maximisation and its corollary, new classically defined economics’ 
(Bakker 2003: 128). The European Citizens Initiative in 2013 responded that 
‘Governments have to implement these rights [to water] not leave these 
services [and pricing] to market forces’10.  
 
Social scarcity of water can be overcome through cash income. In the urban 
areas of five out of eight developing countries11, 70 percent or more of the 
households with daily per capita expenditures of $6–$10 have tap water, 
whereas, for the extremely poor, the share is below 50 percent in all countries 
but two (Table 2.2). The same pattern holds for latrines; the share of those who 
have one among urban households with daily per capita expenditures of $6–
$10 is above 80 percent in seven of the eight countries. Rural areas show 
similar patterns (Banerjee and Duflo 2008: 5). Any pro-poor policy needs to 
ensure this bias is removed. The current delivery of WSS in Botswana is 
skewed towards the urban elites (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). The impact of water 
reforms on the poor is explored in Chapter Eight. 
 
The removal of this cash income barrier to WSS was started by the recognition 
of the right to affordable water for all, which was voted for at the United Nations  
                                                 
10
 Available at http://www.right2water.eu/faq#why accessed 2
nd
 July 2013 
 
11
Taken from a sample utilising data from a range of countries including Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
South Africa, Tanzania, and East Timor, quoted in Banerjee A and E. Duflo What is Middle 
Class about the Middle Classes around the World? J Econ Perspective. 2008; 22(2): 3–28. 
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Table 2.2  Per cent of people with access to tap water (weighted average in 
eight developing countries) (Source: Banerjee and Duflo 2008:21) 
 
 
General Assembly (UNGA) in July 201012. The Assembly’s resolution 
recognized the fundamental right to clean water and improved sanitation 
(WSS), but did not specify that the right entailed legally binding obligations; this 
was expanded and endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in 
October 2010. There, ‘the right to water and sanitation [was stated as] a human 
right, equal to all other human rights, which implies that it is justifiable and 
enforceable’13. On a visit to Namibia in July 2011, the UN HRC Rapporteur on 
water defined the right to water as not being a right to free water.  She stated 
‘affordable WSS [are] not the same as free of charge, but it means that systems 
must be in place to ensure access for those who face economic barriers to 
access’14. There is a tension between the right to water and water pricing for 
pro- poor WRM policies; ‘striking a sustainable balance between treating water 
as an economic good and maintaining affordability for the people is a key 
                                                 
12
 Botswana abstained in both votes at the UNGA July 2010 and  at the HRC of October 2010, 
yet these votes were taken into account in the landmark GOB High Court judgement on the 
Basarwa ‘right to water’ in January 2011 (See Chapter Nine). 
 
13
 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36308 
 
14
 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11223&LangID=E 
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challenge for developing countries’ (Gunawansa and Hoque 2012:19). This 
tension in Botswana water policy will be explored in Chapter Nine.  
 
There has been a move across Africa to establish national central government 
appointed regulators of WSS to reflect the economic value of water and to price 
in the ongoing costs of water resources to all in-country consumers. This has 
led to the establishment of the African Forum for Utility Regulators (AFUR), with 
South Africa being a driving force15. This concept particularly sees the 
regulation of WSS being alongside that for electricity, but in a developed 
country, for example, the UK, there have been concerns at water being treated 
in the same way as other utilities: ‘the British model of regulation [needs] careful 
scrutiny’ (Bakker 2003:187). The UK water privatisation purported to show that 
it is possible to price to get full cost recovery of both infrastructure and 
environmental impacts as has been done with other utilities, such as energy 
and telecommunications and that this could be done with very little political input 
(ibid). The 2012 review of the work of the Office of Water Regulation (OFWAT) 
in the UK showed the limits of such an approach; a KI relates that OFWAT has 
recently taken part in UN meetings to discuss the active involvement of WSS 
regulators to deliver pro-poor policies. The WSS regulator, where instituted, as 
potentially in Botswana, could follow the lead of regulators in Ghana and 
Zambia in delivering pro poor policies: ‘however, the extent to which benefits for 
vulnerable members of society can be realized depends on regulators 
themselves recognizing and addressing the realities faced by the poor’ (Gerlach 
2010:1238). This potential to help the poor in Botswana is explored in Chapters 
Seven and Nine.  
 
Formal regulation of water could be seen as a way to guard scarce water 
resources and to avoid the ‘tragedy of the commons’ based on overuse or 
exhaustion of water resources available under open free access in tribal areas 
under customary laws (Hardin 1968:1246). This has been challenged by those 
who see local community management as better than state regulation, or 
private ownership, at distributing water fairly, and sustaining water resources 
                                                 
15
 The most recent bulletin notes the reports the annual meetings in SA in 2012 and in Tanzania 
in 2013: http://www.afurnet.org/attachments/article/91/AFUR-2012-Bulletin-ENGLISH.pdf 
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(Ostrom 2012:1990). Water security within the State needs to be measured 
against the two gauges of equity and sufficiency (Lankford 2013c). Can 
regulation achieve this? Is much of what passes as ‘scarcity’, a ‘policy induced 
consequence of the mismanagement of water resources’ (UNDP 2006:133)? 
Can policies be improved by either centralisation or decentralisation?  
 
Centralisation and decentralisation of WRM and the delivery of WSS 
 
The Researcher perceives that the current policy paradigm for WRM lies with a 
decentralised model, with local government taking responsibility 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2011; Estache and Humplick 1995). This has been 
further de-centralised to one of Community Based Water Resource 
Management (CBWRM) (Day 2011) and International Aid Agencies have 
supported this approach to delivering WSS. IWRM in developing countries with 
low institutional capacity could best be seen as working through local solutions 
by local decision-makers and local politicians (Kooy and Harris 2012). 
Centralised governance systems for WRM, as seen in the UK, have not been 
the norm in SSA. A lack of governmental institutional capacity can lead to a 
‘regulatory personality’ of  WRM fitted to the local requirements, as in East 
Africa (Hepworth 2009), and IWRM, with its emphasis on organised watershed 
management with engineering capacity, may not be the way forward (ibid). 
 
‘Polycentric systems’ with appropriate levels of central and local institutional 
responsibility for the same resource have been proposed (Ostrom 2012:82). 
The continued importance of decentralised traditional authorities continues to 
be emphasised (Logan 2013). The lack of central government and private 
sector capacity to deliver WSS can mean poor delivery and bottom up evolution 
can be better than ‘a delusory top down attempt to leap to institutional 
perfection’ (Easterly 2008:99). It is thought that planning for drought relief is 
best done in a decentralised process (Bailey 2013:81).But the state must 
ensure that local providers are ‘part of a single coherent system’ for WSS 
(Green 2012:40). It is said that decentralisation has not ‘yet been achieved’ in 
South Africa and that is a reason for the poor level of WSS there (Muller 
2010b:152). The recent analysis of the barriers to rural water supply in 
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Tanzania describes a ‘power struggle around decentralisation between local 
and central government’ (Tilley 2013:8). There, WSS are delivered by default by 
INGO supported Community Owned Water Supply Organisations (COWSO), 
not accountable to or supported by either district or central government (ibid).  
A key reason put forward for support of decentralisation has been the potential 
for greater participatory decision-making. Recent WB literature review appears 
to suggest that participation has often been elite based, with little involvement of 
the poor (Mansuri and Rao 2012:221). It has been suggested that democratic 
decentralisation can lead to ‘decentralised despotism’ (Van der Zaag and 
Bolding 2005:2). CBNRM institutions, it could be argued, are needed to enable 
national policies for resource governance (ibid: 181) but at what point does the 
conceptual adherence to participative decentralisation, because of the 
inevitable central ‘Government failure’, cease to be the reason for not following 
the European centralised model for WRM? (ibid: 52). China, it is proposed, has 
benefited in delivering WRM by having no stakeholder participation in decision-
making (Giordano and Shah 2013:9). 
 
The implementation of IWRM has been seen as requiring ‘more centralized 
policy development and implementation and thus, larger, slower, and more 
bureaucratic authorities to handle all policy aspects’ (Pahl-Wostl 2007:11). A 
movement towards the centralisation of WRM occurred in Europe. ‘As water 
needs moved from small scale to large scale industrial requirements, there has 
been a parallel movement move from community control [to the state]’ (Bakker 
2003:44). Long horizon rent centralisation as opposed to the inefficiency of 
short term rent decentralisation, can lead to strong economic performance of 
the state (Kelsall 2013:19).The need for Central Government coordination has 
recently been emphasised(UNWATER 2014).  
 
Within the processes of centralisation and decentralisation is the issue of   
accountability of the delivery institution. The case of Zimbabwe serves to 
exemplify this. There, a move from local government institutions to a single 
Government owned parastatal, the Zimbabwe Independent Water Authority 
(ZIMWA) failed and had to be reversed (Nyandoro 2012). The moves to the 
centralisation of WRM in Zimbabwe could be related to the country’s ‘decline in 
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democratic governance between 1980 and 2009’ (ibid: 20). It has been said that 
there is an ‘undeniable necessity of [central] government responsibility for water 
supply’ (Bakker 2013:188). The increasing vulnerability to hydraulically water 
scarcity has been identified in the USA (Shi et al 2013). This was discussed at 
the American Water Summit in November 2013, attended by the Researcher, 
and seen as being difficult to solve due to the highly fragmented nature of 
beloved locally elected water utilities, many unwilling to merge or cooperate. 
‘There are more water utlities in the USA than branches of McDonald 
Restaurants. The US Government has removed itself from respomsibility for 
WRM (beyond a limited water quality residual interest) (KIs USA). 
 
The analysis of the literature and positionality16 of the Researcher leads him to 
believe that politicians have the ability to deliver both WRM and WSS but often 
do not do so.  The rationale for first decentralisation and now centralisation of 
WRM and WSS in Botswana is explored in Chapters Five and Eight.  
 
The drivers of change for WRM and WSS 
 
The drivers of change on WRM and the delivery of WSS were identified by 
Cosgrove and Cosgrove (2012) to consist of ten17: agriculture*, climate change 
and variability, demography, economy and security*, ethics, society and culture 
(includes questions of equity)*, governance and institutions (including the right 
to water)*, infrastructure, politics*, technology* and water resources, including 
groundwater and ecosystems (Cosgrove and Cosgrove 2012:6). These drivers 
need to be examined, particularly that of ‘politics’. The Delphi approach adopted 
in the Cosgrove report commented on the ‘politics’ driver as being the ‘lack of 
coordination and of a mutually agreed water strategy at the national, regional 
and local levels, result[ing] in ineffective community participation and lack of 
[their] influence in decision-making’ (Cosgrove and Cosgrove 2012: Annex One: 
59). The low estimates of successful outcomes for access to WSS by 2030 
showed that, in the view of the author, the conceptual approach of IWRM and 
                                                 
16
 This is explored further in Section 4.3 
17
 The asterisked drivers were seen as more important by the Cosgroves 
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CBRM so far adopted as a solution to the problem, was not going to be 
successful in overcoming a lack of a political drive for change (ibid). 
In SSA there is seen to be ‘a widespread lack of ground water data’ with half the 
21 countries reached through a survey in West and Southern Africa in 2007 as 
having ‘no national ground water data base at all or have only fragmented 
ground water data that resides in various organizations’ (Braune and Xi 2010: 
236). The paper goes on to comment that ground water information services are 
‘in many African countries virtually nonexistent’ (ibid). Recharge is inadequately 
studied (ibid: 232) and there is limited knowledge of the agricultural use of 
groundwater (ibid: 236). Given the dependence of rural water consumers on 
groundwater availability, it may explain the the low ambition for WSS contained 
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Vision 2027 (SADC 
2012a:7). There the target for water access is to move from 61% of the 260m 
SADC population in 2012 to 75% of the 350m in 2027; the targets for sanitation 
[undefined] are 39% in 2012 and 75% in 2027. There is no plan to deliver WSS 
to 100% of the people. There appears to be a wish in SADC planning to exploit 
more surface and groundwater but no commitment to measure the availability 
(ibid). 
 
It should be noted that the accuracy of the UN statistical base for WSS 
provision has been questioned (Sattersthwaite 2013; 2000). The figures are 
filled in by the government respondents and often have no hard data surveys to 
back them up (ibid). It is suggested that the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) 
figures (UNICEF/WHO 2012) which are used to pronounce the success of 
access to water are flawed. A KI from the JMP confirmed the very low level of 
finance, and thus surveying, that is available to verify the claims of respondent 
governments. 
 
The achievement on WRM and WSS has further been ‘held back by bad advice, 
Northern arm-twisting and self interest and in some cases by public attitudes 
and beliefs’ (Green 2012:39). WSS policies, so as to be implemented for all, 
has been said to require ‘improvements ...in three aspects of water governance 
and management, namely, legislation, implementation, and financing 
(Guwanasa and Hoque 2012:28). A survey of 40 African countries carried out 
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by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) for the African 
Ministers Committee on Water (AMCOW) demonstrated that they are not 
constrained in the main by a lack of money to implement WSS reforms 
(AMCOW 2012). The key constraints are around political and legal barriers and 
a lack of interest from the governments surveyed (outside the water 
ministries)18. This is important in understanding the position in Botswana and 
will be explored in Chapter Six looking at the drivers for change in WRM. 
The literature on water scarcity, both hydrological and social, has provided 
reasoning for institutional structures to deliver changes in WRM. The emphasis 
on the concept of IWRM perfection has been difficult to achieve, and success 
has come from the more pragmatic state-based political IWRM (Muller 2011; 
Allan 2003), while noting the transboundary initiatiatives in SADC (Van der 
Zaag 2009). This has led to a move to more centralised nation state regulation 
of WRM, but political constraints could still hold back the delivery of WSS 
(Cosgrove 2012). The ‘politics of service delivery’ has contributed to the 
restriction of the completion of continuously provided water reticulation to all, so 
as to provide the continuation of the power of patronage in both local and 
national elections (Harris and Wild 2013; Khemani 2013). 
 
This literature review now explores the particular potential constraints 
expressed in the literature and from Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) on 
developing a water policy in Botswana and redefining its delivery architecture 
for WRM and WSS. 
 
2.3 The context for WRM and WSS in Botswana 
 
Botswana has gone through several periods within which policy on WRM and 
WSS has evolved. The key events are described in Table 2.3 and provide the 
introduction to this section.
                                                 
18
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/aug/30/water-sanitation-priorities-african-
governments?INTCMP=SRCH “only 18 out of 40 felt constrained on WSS by lack of finance”. 
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 1960-9 1970-9 1980-9 1990-9 2000-2014 
Water Events 1968 Water Act 
1968 Water 
Apportionment 
Act 
1970 Act 
establishing 
WUC 
1982 start of 
negotiations on 
ORASECOM & 
LIMCOM (2000; 
reviewed 2007-
11) water-
sharing 
agreements 
1991 NWMP 
1994 (2001) SADC Water 
Protocols/Negotiations 
start on OKACOM and 
ZAMCOM 
 
2006 NWMPR 
2007-10 World 
Bk. Consultancy 
2009-14 
Implementation of 
water reform 
Presidential 
Terms 
Seretse Khama 
1966-1980 
 Quett Masire 
1980-1998 
 
 
Festus Mogae 1998-2008 
 
 
 
 
Ian Khama 2008- 
Income per 
Capita (US$) 
(source: 
Africa 
Monitor 2012) 
$80 (1966)    $8,277 (2011) 
Key Events 1966 
Independence 
from UK 
1970 
Discovery of 
Diamonds 
1976 
Establishment 
of DEBSWANA 
1980-92 
Establishment 
of SADCC in 
Gaborone 
1980-92 
Botswana as 
‘Front Line 
State’ opposing 
apartheid  
1992- 
Foundation and 
Establishment of SADC in 
Gaborone, Botswana 
2008 Ibrahim 
Prize for Mogae 
2008 World Bank 
Loan 
2007-13 
Botswana Budget 
Deficit 
Table 2.3 Botswana Policy Timelines 1960-2010     (Source: the Researcher)
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Botswana is a landlocked country in southern Africa bordered by Namibia to the 
West and North, Zambia and Zimbabwe to the Northeast, and South Africa to 
the South East and South. It occupies an area of approximately 582,000 sq km. 
Botswana is similar in size to France or Kenya. The majority of its people live on 
the eastern corridor of the country, where the soil is more conducive to 
agriculture and there are access routes through to Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. This is shown in detail in Figure 2.1 with the main fieldwork 
location of Kgatleng District arrowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
        Kgatleng District 
Figure 2.1 Political Map of Botswana  (Source: www.nationsonline.org) 
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Climate and water availability of Botswana 
 
Botswana’s climate is arid to semi-arid (GOB 2006c:3). The high summer of 
November to March with temperatures in excess of 40°C is countered by the 
winter of June to August when the temperature can go below 0oC. Rainfall is 
variable and there are periodic droughts, which have been mapped for the last 
150 years (The Botswana Society 1979). Between 2007 and 2011, there has 
been increasing rainfall, and during 2012-14, a drought.  Annual rainfall varies 
from 300 mm to 650 mm from the south to the north of the country, as is shown 
in the Isohyet map of Botswana in Figure 6.2. 
 
36% of the water used in Botswana originates from surface water and of this, 
85% is from allocations from the four transboundary rivers that surround 
Botswana: the Okavango River (North), Zambezi River (North-east), the 
Limpopo (East and West) and the Orange-Senqu River (South) (GOB 2006c:1) 
shown in Figure 2.2. These are subject to the South African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol on Shared Water Courses (2002, 1997) and from 
the river water commissions set up under the protocol (see Chapter Five). 
Botswana is one of only 6 countries where over 75% of the surface water 
comes from outside its territorial boundaries (UNDP 2006:210). The country’s 
average annual runoff is very low at 1.2 mm ranging from zero in the West and 
Central Botswana, to over 50 mm per annum in the North. This average annual 
runoff implies a total annual run-off of 696 million m3 but only a small portion of 
the runoff can be captured owing to the lack of suitable dam sites, high 
variability of runoff over time and high evaporation rates. ‘Evaporation in the 
reservoirs exceeds consumption and global climate change is expected to 
increase evaporation losses’ (Arntzen 2006:16). 
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Figure 2.2 The rivers of Botswana    Source: DWA 2013:36 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The Groundwater Map for Botswana and surrounding countries19 
 
                                                 
19
 Available from 
http://www.whymap.org/whymap/EN/Downloads/Continental_maps/gwrm_africa_pdf.pdf?__blo
b=publicationFile&v=2 accessed February 1
st
 2013 
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Some 64% of the water needs of the country are fulfilled from groundwater. 
‘Western Botswana has virtually no [surface] water sources and relies on 
groundwater [which is] also limited in most parts of the country’ (Arntzen 
2006:15). Botswana's total groundwater resources (including saline) are 
estimated at around 100 billion m3 with a low average annual recharge of 1.6 
billion m3 (ibid) and ‘minimal recharge (<1mm/a) over much of central and SW 
Botswana’ (Mokokwe 2003:15). The data is limited but depicted in Figure 2.3. 
The climate data of Botswana will be further explored in Chapter Six.  
 
The social and political structures that impact on the WRM policy process 
 
The tribal structures in Botswana are largely homogeneous. The Basarwa, also 
known as the San, the indigenous tribe of Botswana, number under 10,000 out 
of a total population of two million (BIS 2012). The eight Tswana tribes that form 
over 85% of the population (ibid), moved into Botswana from modern-day South 
Africa in the early to mid-nineteenth century.The Bakgatla Tribe moved into 
what is now Kgatleng District (S.E. Botswana), which is the main area of study 
for this thesis. They came to Botswana from Transvaal in South Africa from the 
1800s (Matemba 2003:56). The incoming Tswana took the indigenous Basarwa 
as labourers within a cattle-based economy with the latter being the cattle 
keepers or ‘boys’. Wars between the Tswana and the Boers of South Africa, 
with the successful seizure of cattle by the Tswana, led to significant increases 
in the national herd. From this came problems of their watering (Morton 2009). 
Because of the wars, unlike elsewhere in Southern Africa, there were few white 
settlers.  
 
Only 3% of the land of Botswana is freehold and available for sale to non-
Batswana, but it is located in towns and farmland near rivers, such as the Tuli 
Block alongside the Limpopo River (Hillborn 2012). Post colonial debates about 
riparian water rights for white farmers, which impact on water reforms in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia do not feature in Botswana. 
The continuance of tribal institutions alongside the introduction of democratic 
institutions has been seen as key to Botswana’s success. The Tswana were not 
unique in Africa in having institutions like this, but they were unique in the extent 
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the institutions survived the colonial period largely unscathed. ‘British rule had 
been all but absent. The new structures of Independence were not meant to 
expunge the indigenous institutions but to build on them ...new kgotlas 
[community or tribal meeting places] were planned’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012:411). Their interplay, with the critical juncture that independence from 
colonial rule created, could be said to have laid the foundations of Botswana's 
economic and political success on WSS.There is a view that the almost unique 
success of post Independence Botswana in Sub-Sahara Africa is a result of this 
combination of the traditional with the modern institutions with ‘the historical 
development of institutions in Botswana and the contingent factors [being] built 
on rather than overthrown or distorted as they were elsewhere in Africa’ 
(Acemoglu and Robinson  2012:117,404; Guldbrandsen 2012:5). This view will 
be further explored in Chapter Five and Section 7.1. However, a contrary view 
can be sustained of the success of Botswana on WSS resulting from a strong 
centralisation of power. Control over all land and natural resources, including 
water, was taken from the tribal chiefs and became vested in the State through 
the Tribal Lands Acts of 1968 and 1993, and the Water Act 1968, with water 
rights being allocated by a national Water Apportionment Board (WAB) and land 
allocated by a District Land Board (DLB) (HABITAT 2010). Thus water (and 
land) became a national resource, as did the diamonds that funded the 
development of Botswana (Poteete 2009). 
 
The new institutional framework for water allocation came from the post-1966 
Independence structure of elected central government institutions, echoing the 
UK Westminster model. Thus, the President combined the powers of Head of 
State and Prime Minister and was, and is, elected from the National Assembly 
by the majority of Members of Parliament. The President at all times has to 
have majority support in the National Assembly to remain in office. If he/she lost 
a vote of confidence, a General Election would have to be called. This differs 
from elsewhere in Commonwealth Africa where there are no such checks and 
balances. The directly elected presidential process in Namibia was seen by 
Good (2008) as preferable in obtaining a mandate from the people for a five 
year term, and thus accountable directly to them. Parliamentary accountability is 
seen as a poor second best, despite the fact that the Botswana President could 
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be thrown out at any time. A more nuanced view is that Botswana decision-
making takes place through ‘broad consultation and consensus building in a 
system described by the country’s leading human rights activist as “gentle 
authoritarianism”’(Green 2012:159). 
 
Commentators have seen an elite coalition across Botswana society, driving a 
modernising consensus since 1966 on the use of natural resources, including 
water.  
 
‘The political system is dominated by, and policy is set, in the interest 
of a coalition of wealthy well-educated cattle owning political elites 
who are committed to rapid economic growth in the framework of a 
largely free enterprise system. This coalition of traditional leaders, 
teachers, junior state functionaries, and wealthy farmers were joined 
by more senior administrators beginning in the 1970s.’  
 (Picard 1987:147)  
 
This insight by Picard, while over 20 years ago, still has validity from the 
fieldwork for this thesis. It can explain the decision group that decides on policy 
in Botswana; the Presidential leadership of this grouping or coalition, is 
criticised as militaristic and dictatorial by Good (2012, 2011, 2009, 2008), but is 
lauded by others, as the key to the Botswana’s economic success (Kelsall 
2013:26; Sebubudu and Molutsi 2011, 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
It has been argued that the success of Botswana as a ‘strong and effective 
state’ relates to a strong well-educated bureaucracy, largely expatriate, that 
remained in Botswana after Independence (Eriksen 2011:445). There is support 
for the concept of Botswana being the African example of successful 
development by becoming a ‘developmental state’20 (Routley 2014:164; 
Leftwich 1995:405). This has been supported by Taylor (2012) but there is a 
view that the success of Botswana comes because it is a ‘development-oriented 
gate-keeping state’ (Hillborn 2012), concentrating on the successful economic 
                                                 
20
 The developmental state model is seen as having six components: a determined 
developmental state elite, relative autonomy, a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy, 
a weak and subordinated civil society, the effective management of non–state economic 
interests and legitimacy and performance (Leftwich 1995:405) 
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strategies of the GOB, without as yet the full development of a broad-based 
employment creating state. It could be seen as a ‘competent state’ (ibid) driven 
by very powerful elite with a highly competent civil service. When change was 
perceived to be needed, the state apparatus delivered. It is in this context of 
policy making and delivery that the water reforms post-2009 were conceived. 
Understanding how the decision making process played out is the objective of 
this thesis. 
 
Economic structures that utilise Water Resources 
 
The economic development of Botswana has been dependent on both the wise 
use of water and its diamond resources.The data on water availability and use 
is analysed in Chapter Five, but it is important to note here the water based 
origins of the pre-Independence economy based on cattle, and post-
Independence based on diamomd mining. Each of the three bases of Botswana 
life, namely, in the village, masimo and moraka (cattlepost), brings new 
demands on water resources and complex governance structures. This is 
explored in Section 9.3. The cultural lifestyle of the Batswana21, is set around 
the role of the cattle that could be drawn down by slaughtering for use at key 
events such as weddings or funerals. The one to five million22 cattle have been 
both a cultural necessity23 (to establish status and wealth in the tribe) and also 
the main entry point into the post-Independence cash economy. Botswana’s 
wealth in 1966 was its cattle and it was also the basis of subsistence livelihoods 
of that time. This generated relatively high utilisation of water resources in 
Botswana for cattle drinking, which remains, with the support of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA), in small dam construction and boreholes (FAO 2005). The 
cyclical extreme droughts of Southern Africa have seen wide fluctuations in 
numbers of cattle as surface water resources and fodder became scarce. The 
use of groundwater, through the widespread use of boreholes across the 
                                                 
21
 Batswana is the plural for Botswana citizen; Motswana is the singular. 
22
 The variance in numbers 1966-2012 was related to the incidence of droughts during the 
period. 
23
 In 1985, total households owning cattle were 43.4% (23.2% in urban and 57.5% rural) and in 
2003 still 37.5% (urban 24.9% & rural 46.2%) (Statistics Botswana 2012:23) 
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country, has ameliorated the impact of the droughts (ibid). Data on the 
availability of groundwater is however sparse (KII). 
 
The discovery of diamonds in 1967 led to the establishment of DEBSWANA, a 
joint venture between the GOB and De Beers PLC24, with 86% of the income 
coming to the GOB. The resource curse seen elsewhere, such as in Nigeria, did 
not occur in Botswana. This is seen by some as the result of good governance 
structures (Fusu 2011). ‘Rational choices were made [that] the scarce resource 
of water would be shared between mining/energy and the settlements, with 
smaller proportions going to livestock and irrigation’ (Toteng 2008: Table 1). But 
no detailed data of the use of water for mining is available, only estimates 
(Statistics Botswana 2012). 
 
Botswana is perceived to have gained by importing products from water rich 
countries (Dabrowski 2009). Analysis of virtual water trade movements shows 
Botswana as a high user of virtual water for imported goods, largely from South 
Africa (SA) (Earle 2001:33). This has led to a low level of commercial 
horticulture in Botswana, a trend maintained by SA food retailers expanding in 
Botswana (Dabrowski 2009). Export of virtual water from Botswana comes in 
beef exports, as cattle drink up to 60L per animal per day25, normally sourced 
from groundwater piped to cattle posts. It has been suggested that ‘on 
rangeland, [such as that in Botswana] more than 200,000 litres of water are 
needed to produce 1Kg of beef... and production quality is low under such arid 
conditions’ (Pimentel 1997:100). However, it has been pointed out that such 
consumption by cattle amounts to under 1% of the Botswana estimated 
groundwater each year (KII Lankford 2013). Together with the utilisation of 
fodder from ground cover, this could be seen as a sustainable economic use of 
available water. The Researcher remains concerned about the lack of data on 
available groundwater and that with the reduction of surface water resulting 
                                                 
24
 From 2012, a subsidiary of Anglo American PLC, but the GOB/De Beers BOTSWANA 
arrangements remain. 
25
 Stated by KI I6, 18th October 2010. The water need for fodder growth is in addition. Cattle 
kept in feedlots used fodder brought in from SA, an additional virtual water transfer. 
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from climate change, the cattle consumption26 may be using up a largely 
unrecharged limited aquifer resource (see Chapter 6.2.2). 
 
In addition, there is the hidden virtual water transfer from the export of 
diamonds, as dewatering (leading to evaporation of the extracted groundwater) 
is required prior to extraction of the stones, and the ground level process 
requires significant volumes of water. The hydro mission of ‘industrial modernity’ 
in support of use of water for mining was accepted as paramount (Allan 2003; 
GOB 1992). Up to 40% of the water use in Botswana was from the mining 
operations but, with significant policy change in the post 2000 period, this 
consumption figure is being reduced (de Beers 2011; Brook 2009). But these 
figures still do not include the water loss coming from dewatering. The 
difficulties arising from the lack of defendable water metrics is explored in 
Chapter Five. 
 
The 2013 IMF forecast per capita income in Botswana is $11,06627.  
 
‘[The] longer-term current account outlook was seen as rosy, with 
a comfortable surplus likely to be maintained to the end of [the] 
forecast period in 2021, driven by high demand from Asia, 
Botswana will ramp up coal, copper and uranium exports.’ 
(African Monitor Southern Africa July 2012:2) 
 
Botswana is a ‘free market economy that does everything by planning’ (Green 
2012:159). The plan for extractive industries’ expansion will be dependent on 
increased use of groundwater, and surface water brought from NW Botswana 
by pipeline (the N-S Carriers alongside the Francistown to Gaborone main 
road). All the mining initiatives proposed would lead to significant additional 
demand for water (Grynberg 2012:20). They would increase the vulnerability of 
the groundwater to pollution (Mokokwe 2003:16). Water availability is the 
                                                 
26
 Estimated to be 85% for cultutral non-econoimic use  from Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and 
Botswana Meat Commissin figures KII i 4) 
27
 IMF World Economic Outlook 2012 quoted in Mmegi 19
th
 April 2013:B3 and at 
http://www.econsult.co.bw/tempex/Econsult%20Review%202013%202nd%20quarter%20final.p
df accessed 22
nd
 July 2013 
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‘constraint’28 on the future sustainable economic development of Botswana 
(Van der Zaag 2009:246). 
 
The unknown water availability position in Botswana   
 
Before the post Independence water reforms, Batswana always saw 
themselves constrained by the lack of water. There was a deep belief in water 
as the mystical bedrock within the Batswana psyche (Tsuaneng 2010). The 
ability of the Tswana chief in initiating rain for the tribe, both through his own 
skill and that of his rainmaker was therefore crucial to his power (Schapera 
1943). The white missionaries sought to prove their superior knowledge of 
nature by importing European concepts of dams, water harvesting and sand 
wells to collect and store the scarce water. But the Chiefs, while ostensibly 
converting to Christianity, still maintained their primacy, as far as the Batswana 
were concerned, in the delivery of rain (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:130; 
Schapera 1970:125). This is further explored in Chapters Five and Seven.  
In 1966, Botswana planned to provide potable water to all Batswana. Rapid 
population growth was seen as the main driver of change in WRM in Botswana 
(Vorosmarty et al 2000; Falkenmark 1990). At the time of Independence, in 
1966, the population was only 400,000 and is now 2,038,228 (BIS 2012). The 
impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on population growth from early 1990s has 
slowed this29, but even so, Gaborone has grown from 9,000 in 1966 to 350,000 
in 2008. The water for Gaborone comes largely from the Molatedi Dam in South 
Africa as the main share of the transboundary Limpopo River.  
 
Botswana obtains the majority of its surface water through transboundary river 
allocations30 and is subject to the ‘benevolent’ but real hegemonic powers in 
each international river basin (Van der Zaag 2009:256; Allan 2009) and the 
detail of this is explored in Chapter Five. Botswana is thus security-dependent 
on the use of the limited amounts of in-country surface water and its aquifers. 
                                                 
28
 ‘Shortage of water in the south  ...holding  back growth’ (Econsult Economic Review, 
December 2013)  
29
 The universal free provision of anti-retrovirals from 2008 onwards has led to normal Western 
life lengths becoming the norm resulting in a speeding up again of population growth. 
 
30
 ORASECOM, LIMCOM, OKACOM and ZAMCOM.  
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The GOB planned, in the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) (GOB 
1992) and the National Water Management Plan Review (NWMPR) (GOB 
2006c), on a fall back WRM approach with dams and with North–South Carrier 
(NSC) pipelines, ultimately from the Shashe River, delivering water to the 
densely populated areas to the South East. The GOB key water reforms were 
based on unknown water availability within its land-based political boundaries, 
rather than an insecure dependence on known surface water sharing from the 
transboundary rivers that form much of those political borders (Sitorus 2008:18).  
 
The management of relief from the recurrent droughts by cash transfers, now 
planned within the institutions of the National Development Plans (NDPs) from 
1991, has provided a safety net for both urban and rural Batswana (Monemo 
2012). In recognising that the remaining water resources were largely 
unquantified, President Khama hosted world leaders in 2012 and signed the 
Gaborone Declaration on the sustainable conservation of water and other 
natural resources of Africa31. Future constraints on the economy of Botswana 
are coming from the inadequacy of existing policies on WRM (GOB 2006c).  
The UN JWP Statistics for WSS are, in all countries, subject to question 
(Satterthwaite 2013, 2000). Botswana has good social survey records; these 
are shown in Table 2.4 on Access to Drinking Sources, and Table 2.5 on Use of 
Sanitation Facilities. Access to potable water in the urban areas has officially 
reached 99-100% (UNICEF 2012). The percentage having potable water piped 
inside the house or plot, has moved from 23% (1990) to 66% (2010), but rural 
levels of piping to inside the house/plot are still only 36%32 in 2010 compared to 
85% in urban areas. Rural dependence on local surface water for drinking has 
reduced from 9% (1990) to 4% (2010). 22% more of the population have gained 
access to potable water 1995-2010 (ibid). Access to sanitation (Table 2.5) has 
lagged severely, with only 75% (urban) and 41% (rural) having access to all 
forms of improved sanitation (UNCEF 2012). Open defecation (OD) nationally 
has reduced from 24% (1990) to 15% (2010) and in urban areas to 1% (2010) 
from 12% in 1990. However, in the rural areas, OD has only reduced from 53% 
                                                 
31
 http://www.gov.bw/en/News/Gaborone-Declaration-Sustainability-2012/ 
32
 Only 5.1% in rural villages in the last Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2002/3 
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(1990) to 38% (2010). Other figures collated show levels of national OD of 17% 
(2010) and a forecast of 15% by 2015 (Galen et al 2013:527).33  
 
The performance gaps identified in these figures has been seen by Key 
Informants (KI) in Botswana as a key driver to the post 2009 WRM reforms 
which are the focus of this thesis and are outlined in Chapter Seven. 
2.4 Summary 
This review has highlighted the importance of recognising a water scarcity 
situation that sits alongside a paucity of water data (Braune and Xi 2010). There 
is an international agenda of IWRM organising the surface water at river basin 
level within and between states that seeks to address this, but fails at present to 
integrate groundwater management. The delivery of WSS has been contested 
within centralisation/decentralisation alternative models but there has always 
been a need perceived for the state to provide the rules of performance for both 
WRM and WSS, with regulation potentially to be able to provide access to water 
for all (Gerlach 2010). Politics appears to be the key constraint to action 
(Cosgrove and Cosgrove 2012). All these issues are relevant to, and are being 
confronted in Botswana as a landlocked, water scarce state, dependent on 
water for its culture of cattle and its economy for the extraction of diamonds. 
The specialness of Botswana in its governance structures are noted 
(Acemogluand Robinson 2012). This literature review has provided the 
background to start to understand the changes in water management in 
Botswana. These themes will be used in each Chapter as a background to each 
Research Question (RQ) and will finally frame the responses to RQs in Chapter 
Eleven. The next chapter puts forward a potential conceptual framework that 
can be used.  
                                                 
33
 From the same article, levels of OD in Namibia of 55% (2005), 54% (2010) and a forecast of 
53% (2015), and in SA of 9% (2005), 6% (2010) and a forecast of 3% (2015). 
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USE OF DRINKING WATER SOURCES (percentage of population) 
Urban Rural National 
Proportion of the 
2010 Population 
That Gained 
Access Since 
1995 (%) 
Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved Improved Unimproved 
T
o
ta
l 
Im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
P
ip
e
d
 o
n
 P
re
m
is
e
s
 
O
th
e
r 
Im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
U
n
im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
S
u
rf
a
c
e
 W
a
te
r 
T
o
ta
l 
Im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
P
ip
e
d
 o
n
 P
re
m
is
e
s
 
O
th
e
r 
Im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
U
n
im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
S
u
rf
a
c
e
 W
a
te
r 
T
o
ta
l 
Im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
P
ip
e
d
 o
n
 P
re
m
is
e
s
 
O
th
e
r 
Im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
U
n
im
p
ro
v
e
d
 
S
u
rf
a
c
e
 W
a
te
r 
1990 
2000 
2010 
100 
99 
99 
38 
63 
85 
62 
36 
14 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
88 
90 
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95 
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23 
45 
66 
70 
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30 
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2 
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5 
3 
2 
22 
 
Table 2.4 Use of Drinking Water Sources in Botswana (percentage of population) 
Source: UNICEF/WHO 2012:41 
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USE OF SANITATION FACILITIES (percentage of population) 
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5 
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6 
22 
19 
18 
12 
6 
1 
22 
32 
41 
6 
8 
11 
19 
15 
10 
53 
45 
38 
38 
52 
62 
6 
7 
8 
20 
17 
15 
36 
24 
15 
26 
 
Table 2.5 Use of Sanitation Facilities in Botswana (percentage of population)     
Source: UNICEF/WHO 2012: 4 
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Chapter Three: The Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1 Chapter overview 
 
This chapter examines potential conceptual frameworks that will enable 
interpretation of the shift in policy on Water Resource Management (WRM) and 
Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) in Botswana. The review and choice of 
conceptual framework is set within post-positivist critical realist ontology and the 
thesis is grounded in the data analysed through rational empirical enquiry. This, 
it is proposed, is the way forward to examine the setting of policy and the 
process it entails (Blaikie and Springate–Bagiinski 2012:61). The nature of the 
theories of political economy, and its evolution to take account of ecological 
limits is explored. The impact of water on power in societies starting from 
ancient civilisations to the present day in the Mekong Basin (Sneedon and Fox 
2006; Witfogel 1956) is reviewed. The work of Bakker (2003:vii) is used in 
explaining changes to WRM in England and Wales, where she sees a 
movement  from a political economy framework based on a state hydraulic 
paradigm (Allan 2003), to an understanding of change through the lens of 
political ecology towards a more sustainable management of water. This 
sustainability is seen as coming from a ‘market environmentalism’ movement, 
driven by the groups behind UK WRM, post privatisation of the delivery of WSS 
in 1989 (Bakker 2003:viii). A proposal is made that the frameworks for policy 
change have been created by advocacy coalitions (AC) (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith1993) and this is demonstrated by Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) 
which has developed to explain changes in water policies. 
   
A potential conceptual framework of ACT is proposed to explain the changes in 
water policy in Botswana. The structure of WRM and WSS in Botswana 1966- 
2009 is seen by the researcher to be embedded in a wider political economic 
frame, in delivering the economic promises of the politicians, post-
Independence (explored in Chapter Five). The thesis describes the gradual 
movement of the opinion of the governing elite towards understanding water 
management, which entails appreciating the needs of the environment, of 
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delivering sustainability in the economy and requiring the protection of the 
ecosystem. The drivers of this movement are tentatively identified (see Chapter 
Six). The relevance of the theory is proven in Chapter Ten where it is explicitly 
used to interpret the evidence of the data in Chapters Five to Nine. 
 
3.2 Research epistemology based on grounded rational empiricism 
 
The Researcher’s ontology as a former businessman and politician is the 
background to the proposal to set the thesis within a post positivist critical realist 
frame in attempting to understand the structures of society. It is believed that 
knowledge can only exist if it is ‘justified true belief’ (Plato). The thesis seeks to 
be objective and to proceed on the basis of data acquisition that can be used to 
explain the phenomenon uncovered by the research. The rationalism of the 
scientific approach, however, is tempered by empiricism, recognising that, in 
understanding the processes of water reforms, knowledge can only be acquired 
through experience. The analysis is post-positivist: positivism proposes that 
science can provide provable models but post-positivist thinking sees this being 
changed by multiple processes of knowledge production. The Researcher 
believes that WRM, as described in Chapter Two, requires multiple 
perspectives for its study. 
 
Alongside the post-positivism of multiple perspectives is the application of 
critical realism as an attempt to ‘understand real structures of society and the 
world, while acknowledging that any model of such structures will reflect only 
partial experiences of them, and social and political framing is within a research 
process’ (Forsyth 2003:16). Reality may not be achieved from such ‘partial 
experiences’ however much it is striven for, because all measurable data is 
fallible to a degree. Therefore, the Researcher proposes to use data from 
multiple methods, sources and observations to enable the triangulation of 
results (Bryman 2006). The data is collected by quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques which are described in Chapter Four. The thesis organises 
evidence within a theory of social construction, where the ‘social component is 
best seen as indicating the attributions of knowledge [that] are context-
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sensitive’, where many social, cultural and political factors will influence local 
knowledge and understanding (Cohen 1986:576).  
 
Recent work on social learning and WRM emphasises a move ‘from individual 
“multiple cognitions” to interrelated “distributed cognition” and to an 
understanding of group processes to capture the essence of social learning. 
Learning concepts [can be] applied to whole social entities’ (Pahl-Wostl 2007:3). 
The ‘social entities’ could be seen as small communities where ‘community-
based management enhances adaptive capacity in two ways: by building 
networks that are important for coping with extreme events and by retaining the 
resilience of the underpinning resources and ecological systems’ (ibid:3). Large 
changes in WRM governance involving basic belief structures can be conceived 
as being context specific to each society (Kooy 2012). That context in WRM, 
and specifically in land management, is recognised as being of an ‘entire range 
of political economic relations of the land users themselves, both with each 
other and with the state’ (Blaikie 1985:1). For true understanding, the context 
requires the use of political economy theory for subsequent policy analysis 
(Kooy 2012). 
 
3.3 Political Economy  
 
The use of political economy theory for understanding water policy is shown in 
the importance to governments in having control over water resources to 
provide the economy with food (Wittfogel 1956). Water management was a 
means to continuing power. This can be seen in the political economy policies 
of decision-making behind the river basin of the Mekong, where national 
interests are all powerful in delivering the outcomes for water that the politicians 
demand (Sneddon and Fox 2006). Linton (2010) demonstrates the long-term 
link between water and the changing social fabric. The engineering of water 
was a key to the opening up of America to agriculture and irrigation, and the 
taming of the inhospitable land farmed by the Zionists in Palestine in the 1920s 
(Linton 2012). Mehta (2000) identified the driving force of politicians’ decision-
making in the provision of water in India. The justification for the dams in India 
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was from the alarm created over water scarcity (Mehta 2007); this came from 
the political economy policies of ‘uncertainty’ over water which manufactured 
the need to govern water centrally (Mehta and Leach 2008). 
 
Political Economy Theory has developed different strands of thinking: the Statist 
Theory believes that WRM and WSS are best delivered by the state, and the 
Neo-liberal Market Theory that the private sector through the market could 
deliver the required outcomes (Budds and McGranahan 2003:91). The latter 
theory influenced the neo-liberal Dublin Principles (1992); where ‘modern water’ 
was created, with a value as an input to modern society (Linton 2010:17). 
However neo-liberal political economy policy in practice has not delivered WRM 
and WSS to all; low income neighbourhoods have not been a good market for 
the private sector (Budds and McGranahan 2003:109).  
 
These two strands of thinking have been seen in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
relationship between water, political power and economic development, often 
related to the involvement in mineral extraction which requires large quantities 
of water (Buscher 2009:3952). WSS have been provided for human 
consumption locally, by individuals or village level communities, but post 
independence, since the 1960s, states in Africa have taken control of water 
resource management (WRM) within a ‘state hydraulic paradigm’ (Bakker 
2003:13; Allan 2001). This shift follows the pattern of WRM dominant in Britain 
and in many other countries (Bakker 2003:13) throughout much of the 20th 
century, and entails a ‘planning for growth, supply-led solutions, command and 
control regulation, a discursive representation of nature as a “resource”, and 
state ownership [of water]’ (ibid). This Weberian centralised state-organised 
approach to the delivery of WSS (and other economic goods such as health and 
education services) can lead to the neoliberal model of markets for water 
(Budds and McGranahan 2003:191). However, the establishment of ecological 
limits to the hydrological availability of water has led to a new framing of political 
economy theory. 
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3.4 Political Economy Policy influenced by an Ecological lens  
 
The Researcher sees the need to have an ‘ecological lens’ to provide an 
analytical framework (Moore Lappe 2013:15). This lens integrates ‘the concerns 
of ecology and a broadly defined political economy’ (Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987:17). It is a ‘useful framework for analysing how politics and power mediate 
the intersection of human societies and biophysical phenomena’ (Sheridan 
2012:240). It began as an accepted epistemology in the 1980s, and a 
multidisciplinary approach to research, bringing together ‘the different social 
sciences of anthropology, environmental sociology and political science of the 
environment’ (Blaikie and Brookfield 2008:766). Such a lens seeks to ‘politicise 
the understandings about the distribution of water’ (Loftus 2009:953). Those 
who use it stand for environmental justice, do not sit on the fence and are 
‘against apolitical ecologists’ (ibid: 954). The Researcher supports the view that 
political ecology ‘wrestles simultaneously with questions of social justice and 
environmental justice’ (Bakker 2003:193), and, as such the Researcher asserts, 
forms the backdrop for the water reforms in Botswana. The failure by societies 
to deliver potable water to all comes from failed policies, not from a lack of 
water (Loftus 2009). There is enough water, technology and money, but the 
political and societal will is not seen to be there (ibid).  
 
Common Property Resource Theory (CPRT) concentrates on the ability of the 
community or village to manage land and water sustainably with minimal central 
government intervention (Ostrom 2012; 1990). But studies of degradation of 
grasslands in Botswana saw open grazing by peasant farmers within the 
common land as the reason for this, and became the excuse for fencing off the 
land for private use (Blaikie and Brookfield 2008:769). In water constrained 
countries, there has been a clear ecological framework around WRM, as has 
been seen in the Sa’dah Basin of Yemen (Lichtenthaler 2003). This became 
disturbed by the ‘politicised environment’ of the 1970s and the rise of the State, 
but sustainable management of groundwater resources has continued to come 
from traditional communities continuing to ‘manage their own water’ (ibid:6). 
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Politicians, at all levels of government, could be seen as having failed to 
recognise the barrier they form to the delivery of a balanced ecosystem for both 
humans and the non-human natural environment. Political economy theory 
development, tempered by an ecological lens, provides a viewpoint through 
which to understand ‘the issue of the agency of both human and non-humans in 
a way that much political and economic research does not’ (Bakker 2003:192). 
It not only begins from the assumption that socio-economic and environmental 
change are co-produced, but also ‘broadens the set of actors - non-humans as 
well as humans - who are considered both as objects of study and also holders 
of legitimate claims to equitable treatment’ (Bakker 2003:193). 
 
In the case of a less water constrained country, such as the UK, post WSS 
privatisation, an ecological policy framework, it is proposed, could be seen in 
‘market environmentalism’ terms (Bakker 2003:192), where environmental 
objectives are being delivered through managed market mechanisms. These 
cover a range of objectives such as efficiency, fairness in pricing, planning for 
scarcity, using a water regulator to deliver on both economic and environmental 
goals. However, meeting the demands of people and of nature, with its limits, 
judged by the powerful, is not easy in developing support for WRM reforms, or 
for concerns about water at a time of climate change. Dependence on ‘market 
environmentalism’ entails ‘disorderly ecologies, societies and moralities’ 
(Sheridan 2012:240). So how could it be envisioned that order from disorder, 
reflected in policy choices, takes place? 
 
3.5 Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) 
 
Policy in terms of this thesis can be defined as ‘a set of stated intentions and 
resultant practices in the name of the public good. The policy process is the 
means by which policy is conceived, negotiated, expressed and perhaps 
brought into law, and procedures of implementation and practice’ (Blaikie and 
Springate-Baginski 2012:61). Policy reform on natural resources such as water 
does ‘not emerge as a linear response’; research data does ‘not automatically 
become new truths’ and support ‘alternative rational arguments for a policy 
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change’: ‘Changes to policy are much more complex than the simplistic 
rationalist mode’ (ibid). 
 
Sabatier and Jenkins –Smith (1999,1993) sought to codify this complex policy 
consensus-formation process into a system-based approach, with power 
moving across, top-down and bottom-up. The Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) 
they proposed understands the ‘black box’ of decision-making as being 
explained by changes in the beliefs of the participants in the process and policy 
change over a period of time. Underlying the ACT are three belief levels and, 
from these beliefs, come the subsystems to support change to a new coalition 
in support of a policy (Figure 3.1): 
 
 
 Figure 3.1 The Three Belief Levels (after Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) 
 
1) Deep core beliefs, predominantly normative across a society 
being analysed’  
 
2) Policy core beliefs, which can be changed by evidence and can 
lead to coalition formation 
Advocacy Coalition 
Secondary 
Beliefs 
Policy 
Core 
Beliefs 
Deep Core 
Beliefs 
 47 
 
 
3)  Secondary beliefs, more narrow and subject to change over 
time, leading to fine tuning of reforms on an empirical basis 
 
The deep core beliefs (1) of ACT are those that have been used to long term 
effect, to provide a meta-narrative for ‘intractable difficult decisions, such as 
budget decisions or environmental stand-offs, where there is no consensual 
advocacy coalition being formed to provide a solution to the potentially 
intractable problem’. This narrative of beliefs can come from ‘stories from 
individuals or groups, which together make a way forward for the policy makers, 
which has broad support from the community’ (Roe 1991:296). Such a story 
telling approach...  
 
‘brings the social sciences and humanities together to better 
address real-world problems of public policy—particularly those 
issues characterized by extreme uncertainty, complexity, and 
polarization—which, if not more effectively managed now, will 
plague us well into the next century’ (ibid). 
 
The deep common belief systems in water governance could be described as a 
‘commons imaginary’ that bring together coalitions of believers (Wagner 2012). 
Policy process at the micro level, or in ACT terms, the secondary belief level 
(3), can also provide the evidence based justification for political decisions 
(Friedman 2002:8).  
 
By 2010, the presentation of the ACT has evolved beyond the simple three 
belief systems linear movement of opinion (and feed back, when new evidence 
came forward) to that contained in Figure 3.2 (Weible et al 2008).  
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Figure 3.2 The Advocacy Coalition Theory (Weible et al 2008) 
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The left hand side of Figure 3.2 named ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’ 
represents the deep core belief systems (1). This moves to the right in the 
Figure to establish the ‘Long Term Coalition Opportunity Structures’ that in turn 
feed into the ‘Policy Subsystem’. This latter right hand decision box explains the 
movements between Coalition A and Coalition B, arising from potentially new 
evidence based changeable policy core beliefs (2), mediated by the policy 
brokers, the experts who have access to the secondary beliefs (3). The 
feedback loop box from the ‘Policy subsystem’ box at the bottom left takes 
account of ‘External (System) Events’ that could impact on the ‘Relatively 
Stable Parameters’ (1), subject to ‘Short Term Constraints’ that could lead to 
the formation of new coalitions. This figure seeks to show in a dynamic form 
how advocacy coalitions are formed and can be re-formed. 
 
The logic of ACT rests upon the assumption that ‘well organised interest 
groups, mission-oriented agencies, weak political parties, multiple decision-
making venues, and the need for super-majorities to enact and implement 
policy change’ (Weible et al  2008:199). This was seen as applicable to 
situations in the USA but not elsewhere (ibid). Therefore a new category of 
variables, known as ‘coalition opportunity structures’ was developed referring to 
factors such as resource constraints that affect the behaviour of advocacy 
coalitions (ibid: 3). This revision to the ACT contained two additional sets of 
variables: the degree of consensus needed for major policy change, and the 
openness of the relevant political system. Unlike the USA, ‘Westminster rules’34  
democracies require a simple majority for change and, often in these 
democracies, [more usual in Commonwealth African countries], the political 
system is more closed, with a lack of nongovernmental organizations able to 
influence the policy process (ibid). 
  
The ACT can help to explain policy change through policy orientated learning 
and external events, helping to contrast and simplify hundreds of actors into 
coalitions based on shared beliefs. It can explain the policy role of scientific and 
                                                 
34
 The UK system of government set in the Palace of Westminster and utilised by many 
countries, primarily of the Commonwealth, as their democratic mechanism of governance. 
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technical input and of political behaviour. But the ACT has also been criticised. 
It is said that ACT does not explicitly account for, or is ambiguous about, the 
role of ideas and self-interest in the policy process (ibid 2008:6) and that ACT is 
unclear in its depiction of collective action and coalition formation, strategies, 
and their maintenance (ibid). Major policy change could be better 
conceptualized as multiple cascading external events rather than a single 
external event (ibid). The ACT can overlook the stages of the policy cycle and 
the role of public opinion in shaping public policy (ibid). 
 
However, despite these criticisms, ACT has become a tool in the development 
of the policy process across a number of countries and sectors. ACT has been 
used to analyse water reform processes in a number of cases. A key example is 
in Denver USA where ACT explains the positions of federal, state and local 
institutions in Colorado and their movement towards a policy on water for the 
city region (Ellison 1998). The Lake Tahoe water quality analysis, seen through 
an ACT lens, saw, after a heated division in the local community, a coming 
together of a common coalition of consensus on the use of the Lake water 
(Weible and Sabatier 2004). A Ghanaian academic example of the use of ACT 
explains the evolution of a common agreed policy on private sector participation 
in water delivery, where there had previously been deep divisions over the way 
forward (Ainuson 2009). These three papers posit how change evolves with the 
movement from a previous Advocacy Coaltion (AC) towards the coming 
together of a new AC, with an understanding of continuing deep common belief 
systems but changed by new policy oriented learning.  
 
Research in Spain shows a water policy AC to have replaced a hydrological 
paradigm, with an environmentally based AC of politicians together with CSOs 
working through a democratic election process, creating a new coalition, based 
on the recognised need for water reform (Bukowski 2007). The Chinese 
Government’s moves towards a renewable energy and climate change policy 
subsystem after 2007 has been envisaged as the result of an AC explained 
change (Stensdal 2012).  
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Bakker (2003) captures the move of the UK Government towards a new AC in 
her analysis of UK privatisation of WSS. Here she argues that the separate role 
on WRM of the non- privatised, state controlled Environment Agency, and the 
state regulation of the privatised WSS companies by the Office of Water 
Regulation (OFWAT),  
 
‘requires an analysis of mutually constitutive interrelationships 
between the discursive, social, and material dimensions of 
environmental change and social economic restructuring. Thus 
[there] arises a tendency for political and ecological work to bridge 
scales while examining the construction of those scales’  
(Bakker 2003:192)  
 
ACT can be seen as a way for coalitions of policy makers based on political 
economy to ’construct those scales’ with new scientific information underpinned 
by continuing deep core beliefs. Could this be the lens to examine water policy 
change in Botswana? 
 
3.6 A potential Conceptual Framework  
 
The Researcher has seen policy formation and reformation over his forty years 
in politics at the highest level and witnessed the move from political economy 
policies, based on no restriction to growth, to the more sober planning for a 
resource- constrained world based on ecological limits. He brings these insights 
to this thesis.  
 
It is proposed that ACT is an appropriate conceptual framework to explain the 
success of Botswana as a ‘developmental state’ (Leftwich 1995) and the policy 
changes with regard to WRM and WSS in Botswana. The strength of the deep 
core beliefs about water could be seen as a test of the efficacy of the ACT 
model. The Batswana continue to see water as a mystical bedrock within the 
Batswana psyche (Tsuaneng 2010). The beliefs in Botswana emphasise the 
roles of tribal leaders and rainmakers in the source and delivery of water and 
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these are explored in Chapter Five and Eight. Recent analysis of the continued 
influence of deep belief systems in the power of rain in Tanzania, even in a 
deconstructed symbolic system of tribal power (Sheridan 2012:240), provides 
support to similar data from Botswana which is outlined in this thesis. A further 
deep core belief is the non-tribal ownership of water resources seen under a 
post 1966 Independence consensus as being under the ownership of all 
citizens of Botswana: all Batswana have responsibility to use it wisely for the 
benefit of everyone in the community (Poteete 2009). 
  
The ACT policy core beliefs (Figure 3.1) on water are examined through the 
expertise imbued in the civil service and water engineers. This, it is argued, 
provides the underpinning for the formation of coalitions on WRM by powerful 
trained elite groups of knowledge brokers, many trained in European 
universities, based on new knowledge of constraints on WRM and WSS from 
both the hydrological and societal demand in Botswana. This change in policy 
core beliefs is covered in Chapter Six. The study tentatively proposes that there 
is movement between two ACs in Botswana: that of political economy policies 
unconstrained by water limits (1966-2008) then amended to take account of 
ecological limits driven by concepts of water scarcity (2009+).  
 
The structural drivers of policy change on water are defined as the ‘core social 
processes and arrangements, reflective of social and cultural norms, values, 
networks, structures and institutions, that operate in concert with individuals’ 
behaviours and practices’ (Seeley et al 2012:135). This has led to the 
interviewing of a wide range of key Batswana informants to gather data on 
these core processes and arrangements in Botswana. The movement could be 
conceptualised as coming from the kgotlas36 in each village and town and at 
state level and internationally, of an advocacy coalition for change on water 
reform, first in 1966 and then again from 2009. 
                                                 
35
 In this case analysing the  HIV/AIDS epidemic 
36
 Official meeting places where politicians, tribal leaders and the people gather to discuss 
issues. 
 53 
 
The existing political economy policies on water, where politicians in Botswana 
need to win elections on a universally subsidised price and unconstrained 
availability of WSS, could delay an underlying shift to a new AC. The thesis 
explores a complex policy process. In Chapter Ten, the data is analysed to see 
to what extent ACT does explain the changes to policy from ‘alternative rational 
arguments’ (Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 2012: 61). 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
This Chapter outlines the main concepts and proposed conceptual framework 
for the thesis. Knowledge and realism is understood from a critical realist 
standpoint. The theory of Political Economy and its’ interpretation in changing 
policy processes is acknowledged for use in analysing the data collected. 
Finally, the framework of Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) (Weible et al 2008; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) is examined. It is proposed that ACT be used 
to understand the processes of water reform in Botswana. The data analysis will 
seek to test the use of ACT as a conceptual framework to explain the 
movement to a changed paradigm. However, the political economy policies of 
unconstrained water, where politicians in Botswana need to win elections on a 
universally subsidised price and unconstrained availability of WSS, could delay 
an underling shift to a new ecologically constrained AC. The next Chapter 
demonstrates the methodology used for data collection and analysis. 
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Chapter Four: The Methodology 
 
4.0 Chapter overview and background  
 
The methods chosen allow the collection and analysis of data to explain the 
research questions on why and how the processes of water reform have been 
conducted in Botswana. The positionality of the Researcher and those 
researched are examined. The modes of data collection will be identified with 
the ethical code used. The approach is based on an analysis of narrative arising 
from the collection of Key Informant Interviews (KII), a quantitative survey, and 
qualitative Focus Group (FG) data with a six part file system (Blaikie and 
Springate-Baginski 2012). 
 
The adoption of the Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) (Chapter Three) requires 
a methodology to enable an analysis of the process of decision-making on 
water reform in Botswana. The data collected is systematically analysed, so as 
to understand the systems and sub-systems that have formed and are being 
formed to influence the new coalitions which are taking shape with the 
availability of new expert advice (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith 1993: Figures 3.1 
and 3.2). A water reform process is analysed by Karen Bakker in researching 
the UK water industry changes (1991-2003). She saw her approach as 
‘characterised as hypothesis building rather than hypothesis testing, 
conceptualising the key vectors and dimension of the transformation in this 
period of innovation with (and re-regulation of) normative codes and regulatory 
practice’ (Bakker 2003: ix). This approach has been taken to explain the 
changes in the Botswana water industry 1966-2014. 
 
4.1 Modes of Data Collection 
 
The primary mode of data collection is qualitative (Ellen and Firth1984), 
addressing the research questions through a multi-method, interdisciplinary37 
                                                 
37
 Blaikie 2014 
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empirical study of Water Resource Management (WRM) and Water and 
Sanitation Services (WSS) KI transactions in Botswana. Insights regarding 
existing modes of water resource use and management are derived through 
practitioner and participant observation. Semi–structured interviews are carried 
out and kept open ended.  
 
In addition to semi-structured KII, data collection methods include: keeping a 
research journal, which was updated daily; participant observation and 
recording of interviews; document collection and analysis; questionnaire 
surveys; and biophysical and social data collection from papers, reports and 
government documents. This provides triangulation, where possible, against the 
results of the qualitative research and the researcher’s observations. A 
quantitative survey was conducted outside a supermarket in Mochudi, Kgatleng 
District (KD) to obtain data to triangulate with that from WUC internal surveys38 
and the KII and FGs39. 
 
The largest element of the qualitative data collection was through FG  case 
studies. In arranging FGs, the Researcher noted the need to avoid distortion 
that can come from the hierarchy, explicit in the dominant tribe, and over lesser 
tribes (Mompati and Prinsen 2000). The selection of participants in FGs was 
from the poor, represented by the non-tribal representative Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) and workfare participants (the Ipelegeng)40. Table 4.1 
demonstrates the reasoning behind the selection of FG locations and 
participants. The details of each FG are laid out in Section 4.4, File 5 of this 
chapter.and fully in Appendix Three. It is important that individual voices are 
heard in this thesis, particularly noting that:  
 
‘development discourse about poverty has been  dominated by the 
perspective and expertise of thousands of professionals, 
politicians and others who are not poor...and [that] open ended 
                                                 
38
 WUC provided the Researcher with their private surveys on the changes from 2009-12 
39
 Details of data collection are in Appendix Three 
40
 Because of the lack of a VDC, the selection of the FG for Old Naledi was with the cooperation 
of the GCC social workers. The choice was deliberately pro-poor and not tribal specific. 
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participatory methods give voice to the true experts ...the poor 
people themselves’  
(Narayan et al 2000:3)  
 
In this research project, the quantitative ‘statistical generalizability’ has been 
‘eschewed in favour of an evidence based strategy, supporting inductive rather 
than deductive reasoning’ (Bakker 2003: ix). This strategy ‘is particularly useful 
in periods of great economic and social change that poses new challenges to 
analytical categories and theoretical principles’ (Schoenberger 1991:181). The 
water reforms can be seen as such a challenge to Botswana society. 
 
4.2 Ethics of participatory methods 
 
The UEA code of ethics was followed at all times and permission sought and 
obtained for all KII and FG interviews. The consent forms used, translated into 
Setswana, are in Appendix Three. In all cases, anonymity of FG participants 
was guaranteed. The Researcher notes four ethical challenges that can apply to 
this type of research, namely, ‘taking peoples’ time, raising expectations, 
feedback and follow-up action’ (Narayan et al 2000:16-17):  
 
1) Taking peoples’ time 
 
The Researcher agreed to meetings at times that fitted with the 
organisers (usually VDC Chairs) of the group which could be early or late 
in the day. No payment was made for participation41. All groups received 
food and drink at the end of the two hour interviews and knew that these 
refreshments were going to be available42. 
                                                 
41
 A group of ‘destitutes’ in Olifants Drift were withdrawn by the KDC social worker at two hours 
notice, who had organised them to meet, because the Researcher would not pay for the 
attendance or contribute to a ‘local fund’. The Researcher and his assistant replaced the group, 
with the support of the sub chief and VDC chair, with a group of Ipelegeng workers at the same 
location. This is not unusual for example ‘research teams did not always have control over who 
participated’ (Narayan et al 2000:9). 
42
 ‘In some countries, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, researchers paid people 
small amounts of money for participation in discussion groups. In other countries, snacks, 
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2) Raised Expectations 
 
It was repeatedly stressed to participants that the Researcher could not 
promise assistance.  
 
3) Feedback 
 
As the research was conducted under GOB permit (Appendix One), the 
final report is required to be available in Botswana. 
 
4) Follow-up action 
 
Where clear actionable concerns were raised, the Researcher 
immediately contacted the Council or WUC to seek remediation. The 
open ended questions, about who was responsible, also visibly 
empowered participants to consider what they should do. However, there 
remains an ethical dilemma of raising hopes of radical immediate action. 
 
4.3 The Methodological approach 
 
The data collection procedure at each step used a mixed methods approach 
(Newman et al. 2013). It involved obtaining available quantitative data, and the 
collection of qualitative data. The data was then triangulated with the 
observation of the Researcher, who kept a notebook of all meetings and a daily 
reflective journal. This approach ‘can result in new understandings’ from this 
combination (Bryman 2006:111). The initial data analysis could be revised after 
reflection at a later point in the day. However, using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods could be jeopardised by the positionality and the potentially 
restricted reflexivity of both the researcher and the researched (Greenbank 
2003).  
                                                                                                                                               
coffee, or tea served half way through or at the end of the discussions were greatly appreciated 
by the participants’ (Narayan et al 2000:11) 
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The Researcher is aware of his positionality as a white, older, professional 
male, previously an international businessman and politician. He has both 
observed and taken part in decision-making processes in the UK and 
internationally, both with the private sector and within senior levels of both local 
and central government. He has visited Botswana previously, prior to the field 
work period, and has taken part in conferences organised by the Africa Venture 
Capital Association and by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum. As 
important, his home until the age of 20 (1964), was in a very poor, rural village 
in Norfolk, where the only water supply was from a spring-fed reservoir in the 
centre of the village and sanitation was based on a bucket in an outside shed. 
Due to his father’s illness, he was the person who carried the water in pails from 
the reservoir, and each week disposed of the human waste. A standpipe was 
erected locally in 1965; utility run, house connected, tariff based WSS arrived in 
1979. The reason for the delay could be seen as the lack of political will; the full 
WSS had been available within two miles for over 50 years, but the poor were 
kept waiting. This positionality gives him some added insight compared to other 
UK researchers, but not as deep as local informants. The positionality of the KI, 
who were members of the elite of Botswana, needs to be reflected upon. KI 
could often feel that they had to defend the existing situation rather than be 
frank about what they really felt. The length of time spent on the field work 
meant that KIs felt able to speak more openly, having come to trust the 
Researcher and his motives.  
 
The Researcher spent 10 months in Botswana (September 2010 - July 2011) 
and has externally tracked the changes between the start of the research in 
2009 to the completion of the thesis in 2014. He maintained relationships 
throughout this time with key stakeholders and returned to Botswana in April-
May 2013 after the agreed policy was published, and undertook a final round of 
KIIs. He further returned to South Africa in March 2014 to reflect upon the 
previous data collected from that country. 
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The research methodology follows an Analytical Narrative (AN) approach, 
based on the work of Blaikie and Springate-Baginski (2012). He suggests an 
AN path to grounded and useful research, from research design to research 
practice, using a ‘document facility’ concept, as trialled by the International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Kathmandu in 
2007/8, and as used in his own research (Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 2007). 
He suggests the following formal steps that he calls ‘files’:  
 
File 1: The goals of the research programme, utilising the policy documents 
available.  
File 2: A history of the struggle for environmental justice, establishing how the 
policy environment is changing [amended titling in this research].  
File 3: A listing of the key actors who have ‘unequal powers’.  
File 4: Interfaces between the actors in File 3. What are the effective operational 
linkages between actors?  
File 5: The choices of the researcher as to whom he/she wishes to work with. 
File 6: Policy argumentation: what does the evidence based research show? 
 
This approach is used in this thesis to construct and analyse a detailed picture 
of policy change, using multiple sources and types of data from a range of 
perspectives. The data was organised using the file system listed here, prior to 
answering the research questions. The results and insights from across the files 
are integrated in the results and analysis Chapters Five to Nine. The files are 
presented here in sequence to explain their rationale and main activities. 
 
File 1: The goals of the research programme, utilising the policy documents 
available: 
The goal is to understand the water policy reform programme in Botswana. The 
policy documents available are: the reports of the Botswana National Water 
Plan by the Snowy Mountain Engineering Company (SMEC) of Australia (2006), 
the World Bank Botswana Briefing Paper (2009) and the Ministry of Mining, 
Energy, and Water Resources, Department of Water Affairs (MMEWR/DWA) 
implementation reports (2009/10). These documents form the backdrop to the 
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internal Botswana decision-making processes on water governance since 2009. 
In addition to this Botswana specific activity, the Researcher reviewed 
documentation from the World Bank and other Trans-National Organisations on 
water sector reform processes that provide a wider comparative context.  He 
had access to the MMEWR DWA Water Reform Unit in Gaborone, in particular 
to Mr Bafitlhile, who headed the Unit and was driving the process of reform. The 
Researcher attended key meetings and was able to draw from a rich set of 
observations of the processes. The draft proposals for a new water policy, 
Water Act and particularly for the powers of the new water regulator went to 
Cabinet in July 2011 and the final policy went to the National Assembly (NA) for 
approval in 2014. Given the use of the UK water reforms (1989-2012) as a 
potential template for the Botswana reforms, a KII took place with a senior 
representative of UK OFWAT43, on a lessons learned basis in June 2012, so as 
to inform the final analysis. 
 
File 2: An Analysis of how the policy environment is changing: 
Alongside File 1, a literature review of country research of the post 
Independence (1966-2013) water governance systems that are being reformed 
has been established (Swatuk 2004). The decision process on the allocation of 
water in Botswana is moving from a decentralised, community and customary 
law basis to a centralised, national government and common law basis. The 
process started in March 2009 and was planned to be completed in 2014. The 
changes were proposed as being more efficient, cost effective and sustainable 
(World Bank meetings in Gaborone, September 2010). However, the high levels 
of inequality, already evident in Botswana, could be entrenched through the 
changes (UNDP 2010) and this is explored in Chapter Nine. 
 
File 3: A listing of the key actors, who have ‘unequal powers’: 
The Researcher conducted iterative interviews with the ‘key actors’ (Blaikie 
2010:10) both within and outside the government; those who had decided in the 
past and now, on the allocation of water in Botswana. Interviews continued to 
                                                 
43
 KI WEUK 1 
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be on a formal /semi-formal basis, so as to ensure that all aspects of decision-
making were covered. The interviewees were central decision-makers from the 
Ministries, primarily the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) and the parastatal, 
the Water Utility Corporation (WUC) and large private sector users of water. 
These were the key centres of power. During the course of fieldwork, the 
Researcher met a large number of Batswana senior civil servants, all of whom 
were trained to a very high level (PhD or Chartered Institutes) often as water 
engineers or hydrologists. They have progressively moved up the GOB civil 
service ladder. They now run the MMEWR and the Ministry of the Environment, 
Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the three 
most important ministries on WSS. They also run the WUC. 
 
The President of Botswana, Leader of the majority group of MPs in the National 
Assembly, has the power to deliver change in Botswana. The second President 
of Botswana, H.E.Kwett Masire’s autobiography provides a first-hand witness of 
the formation of policy in Botswana from the 1940s (Masire 2006). Whilst his 
insight is likely to be biased in the need to self-justify decisions taken in the 
past, it provides a stage-side view and ear to key events. The President is both 
advised and constrained by a coalition of senior politicians, and social, cultural 
and economic interests. 
 
Below the central level, the interviewees were those now dispossessed of 
power over WSS in Gaborone and in Kgatleng District, namely the District 
Authorities (both elected politicians and appointed officials), the District 
Commissioners, the Land Board officials and the various levels of Dikgosi (tribal 
chiefs). The role of civil society organisations (CSO) was reviewed.  Women’s 
CSOs were involved with the selection of focus groups in line with the Dublin 
Principles (1992). The category listing of the KIs is in Appendix Three. 
The roles of external actors with power, for example, the World Bank (WB), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and private mining 
companies such as De Beers were examined. Despite the withdrawal of many 
International Aid Agencies from Botswana after 1990, because of the rerating of 
Botswana as a middle income country, there were still significant players such 
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as the European Union (EU) and the German International Aid Agency (GIZ) 
(on IWRM in SADC) and United States International Aid Department (USAID) 
(largely on issues on HIV/AIDS). 
 
File 4: Interfaces between the actors in File 3. What are the effective 
operational linkages between actors? 
The operational linkages between actors in the old and new policy structures 
and processes were mapped (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 7.1). It was noted that 
elsewhere there are difficulties in establishing accountable institutions for water 
governance (Cleaver 2007). The external players are muted in their lobbying 
but can still at times be strident, particularly in their advocacy of IWRM and the 
Dublin Principles, as will be seen in Chapter Six. Data collection took the form 
of semi-structured interviews with these players as they sought to influence the 
reform process. The funding of Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) institutions by donors has strengthened the regional protocols and 
reviews of WRM. The thesis seeks to place the Botswana reforms in this 
regional context, and data was collected on these operational linkages. Both 
primary and secondary data was collected on the water policy structure and 
processes in Namibia and South Africa, SADC Trans-boundary Water 
Commissions (TBWCs) and the African Ministerial Committee on Water 
(AMCOW)44. The Researcher also engaged with the United Cities and Local 
Government Association (UCLGA) and the International Centre for Local 
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) data collection in 2011 on WSS across Africa. 
 
File 5: The choices of the researcher as to whom he/she wishes to work with: 
                                                 
44
 Primary data from Namibia came in November 2010 from KII and the Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum (CLGF) Conference on ‘The State of Local Government in Southern Africa’ 
(attended by ministers and civil servants from Southern African States including Namibia, 
Botswana and South Africa) and in February 2011 from a Commonwealth Partnership for 
Technology Management (CPTM) SMART Partnership meeting on regulation in SADC 
countries. 
The South Africa primary data came in March 2011 from KII at the UN Water Day/Week in 
Johannesburg, where the Researcher also interviewed AMCOW participants at the same event. 
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In order to drill down from the bigger picture so far examined, the Researcher 
moved to more localised research in February 2011, using semi-structured 
questionnaires45 in FGs held in six areas. Five were linked by the Notwane 
River from the Gaborone Dam down to the Limpopo River at Olifants Drift - and 
the Artesia site was chosen to represent a non-riverine water stressed area. 
The characteristics of each FG are outlined in Table 4.1. The selection of FG 
locations was made so as to provide a range of data covering different levels of 
WSS provision. The participants in the FGs were chosen to represent poor 
people, broadly earning less than P500 (£50) per month, to provide a 
counterpoint to both the KIIs, who tend to be with the wealthier and more 
educated elite, and the quantitative survey of Mochudi supermarket shoppers 
outlined later in this section. The choice of participants in each FG was left to 
the VDC Chair except in the case of the FG in Old Naledi where the choice was 
made by the senior social worker for the area. 
 
The different WSS interactions at the six locations are compared and 
contrasted46, and details of the FGs are contained in Appendix Three. In all but 
the Artesia FG, the participants were balanced male/female and aged 30-70 
years old. The data obtained provided an alternative viewpoint on the WRM 
reforms from the poor of Botswana to compare with the views of the KI who 
were usually from the elite. While the FG discussions were open-ended, there 
was a semi-structure to the events. Questions were framed around subjects that 
sought to illuminate the research questions. 
                                                 
45
 The Researcher employed a male Setswana speaking research assistant, who was chosen 
because he came from outside Kgatleng District, and so reduced the likelihood of bias. He 
translated the responses from focus groups and KI where the participants chose not to speak 
English or could not. 
 
46
 Gaborone has had WUC running its water services and the City Council running the 
sanitation services. In Kgatleng District (KD), the DWA was, pre 2009, responsible for all WSS 
in Mochudi, and KDC was responsible elsewhere in KD. Mochudi and KD have been chosen as 
research sites because of the rich range of social science research carried out there (Ellis 2010; 
Henry 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2007; Suggs 2002; Peters 1994; Schapera 1943). This 
has enabled comparisons to take place on the processes of change in this area, which have 
been seen as having lessons for Botswana as a whole and Southern Africa (Henry 2009:4).  
Many Mochudi households have cattle at Olifants Drift. 
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Name of FG 
Population 
2011 
Location Main water provision Reason for choice Other relevant points 
Old Naledi 19,079 SW Gaborone 
next to dam 
Standpipes until 2013, 
then piped 
Last area of Gaborone 
to move away from 
standpipes 
Township with cheap 
accommodation used by 
new migrants to the capital 
Broadhurst 16,257 NE Gaborone, 
south of sewerage 
works 
Piped water since 1990s Planned residential 
area from 1960s 
Alongside Notwane River 
Matebeleng 2,196 Southern edge of 
Kgatleng District 
Piped water from Bokaa 
Dam since 2000 but 
some standpipes 
Peri-urban village for 
commuters to 
Gaborone 
Some horticultural farming 
using Notwane River and re-
used water 
Mochudi 44,815 Capital and main 
village in the 
centre of Kgatleng 
District 
Mainly piped water and 
sewerage but some 
standpipes (2011) 
Main urban centre for 
Kgatleng District 
Centre for Bakgatla 
Administration 
Olifants Drift 925 NE Kgatleng 
District, alongside 
Limpopo River 
Mainly standpipes, 
moving to piped water in 
2011 
Riverine village and 
centre for cattle post 
support  
Border village with South 
Africa 
Artesia 2,365 NW Kgatleng 
District 
Standpipes in 2011 Centre for cattle posts Transport stop on main 
trunk road between 
Gaborone and Francistown 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of Focus Groups (FG)
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The findings from the FGs are spread across Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight 
and Nine to provide voices of the poor as well as KII in evaluating the impact of 
the water reforms. 
 
The Mochudi Supermarket Survey 
 
During the fieldwork period in May 2011, it was decided that some quantitative 
data was needed to balance the evidence from the FGs which was largely from 
poorer members of the communities. Therefore a survey of 100 water 
consumers was conducted in June 2011; the questionnaire of which is in 
Appendix Three. Those surveyed were coming out of a supermarket in the 
centre of Mochudi, the main large village in KD. The respondents were 
randomly chosen and interviewed over two periods of time. The results appear 
in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine. 
 
The Researcher returned to Botswana in April/May 2013, and collected further 
data from KI. By doing this, he was able to make comparisons between the 
original policies proposed and consulted on, as reported in Chapter Seven, and 
the final outcome in Section 7.7. 
 
File 6: Policy argumentation: what does the evidence based research show? 
The Researcher sought to analyse, reflect on and triangulate the evidence from 
the data, so as to assess the impact of the processes of change coming from 
the water reforms. The data from KI, FGs and the supermarket survey were 
examined to answer the research questions in Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight 
and Nine. Chapter Ten seeks to integrate the insights from the various sources, 
to link back to the theories of policy processes, and change, expressed in 
Chapter Three. Chapter Eleven provides a tentative answer to the research 
questions utilising the previous five Files (Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 2007).  
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4.4 Summary of Chapter  
 
The methodological approach draws from the work of Karen Bakker (2003) in 
researching the UK water industry changes (1991-2003). Blaikie’s Six Files 
structure has been employed to rigorously collect and systematically interrogate 
data, following a broadly political ecological study design (Blaikie and Springate-
Baginski 2012, 2010). The reflexivity of the Researcher provides both 
triangulation and contextualisation of the data from across the files, which is 
then used to answer the research questions   
 
The following chapters, taking account of the literature review (Chapter Two), 
the chosen conceptual framework (Chapter Three) and the methodological 
approach covered in this chapter, now seek to analyse the data collected to 
provide tentative answers to the research questions. Chapter Five commences 
this process by looking at the provision of WRM and WSS in Botswana prior to 
the 2009 reforms. 
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Chapter Five: What was the governance of Water Resource Management 
(WRM) and  Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) in Botswana prior to the 
2009 Water Reform process? 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The conceptual framework of Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) (Chapter Three) 
is used to examine the extent to which pre-Independence ‘deep core beliefs’ on 
water are held and how these underpin a narrative of water scarcity (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993). An explanation is given for evidence of post 
independence Advocacy Coalition (AC) policies on water and their role in 
removing water scarcity as a constraint on the economic development of 
Botswana. The data comes from the methods and range of sources employed 
as outlined in Chapter Four.  
 
5.1 WRM and WSS decision-making structures before 1966 
 
Prior to the water reforms following Independence in 1966, Batswana saw 
themselves constrained by a lack of water (Schapera 1943). The ability of the 
Tswana Chief to initiate rain for the tribe, both through his own skill and that of 
his rainmaker, was crucial to his power (ibid). In the village of Mochudi, the 
remains of the rainmaker’s house, next to that of the Chief, can still be seen 
(Photograph 5.1). 
 
The white missionaries sought to prove their superior knowledge of nature by 
importing European concepts of dams, water harvesting and sand wells to 
collect and keep the scarce water. But the Chiefs, while ostensibly converting to 
Christianity, still maintained their primacy, as far as the Batswana were 
concerned, in the delivery of rain (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:130; Schapera 
1970:125). This is further explored in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 
Photograph 5.1 Remains of Rainmaker’s house in Mochudi 2011 
 
The Bakgatla tribe, whose capital is Mochudi, had dug wells after their arrival in 
1884. They were among the pioneers in the drilling of boreholes in 1926, initially 
at their own expense and subsequently with the support of the then 
Bechuanaland Protectorate colonial government (Shapera 1970:99). The tribal 
leaders had the power to allocate land, and through that power, water rights, 
under that allocated land (ibid: 99). The tribal grazing grounds became 
organized around cattle posts (moraka). The universal childhood of boys was 
organised around the tending of cattle there and this common experience of 
need for rainfall for the cattle to drink and grow fodder became part of the deep 
belief system of all Batswana (Head 1969). This altered with the drilling of 
boreholes organised by tribal leaders and syndicates of the wealthy (see 
Chapter Nine). 
 
Outside the tribal lands, the colonial power, the UK, (1880-1966) provided water 
and sanitation services (WSS) in the large towns. This was sourced from 
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municipal boreholes, piped to standpipes in each area and, occasionally 
connected to individual houses. The sanitation services were largely 
undeveloped with the exception of private cesspits available to certain domestic 
houses. The capital of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, forerunner of Botswana, 
was in an area of Mafeking, South Africa. The capital of the new state of 
Botswana was planned at the village of Gaborone in 1964, in part for its access 
to water from the River Notwane, which formed one of the perennial head-
waters of the Limpopo River. This led to the construction of the Gaborone Dam 
in that year to serve the new capital (Grant 2012:23). 
 
5.2 Views of Batswana on water in the Botswana deep belief systems 
(Sabatier and Jenkins Smith 1993) 
 
The giver of rain was seen to be God. In all the FG discussions47, there was a 
high appreciation of the role of God and of hydrological processes: 
In the Old Naledi Township, next to the Gaborone Dam, the consensus view 
was as follows: 
“Yes, I believe that water...it comes from above. It is rain-water 
brought by God from above. The one we drink, the one we use from 
taps, is from dams and is purified with machines and is brought to us 
through taps. I mean water comes from God as rain and goes into 
dams, and then people go and connect at the dam and put it in taps 
for us. I take it's like that” (FGON 1) 
“I will be a little different. You mentioned something about culture and 
there is water that when I was growing up I found it coming from the 
ground and sometimes naturally like in places like Kumakwane. It is a 
                                                 
47
 The six Focus Group locations and context are in Section 4.3. The coding for the focus 
groups used in this section is: FGA (Focus Group Artesia, Kgatleng District), FGB (Focus Group  
Broadhurst, Gaborone), FGM (Focus Group Matebeleng, Kgatleng District), FGMO (Focus 
Group  Mochudi, Tsukududu  ward, Kgatleng District), FGOD (Focus Group Olifants Drift, 
Kgatleng District) and FGON (Focus Group Old Naledi, Gaborone). The different voices are 
identified by numbering where appropriate. 
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place that has spring water from the ground. Even though water sips 
into the soil when rain falls, there is water that comes from the ground 
as springs” (FGON 2) 
The view from the Broadhurst FG was the same: 
 
“Water is from the ground. You know when it rains, water falls to the 
ground and we dig a borehole and then it comes and we drink it” 
(FGB 1) 
 
“No. Nobody disagrees. Water is from the ground” (FGB2) 
 
In the Kgatleng District (KD) FGs, the consensus was that: 
 
“Water comes when rain falls. Long ago we would dig and water 
would spring out and we would fetch from this spring and that would 
be water for drinking and doing everything in the home. But that 
would be the case only when rain had fallen. Without rain, there is no 
water” (FGM 1) 
 
“I take it that water is from the seas then it rises up and falls as rain. 
That is when it becomes water. It flows to rivers and some of it we get 
from boreholes” (FGM 2) 
“Water, we get it when rain falls. That is when there can be water 
under the ground. Water really comes from rain. Water comes from 
rain and that's when you can find it underground” (FGOD 1) 
There was an understanding of water recycling at the Matebeleng FG: 
“Water is from rain. Like we heard the lady say that for rain to fall, 
winds rise from the sea, raising clouds and then water falls to the 
ground as rain. There is also some like now we have water which is 
dirty. This water... water from the toilets is pumped into dams and 
then it is purified after which it is pumped back into circulation and 
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this is water which was made by cleaning toilets and everything else. 
It is still rain water but it changes when it gets to places like toilets” 
(FGM 1) 
The water harvesting in the past was a group effort: 
“But when rain has fallen, when we were growing up, we used to 
keep it in small wells or we would dig small dams and water would 
spring from these dams. That's how we got it; we got it after it seeped 
out. There is a place which is called motswedi (place of spring). In 
this place there is a little spring and we knew we fetched from there 
but when there was no rain our spring would dry up. I mean, when 
there is no water the spring cannot hold much water, and we would 
have a water drought and there would be no water” (FGM 3) 
Rain water harvesting by individuals in their lapa (yard) was not seen by most of 
the participants of the six FGs as a matter for individual initiative.  An exception 
was an older lady from Matebeleng who had in the last 20 years dug out six 
rainwater tanks utilizing the soil as bricks to build dwellings and to water a 
vegetable garden. 
“I hired some boys to dig, but this one and that one were done by me. 
I harvest the rain falling from the roofs of my buildings in these holes; 
I have six holes now from my six buildings. I cement in channels from 
the edge of the walls to direct the water to the holes. I cover the holes 
to prevent the water evaporating. I use the water I have saved to 
water the vegetables in this lapa. I can sell the vegetables all year 
round” (KI BR 8) 
But it had been the norm in the past:  
“I built this house yesterday in 1950. I have a buried tank there [under 
the house] and an outside tank…. this house was set up before I left 
to go to SA in 1945. I am not the first person,[we all did it then]. I use 
the rainwater tanks for drinking, after filtering” (KI BR7) 
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Underlying this understanding of the hydrological process was an agreement on 
the role of God. The spiritual source of water was emphasized at all the FGs: 
 
“We believe God is the one who makes water to be there. Only God 
can cause rain to fall. If there was no rain for a long time, even 
Gaborone dam would dry up. If a long time passes without rain, even 
the dam can dry up” (FGON 1) 
Who ensures there is enough water? “It’s God. Mm! It’s God. That means 
it’s everybody’s answer. That is everyone’s answer” (FGB all) 
 
“The weather is different from what it was before. In olden times, 
water was everywhere. It has changed very badly. It is time to plough 
and there is no rain. Now there is no rain; then it was plenty. At 
present it is now God’s law, they do not follow the Chiefs. They 
slaughter each other like goat or like sheep; this is a bad time for us 
older people who lived in those olden days; there is no Christianity” 
(KI BR 7) 
 
“We were never short of rain.... when it got less, it rained again; 
people trusted each other; we had no fine buildings. All these fine 
buildings make people mad.... It all comes as a gift from God” (KI BR 
7) 
 
The role of the rainmaker was known by all FGs and seen as an intermediary to 
God used by their predecessors, not themselves. But in Matebeleng village, 
there was this testament: 
 
“I can comment about one lady, when I was growing up, who used to 
make rain fall. There was one lady, when we were growing up, called 
Mma Morwadi. When rain was not falling she would call.... she would 
talk to the Chief. The Chief would disperse a mophato (regiment). 
This regiment would go around picking dibeela (things that were 
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believed to stop rain from falling, like litter, dead animals etc). After 
picking up the dibeela, they would be brought to the Kgotla and 
megaga and mesimama plants would be brought to her and she 
would look for young ladies and small children and they would come 
to the Kgotla. Some of us who had started growing small breasts 
would dip our feet in water in a bath tub. This water would contain 
mosimama and mogaga. After that, this lady would take this water 
and pour it in small buckets and she would take these children, 
around 9, 10 years old, and she would have a certain plant called 
motshetsane and she would take these children around the village, 
going around all these areas sprinkling water and talking to rain 
saying, ‘let the rain fall down in droplets’. And when she said that, 
even if the place had become a desert, the rain would later fall.This 
lady, I wonder why she had to die leaving nobody with the gift. She is 
the one we knew in Matebeleng. We used to get rain because of this 
lady. She was called Mma Morwadi” (FGM 1) 
 
“So rain was kick started... I mean forced...” (FGM2)  
 
“She asked God” (FGM1) 
 
“That's what I mean. Was it kick started?” (FGM2) 
 
“I don't know how she got the gift, but she spoke to God. It used to be 
that after she had gone around sprinkling, the heavens would rise 
and rain would fall.” (FGM1) 
 
The majority view from the FG in Mochudi was:  
 
“Water, Rra, belongs to God” (FGM 2) 
 
From the FG in Old Naledi, Gaborone: 
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“A village like Radisele is a very good example. They can go for days without 
water and when you ask the elders they say that the ancestors are unhappy 
and that a certain ritual needed to be performed, known to the elders” (FGON 1) 
 
The ritual was described as follows: 
“We had a rainmaker. They had small clay pots. They lived in a 
private house. The pots are not for pleasure but to pray for rain to 
give God respect. The medication in the pots were roots from trees.... 
nobody knows which. Bones gave direction as to how they must 
work. They make medication to keep the thunder away and keep soft 
rain. I cannot tell you the current rainmaker. Of course there is one.... 
he can stop the rain altogether.... stop the ploughing. Maybe this year 
here will be no ploughing. If you put the lid on the pot there will be no 
rain.... I only saw this because I am related [to the royal family]. I was 
respected as a child. They do not respect me [now]. Only men were 
in the room for the ceremonies. Women get too angry” (KI BR 7) 
 
In summary, in 2011, the FG responses show that, despite a good knowledge of 
the hydrological process, there was still a deep belief in the role of God and the 
ancestors and in the intermediary role in the bringing of rain, of the Chief and 
the Rainmaker. The challenge that the water reforms represent to this role, that 
is, through the removal of power from the Chiefs and traditional institutions, is 
explored further in Section 8.1. 
 
5.3 WRM and WSS decision-making structures 1966 – present 
 
Botswana became independent in 1966. All land, water and minerals under the 
land became vested in the State, and the powers of the Chiefs over land were 
largely extinguished, in the period 1966-1972. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the 
structure for decision-making on WRM and WSS was within a quadrilateral 
system of government, still in existence today, with a strong central government 
(represented in each district by the District Commissioner (DC), elected local 
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Figure 5.1 The WRM and WSS decision-making structures 1966-present 
  
NB: The lines represent the reporting relationships, which are both up and down,  
while final power after full consultation lies with the Cabinet of the Government of Botswana,  
who seek to secure a majority in favour in the National Assembly 
 
Source: The Researcher’s reflection after KII 2010-11
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District Councils (DCs) (10) and Town Councils (6), Land Boards (LB) 
appointed by Central Government, and lastly, the Tribal Administration (TA), 
through which the Chiefs exercised their remaining powers. Above this is the 
central legislature with an elected National Assembly (NA) of members elected 
by constituency for five years and an appointed tribal representative House of 
Chiefs (limited in power48). The President is elected each five years as the 
candidate of the political party that has the majority of the Members of the NA, 
and the Cabinet he/she chooses must be members of the NA. The complicated 
web of relationships shown makes it difficult for decisions to be taken with 
speed but it does ensure that full debate has to take place at all levels. There is 
a lack of a distinct and clear hierarchy seen in other systems of government. 
The Botswana structure of decision-making may be seen to require a coalition 
of interests to be formed before any key decisions are made, including those on 
WRM and WSS (Gulbrandsen 2012:109) 
 
While water rights (and all mineral rights) were centralised under state 
ownership, the model for exercising those rights was multifaceted and 
decentralised (Figure 5.1). The removal of tribal powers over land and water 
rights was controversial at the time, but as discussed in Chapter Two and later 
in Chapters Eight and Nine, it is argued that an AC of strong elite leaders in 
support of the change, had been formed under the first President Seretse 
Khama, heir-apparent paramount Chief of the largest tribe, the Bangwato 
(Williams 2006). It gained majority support, in elections for both central and 
local government. This led to his party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), 
forming the first post independence government. This political party has 
remained in power since then through democratic elections. The constitutional 
settlement was challenged in 2010-12 by Kgosi Kgafela Kgafela of the Bakgatla 
tribe and this will be explored in Section 8.1. 
  
                                                 
48
 This is explored in Chapter Eight, Section One 
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5.4 Institutions for WSS 1966-2009 
 
The post Independence settlement on water was codified in legislation: the 
Water Act, 1968 [CAP 34:01] and the Water Utilities Act, 1970 [CAP 74:02] set 
the framework, shown in Figure 5.2. Some pre-Independence water laws 
remain in force, such as the Waterworks Act of 1962 [CAP 34.03], with 
Ministerial powers to set tariffs and prevent water wastage, and the Boreholes 
Act of 1956 on the control on boreholes (FAOLEX 2011). Other Acts and 
regulations that impact on WRM in Botswana are listed and briefly outlined in 
Appendix Two. 
 
The Water Act, 1968 asserts that the State owns all water resources and has 
delegated water development and user rights to various providers: 
 
The Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) is a parastatal organisation 
wholly owned by the Botswana Government, established in 1970 by an 
Act of Parliament, reporting to the Minister for the Ministry of Mining, 
Energy and Water Resources (MMEWR). It took over the previous 
responsibility of government set out in the Water Works Act (1962) for 
the supply of safe drinking water in urban areas in so-called waterworks 
areas49, such as Gaborone, the capital, Francistown, Lobatse and 
Selebi-Phikwe. There, WUC had a monopoly and was the only entity 
allowed to drill boreholes in those areas, subject to permission from the 
WAB set up under the Water Act 1968. WUC is required by law to break-
even50. Before the reforms, WUC provided water to 21.5% of Batswana
                                                 
49
 The defining of the ‘waterworks areas’ could be expanded by order of the Minister and it is 
under the Water Works Act 1962 that WUC has been enabled to take over all responsibility for 
WSS in Botswana after 2009. 
 
50
 CAP 74:02:Para19.1: ‘It shall be the duty of the Corporation to conduct its affairs on sound 
commercial lines...and so prescribe the charges payable in respect of the supply by the 
Corporation of water so as to ensure that its revenues are sufficient to produce on the fair value 
of its assets a reasonable return measured by taking its net operating income as a percentage 
of the fair value of its fixed assets in operation plus an appropriate allowance for its working 
capital’. 
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Figure 5.2 1968-2009 Responsibilities for water delivery  Source: Researcher’s Observation from KIIs, 2011 
 
NB:  The arrows represent the decentralisation of power from the centre. The dotted lines  
from WAB represent the low levels of power held by the WAB
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domestic users in the urban areas (National Development Plan (NDP) 8, 
2000). 
 
 The Department of Water Affairs (DWA) within MMEWR charged with 
the establishment of reticulated water supply systems in the rural 
villages. In addition, it operated and maintained the systems in 
seventeen large villages. It provided potable water to an estimated 
22.5% of the population (NDP 8, 2000). WUC operated largely 
independently of DWA (KI WUCO 5). 
 The 18 District Councils (DCs) who operated and maintained the water 
supply systems in all other rural settlements, usually through the Water 
and Sanitation Division of each District Council. This covered 22% of the 
people (NDP 8, 2000). 
 DEBSWANA PLC, the diamond producing joint venture between De 
Beers PLC and the Government of Botswana (GOB) which provided 
potable water to the mining towns of Orapa and Jwaneng, from 
boreholes. DEBSWANA development was restricted by a lack of water 
(Stephenson 2007). 
 Self-providers who included livestock owners, arable farmers and 
mining companies that operated outside villages and settlements. Self-
providers applied for surface or groundwater rights to the Water 
Apportionment Board (WAB), who granted such rights with an 
abstraction ceiling. Details of boreholes (yields, depth, water quality and 
so forth) were to be recorded in the National Borehole Registry, held by 
the Department of Geological Surveys (DGS), as required under the 
Boreholes Act (1956). Monitoring of abstraction of the self-providers was 
difficult and in practice inadequate. By the 1970s, ‘the water rights 
situation in rural areas was nearly chaotic. In 1972, allocations of 
individual borehole rights in the Central District were being made at a 
rate that amounted to 14% to 17% of the total territory per year’ (Parsons 
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1984:66). It is suggested that the DGS overview of the system “has been 
and remains poor, due to lack of financial resources and political will” (KI 
CGCS3). This has been seen as a major gap in the country’s water 
management system, as self-providers provide potable water for not only 
34% of the population but also the water for livestock farmers, general 
agriculture and the mines (NDP 8, 2000). No definitive figures are 
available as there is almost no monitoring of the off-take of water from 
self provided boreholes and their use of surface water (KI CGCS3). This 
will be further pursued in Chapter Nine. 
 
5.5 The Water Act (1968) 
  
This Act controlled access to, and use of, water resources. Box 5.1 outlines the 
institutions that flowed from the Act. 
 
Water rights were needed to abstract, store, dam and divert water. They were 
granted for abstraction for a specific purpose (for example, mining, forestry, 
industry, power generation and agriculture) and indicated the maximum amount 
and period of abstraction. The abstraction ceiling varied, according to the use 
but usually did not exceed 22.75 M3 per day. The Water Apportionment Board 
(WAB) granted water rights and kept a record of these51. Water rights may be 
cancelled if they are not used within three years or if there is too little water. It is 
said that ‘the rights are conditional: that water should be returned (where 
reasonable) to the body from which it was abstracted and as much water as 
possible (given the type of use) should be returned; water should not be 
polluted’ (Centre for Applied Research (CAR) 2005:33). However, the same 
2005 report states ‘the penalties for non-compliance were high in 1968, but 
have not been adjusted and are now very low. The monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms are inadequate’ (ibid). 
 
                                                 
51
 The records held in paper form at the DGS were “uncoordinated and incomplete” (KI CGCS 
3) 
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No water rights have been removed since the inception of WAB and there have 
been no fines for over abstraction. “There is no check on abstraction levels” (KI 
WUCO1). There was no fee for the abstraction of groundwater beyond the P60 
[£6 in 2010] for the initial application (Grynberg 2013:5). Groundwater, after the 
costs of abstraction, was free. Within the areas granted for mining under the 
Mines and Minerals Act, Part II, Article7 (1), there was no limit on the 
abstraction of water (ibid). 
 
The Act was seen as deficient as cited by CAR 2005: 
 
 ‘There is inadequate demand prioritisation and allocation; 
Box 5.1 The institutions and their roles under the 1968 Water Act  
 
I. Supply agencies:  
Water authorities (WUC, DWA and DCs) who  
 Supply the planning of water resources 
 Have the duty to supply reticulated water in waterworks areas 
 Have  the right to propose water tariffs to Cabinet 
 The right to supply other users, but not at lower charges than those 
for waterworks (WUC) areas 
 Do surface and groundwater explorations and borehole drilling and 
well field development  
 Do desalination 
 
II. Water management institutions: 
 Water Apportionment Board (national level) which is responsible for 
the allocation and monitoring of the use of the water rights. The 
Registrar is based in the DWA. 
 District Land Boards and sub-Land Boards who  
allocate land use rights, which have to be obtained to enable an 
application to the WAB for water rights under the land 
 National Conservation Coordinating Strategy Agency which carries 
out the Implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment(EIA) 
legislation, including reviewing the EIAs and the coordination of 
resource use and management (e.g. land and water) 
Source:  1968 Water Act 
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 It does not provide for an integrated water management approach, for 
example, catchment area management; 
 The treatment of water pollution is inadequate; 
 There is no provision in the Act for management of shared water 
courses’  
 
In other words, the 1968 Act is not in line with the SADC Protocol on Shared 
Water Courses (2003, 1997). In the absence of a comprehensive revised water 
policy, the institutional framework of water planning and management was seen 
as having limitations. However, water suppliers and authorities had managed to 
improve access to potable and affordable water, and to adapt to droughts and 
growing water scarcity. This push for more water for all had led to ‘the past bias 
towards [unlimited] water supply at the expense of a balanced IWRM approach’ 
(CAR 2005:33). There has been a strong critique of the failings of this WRM 
framework. It is said that:  
 
‘water resource planning and monitoring of use has not been 
adequately institutionalised. No single institution is responsible for 
IWRM planning in the country, and no water planning and policy 
unit exists...the absence of a policy and planning institution must 
have contributed towards the delay in water law reforms. Lack of 
such an institution has also contributed to fragmentation and gaps 
in water supply, use and management data’ (ibid). 
 
The institutional framework for WRM and WSS through the Water Act (1968) 
appeared, by 2005, to be both inadequate and incoherent in accountability. But 
the rationale for the water decision-makers in Botswana outlined in Section 5.4 
meant that there was no change in their decision-making process and the 
outcomes of those processes. It was seen as a barrier to the introduction of 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). It could be conjectured that 
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the maintenance of the status quo involved all key stakeholders in a mutually 
consensual advocacy coalition that had held since 1966.  
 
5.6 Sponsoring Ministries  
 
The wording of the 1968 Water Act in its range of official institutions (Box 5.1), 
disguised the multitude of Ministries and their powers attached to the provision 
of WRM and WSS in Botswana prior to the 2009 reforms as is seen in Box 5.2.  
 
 
 
Water extraction rights given for mining and energy production, responsible for 
over 20% of water consumption (NDP 2000), once given by the WAB, were not 
further restricted (Grynberg 2013) (Figure 5.3). But as the industries were 
contained within the single Ministry for Mining, Energy and Water Resources 
(MMEWR), they were overviewed by a single Minister for policy direction. But 
that policy was one of providing that which was seen as necessary for the 
economic development of Botswana, with no restrictions. 
 
Box 5.2 Sponsoring Ministries on Water Issues before 2009 
 
Ministry    Responsibility    
Mining, Energy, Water  WAB, WUC, DWA, DGS, Debswana 
and all mining rights, Botswana Power 
Corporation (BPC) and all power 
producers  
Local Government  District and Town Councils, Tribal 
Administration, and WSS to villages 
(with water from WUC) 
Lands and Housing   Land Boards 
Environment and Wildlife Impact Assessment, Sewerage 
Regulation 
Agriculture   Irrigation, Cattle, Agriculture 
 
Lands and Housing   Land Boards 
 
Environment and Wildlife Impact Assessment, Sewerage 
Regulation 
Agriculture   Irrigation, Cattle, Agriculture 
 
     Source: Researcher’s 
observation  
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The second Ministry with a dominant influence on water, with over 40% of the 
water usage (Figure 5.3), that of Agriculture, was perceived to have operated 
outside the MMEWR/WAB rights based regime. It saw itself as supporting the 
livelihoods of Batswana in providing water, through boreholes, to the up to five 
million cattle (in non-drought years) and the mitigation of rain-fed subsistence 
agriculture through small dams. It has been said that ‘the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) has operated a parallel but separate water policy to MMEWR since 1966 
as part of the consensus on water’ (KI WUCO 1). MoA had, it was alleged, 
‘established and operated dams and boreholes without an application to the 
WAB’ (KI WUCO 1). ‘It is estimated that over 21,000 boreholes exist in the 
country, but many are not used and capped. Just over half of the registered 
boreholes in the country are owned by the government, the remainder by 
private individuals’ (AQUASTAT for Botswana 2012:1). ‘Until 1993, the MoA 
supplied water to farmers at no charge. In 1993 the Ministry [MoA] changed its 
policy and asked farmers to contribute 15 percent of dam construction costs. 
The Ministry [MoA] also gives grants to syndicates to finance a portion of the 
costs of sinking boreholes for livestock watering. Syndicates operate and 
maintain the boreholes, but pay nothing for the water. They are required to 
obtain water rights from the WAB, which are free of charge’ (ibid: 2). However 
there are a large number of unlicensed boreholes, many of which have been 
drilled with the support of the MoA (KI NGON 6). This is further explored in 
Section 9.2. Official statistics show 2% of the Botswana GDP came from the 
44% usage of water (Figure 5.3). The assessment of only 2% of formal 
employment coming from agriculture belies the almost total part time 
employment of the nation, in pursuit of cattle raising and the planting of the 
masimo (ibid). The lack of monitoring of borehole water throughput also brings 
into question the accuracy of the official record. 
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Figure 5.3 Water Use in Botswana 2011(showing share of GDP, employment 
and water use)      Source: GOB 201352 
 
The role of the Ministry of the Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) in 
ensuring the sufficient allocation of water to ecosystems is perceived to have 
been weak relative to the other two ministries. But agreement to the RAMSAR 
designation for the Okavango River delta and the increasing importance of 
water rights to maintain the pristine wild-life parks and thus the Tourism Industry 
shows a balancing within this allocation system, supported by the Wildlife Policy 
passed in 2013. The Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) required to 
take place before major projects which could impact on water resources, have 
been weak and have not led to a change in those plans, usually sponsored by 
MMEWR (KI CGCS 9 2013). The regulation of waste-water by MEWT has not 
led to reuse of water for human consumption and only limited quantities have 
been used for irrigation. The siting of pit latrines authorised by MEWT has not 
always taken account of their impact on the aquifers below as in the case of the 
Ramwotswa aquifer in the 1990s. 
                                                 
52
  Available at 
https://wavespartnership.org/waves/sites/waves/files/images/Bot%20WAVES%20Botswana%20
Presentation%20April%209,%202013.pdf accessed 16
th
 July 2013 
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It is said that “WAB has never been known to turn down a water rights 
application” (KI WUCO 1). The WAB chair denies this but was unable to provide 
any evidence of applications having been turned down (KI CGCS2). “WAB has 
never had a single field staff member” (KI WEN 5). The interviews at MoA with 
Ministers and civil servants confirmed a “strong independent line of command 
over the provision of water for agricultural use” (KI CGP2 and KI CGCS9). It 
should be noted that while there are farmers’ groups that lobby MoA for water, 
there are no water user associations. The cooperative associations set up in the 
years after independence have largely died out with the withdrawal of support of 
ODA money and expertise. The almost universal secondary occupation of every 
Batswana at all levels was and is that of being a farmer at the lands (masimo) 
or at the cattle post (moraka). The researcher reflects that during the fieldwork 
period, he has heard farmers assert their right to whatever water is available as 
an ‘unalienable right’. This contradicts any policy of restricted water demand 
management (WDM) at any time. 
 
The database of borehole locations and water off-take is “very poor” (KI CGCS 
3). A water point survey of Kgatleng District, the last comprehensive analysis of 
water points in the fieldwork area, supports this view (Wellfield 1997:12). “Very 
few water points are registered [with WAB] and the few records that are 
available have unsatisfactory completed forms” (ibid). “A much large[r] number 
of water points than had been originally estimated were encountered” (ibid: 30).  
The Kgatleng Land Board suspended all new land and therefore water rights 
applications from December 2010 to January 2012; this was to conduct an audit 
of exactly how many and where the boreholes were in Kgatleng District. 
“Nobody knew” (KI LBCS 1). “There are many boreholes in this area of 
rangeland and they are not 5 km apart as is required. They do not have WAB 
authorisation and have been drilled by the MoA” (KI NGON 6). “Other Land 
Boards are considering the same course of action “(KI LBCS1). There is 
similarly a “lack of detailed mapping of land rights for land allocated by the 
Chiefs and subsequently allocated by the Land Boards” (ibid). The trial 
mapping, that took place in 2010/11 by the Ministry of Lands and Housing 
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(MOLAH) in Matebeleng Village in Kgatleng District, is being evaluated to see if 
this can be done throughout Botswana53.  
 
This process of borehole and land tenure mapping has brought into question 
the future procedure for the drilling and allocation of boreholes. Discussion at 
the WB presentations of September 2010 (see Chapter Seven) proposed the 
use by GOB of satellite/Google Earth/NASA imaging to track down all boreholes 
to enable WDM to take place. This has not yet been authorised by GOB but is 
seen as “feasible” (KI CGCS 6). However, a former senior civil servant says 
“Lots of borehole water is reticulated in underground plastic pipes to a kraal or 
water point that may be far, far away from the borehole itself. Neither updated 
(cheap) Landsat or Google Earth will be able to locate the roof of a 2.5m x 3m 
pump house” (KI WEN 5). 
 
The researcher reflects that the pre-reform WRM framework for Botswana can 
be seen as fundamentally flawed, in part because of the rivalry between MoA 
and MMEWR, leading to a lack of coordination of allocation of water resources. 
 
5.7 River Basin Organisations (RBOs) impacting on Botswana WRM  
 
The post 1966 water settlement expressed in legislation did not take account of 
the Botswana dependence on surface water from the transboundary rivers 
surrounding the country (Figure 2.4). It is one of only six countries which 
depend on over 75% of its surface water needs on transboundary waters (TBW) 
(UNDP 2006:210). ‘It is the Southern African State which depends the most on 
good neighbourly relations’ (Maupin 2013:12). Botswana is the ‘State of all the 
Commissions’ (ibid) by participating in four river basin organisations: 
 
 The Okavango RBO, OKACOM: established in 1994 
 The Orange-Senqu RBO, ORASECOM, established in 2000 
                                                 
53
 MOLAH Newsletter, 2010:1,2,8  Bontsibokae K. “LAPCAS (Land Administration Procedures, 
Capacity and Systems), A New Tool for Modern Land Administration” 
 88 
 
 The Zambezi RBO, ZAMCOM, established in September 2011 
 The Limpopo RBO, LIMCOM, agreed upon in November 2003, but not 
yet ratified by all members. 
 
The RBOs are guided by the 1997 UN Water Courses Convention54 (not signed 
by Botswana) and the revised SADC Protocol on Shared Water Courses that 
came into force in September 2003. The latter has ‘the overall objective of 
fostering closer cooperation with judicious, sustainable and coordinated 
management, protection and utilisation of shared watercourses and advance 
the SADC agenda of regional integration and poverty reduction’ (GOB 2010:8; 
Jacobs 2012). The Secretariats have now been set up, the last being that for 
the ZAMCOM in May 2011 in Gaborone, located within the MMEWR offices. 
The Water Act (1968) which forms the framework for water resources in 
Botswana does not mention RBOs or the powers of GOB to ensure their 
integration into WRM in Botswana. 
 
It has been proposed that the SADC transboundary water commissions are 
evolving regional water law55 (Van der Zaag 2009).The four RBOs have been in 
the very early stages of negotiation and the availability of water to Botswana 
has been questionable. The renegotiation of the LIMCOM upper water 
allocation, that currently accrues 90% to SA and 10% to Botswana, under an 
agreement made during the apartheid years, moves slowly. The result of such a 
hegemonic process on the availability of water to SA was shown in fieldwork on 
the irrigated farming taking place in 2011 across the Mariko/Limpopo River, on 
the international border between Kgatleng District and the Limpopo Province of 
SA. On the SA side was multi-crop arable farming, using open tower day time 
spraying of water straight from the river. On the Botswana side in Kgatleng 
District, there was scrubland and some subsistence farming. At Olifants Drift 
                                                 
54
 Only SA and Namibia have signed from the SADC states but the SADC Protocol (2003) is 
based on the 1997 convention (Jacobs 2012:72,73) 
55
Although the results are patchy’:the Incomati TBWC has a strong basis of evolving water law 
although progress on the Limpopo TBWC is slow’ (Van der Zaag 2009:256)  
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there were two small horticultural ventures utilising the limited water extraction 
permits from the Limpopo River. Further limited water extraction licenses were 
issued by the WAB in August 2012 and could represent the first changes on 
water allocation. Sergio Sitoe, the Interim Executive Secretary of LIMCOM, 
mentioned a recent complaint in which the Botswana government felt their 
South African counterparts should have officially informed them before 
beginning a development in the river basin. The LIMCOM Head said that “while 
regional agreements allowed for disputes to be taken to the SADC Tribunal, 
there were a number of conflicts in the region that were being discussed behind 
closed doors”56. Recent academic analysis point up the disproportionately low 
uptake of Botswana share of Limpopo River water (Lankford 2013:138). 
 
South Africa, as the local hegemonic power (Saunders 2012: 6; Van der Zaag 
2009:256; 2007), takes from the Orange-Senqu River system57, 99% of the 
flow” (KI IA6). These arrangements were being renegotiated in 2013-14. The 
hegemonic nature of the relationship between SA and Botswana is pointed up 
by the comments of a retired SA negotiator who in discussions with the 
Researcher stated that “if Botswana wanted more water [from ORASECOM or 
LIMCOM], they only had to ask me” (KI WESA 2 2012). The negotiating position 
of Botswana as a frontline state opposing apartheid SA was tempered to take 
account of its dependence in surface water on rivers controlled by SA (Masire 
2006). 
 
In 1994, Angola, Namibia and Botswana signed the OKAKOM treaty 
establishing a legal framework for the sharing of the waters of the River 
Okavango within the instrument of the Permanent Okavango River Basin 
Organisation ( Weinzierl 2013).The GOB unilaterally ratified the RAMSAR 
convention in 1997 to protect the wetland ecosystem of the Okavango Basin, 
and thereby restricted its water from general availability to the economy, beyond 
                                                 
56
 Reported  in http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=108042, accessed 7th June 2012 
57
 There has been academic justification for this allocation of water because of the greater water 
productivity in South Africa (Heyns 2008; Lange 2007). 
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the use for human consumption, local rural livelihoods for subsistence farming 
and the support and development of tourism58. Recent research updates the 
Okavango water allocation needs of the three riparian states and the expansion 
of agriculture that is likely in southern Angola, which is seen as more water 
scarce than Namibia or Botswana (Weinzierl 2013; SADC 2012a Project XB-1). 
Botswana tourism depends on the continued flow of the Okavango River flowing 
through Angola and Namibia to the RAMSAR ecosystem at the end waters of 
the river (ibid). 
 
Botswana’s hopes for water abundance lay on securing a significant59 share of 
the waters of the Zambezi River and of the feeder Chobe River. The SADC 
water protocol process for ZAMCOM was important to Botswana as water from 
the Orange, Limpopo and Okavango Rivers are largely seen as allocated 
(SADC KII November 2010). Only the Zambezi River flows are seen as 
available for new allocation, and much of Botswana’s future development is 
predicated on the North-South Carriers of water, bringing water from the 
Zambezi tributaries upriver, to the Eastern side of Botswana (Khama 2011). The 
co-location of the ZAMCOM secretariat with MMEWR in Gaborone in May 2011 
was seen as an indication of that importance. The first coordinator of ZAMCOM 
was at pains to point out that ZAMCOM was not as yet, in May 201160, a 
binding allocative process water commission. The future allocation of Zambezi 
water to Botswana61 was crucial to agricultural development plans in the NE of 
Botswana, particularly the Zambezi Integrated Agricultural Development Project 
(ZIADP) in the Pandamatenga area (KI CGP2). The claim of water engineers 
that it would reduce the flow of the Zambezi by less than 1% has led to 
assumed endorsement by the Parties in 2013. If there were no objections, it 
was deemed by GOB to have the green light under the SADC Water Protocol of 
                                                 
58
 This followed a successful international NGO campaign against GOB proposals to utilise the 
Okavango water for industrial use (Thomas 2001)  Greenpeace was said to be the key 
opposition NGO by the then Director of the DWA, Moremi Sekwale (ibid;118). 
59
  Reported as agreed by Minister Mokaila on 29
th
 March 2013 available at : 
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=203&dir=2013/ 
60
 In March 2013, the status remained the same as May 2011 
61
 Botswana is requesting 495 Mm
3 
each year 
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2003 (KI IA7). However this was a process outside the absolute power of GOB 
(Lankford 2013). 
 
While the RBOs are set within the IWRM paradigm (see Chapter Two), they 
have been criticised:  
 
‘I am not a fan of the river basin organisations, notably 
LIMCOM and ORASECOM. They manage to promote donors 
and minority environmental voices at the expense of long 
term influence on what happens in the basins because they 
marginalise the national decision-makers. They also drain the 
national administrations of competent people by offering 
donor salaries. But that's my own jaundiced view - although 
empirically, far more has been achieved on WRM in non-RBO 
settings’ (KI WESA 2, July 2012). 
 
The meetings of the transboundary water commissions (TBWC) are frequent 
but decisions on water allocation are slow. It has been suggested that the 
TBWCs can have ‘negative effects’ (Muller 2011:159):  
 
‘First, they weaken national WRM capabilities as some of the 
better staff are lured out of service by donor-subsidised 
salaries in the TBWCs. Second, they weaken political 
oversight over water management and strengthen the hand of 
unrepresentative interest groups. Thus environmental groups 
are enthusiastic for RBO. In addition the establishment of 
these organisations provides donor countries with an easy 
channel of influence for both political and commercial 
purposes’ (ibid: 159).  
 
The participants and funders in the international processes are sanguine about 
the outcomes of these processes (KI IA 1-8). TBWC funders could help smaller 
nations in negotiations with basin hegemonic powers where they occur. The 
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research on the working of ORASECOM suggests that, for Namibia, the TBWC 
funders have been helpful (Kiston 2012).  No formal allocation of water has 
been made to Botswana from the ORASECOM negotiations.  
 
The launch of six SADC Infrastructure Master Plans in 2013,  by the then 
Botswana High Commissioner Nick Pyle, included plans for water and 
meteorology (SADC 2012a; SADC 2012b). The planning had been financed by 
DFID across the SADC area and could impact favourably on Botswana at 
ORASECOM and unfavourably at OKACOM. There was a bid by Botswana for 
water from the Orange –Senqu River, the Vaal-Gamayara water supply for 
villages in SW Botswana (ibid:106, Project GP-9). However it was noted to be 
subject to SA approval. The Botswana instigated project on the Limpopo River 
was to analyse pollution from SA farmers (ibid:91, Project GP-1) 
 
The Researcher reflects on the hydro-mission and private sector drive behind 
the planning, and the absence of any project finance proposals for national 
WRM and universal access for WSS at the country level, in the case of this 
thesis, for Botswana.  
 
5.8 Progress in Delivery of WRM and WSS in Botswana 1966-2009 
 
WRM in Botswana was limited and its absence heavily criticised (CAR 2005). 
The Botswana branch of the Global Water Partnership (GWP) pressed for 
UNEP funding for a Botswana IWRM plan in 2002 and this was granted in 2009 
(see Chapter Seven). Otherwise, as has been shown above, the provision of 
water was on the basis of ‘predict and provide’. This was through nearly free 
groundwater for mining and agriculture and heavily subsidised unrestricted 
(outside drought periods) surface and groundwater for wholesale provision of 
raw water for ultimate domestic and industrial use (ibid).  
The progress on WSS was different. At independence in 1966, the availability of 
potable water to the individual Motswana was recorded as above 35% and 
improved sanitation at above 15%. But records were poor and this may have 
been overstated. By 2009 and before the reforms, these figures were asserted 
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to have risen to 97% for potable water and 84% for improved sanitation (UNDP 
2009). Therefore it could have been said that there was no need to change the 
institutional arrangements. This could have been considered a major success, 
particularly relative to other SSA countries (Stampino 2012). But the figures for 
access have been queried as being exaggeratingly high in both the case of 
potable water as well as for improved sanitation. The figures particularly “ignore 
the problems of access for the poor and access in rural areas” where 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) and District Councils (DC) had the 
responsibility for WSS (KI WEN 1 and see Chapter Nine). The figures given in 
the Government Water Statistics of 2008 from the Census of 2001 were that the 
proportion of population that received piped/tapped water, whether from a 
private connection or a communal tap, was 87.01%. A comparison between 
cities/towns and villages (urban and rural) showed that 99.5% of the population 
in cities/towns in that year got piped or tapped water while in villages the 
proportion was 84.1% (GOB 2009:9). The compilation of figures from 
WHO/UNICEF 2010 (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) shows the gap in 2006 between the 
total coverage of improved drinking-water sources (IDWS) and house 
connections. This was bridged by other provisions, primarily through the supply 
from standpipes. 99.7% of urban areas had access to IDWS but only 81.2% had 
house connections. In the rural areas, there was 91.4% access to IWS but only 
34.4% had house connections. The figures also mask levels of inconsistency of 
delivery. The WUC areas of delivery increasingly gave good performance but 
the intermittent provision in the villages by DWA and DCs was heavily criticised 
by key informants in 2010/11. 
 
The water borne sanitation services (WBSS), while being extended from the 
towns to larger villages under DC management in the period 1990-2006 (Figure 
2), were often not taken up by choice by the citizens due to the cost of the 
connection and subsequent services. The continued use of Pit Latrines 
inappropriately located above water courses and aquifers has lead to large 
scale pollution of key aquifers (KIs 2010-11). While 83% in urban areas had 
access to improved sanitation, the figure dropped to 51% in the rural areas 
(Table 2.3). In both cases, a number of connections were not completed and 
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used (Botswana Demographic Survey 2006). The figures show that, despite the 
good performance of DWA in the non WUC provided large villages; there 
remains a gap in the full provision of WSS.  
 
A major Consumer Satisfaction Survey 200962, carried out on behalf of WUC, 
did not show low performance levels by DWA in the areas which were soon to 
migrate to WUC (Briggs 2010:6). The survey covered existing areas served by 
WUC, soon to migrate areas (such as Mochudi) and recently migrated areas 
such as Tlokweng and Mogoditshane. In the latter areas, satisfaction was less. 
This was blamed on poor communication in the handover, but a WUC KI also 
said “there had been political opposition whipped up against the transfer from 
DWA to WUC” (KI WUCO 4). 
 
5.9 National Water Master Plan (NWMP) 1992 
 
The initial internal driving force for the development of the National Water 
Master Plan (NWMP) was from within the water professional elite, as a 
response to the water needs of Botswana increasing, with the rise in population 
and living standards 1966-1990 (GOB 1992). The NWMP was based on a long-
term hydro-engineering perspective of predict and provide, and recommended 
that the additional water needs be met by additional dams, development of well 
fields and through the construction of the North-South Water Carrier (NSC) I. 
The latter was completed in 2005 and was seen as providing for the long term 
needs of South East Botswana, the main population and industrial centres, by 
moving water from the North East higher rainfall areas to the South. It is subject 
to significant but undisclosed leakage according to WUC sources, reducing its 
efficacy. Major villages were progressively given access to NSC I during the 
                                                 
62
 The Consumer Satisfaction Survey is conducted annually but is a private WUC in house 
document intended to pin point low performance levels. In the case of the survey in 2009, 
across all the main centres in Botswana, most of which were then run by DWA and not WUC, 
the results were very good. No survey was carried out for the rural area where WSS 
performance at that time was being performed by the District Councils. The Gaborone and 
Francistown results for Private and Business consumers were the lowest, thought by the 
surveyors to be due to the “much higher expectations of service delivery than other 
areas”(Briggs 2010:6) 
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period of fieldwork. There were major problems of leakage and pump failure in 
the NSC I (KI WEN 5) with water shortages in the Gaborone area in 2013.  
 
 
Photograph 5.2 Inauguration of work on N-S Carrier II, Palapye May 2013 
 
A NSC II was initiated in May 2013, shown in Photograph 5.2, for completion by 
November 2014. It had been envisaged in 2007 that NSC II would be paid for 
by CIC Energy PLC, the proposed developers of the Mmamabula coalfield 
(Colman 2010). The failure of CIC Energy to get a Private Power Provider 
(PPP) contract from ESKOM, South Africa led to the withdrawal of their interest. 
Financing of the P1.6Bn. fell upon the GOB. The Director of DWA in disclosing 
this63 at the inauguration also spoke of a NSC III in the next ten years. ‘All 
potential coal and other mining needs for water were being planned to be met in 
this way by 2035, as was 76% of the forecast consumer needs of Greater 
                                                 
63
 Dr.Obakeng Palapye;  English translation of the speech made available to the Researcher 
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Gaborone’. At the Inauguration,attended by the Researcher, no figures for water 
flows were disclosed. 
 
The NWMP (GOB 1992) pointed out that Botswana depended on groundwater 
for 80% of water needs at that time and had the lowest per capita storage 
capacity in Southern Africa. It proposed three new major dams namely: 
Dikatlhong, Thune and Lotsane, with capacities of 400M m3, 90M m3 and 40M 
m3, respectively, constructed in order to alleviate water shortage for domestic 
and industrial consumption. The three dams were completed in 2011-2013 and 
in the case of Dikatlhong to provide water for irrigation purposes64. Table 5.1 
shows all the retention dams in Botswana and Figure 5.4 shows the location of 
the dams. Table 5.1 demonstrates the post independence hydro-mission (1966-
93) and then the outcome of the second phase hydro-mission (2005-2013) set 
in train by the NWMP (GOB 1992). The initial phase largely concentrated on 
surface water from the South from the tributaries of the Limpopo River. The 
second phase saw the switch to the utilisation of flows from the North. However 
in all cases evaporation levels led to the need in each year to await the annual 
rains to fill the dams.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
Primarily to the Zambezi Integrated Agricultural Development Project (ZIADP) in the 
Pandamatenga area in the NNE of Botswana.  
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Name of 
Dam 
Year 
Constructed 
Capacity 
(Mm3) 
River Course Location District 
Gaborone 1966 144.00 Notwane Gaborone 
South 
East 
Nnywane 1970 2.30 Nnywane Lobatse 
South 
East 
Shashe 1970 88.10 Shashe Mooke 
North 
East 
Molatedi65 1986 201.00 Marico/Limpopo 
Zeerust 
(RSA) 
West 
(RSA) 
Bokaa 1993 18.82 
Notwane 
/Metsimotlhabe 
Bokaa Kgatleng 
Letsibogo 1997 100.00 Motloutse Mmadinare Central 
Ntimbale 2005 26.50 Tati Tutume 
North 
East 
Lotsane 2011 42,30 Lotsane Maunatlala Central 
Dikgatlhong 2012 400.00 Notloutse Robelela Central 
Thune 2013 90.00 Thune Bobonong Central 
Mosetse 
In 
construction 
31.70 Mosetse Mosetse Central 
 
Table 5.1 Major retention dams for surface water in Botswana 
       Source: after Grynberg 2013:3 
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 In SA supplying water to top up the Gaborone Dam under the LIMCOM allocation of 10% of 
the Limpopo River Basin shared by SA and Botswana 
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Figure 5.4 Location of Dams (surface water sources) in Botswana 
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Table 5.2 Forecast water demand as set out by the NWMP (GOB 1992) 
 
Table 5.2 shows the forecast water demand that led to the rationale of a ‘predict 
and provide’ plan of NWMP (GOB 1992) It was a guesstimate as other than the 
flows measured by the DWA for settlements and energy, the other categories 
were estimates (KII 2010). It was used to justify the dam building indicated 
above. 
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 are not comparable to Table 5.2 but are the Botswana Water 
Accounts for 2006 prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning (MFADP) and again are largely estimates with the exception of the 
information from the DWA and WUC. It should be noted that the Water 
Accounts that were to be produced by the MFADP in 2011 have still not been 
published by 2014. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the data put forward in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4; it could be seen as a reassurance to the elite coalition 
running Botswana that all was known and under control. There was no need to 
 Estimated demands (106m3/a) in the year 
Category 1990 2000 2020 
Settlements 34 69 168 
Mining and Energy 23 33 59 
Livestock 35 45 45 
Irrigation and 
Forestry  
19 29 46 
Wildlife  6 6 6 
TOTAL 117 182 324 
 100 
 
query the status quo only to provide more dams and North South Carriers 
(NSC). 
 
Year 
 
User category 
 
1992 1996 2000 2003 
Agriculture 72.9 70.6 76.0 63.4 
Mining 12.8 14.4 24.1 26.8 
Manufacturing 3.9 2.1 4.0 5.1 
Water + electricity 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.7 
Construction 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Trade 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.2 
Hotels and restaurants 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Transport + communication 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Insurance, banking, 
business 
0.0 0.5 0.7 0.8 
Social and personal services 0.0 1.2 1.7 2.4 
Government 8.7 8.8 11.1 11.5 
Household use 36.1 41.1 48.1 56.9 
WUC private sector 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Grand Total 142.3 141.3 168.6 170.3 
 
Table 5.3 Actual water use by economic sector (Mm3) 1992-2003 
Source: Botswana Water Accounts Report GOB 2006b:32 
 
The low levels of demand for water for electricity generation (and the linked coal 
mining for Marupule A power station) correctly measured from MMEWR 
statistics reflect the then dependence in 2006 of Botswana on electricity 
supplied under the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) from ESKOM. This 
came to an abrupt end in 2009 with notice being given by the South African 
government. The additional water needs for energy production at Marupule B 
and C power stations will be a key to future WDM after 2013 when they come 
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on stream (Colman 2010). Coal mining for Moropule A led to water usage of 
664Mm3 in 2010 (MMEWR Statistics). For their future additional water needs, 
the Morupule power stations and colliery are linked by pipeline to the NSC I and 
in 2014 to NSC II. 
 
 
Table 5.4 Proportion of water use by sector 2003 
Source: Botswana Water Accounts Report, GOB 2006b:32 
 
The assessment of water use by the self providers in mining could be 
contested. The dewatering required by mining and the high usage of water 
rights from WAB in the use of groundwater in the mining process was ‘of 
concern’ (Rahm 2006:178). The statistics from the mining industry were self 
supplied and do not correlate with the GOB water accounts  ‘In 2006, the total 
national water use was 88.3 Mm3/ yr with DEBSWANA operations accounting 
for 25.6% or a total of 22.6 Mm3/ yr’ (Brook 2009:1). The figures for the 
extraction of water, for de-watering, are in addition. By 2009, there was a clear 
concern even in the mining industry that water needed to be conserved and this 
was accepted and acted on by DEBSWANA (ibid, KI I 1)66.  
                                                 
66
 In 2013, the company set in train the ‘Orapa Hypersaline Water Investigation Conceptual 
Study’ for desalination of wellfield brine that could supply over 6Mn
3 
of treated water to the 
Agriculture        37% 
Households       33% 
Mining                16% 
Government        7% 
Other Sectors      7% 
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Photograph 5.3 Moropule B Power Station 2013 
 
The view by MFADP (Table 5.4) was of the pre-eminence of agricultural use of 
water not supplied by MMEWR/WUC (at 37%) which demonstrates the 
consensus for the  two-fold supply system (from MoA and MMEWR) for water in 
Botswana  There are “almost no checks on the self providers of water for cattle 
from their own/syndicate boreholes” (KI WEN5). 
  
‘The confluence of political and economic decision-making 
power in the service of diamonds and cattle wealth ensures 
that resource use and policy reflects narrow interests and 
tends therefore towards preservation of status quo. Failure to 
fully implement the legal structure and low enforcement rates 
allow powerful forces within the country to use the system [on 
water] to their own, often short-term, advantage’ (Rahm 
2006:178). 
                                                                                                                                               
Orapa mine (out of the total DEBSWANA demand
  
throughout Botswana of 20Mn
3 
). Details 
from the Executive Summary provided by KI I:1 in May 2013 
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After the initial payment of BP6067 to the Water Apportionment Board for the 
abstraction license, no further charges were made and the license was in 
perpetuity. There was an incentive to maximise the use of free groundwater and 
minimise the purchase of charged for WUC water (Grynberg 2013, 2012).There 
was no incentive to introduce WDM or water recycling or, in the case of mining 
companies, dry technologies. 
 
The NWMP (SMEC 1992) acknowledged the lack of control over all providers 
and users of water and for the first time recommended a new Water Act and the 
establishment of a Water Resources Council (WRC) to serve as an overall 
coordinating body in the water sector and to take over the functions of the 
Water Apportionment Board. It would provide a strong statistical base for 
planning WRM. But these recommendations were never acted on. Academic 
commentary was critical of this lack of action:  
 
‘The stated goal [of the NWMP] is to work toward Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) in both policy and 
practice. However, policy measures have had limited impact 
on de facto practice. It is our view that a number of 
constraints—cultural, power, political, managerial—combine 
to hinder efforts toward sustainable forms of water resources 
use. If IWRM is to be realized in the country, these 
constraints must be overcome. This, however, is no small 
task’ (Swatuk 2004:1357) 
 
The Global Water Partnership (GWP)/Botswana Water Partnership (BWP) for 
Botswana was set up in 2002 ‘under the auspices of GWP-SA‘ but has limited 
itself to ‘address[ing] identified gaps in IWRM, which were seen as drought 
planning and developing IWRM awareness in national interventions’ (Earle 
2008:10). This limited role was perceived to need to be expanded (ibid).  
                                                 
67
 Approximately £6 in 2010/11 
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By 2006, academic concerns were even stronger on the lack of progress on a 
WRM plan for Botswana:  
 
‘A sustainable water use resource management plan must 
stretch several decades into the future to assure the 
availability of adequate supplies of water to future 
generations while not compromising the ability of the current 
generation to reasonable rates of economic development. Yet 
thinking about sustainability is present in Botswana water 
policy mostly only in rhetoric’ (Rahm 2006:157). 
 
The Botswana National Water Master Plan Review (NWMPR) was consulted on 
from 2002 onwards, and was agreed and published in 2006 (GOBc). This 
review sought to address the criticism of the then advocacy coalition based 
around the concept of ‘predict and provide’.and it produced a water atlas and 
WRM that could sustain Botswana.It was driven by the then Director of Water 
Affairs who in 2010 became the Permanent Secretary of MMEWR. The 
NWMPR (2006) forms the basis for a new advocacy coalition around WRM in a 
water restricted world. The GOB engaged the World Bank (WB) in 2008, to 
propose a way forward. They initiated a series of reports to critique and signal a 
way forward on the NWMPR 2006. These reports form the intellectual and 
hydrological base for action to replace the pre-2009 advocacy coalition and will 
be analysed in Chapter Seven. 
 
5.10 Local Government (LG) and DWA coordination on WSS before 2009 
 
There is only anecdotal evidence on the performance of LG and DWA on WSS, 
but a series of workshops were held on issues including WSS at councils 
across Botswana during 2003-9 (BALA 2009). The section on Kgatleng District 
Council (KDC), echoed elsewhere in the documentation for other councils, 
pointed out that ‘poor institutional coordination was a serious problem facing the 
public corporations such as the DWA, BPC, KLB and the town and planning 
committee [of the KDC]’ (BALA 2009:64). The strong perception was that there 
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was no shared responsibility for good governance between them. The workshop 
observed there was ‘policy confusion between these institutions’ (ibid). The 
BALA President observed that “many times, different institutions in districts did 
not closely work with each other and hardly knows what the others are doing”. 
This resulted ‘in conflict between policies and projects that are meant for the 
benefit of the same people’ (BALA 2009:56).This lack of coordination is further 
explored in Chapters Six and Eight  
 
5.11 South Africa and Namibia Comparisons on WRM and WSS 
 
The water sharing of the Orange-Senqu and Limpopo River systems for WRM 
has been explored in Section 5.7 and the need for Botswana to get on with her 
neighbours (Maupin 2013). The position on the provision of WSS in South 
Africa and Namibia was of good services in the white urban enclaves and very 
little provision elsewhere to either the black townships or rural areas, beyond 
the self provision by farmers and extractive industries. The post-Apartheid 
independence of South Africa and Namibia in the 1990s provided an 
independent benchmark to the Botswana institutional reviews of WSS. In the 
case of South Africa, Article 27 of the South African Constitution states that 
everyone has the right to sufficient water and that the state must ensure, 
through reasonable legislation, the realization of this right. (FAO 2012).This was 
in the South Africa Water Act (1998) and codified a free basic water policy 
(2001) with the entitlement to a free basic allowance of 25 litres per person per 
day. By 2010 the access figures for SA were 92.4% to clean water and 72.2% 
to improved sanitation (SAIRR 2010). The comparison to provision in Botswana 
will be further explored in Chapter Nine. 
  
Both South Africa and Namibia established, after post-Apartheid independence, 
a decentralised model of delivery with direct responsibility for WSS, for 
households, being placed squarely on the shoulders of Local Government 
institutions (Namibia Local Government Act 1992 and 2008, and the South 
Africa Water Services Act 1997). This was within the arrangement of River 
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Basin Agencies for raw water provision, on which local government, existing 
riparian rights owners and water user associations sat.  
 
‘The State was responsible for bulk supply but delegated its 
authority to major water boards and the actual sale and 
delivery of water was left to local government. The glaring 
deficiency of course was the poor delivery of water [to] black 
rural communities and the mushrooming squatter camps’ 
(Johnson 2010:103).  
 
The policy framework of WRM/IWRM was established under their Ministries of 
Water Affairs and Forestry, respectively, through the South Africa Water Act 
1998 and Namibia Water Resources Act 2004 (FAO 2012). However, in both 
cases there was no immediate (or later) removal of riparian rights from the 
existing owners, largely white farmers, and International and national resource 
extraction companies. 
 
The recent critique of WSS in South Africa notes the lack of clear accountability 
between the Local Government Ministry (Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (DCGTA)) and the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWA). KIs from SA commented on the widespread dissatisfaction with a 
decentralized model of WSS delivery (SAHRC 2014). The post May 2011 
Election decision to move responsibility for Sanitation away from the DWA to 
the Department of Human Settlements (DOHS) makes the lines of responsibility 
less clear and they remain so(Ibid) The ‘diffuse’ lines of responsibility between 
district and local government are seen as a concern (AMCOW68 2011:14). This 
tension between central and local government delivery of services in Botswana, 
South Africa and Namibia is further explored in Chapter Eight and Appendix 
Five. 
 
                                                 
68
 The AMCOW country reports on SAA miss out only three SSA countries: Gabon, Namibia and 
Botswana 
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WRM in South Africa has been criticised as inadequate with little control over 
users, domestic or otherwise, leading to forecasts of over 105% use of 
renewable water sources and a coming water crisis (Turton 2013, 2012). 60% 
of water use in South Africa is for farming, with exhortations coming from the 
South Africa Government to reduce this by 15% by 201569. But the primacy of 
the ‘property clause’, giving continuing unfettered water rights to farmers, was 
not challenged in the post Apartheid constitution and undermines water 
allocation reform (Movik 2012:135). The concern about acid mine drainage 
further impacting on South Africa water reserves has led to clear requirements 
on mining companies to carry out remediation. The pricing of water by 
RANDWATER in SA in 2010/11 for supply to mining companies was at ZAR 
6.8Mn3 far higher than the highest prices charged by WUC to miners of 
P5.7Mn3 (Grynberg 2012:39). The pricing of water for all users in Botswana is 
explored in Chapter Nine. 
 
5.12 Discussion of key issues around both the AC of 1966 onwards and 
the nascent AC evident from 2009 
 
The deeply held core beliefs of the Batswana on water 
 
In Section 5.4, the FG data demonstrates the need to consider the WRM 
reforms after Independence, against the deeply held views of Batswana on the 
origins of water, and particularly the centrality of God in this process, and, in the 
past, the role of the rainmaker within Tswana society. This belief was sustained 
by the universal male experience in the past of living at the cattle post 
depending on rainfall for fodder...and access to water to live (Head 1969). 
 
The post 1966 AC policy structures 
 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the complexity of the WSS governance network 
structure in Botswana. The central government elite moved forward its agenda, 
                                                 
69
 Farmers Weekly 26
th
 April 2013:33 
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in this case on WSS delivery, away from the tribal authorities, but there were 
delays and reappraisals in agreeing the policies. The need to gain approval 
from this network between 1966 and 1972 for legislation and, until 1990, for 
dilution of tribal powers over land and therefore water resources, shows the 
depth of the need to build advocacy coalitions before change can be completed 
within the Botswana decision making process. This chapter has also reviewed 
evidence of competition between ministries, and between the government as a 
whole and local institutions. The resolution of this tension is the subject of 
Chapter Eight. 
 
The AC open secret: the shadow water allocation process in rural areas 
 
A tension between MEWR and MoA on ultimate responsibility for water 
resources and allocation was recognised. There is a Batswana view that every 
citizen is a farmer having a right to land and water for crops and cattle, and the 
MoA defends that position. But this stance conflicts with the official strict 
structure of limited water rights from the WAB, run from MMEWR. This is at the 
root of the perceived fault line in the pre-2009 WRM settlement. As will be seen 
in Chapter Seven (in the projected reforms) and Eight and Nine (in the potential 
outcomes on the ground), this secretive shadow allocative process was a key 
reason for the need for water reforms and has led to the proposal for the 
replacement of WAB by an all powerful, strengthened WRC as the main vehicle 
for WRM, WSS and WDM in Botswana. 
 
The acceptance of mining by the AC as an uncritical user of water 
 
The dewatering required by mining and the high usage of water rights from 
WAB in the use of groundwater in the mining process is of concern (Rahm 
2006:178).  By 2009, there was a clear anxiety that water needs to be 
conserved even in the mining industry and this was accepted by DEBSWANA 
(KI I 1). However, the nearly free provision of groundwater and under pricing of 
WUC supplied water did not provide the signals for the introduction of WDM by 
mining companies (Grynberg 2013, 2012). 
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The AC weakness: the insecurity of dependence on trans-boundary rivers 
 
Over 75% of the surface water needs of Botswana come from shared water 
courses (UNDP 2006:210). Botswana has sought to become a water secure 
country based on water resources from within its political boundaries (Sitorus 
2008). The NWMP (GOB 1992) sought solutions through hydro-engineering. 
The NWMPR (GOB 2006c) advocated WDM but implementation needed a new 
coalition of support and this is explored in the next Chapter. 
 
The problem of the lack of strong water statistics 
 
It could be said that water metrics are presented to support the AC that is in 
vogue (KICGCS). In Section 5.9, a range of estimates provided by GOB and 
DEBSWANA are presented. These provide a veneer of knowledge but 
underneath are based, in the agriculture and mining sectors, only on informed 
assessment, as very little borehole monitoring takes place. The assessment of 
groundwater is again incomplete (KI CGCS).  
 
5.13 Summary 
 
The AC on water before Independence was organised by the tribal 
administration, through the chiefs who had the perceived power of intervention 
with God to achieve the rains. The chiefs had powers over the allocation of 
land, and water which was used commensurately with the beliefs in water 
scarcity. After Independence, the Chiefs had decisions on riparian rights 
removed from them.  
 
The post Independence (1966) AC on WRM and WSS led to the Parliament 
Acts of 1968-72 with the disparate allocation of responsibilities for delivery of 
WSS to WUC (4 large towns), DEBSWANA (2 towns), DWA (large villages) and 
local government (the remainder). The water borne sewerage systems provided 
by DWA and local government were limited, outside the towns, to the centre of 
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a small number of large villages. These were small systems and few 
connections had taken place by 2003 (GOB 2006c). The then AC on WRM was 
on a ‘predict and provide’ basis essentially meeting all demand. The WUC had 
the responsibility for raw water provision to piped water suppliers, and DWA 
built the dams and infrastructure for that raw water. 64% of that water was from 
groundwater, with no knowledge of the extent of the resource, and the 
remaining 36% was from surface water, of which 85% from trans-boundary 
rivers, with limited international water sharing agreements (GOB 2009a). But 
there was no wish to restrict the provision of water, despite this dependence on 
neighbouring country agreements. Consumption has leapt and keeps rising and 
could outstrip the water resources, provided by the NSC I and the solutions 
offered under the NWMP (GOB 1992). There was no incentive to reduce the 
consumption of groundwater in the post Independence world. 
 
An AC between the political and economic decision makers (Rahm 2006) 
around WRM and WSS held together from 1966 to 2009, with a flurry of dams 
and the NSC II opening through to 2014, because of the long lead times on 
water infrastructure completion. But there had been increasing concerns 
expressed by the academic community. Institutional mechanisms have been 
seen as ‘complex’ and to hide the reality of a minimalist approach to WDM, 
through the dissipation of decision-making through a wide range of actors 
(Swatuk 2004:1362). Botswana’s water sustainability is seen as ‘fragile’ (Rahm 
et al 2006:178).The statistical base for water planning  has been seen as 
inadequate (ibid).The gradual acceptance of the accuracy of these academic 
judgements by the elite within Botswana led to the drivers of change for a new 
AC now explored in the next chapter, Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Six: What were the underlying drivers of water sector reform in 
Botswana in 2009-2011?  
 
6.1 Chapter Overview and Background  
 
This Chapter examines the extent to which potential drivers of change on Water 
Resource Management (WRM) and Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) can 
be identified and analysed under Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The initial section covers the policy core beliefs about 
water scarcity, which have influenced the identifiable drivers of potential water 
reform and their proposals to resolve competing demands, which is addressed 
in the second section of this chapter. 
 
The definition of water scarcity varies with the positionality of the data provider - 
see Section 2.2. Technical water experts support a biophysical definition of 
water scarcity as:  
 
‘the point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges 
on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional 
arrangements, to the extent that the demand [for water], by all 
sectors, including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully’ 
(UNWATER 2006:2).  
 
However, the biophysical position of the amount of water in Botswana, 
particularly groundwater, is not known (KI DGS1)70. Furthermore, the availability 
of water from its re-use is still being developed (GOB 2010:12). Because of this, 
opinions of water experts vary as to the level of water scarcity in Botswana. 
Furthermore, water scarcity can be seen as ‘socially produced’ (Bakker 
2003:28). ‘[Increasing] awareness of scarcity is a signal not of absolute scarcity 
but of relative scarcity due to factors such as increasing pollution, population 
                                                 
70
 The WaterWorld assessment tool does not cover groundwater. No timescale has been given 
for version 3 to cover this gap (KI Mark Muliigan 7
th
 February 2014) 
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density and water use per capita. Scarcity is dependent on the hydro-social, in 
addition to the hydrological cycle’ (ibid). According to UNWATER (2006:2): 
 
‘Water scarcity is a relative concept. [It] can occur at any level 
of supply or demand. Scarcity may be a social construct (a 
product of affluence, expectations and customary behaviour) 
or the consequence of altered supply patterns stemming from 
climate change. Scarcity has various causes, most of which 
are capable of being remedied or alleviated. A society facing 
water scarcity usually has options. However, scarcity often 
has its roots in water shortage, and it is in the arid and semi-
arid regions affected by droughts and wide climate variability, 
combined with population growth and economic development, 
that the problems of water scarcity are most acute’. 
 
The policy core belief system contained at different levels within the concept of 
water scarcity in Botswana is analysed as an initial driver for change in WRM. 
The Batswana71 definitions of water scarcity are dependent on the context and 
nature of the Key Informant (KI), whether they are hydrologists and water 
experts and have a biophysical definition in their minds, or for other KI, where it 
may be more of a social construct related to their beliefs, and within that, their 
position in society. The Focus Group (FG) analysis provides a social construct 
of water scarcity by poor people in different ways from elite KIs. The results are 
used to examine whether a deep or consistent belief emerges from these 
rounded responses that could have contributed to the drivers of change for a 
new AC for WRM and WSS. Has the success of the GOB in planning for 
drought relief 72(Munemo 2012) dulled an awareness of underlying biophysical 
water scarcity by enabling Batswana to adapt to changing climatic conditions? 
Section 6.2.2 seeks to explore external KI perspectives on water scarcity, 
                                                 
71
 Citizens of Botswana 
72
 A wide range of universal subsidies are invoked with the GOB decision to declare a drought 
year viz. http://www.gov.bw/en/News/GOVT-DECLARES-DROUGHT-RELIEF-MEASURES/ 
accessed 5
th
 August 2013. Chapter Nine looks at the mechanisms put in place by GOB to 
protect the poor from droughts. 
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particularly from the World Bank (WB). Section 6.3 identifies and analyses 
drivers on perceptions of water scarcity. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has put forward the proposal that ‘much of water scarcity is 
policy induced’ (2006:133). Are there international, regional, national and local 
levels of drivers of policy which cut across physical, religious, economic, 
political and social dimensions to provide support for a new coalition of actors 
for WRM in Botswana as suggested in Chapter Two (Cosgrove 2012:6)? 
 
6.2 To what extent did national and international perceptions of water 
scarcity affect WRM decision making at all levels in Botswana in 2010-11? 
  
Botswana is a country of regular droughts and, even in good rainfall years, 
hydrological water scarcity exists. The data over the last 200 years supports this 
view (Hulme 1996; Botswana Society 1979). This has lead to external pressure 
not to develop a strong irrigated agricultural economy beyond the traditional 
borehole dependent cattle ranching (Section 2.2 and Section 9.2). One 
modelling study demonstrated a need for a 300% increase in water provision by 
2075 because of population increase and increasing standards of living (Water 
Surveys 2008:17). It should be noted that the projections are made from a low 
baseline of water use and do not take account of water requirements for mineral 
extraction (ibid). 
 
Botswana ranks second among the most water-scarce countries in Southern 
Africa -after Namibia (Figure 6.I and Aquastat 2008). Botswana has a rainfall 
range of 250–650 mm (compared  to 700–1200 mm for Zambia); average 
rainfall of 400 mm or 233 km3 (compared to 800 mm or 997 km3 for Angola); the 
highest potential evaporation range, together with that of Namibia, at 2600–
3700 mm (compared to the lowest range of 1100–2000 mm in Tanzania); and 
the lowest surface runoff of 0.6 mm or 0.35 km3 (compared to regional highs of 
104 mm or 130 km3 in Angola, and 275 mm or 220 km3 in Mozambique) (Toteng 
2008:478). 
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Figure 6.1 Mean annual precipitation in Southern Africa 
Source: Turton et al 2006:2 
 
A Batswana academic commented that Botswana is:  
 
‘within a zone of a highly variable climate that is influenced by 
the global El Nino Southern Oscillation phenomenon. 
Analysis of rainfall records from 29 stations in the country 
over 65 years shows that drought conditions of different 
severity occurred every 3 to 5 years. Initial assessments [of 
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the IPCCC] indicate that climate change will increase further 
variability in rainfall over the central semi–arid land mass of 
Southern Africa covering mostly Botswana’ (Dube 2003:147).  
 
Projections propose a delay in the rainy season and potentially early cessation 
with a likelihood of more severe droughts (Shongwe 2009). 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the spatial pattern of annual rainfall inside Botswana which 
ranges from 300mm to 700mm and is highest along the North-Eastern fringe, 
with the lowest levels to the Southwest in the savannah lands of the so-called 
Kalahari Desert. The country is ringed on three sides by the Orange, Limpopo, 
Zambezi and Okavango Rivers. The Zambezi tributary, the Chobe River 
provides an access point for the extraction of raw water for the North-South 
Carrier (NSC) pipelines for transmission to the South East of the country. The 
extremes of temperature range from a low winter temperature of below 00C in 
June and July that rises fast to 400C + in October. Very little rain comes in the 
winter months May-July with the majority of rainfall occurring between 
November and April. 
 
The National Water Plan Review (NWPR) (SWEC 1991) saw water scarcity as 
primarily due to climate and being addressed by ‘optimised capital investment’ 
in the delivery of water to water scarce areas (GOB 2010:1.1). Recent 
construction of a SADC (Southern African Development Community) climate 
moisture index (CMI) estimates a value of 0.027 for Botswana (South Africa 
0.075 and Namibia 0.125)73, with high loss of surface water due to evaporation 
from the high temperatures. On the basis of water scarcity indices, Botswana is 
seen at ‘Level One Adequate’ (Arntzen et al 20003; 47) But this assumes that 
all surface water is available for domestic human consumption. It ignores 
ecological water requirements (e.g. for the maintenance of wetlands) and the 
fact that most surface water is shared with neighbouring countries.  
                                                 
73
 It utilises the total enviro-transpiration (TET) and precipitation (P) data for the period 1996-
2012 (Malisawa 2012:1). The index points to the need for transfers of water from Angola (CMI 
0.351) (ibid). 
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Figure 6.2 Annual rainfall isohyet map of Botswana (2001) 
Source: GOB Department of Surveys and Mapping 2001 
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‘The restriction on the use of the water from the Okavango River by the signing 
of the RAMSAR convention by Botswana largely precludes the use of that water 
to ameliorate scarcity’ (KI CGCS 6)74. ‘Despite the inadequacies in scarcity 
assessments, there is no doubt that [potable] water scarcity is increasing’ 
(Arntzen 2000:1).  
 
It has been claimed that Botswana does ‘not have water stress other than the 
quality of water and problems of the dry season’ (Arntzen et al 2003:47), 
However, “Botswana’s total estimated underground water resources, broken 
down between potable, brackish but okay for cattle, brackish and finally, outright 
saline has not been [published]. [The] Makgadakgadi [salt pans] alone must 
have some of the largest saline resources in the entire [SADC] region but the 
cost of desalination make it prohibitively costly” (KI WEN 5 June 2012).It is said 
that the impact of consumption of potable water by cattle from the boreholes 
from ground water is low. ‘Current consumption levels by livestock do not 
threaten groundwater resources’ (Arntzen 2000:12), but there is no data to 
support this..It was estimated that ‘the average borehole extraction75 amounts to 
only 13.6% of the estimated recharge’ (Oageng 1998:55). This appears to be 
conjecture.  
 
The last major groundwater resources map was started in 1976 and published 
in 1987 (Von Hoyer 1989:101). It is this map which was used in the BGS survey 
of African groundwater (MacDonald et al 2012). The KI at the Department of 
Geological Surveys (DGS) opined that a “lot of it was guesswork”. He was 
concerned that “the mineral surveyors, authorised [by DGS to survey] and 
covering much of Botswana, did not have to provide information on groundwater 
so they did not” [give that information to the DGS] (KI CGCS 3). There is, in 
2012, “less reliable knowledge about water in Botswana than a decade ago” (KI 
WEN 7 July 2012). The Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) 
NASA satellite data on groundwater below Southern Africa was not used as a 
                                                 
74
 This Motswana view was queried by KI WEUK 2 pointing out the flexibility of water use arising 
from recent amendments to the RAMSAR Convention 
75
 In NW Kgatleng District  
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data source (KI CGCS, June 2013). Groundwater recharge was ‘very minimal 
(<1mm/a) in a large part of central and SW Botswana with only 5-9mm/a 
recharge in the limited areas of the East and the Ghanzi area in the West’ 
(Mokokwe 2003:15). Central Botswana has good groundwater potential but 
based on fossil water that is not being recharged (ibid). 
 
The most recent assessment of both surface water and aquifer potential in 
Botswana, through to 2035, was made in 2008 (Water Surveys 2008) and is 
shown in Figure 6.4. The water tower in the north east of Botswana is the 
forecast availability of water from the Shashe River filled dams which are 
planned to be fully operational by 2035. The large deficit in the southeast 
around Gaborone and Kgatleng District is from forecast population growth and 
would still need to be met by water transfers from groundwater surplus areas of 
Botswana. But these sources of potable water could be insufficient, given that 
much of the water is thought to be “brackish” (KI WEN 5). The demand forecast 
does not take account of the water needs of the additional mineral extraction 
planned (see Section 2.2). The report concludes that Botswana will still need, 
for its security of water supply in 2035, a dedicated desalination plant at Walvis 
Bay, Namibia (Water Surveys 2008:39). 
 
The concept of climate change, with its potential to increase water shortage, 
was internationalised through the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and internalised to Botswana through ratification of the 
framework in 1994 by the Botswana Government. The Initial National 
Communication to the UNFCCC in 2001 provided projections of the impact of 
global climate change on Botswana (GOB 2001) and increasing water scarcity. 
The cycle of drought years, and the arising hydrological water scarcity, has 
been the stationary nature of the Botswana climate. But climate change could 
bring ‘the end of stationarity’ (Milly et al. 2008:573). This is explored further in 
Section 6.2.2.2. 
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Figure 6.3 Water availability in Botswana: A 3D Representation of an 
assessment of the Surplus and Deficit in the Clusters of rivers and aquifers in 
Botswana by 2035 (Blue is surplus and Red is deficit)  
Source: Water Surveys 2008:38 
 
6.2.1 Analysis of deep core beliefs on water scarcity 
 
Water scarcity is a deeply embedded core belief within the culture of Batswana, 
as expressed both through the indigenous people of the Basarwa and the 
incoming Tswana tribes of the 19th century: in the good years, there is low 
rainfall, and in the bad, there is drought. ‘Rainfall has remained fairly constant 
for the last 1000 years’ but constantly low (Tlou 1995:11). This struggle has 
been identified in the writings of Laurens van der Post (1961:26). The lifestyle of 
the Basarwa, seen as hunter-gatherers, has been said to have a low impact and 
sustainable WRM system that took account of the vagaries of rainfall and low 
North 
 120 
 
availability of surface water (Walker 2009). The Tswana tribes who came in 
large numbers in the nineteenth century had moved from the Karoo and 
Limpopo provinces of present day northern South Africa. Their lifestyle was one 
of accepting water scarcity. The European missionaries sought to bring what 
they perceived as superior WRM techniques. However, the Tswana, through 
their customs, their Chiefs and their rainmakers, saw the provision of rain, and 
thus potable water, as being in the hands of their ancestors. The data from the 
FGs (Section 6.2.2.2) demonstrates that the same feelings still exist about the 
symbiosis of natural and spiritual ecology in the provision of water (or not) by 
the ancestors and deity of the Batswana. 
 
Borehole and dam construction started in the 1930s, driven by the need to 
overcome water scarcity so as to provide for the large cattle populations that 
had become the medium of both wealth and cultural tradition (Morton 2009; 
Schapera 1938a). Kgatleng District, the locus of this thesis, led the way on this 
form of WRM and were also early adopters of motorised boreholes from 1934 
onwards (Schapera 1938a). The Boreholes Act of 1962 attempted to bring order 
to ‘wild cat’ drilling for water across Botswana, by requiring permission to be 
obtained for the boreholes, but this constraint was often ignored76. The 
formation of the new government in 1966, with its aim of ending water scarcity 
(NDP1 1967), the Water Acts of 1968 and 1972 and the dams of the 1960s (for 
example, the Gaborone Dam in 1964), brought an end to the tribal self-coping 
mechanisms. The Government had taken over and promised to provide.  
 
The population went up and so did the demands of the mining industry, and the 
cattle population went to 5 million. A major Symposium on Drought (Botswana 
Society 1979) attempted to provide the institutional memory of pre-hydropower 
days. Drought conditions, defined as a ‘rain-induced shortage’ (ibid: 39), 
continued to hit Botswana on the 7/10 year cycle identified from the records 
from the nineteenth century onwards (ibid; Hulme 1996).  
                                                 
76
 The WAB took on these powers after 1968 but has been largely ineffective (KII at MMEWR, 
WUC and DGS 2011).  
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From 1982 to 1987, Botswana endured a prolonged drought. It severely 
impacted agricultural production, and put over half the population at risk of 
starvation. Depletion of food stocks was greater than that experienced in the 
Ethiopian famine in 1984 (Mayersen 2011).  However, Botswana ‘avoided 
significant famine-related loss of life. This was principally due to a drought relief 
programme, which had been established in the previous decade’ (Mayersen 
2011:259). 1991/2 was a further major drought year (Hulme 1996). The next 15 
years saw a continuation of the previous weather cycles across Southern Africa 
with further drought periods in 2004 and 2007 (Toteng 2008) and again in 2012-
14.The response from household consumers only came after the Water Utilities 
Corporation (WUC) restrictions and tariff increases, and then subsequently, 
after these measures were removed, there was no change in behaviour 
(ibid).The political process in managing drought relief 77 is seen to be successful 
(Munemo 2012). 
 
However, this success has perhaps desensitised Batswana from the situation of 
water scarcity. Despite a pattern of recurrent drought and low rainfall, there is 
still ambivalence about the nature of water scarcity among the elite of Botswana 
(see next section). This could be seen either as national resilience against the 
forces of nature or an unwillingness to accept the constraints that water scarcity 
imposes on Batswana society.  
 
6.2.2 National perceptions of water scarcity 
 
Botswana’s proposed Second Submission to the IPCC in 2009, entitled ‘Climate 
Change Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment of the Water Sector in 
Botswana’78 remains an unsubmitted report (GOB 2009a) but was made 
available to the Researcher. It supports the need for post 2009 water reforms to 
                                                 
77
 This is covered further in Section 9.3.1. 
 
78
 It was produced under the auspices of MEWT, the DNA for IPCCC in Botswana. No CDM 
project on energy or water has moved forward in Botswana. There have been proposals to 
transfer the DNA to MMEWR or the Office of the President (Colman 2010). 
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provide effective WDM and the need for more hydrological data on the impact of 
climate change on water. But the people of Botswana are not fully convinced. 
The data in this section has been gathered from KII, FGs and from a survey, to 
find out the perceptions of a range of Batswana on the concept of water 
scarcity79 and of the potential support for a new Advocacy Coaltion (AC). 
 
6.2.2.1 Analysis of Key Informant Interviews80 
 
The range of opinions about water scarcity is significantly broad from KIs in 
Botswana (Table 6.1). At the local level (Local Government, Kgosi), there is a 
view that “water is scarce but God will provide”.  The Botswana media opined 
that water scarcity exists now “because of the impact of climate change”, a view 
taken from an international media perception of water scarcity across the 
region. But other reporters made clear their views that “there has been a long 
history of droughts in Botswana” (FG of reporters at the Voice Newspaper, 
December 2010). A private sector view, as represented by De Beers (50% 
owner of DEBSWANA), is reported in December 2011 to be that:  
 
‘Botswana is already classified as a water-stressed country. 
Experts from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) have made stark predictions about Botswana: 
temperatures are set to rise by an average of 2°C by 2030 
across the country while average rainfall is set to decline by up 
to 10-15% due to greenhouse gas emissions. This will greatly 
impact the agricultural sector, which employs nearly 30% of the 
population’ (De Beers 2011:2).  
 
Views of the private sector, civil servants and water experts are more nuanced 
saying that so far “there is no water scarcity in Botswana, only operational 
                                                 
79
 The positionality of those surveyed needs to be taken into account. Outside the views from 
water experts, the self definition expressed would be one that is socially constructed from the 
viewpoint of the informant (UNWATER 2006:2). 
80
 Beside each informant group description is the number of respondents. 
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difficulties and a lack of planning” (Private Sector water users). They see water 
scarcity as a challenge that can be met through hydro-engineering. The same 
group of KIs agreed that there is “insufficient knowledge about the state of 
groundwater resources to enable any biophysical support for the presumption of 
water scarcity”. The non- expert informants when questioned were at a loss to 
explain the lack81 of rainwater harvesting in Botswana. When pressed, a 
common view was that rainwater harvesting was promoted by the Colonial 
Government and by INGO and was seen as “something that Batswana did 
when they were poor in the past82” (Media). The Botswana Integrated Water 
Resource Management – Water Efficiency (BIWRM-WE) policies of 2010 
(outlined later in this Chapter in Section 6.3.2.2.3) reintroduced the concept as 
part of the water reforms. Even though KIs from the Media asked “Why has the 
Government not done more to alert us about water recycling, given the future 
lack of potable water?”, it was a common response generally that “water 
recycling is not something we do in Botswana” (CSO)83.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 Building regulations that would require guttering and water harvesting from all new building 
were proposed in 2007 financed by DANIDA but had still not entered into law by 2013 (KI WEN 
6) 
 
82
 A strong tradition of rainwater harvesting had been carried out pre-Independence and was 
supported by individuals such as Vernon Gibberd and groups like Intermediate Technology until 
1981(Pacey 1986:94 Figure 4.5) 
83
 The WRM reforms target a 96% reuse of water by 2030 (NWP 2010:13). 
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Key 
Informants: 
 
Private 
Sector 
(2) 
 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(5) 
Local 
Govt 
(4) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Average 
(29) 
Perception 
of water 
scarcity  
(out of 7) 
4 5 5 6 7 4 6 5 
 
Table 6.1 The responses of KI when asked “Is there water scarcity in 
Botswana?”  
Source: KII September 2010-July 2011 (Likert Scale where 1 is disagree and 7 
is agree) 
 
6.2.2.2 Focus Group (FG) Analysis of the perception of water scarcity84  
 
This section analyses the data gathered from the six FGs covering the 
Gaborone City Council area (GCC) and Kgatleng District (KD). FG participants 
saw the scarcity of water as largely coming from the perceived inadequacy of 
the physical infrastructure to provide what the politicians had promised, which 
was WSS for all at any volume. None of the FGs raised the concept of climate 
change when addressing the reasons for water scarcity. 
Old Naledi (FGON) is a Gaborone township within one mile of the Gaborone 
Dam which most residents can see from their windows, and was the last area in 
Gaborone to wholly depend on standpipes and pit latrines. It was subject to 
major water and sanitation services (WSS) infrastructure works going on in 
2010/13 at the same time as the FG took place. The FGON largely blamed 
water scarcity on Chinese contractors, who, on a Botswana Government 
financed hydro-mission project, were digging up, by mistake, existing water 
                                                 
84
 The FG locations, contexts and coding details are explained more fully in Section 4.3 
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pipes: 
“These days it's worse. It runs out so frequently and sometimes when 
you wake up, you find there is nothing. Sometimes people go to work 
without a bath.”(FGON1)  
“The issue of water running out is caused by the developments that 
are currently taking place. It is the Chinese who cause water 
shortages. Since they started working here, they have been breaking 
pipes causing shortage.” (FGON2) 
There was also a wider appreciation of water scarcity;  
“There are some villages [that ] do not have any developments taking 
place but still experience water shortages and they can go for days 
without water” (FGON3) 
In Broadhurst (FGB), a Self Help Housing Association (SHAA) area in the north 
of Gaborone, the scarcity of water is perceived as being because of the 
increasing population pressure on water resources: 
“It’s true, water is scarce. There are times when water is scarce, like 
now it’s been heard that water is scarce because the township is 
growing. That causes water to be scarce” (FGB 1). 
The position in the rural areas was seen as worse than in the city:  
“So we are saying here it is getting better than in the rural areas 
because in the rural areas water is scarce more than the limit” 
(FGB1). 
“It’s true what these gentlemen are saying about water being scarce. 
Even in town, water is scarce but the shortage of water can’t be as 
much as in the rural areas, because in the rural area you find that 
people can go for days without any water. Like I am from Barolong 
farms, we went there for holidays on the 22nd [December] and came 
back on the 8th January. We were brought back by the thirst. There 
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wasn’t any water. We would even go for 2 days without cooling 
because of [lack of] water” (FGB2). 
 
Ultimately the scarcity is seen as caused by lack of rain filling the dams but 
nevertheless, the government would provide:  
 
“I am under the impression that when water is scarce like this, it’s 
because in the [Gaborone] dam, there is a shortage because there is 
no rain. That’s what I was thinking.” (FGB3) 
 
Mochudi (FGM), the capital of Kgatleng District, was supplied in the past by the 
perceived more consistent DWA (Department of Water Affairs) provider. Here, 
scarcity is identified by supplier breakdown, not from climate change:  
“Mokgatla [people of the Bagatla tribe], there is no water. These our 
children are dying of hunger. They are dying of thirst. The cause of 
this lack of water is usually a burst pipe, but we get consulted later” 
(FGM1).  
“Yes, there is a shortage of water. We can go for 2 weeks, 3 weeks 
without drinking and we would just be sitting not knowing why water 
was cut. And then we are told a pipe has burst and we don't know 
what to do with the children. We really suffer when it comes to water” 
(FGM2).  
“Yes Kgabo. Yes Rra. We are suffering in this village. The first people 
who were giving us water, Water Affairs [DWA], were giving us water 
nicely without any problems. But since the ones that replaced them 
came in [WUC], there are only problems” (FGM3). 
At Olifants Drift (FGOD), a fishing village by the River Limpopo, 180 km from 
Mochudi, there was no lack of water, since it could always be pumped from the 
river. But due to issues on water rights, the GOB provided water from boreholes 
away from the river. The residents’ commentary was therefore about borehole 
provided water:  
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“We only lack water when the pump attendant is not around, or when 
the engine is dead, that is when we lack water.” (FGOD 1)  
“We don't have a shortage of water in this village. What is there is 
that this water makes us sick. It makes our stomachs sick” (FGOD2). 
In Artesia (FGA), the village on the main trunk road to the North, again water 
scarcity is a concept related to DWA or WUC management ability:  
“Water, sometimes is weak when it comes out maybe in the morning. 
But a little later it will be coming out again. We don't know what 
makes it like that, but it happens when there is no electricity which 
means the borehole uses electricity” (FGA1).  
“It is scarce mostly on the days when it's busy in the village when 
there is a lot of people like on weekends and holidays when people 
have come from places like Gaborone. I think the WUC is the cause 
because first there were Water Affairs [DWA] and there was no 
shortage of water.”(FGA2). 
So the dominant perception appears to be driven by the ability of the water 
supplier to maintain supply. The hydro-mission concept of unlimited supply at 
the turn of the tap underpins this perception. The concerns about climate 
change and the need for water demand management appear to be of a lower 
order. 
The areas more linked with the rural migratory poor, in Old Naledi and in 
Matebeleng, felt more concerned about the long term scarcity of water. Their 
views appear to reflect the deep beliefs historically contained within Botswana 
society (see Section 6.2.2). The people of Old Naledi (FGON) interviewed were, 
in part, temporary visitors, utilizing the low cost rentable property there. As such 
they were more linked to rural village life, to a greater extent than the more 
settled communities in KD. They saw water abundance and scarcity as coming 
from the intervention of God.  
“We believe God is the one who brings water. Only God can cause 
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rain to fall. If there was no rain for a long time, even Gaborone dam 
would dry up” (FGON1). 
“Sometimes it is about culture. A village like Radisele is a very good 
example. They can go for days without water and when you ask the 
elders they say that the ancestors are unhappy and that a certain 
ritual [needs] to be performed to appease them” (FGON2). 
This was also true of the poor of Matebeleng (FGM), a peri-urban village 
providing largely unskilled labour to Gaborone (Kgatleng District Plan 2002). It 
had not received reliable supplies of water, except from the perceived untreated 
sewage water in the River Notwane85. Here, the concept of water scarcity is 
sharper: 
“There is much shortage of water in Botswana. That's why sometimes 
we are asked to conserve water so that we can save the little that we 
have. Even dams sometimes don't have water because there is 
shortage of water” (FGM1).  
“There is a severe shortage of water in Botswana. We really suffer to 
get water” (FGM2).  
“Water is scarce. Water is scarce and there is awareness that water 
should be used with care. Sometimes there is a situation whereby 
boreholes dry up and there is need for water to be preserved” 
(FGM3).  
“Yes, water is scarce in Botswana. Water is the human being; it is a 
human's food. When there is no water we would all die. So, we are 
dying people, help us” (FGM4) 
Only occasionally was the view expressed as to what individuals could do about 
                                                 
85
 WUC took over responsibility for the GCC sewage works in March 2011. No warnings were 
ever given not to extract from the River Notwane and it was used by horticulture farms in the 
Glen Valley, Oodi and Matebeleng areas. WUC immediately put in place higher standards of 
treatment of the effluent prior to release into the River Notwane. In May 2012, WUC was 
ordered by the GOB under government directive to take over all sanitation responsibilities from 
local councils. This was subsequently delayed to October 2012. 
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the situation:  
“When I was growing up, at our farm, we used raseboa (sort of tank 
with a tap). We had 2 of them. We'd fetch water from the stream and 
fill them. We would then drink from the stream until it dries then we 
would turn to raseboa. I think people should do the same or buy tanks 
so that, when it rains, they can collect and store water” (FGON 4). 
 
6.2.2.3 Survey analysis of perceptions of water scarcity 
 
A quantitative survey was undertaken in Mochudi in June 2011 by interviewing 
shoppers leaving a supermarket. These respondents by nature of the sampling 
location were unlikely to be poor in income, as it is located in a middle class 
district.  Their views are tabulated in Table 6.2 and then analysed by age in 
Table 6.2.1, by sex in Table 6.2.2, and by earnings levels per month in Table 
6.2.3.and Chi Squared tests are summarised in Appendix Three. 
 
 
x axis = number of respondents  y axis= 1 no scarcity to 7 very scarce 
Table 6.2 Is there a scarcity of water in Botswana? 
 
Source: Data obtained from 99 respondents by Researcher at Mochudi 
supermarket, June 2011 for 6.2,1,2,3 and 4 
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Again, as with the views of the KI and the focus groups of the poor, the middle 
class of Mochudi have a range of opinion as to whether water is scarce. There 
is no majority of view, either by sex, age or income, as to whether water scarcity 
exists, but there is an overall weighting towards a concept of a low water 
scarcity as can be seen in Table 6.2.  
 
 
Range of responses: 1 no scarcity to 7 very scarce 
Table 6.2.1 Is there a scarcity of water by age range? 
 
While the Chi Squared Test shows the relationship as not significant, the hard 
data shows stronger support for the range scarce to very scarce (5-7) among 
the over 40 year olds at 42% as opposed to 30% for the under 40s’s.  
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Range of responses to 1 no scarcity to 7 very scarce 
Table 6.2.2 Is there a scarcity of water by sex? 
 
The Chi Squared Test shows a low relationship (at 0.95275) which is surprising 
given the concept within the water reform literature of the greater importance of 
water to women than men as expressed in the Dublin Principles (1992). This 
may reflect the higher absolute levels of WSS in both urban and rural areas in 
Botswana compared to other developing countries. 
 
Range of responses to 1 no scarcity to 7 very scarce 
Table 6.2.3 Is there a scarcity of water by earnings levels? 
 
The Chi Squared Test of earnings related to scarcity showed a high significance 
at 0.038525 to within 95% confidence. Water had been provided to the citizens 
of Kgatleng District by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) and now the 
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Water Utilities Corporation (WUC). Other than the inconvenience caused by the 
occasional bursting of pipes and the subsequent temporary cutting off of the 
water supply, there had been little to constrain their use of what they saw as 
unlimited supply. There was no general perception of scarcity that might have 
influenced user behaviour.  
 
Range of responses from 1 disagree to 7 strongly agree 
Table 6.2.4 Respondents’ answers to the question: How acceptable is recycled 
drinking water in Botswana? 
 
This may have influenced the attitude to the urgency of the need to recycle 
water for drinking. The response to the survey questions on water recycling was 
thus unsurprisingly weak. When questioned about water recycling, the 
respondents’ awareness of water recycling was high at 65%, but the 
acceptability of recycled drinking water in Botswana was low, with over 40% 
seeing it as not acceptable at all (Table 6.2.4). At all the FGs, the respondents 
said “don’t tell us if you are recycling”. The GOB target for recycling is 96% by 
2030 (GOB 2010:13). As of 2013, there is no recycling of drinking water in 
Botswana. 
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6.2.2.4 Botswana Society86 views, May 2012 
The Botswana Society, representing both the Batswana and expatriate elite 
dealing with natural resources in Botswana, has had a number of meetings and 
reports about water scarcity and on the available hydrological data on Botswana 
since its inception in 1966. A meeting of 30th May 2012 debated the potential for 
future water scarcity in Botswana, led by a University of Botswana (UB) 
researcher. Over 50 KI were present. It was the first meeting on water scarcity 
since the inception of the water reforms in 2009 and brought together a wide 
variety of KI. The academic viewpoint from UB was of impending long-term 
water scarcity:  
 
“Given the lack of a comprehensive water supply policy and the 
ravages of climate change among other factors, the country will be 
very thirsty by 2015. If predictions are correct, Botswana will likely be 
among the first nations to feel the water crunch. With no perennial 
rivers under its full control (save the tail-end of the Okavango), a 
drought-prone environment, and dam evaporation rates accelerating 
with global warming, Botswana has perilously few water resources to 
meet ordinary demand and support economic growth. The time we 
have, to secure delivery, eliminate wastage, and curtail use, is 
running out” (KI UB 5).  
 
“To avert the disaster, the stakeholders [must] give special attention 
to future culture change and instil a national mind set of conservation. 
The government seem reluctant to penalize key employers and there 
are no policies to monitor water use. Are the nation’s existing water 
resources considered valuable enough to preserve? Can Botswana 
sustain, for example, its cattle industry, when it is estimated that it 
takes 20,000 litres of water to produce a kilogram of meat as 
opposed to 1,200 litres to produce a kg of grain?” (KI UB 5).  
                                                 
86
 A Civil Society organisation dating from the 1960s debating and publishing its proceedings 
each year 
 134 
 
But it was asserted by KI from the Ministry of Mining, Energy and Water 
Resources (MMEWR)/DWA at the meeting that “everything the researcher [had] 
said was lacking, was covered in the new [water] policy” (KI CGCS 6). 
 
6.2.3 International perceptions of water scarcity in Botswana 
 
The academic analysis of hydrological levels of water in Botswana of the last 
200 years has established a stationary pattern of low rainfall and periodic 
droughts (Hulme 1996). This has led to advice from non-Botswana water 
specialists on the impact of this periodic water scarcity on Batswana life and 
how it can be dealt with. The new movement of international advice on long-
term water scarcity has come from the climate change predictions reviewed 
within the work of the IPCC (Christensen 2007). This section reviews the data 
that revises the previous drought database and forecasts higher levels of 
hydrological water scarcity. 
 
6.2.3.1 Analysis of core policy beliefs  
 
There is an international perception of the probability that water scarcity is 
getting worse. For Southern Africa, most climate models suggest drying 
(Conway et al 2009). The IPCC academic analysis, based on Global Change 
Models (GCM), comparing the period 2080-2099 to 1980-1999, suggests, for 
the later period, an increase in temperatures (compared to the global annual 
mean temperatures) of 3.1oC for summer warming and 3.4oC for winter warming 
(Christensen et al 2007). 
 
The HADCM3 GCM, using the IPCC SRES A2 Scenario, predicts a hotter 
(Figure 6.5 a) and drier (b) Southern Africa by 2050 (Scholes & Biggs (2004:4 
quoted in Turton 2012:3). This scenario has ‘as yet largely unknown 
implications for groundwater recharge’ (ibid: 3). This is supported by the SADC 
report (Hulme 1996) which had outlined the need to amend WRM practices to 
 135 
 
take account of likely increased climate variability (Dube87 2003:152-4)88. 
Pauline Dube, a Motswana climate scientist and reviewer for the IPCC report, 
carried out an assessment of the Southern Africa (SnA) condition on water 
resources in 2003 (Dube 2003:152-4). She believed that SnA could reach the 
limits of water availability by 2030 under existing climate conditions.  
 
A decrease in surface water could undermine the North-South carrier project. A 
shortage of water would increase competition for the use of water between the 
different parts of Botswana, as well as between the countries involved in the 
transboundary water commissions (TBWC). The lack of water could directly 
affect all development plans in Southern Africa and it was recommended that 
SADC water protocols be strengthened, and focus on a formal metric analysis 
of both surface water and groundwater (Hulme 1996). For the region, there was 
a need for WDM refined methods, pricing, water allocation and consumption, 
and questioning of the policy of large government water subsidies. 
Environmental impact assessments for new economic proposals, it was felt, 
should take account of the effect of climate change on water in the region (Dube 
2003). Alongside these conclusions are those seeing increased wind speed 
from climate change, which has been modelled to potentially show an extension 
of the dune system of the lower Kalahari to extend North to cover the whole of 
the Kalahari leading to total loss of vegetation and fodder for cattle feed 
(Thomas 2005)89. 
                                                 
 
87
 P Dube was a member of the IPCC panel of reviewers 2007-12 
 
88
 The Southern Africa Science Service Centre for Climate Change and Adaptive Land 
Management (SASSCAL) was established in Namibia in April 2012 to increase local capacity 
for research into the impact of climate change and thus potential water scarcity on Botswana. 
The opening was attended by Ministers from Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and 
Germany.... and by Botswana, by its resident High Commissioner in Windhoek. This 
representation at the inauguration supports the Researcher’s perception of the low ranking of 
the work within the Batswana elite. 
 
89
The so far one-off event of a 90 km wind blowing off the roof of the Gaborone airport building 
on March 1
st
 2013 has brought the monitoring of wind speeds above the currently-thought 
maximum of 40 km, into question. Botswana has always been seen as a country where wind 
speeds are too low to allow for renewable energy coming from wind turbines. 
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Figure 6.4 Projected climate change to 2050, from the HADCM3 Global Climate 
Change Model using the IPCC SRES A2 Scenario 
        Source: Turton 2012:3   
 
6.2.3.2 The World Bank Analysis 
 
The World Bank (WB)90 was employed by the GOB in 2008 and subsequently 
(2008-11), to review the National Water Management Plan Review (NWMPR) 
(GOB 2006c) and to recommend a way forward (covered in Chapter Seven). 
This was followed in 2009 by the WB report on climate variability in Botswana 
(WB 2010). This WB Report was completed in 2010 for the Ministry of the 
                                                 
90
 The WB has become active in Botswana since its engagement in providing a stand-by loan of 
$US 500 M in 2008 following the world banking crisis and the reduction in sales of diamonds by 
Debswana (GOB Budget report 2008). The GOB, after many prudent years of non deficit 
budgeting, has since 2008, set deficit budgets, spending more than it raises in taxes and other 
income. It has become dependent to some extent on outside financing, albeit at a low level, 
from the Bretton Woods institutions (GOB Budget report 2012). The WB endorsement of the 
Morupule B 600 MGW power station in 2010 (see Colman 2010) has meant that the failure of 
the inauguration of the power station in 2013 has led to WB pressure for a full investigation. 
This could be a factor in the delay to late 2013 in debating the final water policy given the 
capacity restraints within MMDWR (see Section 7.2) 
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Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) which is the Designated National 
Authority (DNA) for Botswana for the UNFCCC. It did not involve the MMEWR 
which is responsible for the proposed water reforms. It has remained a Draft 
Report only and as such is not an official WB/GOB document. It updated the 
analysis contained within the Initial Communication from Botswana to the 
UNFCCC (GOB 2001) and set out an assessment of the water scarcity in 
Botswana and the potentially worsening situation. The report provides an 
external view of water scarcity and the need for WDM. The WB provided a 
forecast of the underlying variability in Botswana that could result from climate 
change. Their models showed that there is likely to be an increase in the 
frequency and severity of droughts and storms in Western and Northern 
Botswana while, in the South-East, rainfall is likely to decrease but there may 
be more flooding. They proposed that there was likely to be increased droughts, 
and that the already low groundwater recharge would decline. The WB believed 
there was greater consensus on the impact of climate change on Botswana 
compared to that arising from modelling that they have done elsewhere (WB 
2010:5). They stated that this would have a number of impacts both direct and 
indirect: without adaptation, there could be adverse effects on subsistence and 
commercial agriculture and the drop in groundwater recharge would affect 
groundwater resources and vegetation, affecting both land productivity and 
ecosystem services (ibid). The lower surface water runoff would reduce already 
low levels of water held by dams and could badly affect areas such as the 
Okavango Delta. Therefore the WB suggested there was a need to increase 
investment in water infrastructure, particularly additional storage volume and to 
review the existing national and water policies (ibid). They were further 
concerned that infrastructure design standards needed to be examined to 
ensure that they could cope with the potential increased bursts of rainfall91. This 
analysis was supported by the WB report of November 2012 which inter alia 
repeated their view of consensus around lower rainfall in Southern Africa from 
the higher temperatures resulting from climate change (WB 2012a:37). These 
                                                 
91
 The internal WB presentation of the report is available as a webcast of February 4
th
 2011 at 
http://water.worldbank.org/events/water-days-climate-change-and-adaptation accessed 1st 
March 2013. 
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warnings from the World Bank have underpinned the informational position of 
advocacy coalition ‘secondary beliefs’ on water scarcity and the need to allocate 
water wisely (Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith 1993)). 
 
The WB report gave a steer to MEWT in its lead role in appointing staff to the 
Botswana Government delegations who have assiduously attended the 
UNFCCC Committee of the Parties (COP) meetings, including Durban in 2011 
and Doha in 2012. The attempts by the African Ministers Committee on Water 
(AMCOW) to get adaptation to water scarcity as a key outcome of the 2011 and 
2012 COP meetings were not successful, despite the WB report and many 
other efforts. The Minister for MMEWR represents Botswana, not the Minister 
for MEWT, on the AMCOW. Elsewhere in Africa, water ministers similarly were 
not represented on the country delegations to negotiate at the COP meetings. 
Nevertheless, in September 2011, SADC water ministers instructed the SADC 
Secretariat to push for the inclusion of water as a standalone agenda item 
under the UNFCCC negotiation and at the Durban COP meeting (December 
2011). Their position was that ‘water is a specific agenda item on climate 
change debate, because water is an engine and catalyst for socioeconomic 
development and is linked to the GDP in most of our countries where GDP is 
increasing by three percent where there is more water, and less than one 
percent where there is less’ (Phera Ramoeli reported by IPS 30th November 
2011). “Adaptation is the main priority”, South Africa's Minister of Water and 
Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa said and she called for comprehensive and 
integrated actions to tackle the impact of climate change on precious water 
resource (IPS 30th November 2011).  
The Botswana MEWT delegation had a different view. Among its leaders was 
David Lessolle, a former very senior civil servant at MEWT and one of the 
authors of the first Botswana Submission to the UNFCCC (GOB 2001). He is 
reported as saying that: 
 
“There is need to see water as a broad issue before putting it up as a 
major agenda item for the UNFCCC. For something to become major 
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agenda, it has to benefit me as well. As a negotiating partner I must 
see something in it, for example, in the case of agriculture I can sell 
you technology, you get more food and become climate resilient and 
therefore it’s a win-win but for water no, why should I do the job that 
your government should be doing. There [is] plenty of water but it [is] 
being wasted and [is] not included in development planning. Hence, 
until such a time that water was seen as broad issue and people were 
ready to talk about water technologies, they should not be pushing it 
on the UNFCCC agenda” (IPS 30th November 2011). 
 
This opinion on the perception of water scarcity was placed on the record as the 
GOB view at the Durban COP. It is at the heart of what appears to be a tension 
in attempting to establish a new Government driven WRM paradigm, a new 
advocacy coalition. With a population of 2,038,228 in Botswana (2011 Census), 
is there a new way forward that can command support? The appointment in 
October 2012 of the President’s brother as the new Minister for MEWT, leading 
at UNFCCC meetings, could be a sign of change. The Permanent Secretary at 
MEWT, from January 2013, Neil Fitt, wishes to take a stronger line on water 
scarcity (KII May 2013). Will water scarcity now be seen as a priority at the 
UNFCCC 20th COP in Paris in 2015 with the increasing knowledge of the likely 
impact of climate change on Botswana? 
 
6.2.4 Summary 
 
The earliest climate records of Botswana demonstrate a wide range of rainfall 
(Tlou 1995:9). Over the last 150 years, there is data of a cyclical pattern of 
drought in the region (Hulme 1996; Tyson 1978). The national culture has taken 
account of this from both the Basarwa indigenous peoples and the incoming 
Tswana tribes. The post independence paradigm of supply-side management 
lessened this culture which had co-evolved with water scarcity. The 
international agencies and academic support for the concept of increased water 
scarcity arising from climate change was portrayed in the IPCC/UNFCCC and 
WB Reports. 
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The perception of water scarcity seen in the tribal rainmaking rites of the 
Tswana has been overtaken, as described in Chapter Five, by a hydro-mission 
to provide WSS through the arms of Local Government in the rural areas, by the 
DWA in the urban areas and by WUC in the cities. The perception of the elite 
(from KII), the poor (from FGs) and the middle class (interviewed outside a 
Mochudi supermarket) is that, whilst water may sometimes be scarce, the 
government will, or at least should, provide. The national and local elites and 
the poor appear to be unconvinced of a need for urgent change, even though 
there may be increased water scarcity. The hydrological data of water scarcity 
appears to be questioned by the elite KI, and the increasing demands of an 
ever wealthier society could be seen as turning a deaf ear to international 
perspectives. So why were the changes in WRM proposed? The next section 
looks at the processes that since 2009 have potentially brought forward a new 
AC on water management onto the agenda. 
 
6.3 What processes have contributed to the potential for change? What 
placed water reform on the agenda?  
 
6.3.1 Background 
 
This section sets out a tentative map of the Botswana WRM reform processes 
in 2010/11. The situation in Botswana had been described as ‘complex’ (Swatuk 
2004:1). The data used here includes a conceptual mapping of Botswana 
stakeholders associated with IWRM and the water sector reform processes92. 
Further data sources were KIs from the Ministries, local government, Chiefs, 
civil society, private sector and the media. The semi-structured interviews were 
carried out during September 2010 to June 2011and followed up with KII in 
April-May 2013. 
 
 
 
                                                 
92
 This data was collected at a FG at a Global Water Partnership Botswana (GWPB) meeting, 
financed by UNDP/GEF, in Maun in October 2010. 
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6.3.2 International processes and drivers  
 
The processes of the four SADC-supported water commissions (ORASECOM, 
LIMCOM, OKACOM and ZIMCOM93) are fundamental to the water agenda of 
Botswana. The negotiators are ostensibly Heads of Government, given the 
international treaty status of these commissions. The detailed negotiations on 
allocations are carried out by senior civil servants. The work of the four 
commissions has been mainly funded by international development 
organisations, primarily GIZ94 and DFID but also the WB with Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) funding. The funders’ emphasis on IWRM 
principles, for example, involving wider groupings of actors beyond the ministers 
and civil servants, is contested (GWP 2000). KIs noted that the concept of full 
stakeholder consultation (to include women) is asserted by SADC but given the 
numbers (seven countries were negotiating within ZAMCOM in 2012), 
stakeholder involvement is largely tokenistic (Earle 2008; SADC 2007). The 
lacuna is understood, and studies took place for LIMCOM (Mushari 2005) and 
ORASECOM (SADC 2009), but the range of actors was still restricted in the 
consultations with the strong predominance of government representatives at 
pan SADC review events. This can be seen from the analysis of participants at 
the SADC Water Dialogue in June 2011 (Table 6.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93
 See Section 5.7 
94
 Germany funded a SADC EURO 10M fund for WSS in December 2012 details available at  
http://www.sadc.int/files/6613/5783/5076/Press_Release_signing_Water_Fund_Agreement_fina
l_version.pdf  
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Table 6.3 The range of groups of actors at the SADC Water Dialogue, June 
2011 
Source: SADC Water Division Internal Survey of all Participants June 2011 
[RHC=number of participants LHC= the % arising from the RHC] 
 
No major funding from International Development Organizations (IDOs) 
appeared to be channeled to the GOB or to water NGOs in Botswana, beyond 
the TBWC funding and the IWRM-WE projects (see Section 6.3.2.3). The 
original high levels of International Donor Organizations’ (IDO) funding for the 
development of Botswana dropped in the 1990s to under 10% of the recurring 
GOB budget and then to zero (except for help for the HIV/AIDS pandemic) 
(Masire 2006:153). The financial influence of IDOs on Botswana’s national 
water policies since then has therefore been low. The EU assistance for WSS in 
Botswana in direct budget support 2001-10 was Euros 3.3 M out of a total 
allocation to WSS across SSA of Euros 1.01Bn (EU 2012, Appendix One). The 
Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) commercial bond for P150M (US $ 10M) was 
funded by the European Investment Bank. The roll-over of the payment in 2010 
was an important endorsement of the WSS reforms (KI WUC4). Involvement of 
the Swedish International Water Institute (SIWI) in these processes was through 
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the GOB hiring that institution to advise them on the reforms then in progress. 
But the involvement of the EU office in the water reforms was negligible. 
However the importance of the WB credit line to Botswana (WB 2010) for 
general use by the GOB to cover the budget shortfall in 2009-11 must not be 
underestimated95, although it was largely unused (Bank of Botswana 2011). It 
may have given the WB leverage96 to encourage the water reforms. The GOB 
paid the WB as consultants on the water reforms and the privatization of water 
was excluded from the remit (GOB 2008) although the WB was seen as 
pursuing an agenda which included privatization (Marobela 2012:103).The 
lending from the WB for power, transport and HIV/AIDS outcomes has 
increased (Table 6.4). 
 
 
Table 6.4 Lending by volume by the World Bank to Botswana 
      Source: WB Country Report 2012  
 
The Botswana involvement in the Africa wide AMCOW appears to have been 
low key. The Researcher took part in a multi- stakeholder meeting for two days 
during the Cape Town World Water Event in March 2011. While the then 
Minister for MMEWR, the Hon P.Kekekilwe MP, was present for the overall 
event,  neither he, nor any Botswana civil servant, attended the concurrent 
AMCOW meeting. The meeting prepared the AMCOW position for the World 
                                                 
95
 GOB 2010 External debt to GDP: 11.5% Total external debt (current US$) 2010: $1,709m 
2005: $447m 2000: $453m 1995: $717m  Source WB 2012,88 
96
 See footnote 93 
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Water Forum in Marseilles held in March 2012. There was no evidence of 
Botswana involvement in the negotiations. However, this may be because much 
of the work of AMCOW was to develop a case for ODA for WSS in each country 
and Botswana as a middle income country did not qualify for such ODA. 
Its dependence on ODA decreased almost totally in the 1990s, but, from 2009, 
the previously strong economy needed loans and became influenced by WB 
policies. Overall, the GOB tends not to get involved with AMCOW deliberations 
with their emphasis on aid requests, not loans, for WSS. The Researcher 
reflects that the GOB often does not respond to international requests for water 
data leading to further isolation from the SSA discourse on issues of water 
scarcity. 
 
6.3.3 National Processes and Drivers for a new AC 
 
1) National Development Plans (NDP) from 1966 onwards 
The NDPs were intended to establish measurable goals for the development of 
Botswana, including on WSS. They were set after Independence (1966), initially 
for five year, then rolling ten year cycles (Masire 2006:151). They have been the 
key process for resolving national demands for water:  
 
‘At the beginning, priority for spending on social and physical 
infrastructure was adopted.... We knew that without water 
supplies...we could not establish enterprises that would employ 
people productively. Our people have told us that they wanted clean 
water, educational opportunities and access to healthcare for 
themselves and their families. Therefore we responded directly to 
people's desires and also provided the basis for further investment 
and employment’ (Masire 2006:149). 
Furthermore, former President Masire, has outlined the process of establishing 
WRM and WSS goals:  
 
‘The formulation of a National Development Plan (NDP) involved a 
complex process of consultation with each Ministry and within the 
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economic committee of the Cabinet. There was ultimately a decision 
in Cabinet and the Plan was submitted to the National Assembly for 
public debate, possible amendment and ultimately approval. Our 
planning has been a very public process...We felt, when one used 
national resources, people should know that everybody received what 
they deserved and that the interests of the nation were served.... We 
made use of experts to help us understand things we thought we 
needed to know, and those experts came from where ever we could 
find the best people and best ideas whether within Botswana or 
outside the country. It simply seemed to us to be the logical way to 
proceed if we were to be both democratic and effective. The extent of 
consultation made planning a very time-consuming process’ (Masire 
2006:152).  
 
In response to post independence droughts, the GOB successfully built a range 
of drought relief institutions in the period 1982 -1990. These were normalised 
within the NDP process from NDP 7 (1991-1997) onwards, by a ‘secure 
incumbent’ political class, utilising this coalition building process (Manemo 
2012:157). In this way water scarcity, in the extreme of drought, was onwards 
managed through a process of ‘standing relief programmes... insulate[d] from 
immediate political manipulation’ (Ibid: 176).   
 
TheWater Apportionment Board (WAB) established under the Water Act (1968) 
was the institutional mechanism, within each NDP for the allocation of water. 
But it appears that the key influence on the allocation was outside the Cabinet 
and National assembly process. It is said that there was a coalition of interested 
politicians, bureaucrats and cattle owners (Hilstrom 2012), which decided on the 
allocation of water, and that this coalition viewpoint held from 1966 to 2008. 
This could be seen as a policy-making process for WRM and WSS within an 
advocacy coalition of interests (Sabatier and Jenkin-Smith 1993). No real 
restrictions were placed on the use of water and the delivery mechanisms were 
seen as complicated, ineffective and inefficient (KI CGCS2). In 2008, it was 
commented that ‘there is no official water conservation policy in Botswana that 
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has been adopted by parliament’ (Toteng 2008:475). The latest NDP10 for the 
years 2009-2016 supports the implementation of the NWMPR (SMEC 2006) 
and was finalised in February 2010 (GOB 2010c). It is entitled ‘Accelerating the 
achievements of Vision 2016 through NDP 10’. 
 
2) Vision 2016 (V2016) from 1997 to 2016 
Vision 2016 (GOB 1997) is a target-setting rights-based document97. It came 
from a nationally led initiative, but was rooted in a localised participatory 
exercise. It is based on a 50 years from Independence development plan (1966-
2016). While it could be seen as an attempt by President Masire (1981-1997) to 
stamp his vision on Botswana as his legacy after standing down, the 
participatory network of informants across Botswana in the setting of Vision 
2016 gives it a much wider acceptance. 
 
The vision on water (Box 6.1) states that: 
 
‘Botswana faces a challenge to establish the sustainable level of 
withdrawal from the country's water resources for domestic, industrial 
and personal needs. The nation will need to address the challenge to 
develop appropriate technologies for improving water supply for 
isolated communities’ (GOB 1997: 20) 
                                                 
97
 The initial drive came from the friendship between the leaders of Botswana and Malaysia. 
The Malaysia Vision 2020 included a specific Water Vision (Government of Malaysia 2000) 
which is a combination of both a participatory Vision and IWRM. The Vision for WSS was 
incorporated in the Eighth Malaysian Plan (2001-2005) and the Third Outline Perspective Plan 
(2001-2010). It has led to very high levels of WRM and WSS in Malaysia. 
  
The V2016 initiative has been followed elsewhere in SSA: Mauritius Vision 2020, Uganda Vision 
2035, Tanzania Development Vision 2025, Agenda 2025 Mozambique, National Development 
Strategy 2022 Swaziland, Vision 2020 Lesotho, Vision 2030 Namibia, Cameroon Vision 2035, 
Seychelles 2020. 
. 
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The Vision covers all aspects of Botswana life including the goal that, by 2016, 
Botswana will have eradicated absolute poverty (GOB 1997:8). The extent to 
which the drivers of the water reform process proposed to recognise and 
incorporate poverty reduction objectives within the plans and implementation 
will be examined in Chapter Nine. 
 
A V2016 Council of Batswana stakeholders was set up in 1997 to push the 
agenda. Subsequent Presidents Mogae (1998-2008) and Ian Khama (2008 
onwards) have endorsed the Vision and held annual meetings to review 
progress. After 2009, the National Vision added an annual District level focus. 
The V 2016 meetings in September 2011 were held in Kgatleng District (KD), 
achosen area for fieldwork. Despite their differences over the constitution (see 
Chapter Eight), all present, the Vice President, the Paramount Chief, MPs and 
District Councillors and other stakeholders, shared a joint platform and 
recommitted themselves to the targets of V 2016, including those on WRM and 
Box 6.1 The V2016 Plan for Water 1997 
 
‘The National Water Master Plan [1992] points out that there is an urgent need to 
give attention to the use and conservation of water in Botswana. It is essential to 
harness the scarce water resources to ensure an adequate supply of safe drinking 
water for all citizens. Botswana must develop a national water development and 
distribution strategy that will make water affordable and accessible to all including 
those who live in small and remote settlements. 
 
Water must be used as efficiently as possible, for example by the adoption of 
technologies such as drip feed irrigation. More dams must be constructed 
wherever feasible and the water made available to the local communities. All 
Botswana must be encouraged to make full use of rainwater through water 
harvesting techniques from rooftops and by collecting surface run-off. The 
recharge of boreholes must be monitored. 
 
Botswana must play a full part in negotiating international agreements concerned 
with water usage and storage at regional level provide a buffer against localised 
drought’ 
Source: Vision 2016 GOB 1997:40 
 
 148 
 
WSS98. The 2014 review, ahead of the elections, is being carried out under an 
EU grant by a non-Batswana, as is the setting of the Vision 2030 by Professor 
Porter of Harvard University, around the creation of sustainable jobs. But both 
new documents will quickly come to understand the constraints of water on the 
development of Botswana (Grynberg 2012). 
 
3) The national process of agreement of a Botswana Integrated Water 
Resource Management –Water Efficiency (BIWRM-WE) plan 2009-2012 
This Plan incorporated both a national IWRM plan and particular projects for 
water efficiency; it suited the Global Environment Facility (GEF) bidding process 
to wrap the two bids as one. The successful bid had arisen from the 
increasingly strident academic critique of water allocation processes (Toteng 
2008:475; Rahm 2006). Nearly half the member countries of AMCOW have 
executed national plans for IWRM in line with the Africa Water Vision for 2025 
(AMCOW 2012). In 2012, 18 countries had IWRM plans, compared to a study in 
2008 in which only five of the 16 countries that responded to the survey had 
IWRM plans or were in the process of developing them (ibid). IWRM plans were 
completed in Zambia and in Malawi in 2008. South Africa and Namibia99 
followed in 2010 and 2012 respectively.   
 
An application for funding was made by the Global Water Partnership Botswana 
(GWPB), led by the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS), to UNDP/GEF in 
2004, finally becoming successful in 2008 and operational in 2009. On 16 June 
2009, the project was launched in Gaborone by the DWA and KCS in 
partnership with UNDP (the funder) and the GWPB (Box 6.2). BIWRM-WE 
differed from the NDP and Vision 2016 processes in requiring an overview and 
acceptance by an external actor, UNDP. Otherwise it mirrored the NDPs and 
V2016 and worked alongside the GOB generated water reform consultation 
process.  It had specific foci around water loss and inefficiency. It pioneered 
                                                 
98
 The 2012 meetings, on the same basis, were in Robelela village, near Selebi-Phikwe and in 
2013 at Tshane in Kgalagadi District. 
99
 The Namibian IWRM was announced via http://nepadwatercoe.org/namibia-new-water-plan-
for-water 
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work in schools and government offices to reduce water loss. It brought forward 
a vision for Ngamiland wastewater to protect the Okavango River and 
conformed to the Dublin Prescriptive IWRM principles (Figure 2.1). There were 
instantly recognisable synergies and overlap between the WSRP and the 
IWRM-W E (Box 6.2). The KCS and the Project Management Unit (PMU) at 
DWA were ‘urged to work closely together’ (GWPSA 2010:22). 
 
 
 
A scoping report100 to outline the then current state of water knowledge and 
structures was prepared by Professor Jaap Arntzen and his consultancy CAR, 
and was received in May 2010. In October 2010, the BIWRM-WE stakeholders, 
chosen by the Botswana GWP, and the PMU of MMEWR met to indentify a way 
forward. The Researcher was invited to take part in the three day workshop in 
Maun101, which led to the data collection shown in Appendix Three, and the 
resultant mapping in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.5. 
 
                                                 
100
 Available at 
http://www.iwrmbotswana.com/Uploads/IWRM%20National%20Scoping%20Study.pdf 
accessed 27
th
 July 2012 
 
101
 The full report of this workshop is at 
http://www.iwrmbotswana.com/Uploads/Report_IWRM_Retreat_Maun.pdf, accessed 27
th
 July 
2012. Table 5.5 is contained within this report as was required under the terms of participation 
in the workshop. The group led by the Researcher separated from the rest of the participants for 
this data collection. 
Box 6.2 Launch of BIWRM-WE, June 2009 
 
The then Deputy Permanent Secretary [promoted to Permanent Secretary for 
MMEWR in October 2010] for DWA MMEWR, Mr Boikobo Paya, highlighted in his 
speech the need to align the project with the 10 priorities in NDP 10 for Botswana. 
These included “network rehabilitation for the rural and major villages’ water supply, 
water conservation technologies, water conservation projects in schools and the 
water sector restructuring project (WSRP)”. On the latter, Mr Paya pointed out that 
he was motivated by the “concern expressed at the multiplicity of institutions 
involved in the management of water resources”. He said “there was no clear 
accountability for institutions involved in the water resource management functions 
and those in service delivery”. 
Source: GWPSA 2010:22 
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Stakeholder / 
stakeholder 
group  
How 
strong is 
the 
influence 
(their 
decisions 
and 
actions) 
(H/M/L)  
How 
strong is 
their 
interest in 
IWRM  
(H/M/L)  
Comments at the time, from the 7 
Batswana participants, to explain 
the rating 
OKACOM H  H  Since we are looking at the issue  of 
trans-boundary rivers,  they can 
influence  
ORASECOM H  H  Same as above  
LIMCOM H  H  Same as above  
ZAMCOM H  H  Same as above  
GWP / Waternet  L  H  They cannot influence country’s 
decisions  
NGOs 
(National)  
M  H  They are limited by the funds they 
have  
NGOs 
(International)  
M  M   Survival International (a right to 
water for everyone)  
SADC  M  H  They respect the sovereignty of 
countries  
UNDP/GEF  H  H  Co-funder of BIWRM-WE. Interested 
in seeing  projects completed 
accordingly  
UB / Research L  H  The uptake of the research results is 
Table 6.5 
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Institutions  not guaranteed.  
M of Agriculture L  H  Low economic input  
MMEWR  H  H  High Economic Input 
MEWT  H  H  Because of DEA and DWMPC  
MFDP  H  H  Every development is dependent on 
water  
MLG  L  H  Water Sector Reform taking water 
supply from LAs.  
Ministry of 
Lands and 
Housing  
M  L  They allocate the surface rights  
Department of 
Women Affairs  
M  L  Interests are on labour and social  
equity  
African 
Development 
Bank  
M  M  Funding organization with interest in 
water project  
Ministry of 
Education  
L  L  Has potential to be high influence in 
terms of spreading knowledge but 
currently ineffective. High end user  
Media  H  L  Reaches a greater population than 
other outlets; however interests vary  
Mining 
Companies  
H  L  High end users. Subject to govt 
regulations hence low influence. 
Operations greatly depends on 
availability 
Table 6.5 
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Botswana Power 
Corporation  
H  L  High end users. Subject to govt 
regulations hence low influence. 
Operations greatly depends on 
availability  
Private Sector  H  L High end users. Subject to govt 
regulations hence low influence. 
Operations greatly depends on 
availability  
UN Water  L  H  Not active  in Botswana 
 
Table 6.5 Analysis of participants’ responses when asked to rank the 
‘importance of various Groups in achieving a dynamic plan for a Botswana 
IWRM-WE’. Maun October 7th 2010 
 
It is interesting to note that the FG placed the river basin commissions (TNBC) 
first in their minds both as key players and as having great influence on a 
Botswana IWRM. This contrasts with KIs, interviewed separately from the 
workshop, who saw the same commissions as weak in influence. The 
weakness of the NGO and UN sector was agreed, with the exception of 
UNDP/GEF (but this view may have been influenced by the fact that 
UNDP/GEF funded the workshop and the whole project). The research 
institutions such as University of Botswana were seen as having low influence. 
The Ministries (MMEWR, MEWT, MLH and MFDP) were all seen as key 
players, except for the MoA which was categorised as having low influence. The 
researcher reflects that this was surprising given the strong position of the MoA 
ministers in the Cabinet on the water reforms. The Ministry of Local 
Government (MLG) was rated as high interest but low influence, with water 
delivery responsibilities taken away from them. The MLH was erroneously seen 
as allocating water rights through the allocation by Land Boards of land rights. 
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It was felt that the Department of Women’s Affairs would have a low interest in 
the BIWRM as they were more interested in ‘social equity’. This seemed to 
reflect an urban middle class view of the participants, not in tune with Principle 
Three of the Dublin Principles (see Chapter Two). A rich discussion was had on 
the role of the Ministry of Education, rated as low in both interest and influence. 
It was felt that teachers and thus the pupils would be able to understand the 
need for a BIWRM-WE plan and could convince the country to press ahead with 
implementation. Schools were also seen as high end users of water and the 
water efficiency (WE) work would be directed towards them.  
 
The mining companies, the national Parastatal Botswana Power Corporation 
(BPC) and the private sector were all seen as having low interest but high 
influence. It was agreed that the main action for the BIWRM-WE team should 
be to concentrate on these players. The BIWRM-WE meetings observed by the 
researcher in fieldwork followed this through. 
 
 
 
Key to Figure 6.5 (following page): 
1 = OKACOM    13 = MEWT 
2 = ORASECOM    14 = MFDP  
3 = LIMCOM     15 = MLG 
4 = ZAMCOM    16 = M of Lands and Housing 
5 = GWP/Waternet    17 = Dept of Women’s Affairs 
6 = NGOs (National)     18 = African Development Bank 
7 = NGOs (International)   19 = M of Education 
8 = SADC     20 = Media  
9 = UNDP/GEF    21 = Mining Companies 
10 = UB/Research Institutions  22 = BPC 
11 = M of Agriculture   23 = Private Sector 
12 = MMEWR    24 = UN Water 
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Figure 6.5 The Resultant Mapping of the players in BIWRM–WE from the data 
in Table 6.5 
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Key Informant Interviews on BIWRM –WE 
 
Key 
informants 
Private 
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(3) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
Experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) Mean 
Awareness of 
IWRM-WE 
process 
5.5 6.5 5 1 0 5 2 4 
Stakeholder 
role in 
IWRM-WE 
process 
3.5 6 5 1.5 0 0 0 2 
 
Table 6.6 Summary of KI views on BIWRM-WE collected by the Researcher 
September 2010-July 2011 (expressed on a Likert Scale where 0 is Low and 7 
is high) 
 
Knowledge by local government representatives, the tribal administration and 
the media, about the Botswana IWRM-WE was very low in 2011 (Table 6.6). 
Only the civil servants (who were the main attendees at the Maun workshop) 
knew of its existence and even the water experts did not know they were meant 
to be key stakeholders in the process.  
 
4) The range of actors moving towards a new national consensus on 
WRM/WDM 2009-14 
 
The National Development Plans from 1966, the Vision 2016 from 1997 and 
now the BIWRM-WE process from 2009 provide a framework for change, to 
give Botswana sustainable WRM and universal WSS.This section seeks to 
bring forward the key players that used this framework to drive forward a 
consensus view of change to a new Advocacy Coaltion based on limited natural 
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resources, of hydrological water scarcity arising from climate change. The 
potential drivers of change are now analysed: 
  
Water experts advising the Government  
 
Botswana has prided itself since Independence in appointing experts on the 
basis of merit so as to ‘retain an efficient administration’ (Masire 2006:39 and 
98). Water policy was ‘one of the areas where it was important for experts – 
hydrologists, engineers, economists –and us politicians- to understand one 
another as we reviewed our options and made decisions on major projects’ 
(ibid:173). The Botswana civil service slowly localised over the following 30 
years as citizens replaced expatriate experts only on merit. This initial decision 
to underpin the Government with trained expertise was seen as one reason for 
the success of Botswana. ‘In a democracy, positions should be secured on 
merit’ (Masire 2006:40). 
 
A group of well qualified KI water experts advising the government were 
interviewed continually by the Researcher. They were involved in adapting and 
revising the new WRM policy as new information on the policy outcomes 
became known. The then Head of Water Affairs in MMEWR in 2002 set out the 
parameters for what became the National Water Plan Review (GOB 2006c). He, 
as the Permanent Secretary at MMEWR from 2010, sees himself as a driving 
force for the change. 
 
Parliamentary Pressure 
 
There was a change in the appreciation of the potential impact of climate 
change on water scarcity. The National Assembly of Botswana decided in 
November 2010 to establish permanent committees on ‘Climate Change’ and 
separately on ‘Environment and Natural Resources’. The Committees met in 
Gaborone in April 2011 under the auspices of the Association of European 
Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) and the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) and the UK Government. The meeting 
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was attended by the Researcher. The Chair of the Climate Change Committee, 
Hon W.Mmolotsi MP, said: 
 
 “Climate change has the potential to reverse much of the gains we 
have made so far in the country and in the region, in terms of food 
security, water security, economic development and poverty 
eradication.... Subsistence rain-fed agriculture as is the case in 
Botswana is more sensitive to climate variability than irrigated 
agriculture which is supported by water storage systems and 
management of available water resources. We are tasked with 
providing oversight on climate change policies and laws and 
advancing mainstream climate change issues in every aspect of 
human environment interaction”.  
 
The Researcher saw a movement among Parliamentarians, during his fieldwork 
period (2010-13), to support the need for the WDM reforms. The National 
Assembly sent a delegation to the Rio+ 20 conference in 2012 and agreed to 
the setting up of a GLOBE102 Botswana group. 
 
Opposition Parties 
 
KIs from the opposition parties103 supported the need for water reforms104 (KI 
CGP 3, 4). Their power base was primarily in the urban areas, not in rural 
areas. ‘Opposition strength [came] from government employees, urban 
residents and a number of disaffected ethnic groups’ (Picard 1987:148). The 
rural areas, supporters of the BDP Government Party, were perceived as being 
concerned at the potentially adverse impact of the water reforms:  
                                                 
102
 GLOBE = Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced Environment, a worldwide 
parliamentary grouping on Climate Change and WDM  
103
 During the period of fieldwork September 2010–July 2011; but in  March 2013, the opposition 
parties saw media concern about the WSS progress and made it a political issue (Mmegi 22
nd
 
March 2013) 
104
 The 2008 GE manifesto for BAM and the BCP “A Nation at the Crossroads”:21,23 
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‘In spite of the general lack of rural support for the opposition parties, 
the BDP political elites have been more concerned with rural 
challenges to their position ....than with an urban-based opposition105. 
It is for that reason the government has turned to the District 
administrative apparatus to monitor opposition activities in the rural 
areas’ (Picard 1987:148).  
 
District Commissioners (DC) 
 
The District Commissioner, as the arm of central government, chaired the water 
review committees in each District set up by DWA after Independence (KI 
CGCS 6) and the District Development Committees which brought together the 
views of Village Development Committees (see Chapter Five).They saw the 
poor level of WSS and had to field the complaints as the eyes and ears of the 
President and the Cabinet. ‘The district bureaucracy in Botswana has not 
changed since independence. Political elites inherited a political system based 
for the best part of the century on the principles of indirect rule and political 
mediation vis-a-vis traditional [and elected local] authorities’ (Picard 1987:149). 
It ‘is deemed essential [that WSS for the poor are available] if the Botswana 
social and economic elites pursue a strategy of economic growth based on 
mineral exploitation and commercial cattle ranching’ (ibid). The DC for 
Gaborone, in 2011 was appointed to be DC for Kgatleng District as a promotion 
to give her a direct role, away from the Capital, in reporting to the centre on the 
water reforms outside the capital.  
 
Trade Unions  
 
The water reforms proposed in 2009 envisaged and delivered major job cuts in 
excess of 4,000106 in DWA and local authorities, but there was broad support for 
the reforms among the trade unions, with the expansion in recruitment to WUC. 
                                                 
105
 The opposition to the BDP faded in 2012: Africa Confidential 53,96,9 
106
 This is out of a total civil service of only 100,000 i.e. 4% of the workforce 
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The almost total civil servants’ strike of April to June 2011 was not about the job 
losses from the water reforms but about the perceived need for a general 
standard of living increase107 with initial support from the South Africa Trade 
Union movement... The strike was called off after eight weeks in June 2011 by 
the TU leaders, with only a 3% across the board increase in pay agreed 
(against an initial demands for 30% lowered to 14%).  
 
Civil Society 
 
The role of the umbrella grouping of the Botswana Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO) in the WRM processes has been 
weak. As will be shown in Chapter Seven, BOCONGO were engaged with the 
WB/GOB on the consultative process on water reforms. However, beyond the 
two main environmental NGOs, the KCS and Somaraleng, there was little 
engagement. The leading women’s rights group, Emang Basadi, had little 
involvement and, even after discussions with the Researcher, did not see how 
they should have a role. A broader human rights group, Ditswanelo, had a 
primary interest on the water rights of the Basarwa alone (see Section 9.2.1).  
 
The Churches 
 
The main NGOs concerned to tackle the underlying scarcity of water and lack of 
coherence on pre-2009 WDM were the churches. They followed the deep 
beliefs of the Batswana in terms of the spiritual nature of water and its provision 
by God. The church leaders preached on the sacred nature of water to all 
Batswana (Tsuaneng 2010). They said prayers for rain and “blessed the 
buckets of water brought to the Cathedral on Maundy Thursday” (KI RM 1). The 
                                                 
107
The legal requirement of the Government to meet with the trade unions to discuss the sharing 
of the national cake was codified by meetings with BFTU. The breakaway from BFTU of the 
Federation of Public Sector Trade Unions, forming BOFEPUSO in February 2011, led to the 
breaking of the national consensus.  As the majority of the employed in Botswana work in the 
public sector (with over 5000 in water related work at DWA and in Local Government), 
BOFEPUSO leaders felt they should lead the BFTU but other Trade Union (TU) officials did not 
agree. No formal negotiations therefore took place between the Government and BOFEPUSO 
and the latter called their members out on strike in April 2011, ultimately indefinitely.  
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Botswana Council of Churches (BCC) lobbied the President on behalf of the 
San and their right to access to a borehole in the CKGR (see Section 9.2). The 
Pew Centre survey of African beliefs show 69% adherence of the population to 
Christianity in Botswana108.  
 
The BCC, mainly offshoots of the European based churches, joined in May 
2011, in a unifying Covenant with the Southern African Evangelical Churches 
and a grouping of locally founded Batswana churches. Ostensibly this was to 
enable an approach to be made to the EU for funding for joint projects. But it did 
enable common approaches to be made to social problems, including that of 
the provision of water. This was seen as both a spiritual issue but also a social 
issue with the need to have ‘free’ standpipes in church grounds in each 
village109. The BCC stated in May 2011 that they would provide the alternative 
to the closure of open standpipes in the villages, if their village wanted this 
safety net110. 
 
Botswana Association of Local Government (BALA) 
 
BALA and the BCC had the same President 2009-13, Cllr the Rev Mpho 
Muruakngoma, a BDP member and Deputy Chair of Kgatleng District (from 
2012). Water reform was continually on the agenda for their meetings, and 
supported. This was despite the proposed loss of responsibility to WUC. But it 
was understood that the previous situation was not sustainable (KI LGP4). 
 
BALA was one of fifteen SSA countries Local Government Associations (LGA) 
surveyed on WSS progress in 2011-12 under a United Cities and Local 
                                                 
108
 In the 2011 Survey, Botswana had one of the lowest figures for Christian participation across 
SSA 
109
 Discussed at the Botswana Council of Churches meeting on 10
th
 May 2011, with the 
Researcher present 
110
This had not been implemented by May 2013 but was seen then as urgent to review (KI 
LGP4) It may also reflect the move to keep prepaid standpipes had lessened the impact of the 
changes. 
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Government Association of Africa (UCLGA) WSS initiative111. Meetings took 
place regularly between BALA and its sponsoring ministry, the MLG on WSS, 
but it was the MLG that represented BALA at the water process discussions. 
The Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) meeting in Windhoek in 
November 2010, attended by the Researcher, was on the delegated powers to 
local government institutions, including WSS, across Southern Africa. The 
Botswana delegation was again dominated by the MLG. The tension between 
local government institutions and the MLG on WSS is further pursued in 
Chapter Eight. 
 
Tripartite Meetings of Government, Private sector and Trade Unions 
 
Decision making on a new water AC used the vision of Seretse Khama which 
was for the development of Botswana by consultation and agreement within a 
big tent inside which he brought together the key actors (Masire 2006). 
Discussion took place at the twice yearly formal High Level Consultative 
Committee (HLCC) meetings (and additional ad hoc meetings) of the President 
and Cabinet, the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and 
Manpower (BOCCIM), and the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU). 
The water reforms came to the tripartite meetings in 2010 and were agreed in 
principle. BOCCIM were fully consulted on the detail of the reforms in March 
2011 and supported them. 
 
 
                                                 
111
 Cllr the Rev Mpho Muruakngoma was President of UCLGA 2010-11, representing local 
government at the AU level. UCLGA and ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability – Africa 
were partners in the European Commission (EC) funded project ‘Local Initiatives in Promotion 
of the Attainment of Water and Sanitation Millennium Development Goals’. The project took 
place in 15 countries within Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. The main aim of the project was to ensure that the role of local authorities in the 
delivery of the water and sanitation MDGs is recognized and to enhance the capacity of local 
authorities to fulfil that role through sharing of knowledge and innovative practices. 
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Summary 
 
These groups of players, water experts, the back bench parliamentarians of all 
parties, the district commissioners, the trade unionists, the civil society primarily 
represented by the churches, and local government leaders all moved their 
beliefs in the 2010-12 period in favour of a new advocacy coalition for water 
reform. The ‘big tent’ approach of Seretse Khama helped that process. 
 
6.3.4 Competing demands for scarce water within the government 
 
As has been seen in Section 5.6, the MMEWR covered competing needs for 
water - human needs through the Department for Water Affairs (DWA), energy 
needs through the ownership and direction of the Botswana Power Corporation 
and mining needs for water rights through the Departments of Mines and 
Geological Surveys. The Water Apportionment Board (WAB) under the 
chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary of MMEWR allocated water rights, 
including those applied for by the Water Utilities Corporation (WUC).  
 
The other water engaged Ministries dealt with agriculture including livestock 
(Ministry of Agriculture-MOA) and the tourism and ecosystems needs (Ministry 
of the Environment Wildlife and Tourism - MEWT) but those Ministries are 
supposed to go to the WAB and MMEWR for their water rights. Sanitation 
delivery came under the MLG, until 2011/12, but was overviewed with permits 
for location and type of sanitation being decided by MEWT. These 
arrangements are more fully described in Chapter Five with diagrams of the 
relationships. Cross government processes brought together competing 
demands and, outside MMEWR, competing ministries before the water reforms. 
The competition for water based economic operations was such that water was 
free (after abstraction costs) to mining companies (MMEWR) (20% of water 
usage) and agricultural boreholes (44% of water usage) (MoA) (Grynberg and 
Sekakela 2013) (Figure 5.3).  
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Key 
Informants 
Private 
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(4) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
Experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Mean 
Average 
(29) 
Priority for 
Water – 
Mining 
7 7 6 6 5 7 6 6 
Priority for 
Water – 
Energy 
7 7 6 6 5 7 6 6 
Priority for 
Water – 
Cattle 
ranching 
6 7 6 6 7 4 6 6 
Priority for 
Water – 
Agriculture 
(irrigated) 
5 6 6 6 4 4 7 5.5 
Priority for 
Water - 
Tourism 
5 6 6 5 4 4 6 6 
Ecosystem  5 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 
 
Table 6.7 KI Summary of priorities for Water Sept 2010 –July 2011 (based on 
Likert Scale of 0= no priority and 7 = highest priority) 
 
Table 6.7 points to the lack of prioritisation of water allocation in 
Botswana.among the KIs. They gave the highest priority for water equally to 
mining, energy and for cattle ranching, except the latter case, where water 
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experts disagreed.112 Tourism and Ecosystem needs were slightly lower. 
Overall there is a low conception of the need to prioritise to take account of the 
likely scarcity of water. There was a lack of understanding from the KIs about 
the fact that 80% of the water came from aquifers (before the operation of the 
NSCs?) such that groundwater use would be unsustainable if all these 
competing priorities were met. ‘There needs to be an education process’ (KI 
CGCS 6).  
 
6.3.5 What brought the agenda forward? The role of the President 
Water Ministers and the Cabinet as a whole recognised that this situation could 
not continue and authorised the National Water Management Plan Review 
(NWMPR) (GOB 2006d), which led to the water reforms 2009-13.’New 
mechanisms are needed to ensure the principles of efficiency and equity are 
met’ (GOB, 2010a:7).The policy processes on water reforms and actors working 
within these processes had gone on since 1992 (NWMP) and 1997 (V2016), 
2004 (BIWRM-WE) and 2006 (NWMPR). So what could be seen as the catalyst 
to drive the water reforms? It has been suggested that the succession of 
President S E Ian Khama to leader of the BDP in the NA in 2008 and his 
election as President in 2009, ‘brought theory into action’ (KI CGCS6). 
 
There had been criticism of the strong position of the President within the 
Westminster model of democracy set out in the constitution (Good 2010). It 
undoubtedly gave power to the President, but it was weak in that he holds 
power only while he commands a majority within the National Assembly. The 
President of Botswana is one of the few Commonwealth leaders in SSA not to 
have his own personal mandate for his position. If he loses a vote of 
confidence, a General Election must be called (KI CGP5). His power is limited 
to two periods of five years and he has to get the support of a majority of the 
MPs in the NA at those five yearly elections. This he did in 2009 by a large 
                                                 
112
 The SA view of water allocation is ‘domestic, industrial and mining users get 97% assurance 
of water supply, irrigation 91% assurance’ (SA DWA view expressed in Farmers Weekly 14
th
 
March 2008:27) 
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majority. His approval rating according to a Gallup survey was 81% in 2011 as 
opposed to the approval rating for the government as a whole of 73%113. 
 
The President S E Ian Khama, after his election in 2009, decided to act on the 
WRM/WSS reform plans of the NWMPR (SMEC 2006), worked through by the 
team at the DWA and ready for implementation (KI CGCS6). His previous 
career before politics was different from the civil service elite background of 
former Presidents Masire and Mogae. He was son of the founding President 
and had been inducted by him as Paramount Chief of the Bangwato in 1979114. 
However, his whole career was in the Botswana Defence Force. There, over 
10% of the army was committed to wildlife and ecosystem protection (Smith 
2010:1). His selection as Vice President was controversial, as, at that time, he 
had no experience outside the Army, where he was Chief of the Defence Staff 
(Good 2010).He admired the water recycling policies of the Israeli government 
and visited the country to inspect water facilities (Gilmont 2013a). KIs remarked 
that he invited Israeli technicians to Botswana to work in the Glen Valley treated 
sewage effluent watered farming area alongside the main Gaborone barracks.  
 
He has interests in conservation, particularly defending the RAMSAR status of 
the River Okavango and its Delta. He was, from 2009, a Member of the Board 
of the US based INGO Conservation International (CI). That organisation 
supported the concept of IWRM and hosted the Alliance for Global Water 
Adaptation. In March 2012, he endorsed the WB initiative on Wealth Accounting 
and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) (Box 6.3). He organised the CI 
Summit for Sustainability in Africa on May 24-25, 2012, leading to the Gaborone 
Declaration115, which endorsed the WAVES work. “Besides the prospect of an 
improved appreciation of the true market values of our unique set of resources, 
                                                 
113
 The Botswana Gallup Survey was conducted from the 15-29 October 2011, through face to 
face interviews in Setswana and English with a scientific sample of 1000. The survey, according 
to Gallup has a potential plus or minus error of 3.9%. 
 
114
 President Ian Khama announced that, when he steps down as President, he would resume 
the Paramount Chieftaincy (The Monitor 30
th
 April 2012:1) 
 
115
 Summit Website: http://www.conservation.org/ssa 
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green accounting can provide a better framework for meeting specific 
challenges, such as the pricing of scarce water resources” (KI M3)116. WAVES 
has been driven by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, putting 
water policy at the centre of the NDP process. 
 
Given this proposed commitment to WAVES, it is assumed that the President is 
supporting the new policy for a demand-constrained management of water 
resources of Botswana. He owns no cattle but endorses the concept of every 
Motswana being independent and that involves the widespread ownership of 
cattle even down to the poorest in the community. He has said that any WRM 
reforms must allow access to water for the poor (Khama 2008).This 
commitment is further explored in Chapter Nine. 
 
The delivery of WSS had remained unchanged since the Water Act of 1972 and 
had been seen as successful in the high levels of access to WSS, particularly 
among a peer group of developing countries (UNDP 2009). After his 
inauguration as President, Ian Khama received the analysis contained in Tables 
2.2 and 2.3 and decided that Botswana, despite the success so far, could do 
better (KI CGCS 6 May 2013). While the overall figure for improved sanitation 
shows a rise to 62% of the population having access, the split between urban 
and rural is stark with 75% in urban areas and 41% in rural areas 
(UNICEF/WHO 2012:40). The figures for open defecation were still at 38% in 
2010 in rural areas. The vulnerability of the aquifers to ‘improperly managed’ 
sanitation practices was known (Mokokwe 2003:20) with the closure of the 
Ramotswa aquifer for this reason (Kholoma 2011). Was it time to change the 
way sanitation was delivered in Botswana and to protect the aquifers?  
                                                 
116
Progress was reported in April 2013 at a seminar in Washington D.C in a presentation 
available at 
https://wavespartnership.org/waves/sites/waves/files/images/Bot%20WAVES%20Botswana%20
Presentation%20April%209,%202013.pdf. But a contrary view from a KI: “there has been no 
water accounting to date within the DWA” (KI WEN 5 2013). 
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The statistics for drinking water sources showed further concern with a 96% 
access figure (urban 99% and rural 92%) masking lower figures for access to 
piped water. The statistics could be seen to show that reforms in the delivery 
mechanism of WSS were needed. A further driver was the increasingly 
understood unacceptable level of unaccounted for or lost potable water. This 
had been assessed at over 46% due to a combination of poor infrastructure, up 
to 50 years old, and uncharged-for water often from free standpipes (UNDP-PE 
2012; Kholoma 2011)117. The increase in water borne sanitation without 
infrastructure would only make this worse (Kholoma 2011: 3). As a former 
military leader, Ian Khama could be seen to set out an agenda for MMEWR and 
                                                 
117
 WUC believed the figure in 2013 was still at 29%, Mmegi 22 March 2013 (30) 44: “The 
gospel according to WUC” 
Box 6.3 The wealth accounting and valuation of ecosystem services (WAVES) 
approach to water in Botswana 
 
WAVES initially targeted the valuation of the Okavango water system. It reiterated 
the need for “more efficient use of scarce water resources, which underpin all 
economic activities” (3).  
 
It stated ‘Botswana faces severe water constraints that, if not properly managed, 
threaten to hold back economic growth and development. At least two of the major 
strategies for economic diversification—expanded mining, especially of coal, and 
irrigated agriculture—are water intensive, and it is not clear that there is sufficient 
water in the right places to support all these activities, as well as a growing 
population. Botswana has introduced significant water sector reforms, privatizing 
water supply under full-cost recovery with uncertain impacts on access to water by 
the poor’ [Researcher’s italicising]1(8).  
 
‘Recognizing that careful water management is essential to support growth and 
diversification, the main new mandate of the Department of Water Affairs is 
integrated water resources management (IWRM). Economic assessment of water 
use and supply, and improved water efficiency are major goals of IWRM, and water 
accounting can provide a tool to support these goals. That includes coordination of 
sectoral activities, careful assessment of the economic tradeoffs among competing 
users, and incentives for water efficiency is needed to ensure that water is used most 
efficiently to support economic growth’ (8). 
 
Source: The Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) 
Priority Policy Objectives Report (GOB 2012a) 
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WUC to make the challenging switch described in the next chapter. His re-
election campaign for 2014 is the backdrop to this thesis. A stance on WRM 
and WSS policy could jeopardise the re-election of a BDP majority if the policies 
prove unpopular and unsupported by a broad base of MPs and the electorate 
as a whole. Therefore, an AC of support, based on perceptions of water 
scarcity, including the drivers for change referred to earlier, would have to be 
built to ensure acceptance by the country of the change. 
 
6.4 Discussion of the Key Issues in Chapter Six around the deep core 
beliefs and policy core beliefs supporting a new AC on water reform 
 
Batswana understanding of water scarcity within the Botswana economy 
 
The hydro-mission, supply side approach to water scarcity since Independence 
had brought about a low level of appreciation of the long term constraint that 
water scarcity would impose on the development of Botswana. A national 
debate on the impact of less water and the need for WDM needed to take place. 
The FG members and KIs did not fully accept what water experts, international 
and local, were telling them. The drivers for change came together to try to 
overcome this apathy. The Kgosi (tribal leaders), from their knowledge of the 
past, recognised the need for action. 
 
The role of Vision 2016 to press for change  
 
V 2016 has been an important mechanism alongside the National Development 
Plans for focusing attention on change, particularly during the fieldwork 2010-
13. As 2016 draws near, however, there is concern from the Batswana elite that 
criticism would come from the media and opposition politicians, where 
backsliding against the targets on water and sanitation, among others, set 
within a political economy framework, was perceived to have occurred. It was 
likely that the President may wish to see a new advocacy coalition around 
targets, seen through a lens of political ecology, including WRM and based on 
the WAVES analysis, to be put in place to provide a longer term vision for the 
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Botswana water sector. But this may be in opposition to the expansion of 
mineral extraction and the royalties arising needed to fund long term 
development (Grynberg 2013). The new Vision 2030 could contain tensions 
over WRM. 
 
The deep core beliefs of the Churches 
 
The main NGOs in Botswana are the churches. They underpin the WRM and 
WSS reforms based on respectively, deep beliefs in water values in religion and 
the support of the poor who could be affected by the changes (see Chapter 
Nine).They are the watchdogs in Botswana, as shown by their intervention in 
the issue of the right to water of the Basarwa (Section 9.2). 
 
The position of the President in support of the new AC in 2009, at the 
same time, seeking re-election in 2014 
 
If the President and the needed BDP majority in the National Assembly want to 
be re-elected in 2014, he and the BDP would have to take account of the 
potential unpopularity of any WRM and WSS changes outlined in the following 
Chapter. Therefore, even given the ecological credentials of the President in 
support of WDM, there may be a delay for reasons of political expediency.  
 
6.5 Summary 
 
The concerns about water scarcity laid out by international and local water 
experts set out earlier in this chapter (Section 6.2) placed water reform on the 
agenda. The post independence coalition drive for modernisation (as shown in 
Chapter Five), with a demand side hydro-mission basis of thought and action, 
and, as a result, for the unlimited provision of potable water, had diminished that 
belief, and re-education on hydrological water scarcity was needed. The 
processes in the period 1990-2009, through the NWMP (GOB 1992) and 
NWMPR (GOB 2006c) were led by the political and bureaucratic elites to drive 
a concept of change, towards a constrained demand-led mission in a water 
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constrained world, as shown in Section 6.3. The NDPs and Vision 2016 
provided the processes on potential water allocation and drought relief 
(Munemo 2012). The key drivers and policy brokers were the politicians and 
civil service who had driven the great achievements on access to WSS in the 
immediate post independence years. Now in 2009 they saw themselves as 
leading again. A tension could be perceived between the Central Government’s 
driven policy process of WRM and WSS reforms from the NDPs and Vision 
2016, and a BIWRM-WE, an externally UN funded process. This latter process 
was both competition to and a constraint on the water reforms being rolled out 
in the four years 2009-13 by the Government. The role of President S K Ian 
Khama, in terms of his power and ecological commitment, appears to be the 
most significant driver for change. He is said to have brought the WRM and 
WSS reforms forward. But the democratic need to get re-election in 2014 for his 
party and himself at the General Election could slow the project. The new 
coalition could not deliver on the WRM policy solely through the President and 
his immediate circle: there had to be a broad-base support for the new strategy 
and this could delay its implementation. 
 
Chapter Six has examined the extent to which there is evidence of a possible 
new Advocacy Coalition (AC) being formed, of academics and experts and then 
Batswana groups of actors who could be seen as providing the underpinning of 
new policy core beliefs, which can be changed by evidence and can lead to 
coalition formation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The next Chapter seeks 
to demonstrate the strengthening of the AC through the working out of detailed 
secondary beliefs, more narrow and subject to change over time, leading to fine 
tuning of reforms on an empirical basis (ibid) by examining  the WRM and WSS 
reform policies of 2009-13. 
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Chapter Seven: What were the proposed WRM and WSS reforms during 
2009-2013 and how did they evolve during the process?  
 
7.1 Chapter overview  
 
The previous chapter pointed to why and how a possible new Advocacy 
Coalition (AC) of academics and experts, then Batswana groups of actors, 
could form with their actions underpinned by deep core beliefs. In this Chapter, 
the new policy core beliefs which have changed through evidence of current 
and future water scarcity, have led to new policies through the working out of 
secondary beliefs, more narrow and subject to change over time, leading to fine 
tuning of reforms on an empirical basis on Water Resource Management 
(WRM) and the delivery of Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith1993). The initial policy (GOB 2010a) is reviewed, together with 
the process of consultation and how the proposed reforms evolved to the final 
policy (GOB 2012d) which was sent to the NA in December 2012 and is due to 
be debated in 2014 
 
7.2 The draft National Water Policy (GOB 2010a) 
 
The planned centralisation of all WRM and WSS responsibilities within the 
Ministry of Mining, Energy and Water Resources (MMEWR), through the 
proposed Water Resources Council (WRC) and the Water Utilities Corporation 
(WUC), can be traced to the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) (GOB 
1992), confirmed in the National Water Management Plan Review (NWMPR) 
(GOB 2006), worked through in World Bank (WB) papers of 2008-10 and 
partially carried out from 2009 onwards. The Government of Botswana (GOB) 
had sought the advice of the WB in 2008 on choices for the WSS delivery and 
the GOB approved Option (3) (KI CGCS 6) as outlined in Table 7.1 below. This 
shows the alternatives originally put forward in the NWMPR (GOB 2006c). 
Chapter Five has described the range of players, WUC in the large towns, 
Department of Water Affairs (DWA) in the large villages and 18 local councils 
delivering disparate services everywhere else. The final recommendation by the 
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WB was based on the need for increased accountability, to enable the public to 
know who was responsible for their own delivery of WSS, and through 
centralisation118 with a single provider, a lower cost of provision. The WB view 
was that Option Three would deliver these objectives by WUC becoming 
vertically integrated and responsible for bulk water, water supply and sewerage, 
and reuse of water throughout Botswana. 
 
The possibility of the privatisation of WSS was considered by the GOB and their 
WB advisors but was ruled out (KI CGCS 4). This was said to be because of the 
perception that the size of the WSS market in Botswana and its potential for 
private sector interest was very low, given the high levels of investment needed 
(ibid). Both outright sale and 10 year licensing were rejected. This was despite 
the Mbombela/Nelspruit City model119 of 10 year licensing of WSS, espoused 
by the WB, being seen as successful in neighbouring Limpopo Province of 
South Africa (SA) (KI IA5). It should be noted that the GOB has actively sought 
to privatise its parastatal organisations (KI CGCS 4). The decision not to 
privatise WSS provision in 2010 was not done on ideological grounds but on the 
basis of potential lack of interest (ibid). It was not ruled out by GOB for the 
future, as could be seen in the Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services (WAVES) statement of March 2012 (see Box 6.3). 
 
All water resources and the WRM function continue under State ownership, as 
in the UK (KI CGCS 6).  
 
With the adoption of Option Three, the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) was 
to be left with an advisory role to the independent Water Resource Council 
(WRC) on water rights and joint responsibility with the WRC on waste 
discharge. Coordination lies at Ministerial level with DWA, WUC and WRC 
(successor to WAB), all residing within the MMEWR (KI IA 5) (Figure 7.1). The 
                                                 
118
 As has been seen in Chapter Two, Section 2.2.3, the selection of centralisation under a 
single water utility is a contested concept for accountability. 
119
 Nelspruit (SA) renewed the license to the private sector for a further 10 years in 2010 
because of the successful operation of the franchise. 
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Local Government Ministry (MLG) and Local Authorities and MEWT were left 
with an undefined watchdog role. 
 
Options Town Villages Rural 
Reduce 
Costs 
Accountable 
Final 
Decision 
(1) 
Unchanged  
WUC DWA Local Govt NO NO 
Must 
Change 
(2) 
Two 
Parastatals   
WUC WUC 
New 
Additional 
Parastatal 
Maybe but 
less than 
Option 
Three 
YES More Costly 
(3) 
One 
Parastatal  
WUC WUC WUC YES YES YES 
 
Table 7.1 Options for delivery of water and sanitation in 2008   
 
Source: Researcher’s Discussions with KI, 2010-12. Water-borne sanitation 
was moved from the District Councils (MLG) to WUC in March 2011 
 
The broad conclusions of the NWMPR (GOB 2006c) were put up on the GOB 
MMEWR website in 2009 for open engagement with the public, on the 
principles of the WRC on WRM and choice of WUC as the single national 
distributor of WSS (Figure 7.1). The WB led the consultation process (2008-9) 
on the initial conclusions including two meetings with the Botswana NGO 
coalition (BOCONGO). Very few NGOs came to the meetings. The subject was 
not seen as important by the wider NGO universe. Emang Basadi, the main 
women’s NGO in Botswana was invited to both meetings but did not go as the 
director “felt it was not an issue on which [she] should engage” (KI NGON4). 
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The Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS), already working on the Botswana 
Integrated Water Resource Management –Water Efficiency (BIWRM-WE) plan, 
was agreed as the lead NGO by the Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO) 
(KI NGON1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The proposed responsibilities for water and water borne sanitation 
delivery when reforms are completed in 2014 (Option 3 in Table 7.1) 
Source: KI IA5, October 2010 
 
 
The decision of the GOB, expressed in a Cabinet memorandum of the 3rd June 
2009120, was ‘for a 5 year period for implementation with the following timelines 
of a WUC takeover of sewerage services, water supply and bulk water delivery 
for the entire country by April 2014 and all legal and institutional framework for 
the sector to be in place by 2013’. It was not brought to the National Assembly 
for debate, let alone a vote; no politician demanded it be so and this points to 
the strong coalition of support for this major change in the delivery of WSS. 
 
                                                 
120
 P/S MMEWR B.K.Paya quotation in a presentation to the National Assembly 2
nd
 December 
2010 attended by the Researcher. 
Regulator WRC 
WUC 
Boreholes 
MMEWR/DWA 
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The WB, acting as a paid agent of the Botswana Government, worked through 
the detail of the implementation of the full policy between September and 
November 2010 at meetings in Gaborone, many of which the Researcher 
attended. The allocation of responsibilities within a new regulatory framework 
for WRM was agreed by the GOB as consisting of:  
 
1) Water Rights - a new Water Resources Council (WRC) to replace WAB,  
2) Waste Discharge – WRC/DWA and  
3) Tariff and Customer Care – a new Water Regulator 
  
The WB made final presentations to ministers and senior civil servants (and the 
Researcher) in early September 2010. From September 15th to 17th, the WB 
team then presented to 40+ representatives of the ministries and stakeholders 
affected by the changes. The Draft Water Policy was approved by Cabinet in 
early October 2010 and was then issued for consultation outside government 
(GOB 2010a). But the WSS reforms went ahead without waiting for 
consultation, having the general support of the AC outlined in Chapter Six. 
 
7.2.1 Policy principles agreed by the AC 
 
The document (GOB 2010a) proposes three essential guiding and overarching 
principles: equity, efficiency and sustainability, and its key features are 
presented in Box 7.1.These policy principles set a very high bar for the water 
reforms. They reflect the theoretical norms for IWRM and the Dublin Principles 
as outlined in Chapter Two, which could be seen to represent ‘external system 
events’ affecting the creation of a new Botswana subsystem from other external 
subsystems for an new Advocacy Coalition (Weible et al.2008). 
 
The Researcher will return to these principles to show the extent to which they 
are being applied in the initial implementation of the water reforms later in this 
Chapter (on efficiency and stakeholder involvement) and in Chapter Eight 
(dealing with  accountability) and Chapter Nine (dealing with issues of equity).  
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Box 7.1 Principles of the draft Water Policy (GOB 2010a) (italics by the Researcher) 
 
Equity: 
‘All water belongs to the State and is held in trust on behalf of the people of 
Botswana. There should be equitable access to water and no authorisation for its 
use should be in perpetuity. Water resources shall be managed in an integrated 
manner to meet the needs of present and future generations. Management shall be 
through participatory approaches involving users, planners and policymakers at all 
levels. Access to water will be given in the following order of priority:  
1) the basic requirements required for human consumption,  
2) the environment to ensure sustainable foundations for supporting the national 
interests, and  
3) agriculture and livestock, commercial and industrial applications. Gender and 
social equity in accessing water resources will be ensured and in particular women 
shall be empowered to participate fully in issues and decisions relating to 
sustainable development and management of water resources’ (GOB 2010a:4) 
 
Efficiency: 
‘All people in Botswana are responsible for the proper use and protection of the 
country’s scarce and valuable water resources. Existing usage will be monitored and 
analysed to identify wasteful practices and their impact. Water has an economic 
value which must be recognised and reflected in its cost to users [who] must ensure 
the wise use of water and support the development and application of technology to 
improve efficiency. Given the limited water resources available, regulatory functions 
and service delivery responsibilities will be separated to improve the efficiency of 
both’ 
 
Sustainability: 
‘Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource which is essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment. Long-term development and prosperity are 
dependent upon sustainable application and recognition of the shared nature of the 
nation's limited resources. Water is one of the nation’s most important 
environmental assets. Provided the basic requirements for human consumption are 
met, the environment and ecosystem requirements will receive priority when 
planning and allocating water among competing uses and users. Water should be 
managed at the lowest appropriate level through a participatory approach with 
planning, management and use based on integrated catchment management 
approaches that encourage conjunctive use including technical, financial, legal, 
public awareness and education inputs and outputs, as well as improvements in 
management at all levels . The precautionary principle shall be adopted with water 
conservation measures and practices used to promote environmental sustainability, 
economic efficiency and social equity.’ 
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7.2.2 The basic policy proposal (GOB 2010a)  
 
The water resources situation in Botswana, set out in the policy, is described in 
Section 2.3.1. The policy proposal added to that analysis, in identifying the 
availability of treated wastewater, which ‘remains under-utilised, despite the 
National Master Plan for Sanitation and Wastewater (NMPSW) (GOB 2003) and 
is estimated to be 0.03km3 annually’(GOB 2010:6). It reflects the new AC view 
of water scarcity needing the utilisation of all potential water resources. The new 
policy targeted the virtually complete reuse and recycling of treated wastewater 
by the year 2030, but outlined the fact that access to sanitation, and sanitation 
infrastructure  was lagging, especially in rural areas where it was considered 
only 30% of the population were covered (KI NGON 6).  
 
The policy therefore proposed: 
 
‘the consolidation of all water and wastewater operations under the 
WUC, the establishment of the Water Resources Council (WRC) to 
manage the country’s water resources organisation.... and the 
establishment of an independent Regulator for water and sanitation 
services. These decisions are intended to clarify roles, responsibilities 
and accountability throughout the water sector’ (GOB 2010a:9). 
 
The WRC ‘will be an autonomous entity’ supported by the Ministry of Mining, 
Energy and Water Resources (MMEWR)/ DWA. It would: 
  
‘....allocate water resources among users, monitor water resources 
and develop water related policies. Through the separation of service 
delivery activities, the [WRC] will ensure independence and equity in 
the sustainable allocation of water resources’ (ibid: 9).  
 
Furthermore it would for the first time establish  baseline water metrics for water 
for Botswana leading to the publication of a ‘water atlas’ on which all could 
agree (KI WB1). 
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The DWA was to ‘act as a secretary to the WRC and to provide technical 
expertise’ (ibid). Membership of the WRC was to be stakeholder based without 
the built in civil service majority of the Water Apportionment Board (WAB). The 
chairman would not be the Permanent Secretary from MMEWR as with the 
WAB, but an independent individual, not working in the Government. There 
would be positions held on the WRC for representatives of CSOs and academia 
(WB briefing of September 2010). There was a strong view put forward that all 
water extracted and consumed in Botswana must come under the new water 
rights regime of the WRC. All water utilised, it was proposed, should be 
metered, measured and appropriately charged for, at the wholesale level, 
whether to the WUC, who would  then subsequently supply, at a charge, 
individual consumers, or to any self provider, utilising boreholes, be they mining 
companies, industrial companies or cattle ranches. The potential impact of this 
latter proposed policy of charges on the poor, utilising syndicate boreholes, is 
explored in Chapter Nine. 
 
The MMEWR/DWA had a strategic role to ensure that there were sufficient 
surface water resources and continued to have responsibility for dams and 
major water infrastructure projects. It was to lead on ‘international cooperation’ 
in negotiating water allocation from and through the Trans-Boundary River 
Commissions (TBRCs). The MMEWR was to review the policy ‘at least every 
seven years’.  While this gives an overarching policy role to DWA, it proposed a 
shrinking of the numbers both regionally and in the main Head Office near Old 
Naledi, in Gaborone. There, 2 out of 3 floors of the DWA offices were vacated 
by 2011, the result of which is shown in photograph 7.1. “The restructured DWA 
establishment will reduce from 2,099 to 450 employees while the Local 
Authorities (LA) establishment for WSS will reduce from 1,818 to zero” (KI 
CGCS 6). This was confirmed as having taken place in a speech in October 
2012 by the then Vice President and former Minister of the MMEWR121. 
 
                                                 
121
  Mmegi 5 October 2012 (29)148 
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Photograph 7.1 DWA office clearing (March 2011) 
 
Having set out the new institutional framework, the policy put forward the 
objectives and strategies for the WRC to balance the needs of water for 
‘Growth, Conservation, Environment and Tourism, Agriculture (irrigation, 
farmlands and livestock), Mining and Industry, and for Energy’ (GOB 2010a:10-
16). Given the then ‘current toothlessness’ of the WAB in allocating demands 
for water rights (KI WUC 2), this policy set out a major change in power over 
WRM and WSS in the Botswana economy. 
 
7.3 The Delivery of Water Supply and Sanitation (GOB 2010a:12) 
 
The Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) was established under the Water Utilities 
Corporation Act of 1970 (see Chapter Five). The WUC reports directly to the 
Minister of MMEWR and not through DWA or the Permanent Secretary of 
MMEWR. Under the terms of the Act, WUC can be appointed to provide water 
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in any area of Botswana as declared under a Waterworks Area Order: 
therefore, there was no need to pass new legislation to allow for the WUC 
expansion. The WUC Act also specified financial principles and methods of 
charging water to ensure that WUC runs on a commercial basis and that the 
cost of water supply services is recovered (GOB 2010a:9). The expansion of 
WUC under these commercial principles led to the charging of water being 
planned to come into effect throughout Botswana. 
 
WUC management were proud of their success in delivering high quality water 
and sanitation services (WSS) efficiently in the areas they operated from 1970 
onwards with what they saw as a European standard of performance (KI WUCO 
1-5). This view was supported by all the KI politicians and civil servants. Thus, 
the AC in 2009 embraced both WUC and the Government, but there were 
forebodings by WUC senior management as to whether the financial and 
capacity resources would be made available (KI WUCO 4 and 5). Consumers, 
while appreciating the efficiency of WUC operations, were concerned that they 
would now have to pay water charges (KI BR 1-5). 
 
Enthusiasm within the DWA and within Local Government (LG) to collect water 
charges from individual consumers at the village level had been uneven in the 
past, leading to significant backlogs in the collection of outstanding debts (Table 
8.2). One of the drivers for the water reforms was to ensure that water was paid 
for within the existing tariff structures and “there are no freeloaders” (KI IA4). At 
the WB briefings in September 2010, there was a strong presumption in favour 
of the ending of subsidies on domestic use of water and the implementation of 
progressive full cost recovery. Chapter Nine, in looking at the pro-poor policy 
behind the proposed reforms, will explore the potential impact of all consumers 
having to pay WUC for their personal consumption of water. 
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‘As WUC takes over operations, it plans to grow its staffing level122, 
[before the reforms] from 850 employees, providing only water 
services in the six urban centres [sic], to about 3,763 employees, 
providing water and wastewater services in every village  throughout 
the country.  The WUC will grow from 80,000 water connections to 
270,000 connections’ (GOB 2010a:1).  
 
The consolidation of all water and sanitation services (WSS) under WUC meant 
‘all’. In the past, WUC was limited to water services in the main towns with 
some additional commercial contractual arrangements. Now, all WSS in 
Botswana whether for agriculture, industry, energy plants and mining, all, in the 
future, were proposed to go through WUC. This is graphically presented in 
Photograph 7.2. Considerable discussions took place with DEBSWANA Plc who 
made it clear they had no problem with the policy (KI I1). However, they would 
insist on an insurance policy to cover them if WUC failed to provide the water 
they were currently accessing through their own boreholes. Only borehole 
syndicates and very small settlements (below 250) were to be left to themselves 
to provide, and even there, the WRC would monitor meter usage and could 
charge for water used. 
 
 
 
                                                 
122
 WUC did not have to takeover staff from DWA and District Councils (MLG) who had the 
guarantee of redeployment in their existing Ministries, but “it becomes more and more difficult” 
(KI CGCS 5). However by October 2012, 1,730 so redeployed had been given early exit from 
the civil service, amounting to allegations of  ‘brain drain’ from the Botswana Civil Service 
(http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=14068&GroupID=1) 
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Photograph 7.2 Winning entry in WUC school painting competition (Nov 2010) 
 
Prior to the reforms of 2009-2013, the provision of sanitation services came 
under the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) for delivery and was overviewed 
by the Ministry of the Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) for regulatory 
purposes. The decisions of MEWT in authorising the planning of the location of 
pit latrines were regarded with concern by the DWA/WAB and MMEWR as a 
whole (KI CGCS 2). The new authority of the WRC was envisaged to override 
MEWT in the protection of aquifers from pollution from inappropriate placing of 
pit latrines and slurry ponds. The large Ramotswa aquifer south of Gaborone, 
polluted by pit latrines in the 1980s, was only just recovering in 2011 (KI 
WEN5). Its reopening in 2013 required a new treatment plant. There was grave 
concern that rights given by MEWT for pit latrines in Ghanzi, if implemented, 
would pollute the Ghanzi aquifer (KI CGCS 6).The handing over to WUC of the 
existing water borne sewerage plants by the MLG /local authorities took place in 
March 2011. The WUC had no expertise in sanitation. Expertise was 
immediately hired from South Africa and gradually the quality of the discharge 
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from the plants improved (KI WUC 1). The implementation of Chinese built 
sewerage infrastructure for Gaborone came on-line in late 2012 with difficulties 
in implementing the new reticulation, with blockages of lines a frequent 
occurrence (KI WEN 5). The policy of 96% recycling of sewage water for human 
consumption by 2030 in line with National Master Plans123 (GOB 2010a:13) was 
not greeted with enthusiasm by FG members124. Due to an oversight in the 
drafting of the Bill, and to the irritation of MMEWR and WUC senior 
management, the legislation passed in 2010 to enable the transfer of sanitation 
responsibilities to WUC, and did not authorize WUC to charge additionally for 
sanitation services (KI WUCO 1). Recoupment of cost could only be based on 
the additional amount of water used and thus added to water bills (KI CGCS 5). 
 
In May 2012, the responsibility for pit latrine location and emptying was moved 
by the GOB directive from local councils and the MLG to WUC. The 
implementation was delayed in Gaborone to 2013 because of the backlog of 
emptying latrines by GCC and the inherited lack of management and equipment 
to enable WUC to easily takeover (KI WEN 5, December 2012). The WB had 
recommended in 2010 that the pit latrine service be privatised and this was 
consulted on between MMEWR and the Botswana Association of Local 
Authorities (BALA) in 2013 and subsequently came into operation within a 
national tariff scheme but with village based licensed contractors (KI CGCS 6 
May 2013). 
 
The WUC inheritance from DWA and District Councils (DC) 
 
The WUC took over a WSS infrastructure that was up to 50 years old and of 
poor quality. Connections to the water mains had often been allowed to be done 
by individual consumers with no supervision and with resulting high leakage 
rates. Very little investment had been made since the initial installation of water 
mains and, in the rush to take over from the DWA and district councils, no prior 
                                                 
123
 It had been suggested that 80% of the wastewater was not being used at all (Hambira 2007) 
124
 This would equate to Windhoek practice but was a high benchmark internationally (Lazarova 
2013)  
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planning of capital investment needs was done in any detail. In the 
circumstances the water and sanitation reforms could not be seen as delivering 
an immediate improvement in WSS over the previous levels of provision. In 
April 2012, Hon P Kedikilwe, now Vice President and then Minister for the 
MMEWR, reported to the National Assembly (NA) that “WUC [has] inherited old 
and incapacitated water supply infrastructure in most areas. These old pipes 
...are of low class and this, coupled with poor workmanship, result in frequent 
bursts leading to interruption in water supply” (KI CGP 6). “This is one of the 
biggest challenges of the reforms, as there is a need to upgrade all such 
infrastructure” (ibid). “In the majority of areas taken over by the corporation, the 
billing was not done and the registration of new customers in these areas was 
low” (ibid). The WUC had inherited a debt of P76million [£8M] from the former 
water authorities:  
 
“It had inherited 27 different tariffs which were applicable to the 
various water authorities. The Corporation spent at least P100million 
[£10M] annually on wastewater services that currently yields no 
revenue. The WUC made an unprecedented loss of about 
P260million this year [2012], which was projected to continue. Some 
of the villages taken over had water losses in excess of 40 per cent 
due to low class pipes used in the distribution network”125 (ibid).  
 
The delivery of WSS in Botswana was thus not immediately improved by the 
reforms, but without them, the level of delivery of WSS would have continued to 
decline.  
 
  
                                                 
125
 Parliamentary session 2
nd
 April 2012 
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7.4 The role of the Regulator 
 
The draft Water Policy stated that:  
 
‘A Water Regulator will ensure financial sustainability across the 
water sector, reducing wastage by facilitating the streamlining of 
operations, determining revenue requirements to inform regular tariff 
adjustments. When reviewing revenue requirements, the Regulator 
shall take account of government guidance on service objectives, 
direct subsidy and cross subsidy, informed by affordability 
considerations. The Regulator would also oversee the compliance of 
service standards, (so as) to ensure efficiency and protect consumer 
rights’ (GOB 2010a:10).  
 
The Government of Botswana (GOB) decided to combine the regulatory 
functions of the power industry with that of WSS to form a Botswana Energy 
and Water Regulatory Authority (BEWRA). The consultancy Mott McDonald 
(MM) was engaged in September 2010 to propose, without constraint, the detail 
of the new Regulator; they reported in February 2011 and the final report was 
accepted in May 2011 by MMEWR (Mott McDonald 2011, GOB 2011b) and 
seen by the Researcher. The WUC, under its 1968 articles of association, was 
required to maximise profit for its shareholders, the GOB, unless otherwise 
directed. The powers of the newly proposed BEWRA were perceived by GOB 
and MMEWR as providing the countervailing power to WUC, to ensure poverty 
reduction objectives were embedded in the water reforms (see Chapter Nine). 
The regulator was strongly welcomed by senior WUC management who saw it 
as “potentially free of GOB political constraints on tariff increases needed to 
provide investment funds and a convenient scapegoat for the WUC” (KI WUCO 
4). 
 
The MM proposed framework for WSS regulation is shown in Figure 7.2. This 
proposed a Botswana Environment Authority (BEA) as an alternative to the 
Water Resources Council (WRC) and as such was the backdrop to the dialogue 
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that took place across GOB ministries in 2011/2. The BEA, also titled the WRC, 
is shown within MEWT. The alternative proposed in the Water Policy (GOB 
2010a) was for the role of the water resources’ champion to be under MMEWR 
as the champion of the economic uses of water rather than at MEWT with its 
key role in the protection of water for the ecosystem, but this latter use of water 
was not covered in the proposed remit of the water regulator. The water quality 
monitoring role of the Botswana Bureau of Standards (BSS) (under the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (MTI)) is not mentioned in the draft water policy (GOB 
2010a), but is here. This came to the fore in 2013 with concerns expressed 
about the quality of drinking water across Botswana and the lack of 
transparency in providing the information126. The details of the Mott McDonald 
report were not consulted on outside the civil service and WUC. The final report 
went to Cabinet in May 2011 for agreement. As with the decision to go ahead 
with the reorganisation of the delivery of WSS, here again the AC feels strong 
enough not to seek support from outside the coalition. 
 
The delay in bringing forward legislation for BEWRA appears to be related to 
problems Botswana has had with its energy suppliers in 2013/14, in bringing 
online the Morupule B power station, proposed provider of 80% of Botswana’s 
electricity needs. The BEWRA Bill was planned to go to the NA in early 2014127 
and is expected to be ‘functionally’ operational by June 2014.128 However, with 
the Election due in October, it is unlikely to go ahead until after this. Control on 
the pricing of water, in the short term, will remain with the politicians of the ruling 
party and then, as with electricity pricing, move to the independent regulator (KI 
CGCS 6). 
                                                 
126
 Statement from MMEWR http://www.gov.bw/en/News/Gaborone-water-is-safe challenged by 
Sunday Standard 4
th
 March “Death by water” by Sonny Serate 
127
 Announced in the NA on 4
th
 March 2013 by the Minister for MMEWR. 
 
128
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/AFR/2012/07/18/B
677C8396C04B0B885257A3F00488D7A/1_0/Rendered/PDF/ISR0Disclosabl01820120134261
7148163.pdftober 2012. The delays on Morupule B have been reported to the NA in March 
2013 with a new operational date of June then December 2013.  
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Figure 7.2  
The proposed WSS 
regulatory structure 
from Mott McDonald 
consultants report 
(February 2011) 
Source: GOB 
2011b:19 
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7.5 The process of the stakeholder meetings 
 
Consultations were organised by the GOB through stakeholder meetings to act 
as a feedback mechanism for both the ‘on the ground' delivery of WSS and also 
the projected changes to WRM. The draft water policy paper (GOB 2010a) 
claimed in October 2010 that the Government and WUC:  
 
‘have consulted extensively in the period 2008-9 as part of the water 
reform process with numerous meetings taking place in District 
Councils and Kgotlas.... as well as with academics, business 
representatives and representatives of civil society and NGOs. These 
consultations then facilitated the formation of the many provisions of 
this policy’ (GOB 2010a:10).  
 
The Researcher found little evidence of these 2008-9 meetings held by either 
the MMEWR or WB. 
 
While consultations did subsequently take place after October 2010, the depth 
and width of the representative groups was narrow. The invitation list was very 
broad but very few of those invited came. This was especially true of CSOs. 
The National Water Policy stated its adherence to the Dublin Principles with its 
commitment to ‘a participatory approach including involving users, planners and 
policymakers at all levels... women play a central part of the provision, 
management and safeguarding of water’ (GOB 2010:8). However, if CSOs, 
including those representing women, are invited and do not come, it is hard to 
criticise the body (MMEWR/DWA/WUC) which does the inviting129.  
 
 
 
                                                 
129
 The presentation to the National Assembly on 2
nd
 December 2010 by the Water Reform Unit 
(WRU) (slide 16) spoke of ‘effective stakeholder participation ensured through Water User 
Forums’. In the period of fieldwork and the writing of this thesis, these forums had not been 
formed. 
 
 189 
 
7.5.1 External stakeholders meetings 
 
Meetings took place in the form of a road show with each section of the Draft 
Policy being introduced by a specialist from the DWA or WUC or the Ministry 
concerned. This meant that the mining section was explained by a mining 
specialist, the environment by a MEWT official, and so forth, so as to present a 
single agreed face to the public on the policy. Questions asked at the meetings 
were noted for a final meeting in Kasane (Section 7.6).  
 
The external stakeholder meetings, normally in Gaborone, were: 
 
Local Government - October 2010 (LGSM) 
BOCONGO - November 2010 (BOSM)  
House of Chiefs - November 2010 (HCSM) 
National Assembly - December 2010 (NASM) 
Farmers (in Ghanzi) - December 2010 (FSM) 
Private Sector/Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and 
Manpower (BOCCIM) - March 2011 (PSSM) 
Miners (in Selebi-Phikwe) - June 2011(MSM) 
 
Absent from the arranged meeting schedule was the involvement of Trade 
Unions and the media. The continual touring of ministers and officials to the 
village Kgotlas was seen as a series of open meetings to consult and inform the 
electorate on the detail of the policy. All could come, including the Trade Unions 
and the media, and the latter certainly did. But at the Kgotla meetings attended 
by the Researcher, there was only mention of WUC taking over WSS and no 
mention of the new WDM powers of the WRC. The WUC change was accepted 
on the basis that ‘WUC can only be better than the existing provider’ (the 
Molepole Kgotla meeting, November 2010). Social media was not used despite 
the rapidly rising numbers with internet access (KI WUC 4). Information on the 
WUC website was often not available due to web reconstruction during the 
period of the fieldwork. Large advertisements were taken out in the newspapers 
outlining the changes but chiefly to advise the DWA/Local Government WSS 
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users that a new contract had to be taken out with WUC at the handover point 
to enable the continuity of supply130. 
 
7.5.2 Internal stakeholder meetings 
 
The MMEWR-led civil service Standing Committee on the water reforms met at 
least fortnightly to smooth over any inter-ministerial difficulties but despite this, 
the position on the ground was often different. The difficulty of individual WUC 
District operational units obtaining the transfer of LG assets such as water 
bowsers or tankers is noted in Chapter Eight. The DWA and WUC held 
‘Lessons Learnt’ meetings after each phase of the takeover, of all levels 
involved in the delivery changeover. The relevant Trade Unions were fully 
involved, but no water consumers were invited to give their views. The October 
2010 changeover in Kgatleng District (from DWA and Kgatleng District Council 
(KDC) to WUC) was attended by the Researcher, as was the follow-up ‘Lessons 
Learnt’ meeting in April 2011. Full 360 degree feedback was allowed and action 
points taken up to avoid mistakes going forward. An example was the review of 
the policy for the replacement of ‘pumpers’131 by a ‘flying’ car-borne official 
covering many villages, which was seen as not working. The resolution agreed 
was of a new category of village based official, who would multi-task, not only 
looking after the boreholes but doing additionally needed tasks, such as 
providing all WUC outreach in the village, including ensuring bills were issued 
and paid (if not registered destitute132) and a credible disconnection threat if 
they were not. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
130
 Despite this advertising campaign, a road show and letters to households, many users did 
not sign the new WUC contracts, but were not disconnected, leading to billing problems which 
continued through 2013 (see Chapter Nine) 
131
 Men employed to run the boreholes and water supplies in small villages  
132
 See Chapter Nine for definition and explanation 
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7.5.3 WUC/Trade Union meetings 
 
The original extension of the WUC delivery of WSS beyond its 1968 Act 
designated areas had involved a negotiation in 2009 between the Government, 
WUC and the National Amalgamated Local, Central Government and Parastatal 
Workers Union (NALCGPWU), the WUC Trade Union. The agreement was a 
win-win for union members: all those who transferred from DWA and LG to 
WUC, as it expanded into the new areas, would have a pay increase of 
approximately 20%. Those who did not, were guaranteed a continued 
alternative job in their existing Ministry. The Trade Unions and the WUC met at 
a senior level very regularly and harmoniously (KI WUC 4). The Researcher 
noted the wide range of additional WUC allowances, including relocation, 
travelling, medical costs and training. 
 
7.5.4 KI knowledge of the proposed reforms 
 
There were high levels of knowledge about the WRM and WSS reforms among 
KIs interviewed (Table 7.2). The exceptions were the media who surprisingly 
(given the widespread advertising of the reforms in the newspapers) did not fully 
understand the reforms and felt that they had not been consulted. All KIs felt the 
reforms would be good or very good for Botswana. The water experts had the 
view that they had not been fully consulted and this view was shared to a lesser 
extent by CSOs. 
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Key Informants: 
Private 
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(4) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Mean 
Average 
(29) 
1.Understanding 
of WRM 
Reforms 
(x  low to high) 
 
7 
 
7 6 6 6 6 3.5 6 
2.WRM 
Reforms are 
good for 
Botswana 
(x disagree to 
agree)  
7 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 
3.Consulted on 
WRM Reform 
proposals 
(x not to fully) 
7 7 5 7 7 3.5 4 6 
(based on a Likert Scale 1-7 x) 
Table 7.2 KI summary of views on the knowledge of GOB WRM reforms, Sept 
2010-July 2011 
 
7.6 The questions and answers from/to the stakeholders: Kasane (June 
2011) 
 
A meeting in Kasane (19 -22 June 2011, attended by the Researcher) was 
arranged to enable a core group of civil servants across the relevant ministries, 
MMEWR (including WUC), MEWT, MLG, MOA, Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning (MOFADP), Ministry of Lands and Housing (MOLAH) 
and Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration (MPAPA), together 
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with the representative of the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS) to meet. It 
was to review and evaluate the responses to the draft policy document from the 
stakeholder meetings listed in Section 7.5.1. The coding of the stakeholder 
groups is noted in the footnote133. A recording was made of a sample of 
questions from each stakeholder group (italicised) and the agreed responses of 
the review group which was subsequently passed back to the various 
stakeholder groups. The views of the review group, after considerable 
discussion, were then summarised by the Head of the Water Reform Unit. The 
following sections cover the stakeholder questions (shown in bold italics, with 
attribution to the stakeholder meeting) and the response the group agreed on. 
The meeting discussed each question in turn and in depth. The words quoted 
below are those agreed by those present and provided by the review group to 
the Researcher at the end of the meeting.  
 
7.6.1 The organisation of the WRC and WUC 
 
a) The LGSM requested Local Government to be on the WRC by right 
as ‘councils were the first political point of contact for consumers of 
WSS’. It was agreed that BALA should compete to have one of the two 
slots earmarked for NGOs on the WRC. But in addition the WRC would 
have district administrative structures at district council centres, feeding 
into the National WRC. 
b) The FSM (see footnote 66) requested special representation on the 
WRC. This was not agreed as the Permanent Secretary of the MOA was 
already designated a member. The PSSM (see footnote 66) wanted 
                                                 
133
 Local Government, October 2010 (LGSM),  
BOCONGO, November 2010 (BOSM),  
House of Chiefs, November 2010 (HCSM),  
National Assembly, December 2010 (NASM),  
Farmers (Ghanzi), December 2010 (FSM),  
Private Sector/ BOCCIM, March 2011 (PSSM)  
Mining, June 2011 (MSM) 
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BOCCIM to be represented on the WRC. This was not agreed. It was 
agreed that the CSOs from the BOCONGO should elect their own two 
members of the WRC and ‘it is for all CSOs in Botswana to compete for 
the representation’. 
c) The independence of the WRC remains a concern of all 
stakeholders. This was to be protected by being enshrined in the 
enabling Act of Parliament. The reporting through the MMEWR Minister 
(who is “the custodian of the nation’s water” (KI CGCS1) was asserted to 
be conforming to international best practice. Funding for WRC would be 
a separate parliamentary vote. District locations of the WRC should align 
themselves to those of the DWA so as to get synergy. 
 
There was concern that all power for WSS delivery was to be vested in WUC. 
What was the wisdom of vesting all responsibility on one authority, were 
other service delivery options such as outsourcing considered? (PSSM) 
Yes, various service delivery options were explored including private sector 
participation and were subjected to scrutiny through public consultations. The 
option to have a public enterprise responsible for service delivery was decided 
by public consensus and presented to be the most appropriate for the country. 
In any case, “it is envisaged that other players will in future be allowed to 
participate in the water provision” (KI CGCS 1)134.  
 
7.6.2 The issue of equity and poverty eradication 
 
The issue of equity was raised through the following questions and responses: 
firstly, one of the guiding principles should be that water is a basic human 
right (BOSM – see footnote 66). The view of the group was that the 
Government shall provide water to all citizens, but the Government was of the 
view that water users should be charged a fee commensurate with the cost of 
its provision. The Government has other structures to cater for the less 
                                                 
134
 This is contrary to both the content of the Draft Water Policy and what was said at the 
stakeholder meetings. 
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privileged so they are able to have water for domestic use. They went on, the 
issue of water as a basic human right is well understood internationally but 
countries defer on the implementation of this. Some countries such as South 
Africa prescribe a certain volume of water per month which is provided for free 
to every individual. As for Botswana, an increasing block tariff structure is 
proposed which, due to scarcity of water in the country, encourages 
conservation by charging incrementally more for water as the customer uses 
more. As to the indigent and poor, Government will provide for their water 
through existing structures such as destitute programs135. The proposed tariffs 
are aimed at ensuring that every Motswana has access to water. The 
Government in 2010 subsidises about 40% of the operation and maintenance 
costs of water supply (GOB 2010). 
 
There was concern that poverty eradication could be undermined by the new 
proposed policies. There is a need for reconciliation policy with the current 
economic schemes aimed at poverty eradication. Are these schemes 
running counter to the water policy? (LGSM) The response was that: It is 
usually sufficient that a policy statement provides for the linkage of water and 
poverty eradication. The details would usually be captured in the regulations or 
subordinate legislation. The issues of improved access to water for example will 
enable implementation of social economic activities such as backyard gardens 
which are in themselves part of the poverty eradication initiatives. 
 
Would the water tariffs go up?136 The group answered that: the Cabinet 
directive that approved the water sector reform mandated that existing tariffs 
charged by local authorities or by DWA should remain the same until such time 
that a comprehensive national study of water tariff is completed. But the 
consolidation of all water service provision to WUC raises issues of 
affordability - how can a commodity be affordable if it is provided by one 
                                                 
135
 This is explored further in Chapter Nine 
136
 Standardised VAT was placed on water at 10% in each area that WUC took over from 
DWA/Local Councils but the inherited tariff varied by area. A general increase of 10% was 
announced for May 2013, the first increase since 2004, The WUC original 1968 areas had 
increases of 20% imposed in May 2012. 
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entity? (LGSM) This was answered as: the issue of affordability is of genuine 
concern and one should note that the consolidation does not necessarily mean 
a rise in prices. With consolidation one gets to enjoy economies of scale in 
works, procurement and support services which tend to reduce operating costs 
and hence the reduction in tariff. Further to this, it is envisaged that an 
independent regulator will be established to look at the issue of tariffs to ensure 
that not only are they affordable but they are also high enough to keep WUC 
sustainable. Instead of disconnection for non payment, shouldn’t other 
strategies such as restrictors [South Africa policy in Cape Province] be used 
to ensure that people still have some access to water? (LGSM) But the 
decision of the group was that: the disconnection policy will continue for non-
payment, as those who cannot afford to pay are catered for through government 
schemes for the destitute.  
 
7.6.3 Water demand management (WDM)  
 
There was encouragement from stakeholders to press on with WDM. It was 
asked: Can it be made compulsory that future buildings and houses be 
fitted with water conserving devices? (LGSM, PSSM) and the group 
confirmed that: all building codes will be amended to incorporate mandatory 
standards of water conserving devices. There was pressure on speeding up the 
reuse of water: what are the problems with the reuse of wastewater, why 
can't we scale up these pilot projects (such as Glen Valley) countrywide? 
(FSM) The response from the group was that: the lack of infrastructure is 
hampering the scale up; there are very few wastewater treatment plants 
countrywide and as such there is not enough treated effluent. Plans are there to 
use most of the treated effluent.  
 
7.6.4 Impact of the proposed water policy on farmers 
 
The questions raised were in two main categories, the proposed payment for 
water and concern that the new policy did not explicitly take account of climate 
change. On the former point, the FSM, HCSM and NASM (see footnote 66) all 
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wanted to know why an individual who has used their own resources to 
drill a borehole should have to pay for his water. The response was that: all 
water belongs to the state and as such private use for water, barring domestic 
consumption, deprives others the right to use the water in question. Abstraction 
fees provide an economic incentive for users to use water resources as 
efficiently as possible. The revenue obtained will also boost the public treasury 
of which funding for WRM is derived. Again there was the question, is the 
water levy going to be charged on large farmers who are watering the 
livestock from the river? (FSM) This was answered by: in future, water right 
payments will be required as with groundwater and these will be annual instead 
of the current system of a one off payment. It is proposed that those extracting 
beyond certain threshold volume will be charged a volumetric tariff while those 
below this threshold may have to pay annual charges tied to their water rights. 
 
Concerns about climate change led to questions such as: Botswana is a water 
scarce country. What initiatives (are) the Ministry doing to come up with 
both breed of cattle and crops that are more water efficient? (FSM) 
Continuous research to get the right animal breeds and crop varieties for the 
specific conditions of the locality is carried out. The Ministry needs to come 
up with a strategy to deal with the effects of climate change as it affects 
food production? (FSM) There is mainstreaming of the climate change issues 
on the policy. Further research will be carried out. Government should 
encourage the ‘debushing’ of farms in order to promote a rise in the 
underground water levels (FSM). It is not encouraged137. 
 
7.6.5 Impact of the proposed water policy on Mining and Industry 
 
Given the importance of mining in the Botswana economy, the questions arising 
from the MSM (see footnote 66) were surprisingly limited, but started with: will 
charging the mines extraction fees for using their own boreholes 
                                                 
137
 Discussion at the meeting came to the conclusion that there was more likelihood of water 
retention in the soil and aquifer recharge through scrubland remaining rather than ‘debushing’ to 
expose the sandy soil leading to potential fast erosion 
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overburden them? (MSM) There is an obligation to provide infrastructure to 
enhance economic activity and as such mines will be catered for under this 
dispensation. Most of the mines’ operations do not necessarily need the 
dewatering water and have to pump it out. Charging them for the said 
water amounts to double taxation (FSM). Dewatered water138 can be used by 
the mines. Will WUC be able to meet water supply service expectation for 
large-scale customers such as Orapa mines and others? (MSM) It is agreed 
that [the WUC] will need to up their capacity for customer expectations 
especially for large users such as the mines. Already WUC is supplying water to 
all mines in the country except DEBSWANA mines. There is therefore no 
reason to believe that WUC could have a problem with supplying water.... [to] 
DEBSWANA. Questions by those outside the mining industry were more hostile 
and the response stronger: Mining operations are synonymous with huge 
usage and wastage of water resources. Will the policy be in a position to 
help curb some of these wastages? (LGSM) Yes, full accounting of all mine 
water will be carried out and charges for consumption will be levied. Repeated 
wasteful behaviour will be penalised through fines and possibly revoking of the 
water right. 
 
Summary 
 
The Kasane review group responses to the questions raised in this section from 
the stakeholder meetings did not come easily. For each response there was 
informed argument and a final negotiated agreement. The three day process 
away from Gaborone with no mobile phones was intensive and built a high level 
of support for the reforms.... an AC of experts establishing their secondary 
beliefs based on their specialist knowledge (Weible 2008). Only the 
representatives of the MoA were reticent on agreement when the section on 
farmers (Section 7.6.4) was negotiated, but finally concurred.  
                                                 
138
 Before mining can take place, water if present in the mine shaft, has to be removed to the 
surface and is left to evaporate in ponds. The impact of this on Botswana’s ground water 
reserves has been the subject of NGO investigation. DEBSWANA has moved in 2013 to 
minimise its potable water use in its mines with use of desalinated water (KI I 1). New mining 
operations for coal and other minerals will lead to dewatering of the mines and a policy on reuse 
of the dewatered water has not yet been tabled by GOB. 
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7.7 The Tabled National Water Policy, December 2012 
 
Major delays inside cabinet 
 
The water delivery reforms, through the extension of WUC responsibility for 
WSS throughout the country, went ahead unchanged from that laid out in the 
draft policy put forward (GOB 2010a). However, the water policy related to the 
introduction of the WRC to replace the WAB, and the water regulator legislation 
did not go ahead as planned. The timetable originally presented to the National 
Assembly in December 2010 envisaged “the approval of the draft National 
Water and Waste Water Policy by the end of the July 2011 Parliament sitting” 
(KI CGCS 5). This was “delayed by the Cabinet in May 2012 asking for more 
consultation, particularly about charging for extraction” (KI WEN 7). 
 
The President authorised the water reform process during 2009 -12. A media 
report said in August 2012 that: 
 
‘by micro-managing the country by means of whims, President Khama 
has disabled the Government of Botswana. The President may mean 
well, or he believes he does. However, his inter-meddling style of 
leadership has put the fear of God into the heads of senior civil servants, 
the wretched lot of whom now hesitate to take decisions on even the 
most mundane of matters. The result is that Batswana are literally 
helpless unless the President personally attends to the problem. 
Needless to say, this is untenable’ 
     Source: MMEGI 7TH August 2012 
 
But, despite Presidential approval, the agreement of the policy was still blocked 
in Cabinet. In August 2012, the Hon P Kekikilwe, seen as outside the Khama 
faction139, was appointed as Vice President as well as remaining the Minister for 
                                                 
139
 Africa Confidential (53) 96: 9  6
th
 August 2012  
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MMEWR, the sponsoring ministry for the water reforms. In October 2012 he 
relinquished his ministerial post at MMEWR to be succeeded by the Hon 
Mukaila, formerly Minister at MEWT, where his successor was the brother of the 
President, the Hon Tshekedi Khama. The MEWT Permanent Secretary was 
changed in January 2013 to Neil Fitt, close to the President and previously 
Director of the Agriculture Hub at MoA, and thus key to the water reforms there. 
These cabinet and civil service moves during August 2012-January 2013 
appear to the Researcher in part to remove the potential blocks on the water 
policy from MEWT and from MoA, and to be in support of an advocacy coalition 
for WDM. 
 
The Changes 
 
A final water policy was tabled140 in the Vote Office of the NA in December 2012 
and circulated to all MPs, but debate in the NA was postponed to 2014. While 
the bulk of the draft policy survived the infighting in Cabinet, there were 
important changes: 
 
a) The independence of the WRC (renamed the Water Resource Board). 
This had been proposed to be separate from MMEWR but now became 
institutionally unchanged from the WAB (GOB 2012d:12). 
 
b) The ability to charge, through the WRC, mining companies or borehole 
syndicates /large agricultural users of groundwater for their volumetric 
groundwater use. Instead ‘graduated flat abstraction fees shall be 
assessed for commercial, industrial, agricultural and other uses of water’ 
(ibid: 17) But metering of all water abstractions would take place. 
                                                 
140
 All new bills and policy documents for approval by the NA go first to a Committee of the 
whole NA where they are introduced by the Minister concerned. In the case of the National 
Water Policy document, this did not happen in December 2012 as the minister was not 
available. No reason was given. The introduction was postponed to late 2013 (KI CGCS 6 May 
2013).  
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c) The removal of the absolute right to withdraw water rights. Licenses 
would instead be issued for a defined period which shall be subject to 
renewal. Renewal of the licenses ‘should not be unduly denied’(ibid:4) 
 
d) The ability of WRC/WUC to charge the MoA for agricultural water supply 
to clusters of malapa. The original concept of irrigation being available 
for all year round crop cultivation has gone. The MoA has retained its 
prime role in the provision of water for agriculture and livestock farming. 
 
In two long interviews held with the Researcher in May 2013, a senior Civil 
Servant in MMEWR, a prime mover of the new water policies, sought to de-
emphasise the impact of these changes on the WRM policy as a whole.  
He felt on a) that to keep the new WRB chaired by the Permanent Secretary 
(PS) would give it a good start and enable a stronger WRM implementation than 
if it had been chaired and run independently. On the conflicts of interest  there 
would now be on restricting allocation of water for WRM reasons to certain 
water users such as mining companies under the control of MMEWR, he felt it 
would be easier for the PS  to broker a solution.  
 
On b) he suggested that the key WRM tool of water metering of all boreholes 
had been accepted by Cabinet which gave the WRB under him the ability to 
charge a fee that was commensurate with usage and the potential damage to 
the aquifer being utilised.  
 
He thought in the case of c) that the replacement of the words in the draft text 
that ‘no authorisation for its [water] use shall be in perpetuity’ with ‘authorisation 
for a defined period’ was much better to keep license holders in check. But he 
agreed that the legal meaning of a renewal of license ‘not being unduly denied’ 
would need to emphasise the need to protect fossil groundwater.  
 
On d) it was suggested that it could evolve over time. The decision in March 
2013 to allow cattle and crop cultivation at the malapa would lead to demand for 
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lapa boreholes to be less than 5 km apart (the current law). The only answer 
would be for clusters of malapa around one borehole, provided either by MoA or 
ultimately by WUC. 
 
He felt that the Researcher, by concentrating on these four changes, was 
ignoring the success, after very long discussions in Cabinet, in achieving a 
strong WRM policy with teeth for Botswana. The policy had widespread support 
in the country following the consultations 2010-11.The final report of the 
BIRWM-WE would also be published in time to support the NA debates (see 
below).Cabinet had  agreed a five year programme of tariff increases to 
eliminate the subsidy on water, with continuing protection for the poor through a 
steep stepped tariff. Within three weeks, the initial tariff change to a two tier 
national tariff was announced by the GOB and WUC (see Section 9.4.1.4 and 
Appendix Five). He further said there was agreement from the Botswana 
Association of Local Authorities (BALA) for pit latrine emptying to be handed 
over to local private contractors under paid for licenses with a national tariff. He 
felt there was an impetus for change. 
 
In support of the WSS changes, he reiterated the great difficulties the WUC 
management had had with inheriting very poor infrastructure. The completion of 
the final transfer of areas to WUC in the North of Botswana had gone smoothly 
and WUC could now get on with the upgrade of WSS across all Botswana, rural 
and urban at the same high standards.  
 
The acceptance by the NA of the final water policy with its austerity message of 
water scarcity and the need for WRM was not a foregone conclusion. But the 
period from the end of the main fieldwork in July 2011 had seen less rainfall. 
2012/13, and 2013/14 were designated141 drought years by the GOB and this 
                                                 
141
 The GOB announcement for 2013/14 was on 23
rd
 July 2013 
(http://www.gov.bw/en/News/GOVT-DECLARES-DROUGHT-RELIEF-MEASURES/.The view of 
KI was that this was done to enable the release of funding to traditional BDP supporters, rather 
than strictly justified by rainfall levels. These were at Gaborone July- June 09/10- 792mm; 
10/11- 632mm; 11/12- 403mm; 12/13- 511mm. ‘’Botswana never has a total national drought- 
even in the mid ‘60s, Ghanzi and Northern Kgalagadi had only a small deviation from their long 
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allowed the MoA to give additional support to farmers. The WUC brought in 
water restrictions on potable water in November 2012 and these were continued 
throughout 2013 with a blast of publicity in May 2013. The enforced rationing of 
water across the SE of Botswana during March- September 2013, due to the 
need for the maintenance of the North-South Carrier 1(NSCI), gave a sense of 
real concern. The glitzy inauguration of the NSCII in May 2013, the largest civil 
engineering project ever in Botswana at BP 1.6 billion, was neither attended by 
the President of Botswana nor the Permanent Secretary of MMEWR. There was 
a concerted effort to impress on Batswana the severity of the water situation. 
 
7.8 The outcomes of the Botswana Integrated Water Resource 
Management–Water Efficiency (BIWRM-WE) process (April 2012-
December 2013) 
 
In Section 6.3.3, part 3, the BIWRM-WE process is described and in Table 6.5 
the views of both the Water Reform Unit (WRU) of MMEWR and the Botswana 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) are analysed. The process continued from 
October 2010 to the completion of the field work in July 2011 but was always in 
the background, never in the foreground, for the water reform process as a 
whole. In a presentation142 made in April 2012, Mike Romaano, of the Kalahari 
Conservation Society (KCS) and coordinator of BIWRM-WE, claimed the 
BIWRM-WE process had drafted the National Water and Waste Water Policy in 
2010, based on IWRM principles. The presentation is summarised in Box 7.2.  
                                                                                                                                               
term seasonal norm. There are two distinct types of drought- arable and livestock.  Arable is 
much more common.  If sprouting crops go two weeks without rain in late February, for 
example, they are stunted.  If they go three weeks they are wasted and only suitable as forage 
for cattle.  The livestock drought varies depending on the extent of overgrazing to start with.  On 
freehold farms with good paddocking, all the farmer really has to do is increase the rotation 
speed amongst the paddocks.  His fail safe option is to de-stock, either by sales to the BMC 
(not popular since the cattle are lean by that time) or by moving the stock to a part of the 
country that is not so hard hit—Ghanzi farmers send cattle to the Molopo farms and Barolong 
farms; Tuli Block farmers do similar things’’ (KI WEN 5 July 2013). The Researcher reflects that, 
while this reaction may be true for commercial farmers, the possibility of small farmers to be 
able to do the same adaptation to drought is limited. Drought must hit the poor - and thus more 
vulnerable - farmer. 
142
 Available at http://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/2864/newsletters/iwrm-we-achievements-best-
practices-and-challenges, accessed 27
th
 July 2012 
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The BIWRM-WE Plan was finally written up by CAR and jointly published by the 
GOB and UNDP and launched in December 2013 (DWA 2013). However, a 
number of the outcomes detailed in Box 7.2, derived from the Water Policy 
review process described in this Chapter, and not from the BIWRM-WE 
process, which was instigated after the outline of the reforms was decided in the 
WB review of the NWMPR (GOBc 2006). Mike Romaano confirmed this and 
noted: “the lack of uptake of the IWRM concept and its implementation by other 
stakeholders, that is, agriculture, land authorities, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs”. There was overlapping with “threats posed by the Water Sector Review 
initiatives as the environment [for the reforms] was continuously changing and 
[from this] the difficulty of synchronising national and trans-boundary initiatives 
as a lot is happening at basin level, but not at the same time” (ibid).He further 
noted the “delays in the disbursements of funds by the UN agency/ UNDP”. The 
Researcher witnessed the effect of these delays in holding up work on the water 
efficiency demonstration projects and in the Okavango Basin work. This delay 
Box 7.2 The BIWRM-WE 2009-12 claimed outcomes  
 
• Establishment of the Water Resources Council which will facilitate the 
implementation of the IWRM-WE plan 
• Prioritisation and implementation of activities identified in the National Action Plan for 
the Okavango Basin  
• Increased awareness and capacity of national and regional stakeholders 
(government, private sector and members of the public) to engage in the IWRM 
(planning and implementation) process through regional knowledge management 
initiatives 
• Build capacity and increase awareness on IWRM in collaboration with SIWI and 
CapNet  
• Put in place guidelines to facilitate IWRM implementation at local level and 
transboundary level 
• Liquid Waste Management Guidelines for the country and the Okavango River Basin 
addressing pollution issues 
• Demonstration Project: Water conservation through conjunctive use of Grey-water 
Re-use and harvested rainwater in schools within Botswana: A Pilot Case for IWRM 
and WE Plan Implementation. 
• Uptake of the demonstration technologies encouraging esp. by the private sector e.g 
hotels (use of recycled water), DEBSWANA (storm water harvesting)  and schools 
(rainwater harvesting)  
 
Source: KCS Coordinator, 2012 
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was not due to the local representatives of UNDP but came from UN New York 
bureaucracy. It meant the work went in fits and starts according to the 
disbursement patterns. Ideally, the Researcher reflects that IWRM national 
plans may be improved by being locally driven with full disbursement of ODA 
made on time against an agreed schedule. But the sign off should be from local 
stakeholders and not a UN New York based control system. The process that 
started in 2004 with the original application for funds by the GWP Botswana, 
took until 2010 to get started and, while welcomed by the water expert elite, was 
always seen as an outside overlay on the water reforms that were driven by a 
Botswana WRM and WSS agenda. However, where it endorsed that agenda, it 
was used in 2013-4 to provide an international and third party support in the 
political drive for acceptance of the GOB water reforms (KI CGCS 6) 
 
7.9 Discussion of Key Issues in understanding the secondary beliefs 
within the Advocacy Coalition (AC) policy formation  
 
The lack of interest of civil society in stakeholder engagement on the 
Water Policy reforms in Botswana in response to the Government 
initiatives (October 2010 - June 2011) 
 
The drivers of change for WRM/WSS have not come from civil society. Section 
2.3 records the perceived weakness of Botswana civil society, in part due to 
lack of external international donor funding for CSOs, with the near cessation of 
ODA since the 1990s143. Other than the Churches, they were not among the 
drivers for change noted in Chapter Six. Their interest in the reforms was low as 
shown by the Researcher’s interviews with CSO KIs. Consultation meetings 
were called but very few CSOs decided to attend to put forward their views. The 
exception is the role of the KCS advocating for water for the ecosystem and 
who were paid as the secretariat of the UNDP/GEF externally funded BIWRM-
WE. 
 
                                                 
143
 The exception is CSOs dealing with HIV/AIDS where USAID funding has been significant. 
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The low level of co-operatives in Botswana is notable144. The absence of any 
Water User Association (WUA) cooperatives was therefore in tune with this. 
The exception was that of the borehole syndicates145; elite wealthy cattle 
owners, seen as sustaining the cultural Botswana icon of the cow (see Section 
9.2). 
 
The support for changes in employment with cuts in the DWA and LA and 
increased employment in WUC demonstrating support for the new AC 
from the Trade Unions 
 
The increase in WUC employment from 850 to 3763 (planned) was against a 
net loss of over 1000 jobs in the water industry as a whole. The WUC 
recruitment was on the basis of merit, with the full support of the Trade Unions. 
While a 20% average pay increase for new recruits helped gain support for the 
change, it remained a remarkable public service management success in 
recruiting on merit, a cadre of trained and educated Batswana in what was until 
recently a very poor developing country.  
 
The problems of updating the post independence legacy of WSS 
infrastructure as a set back to the new AC  
 
The WUC took over a WSS infrastructure that was up to 50 years old and of 
poor quality. Connections to the water mains had often been allowed to be done 
by individual consumers with no supervision and with resulting high leakage 
rates. Very little investment had been made since the initial installation of water 
mains and, in the rush to take over from the DWA and district councils, no prior 
planning of capital investment needs was done in any detail. In the 
circumstances the water and sanitation reforms could not be seen as delivering 
an immediate improvement in WSS over the previous provision.  
                                                 
144
 This was recognised by GOB with legislation in support of co-operatives in  2013 
145
 Borehole syndicates are not defined as co-operatives within the Botswana legal system and 
are thus not allowed to operate within the co-operative financial mechanisms. This is explored in 
Section 9.5 
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Botswana Integrated Water Resource Management (BIWRM-WE) process 
concentrating on Water Efficiency in support of the new AC 
 
This process should have started in 2004 but awaited external UNDP funding 
until 2010 and thus started after the MMEWR driven WRM reforms. As such it 
had a weak impact. The donor emphasis on TBWCs and, at the lowest level, 
WUA involvement did not chime with the centralising National vision of the 
water reforms. 
 
The setbacks to the AC and the compromise in Cabinet 
 
The WSS reform process continued unabated 2009-13 and was completed. The 
water reforms review elite, shown in their views on WRM at the Kasane 
meeting, were uncompromising in staying with the original reforms. But, despite 
the view of the President being all powerful and able to force through his 
policies, it was notable that there was a delay of nearly three years on agreeing 
the final policy on WRM. Cabinet democracy was real, over the case of water 
sector reform process, in Botswana in 2011-14. The compromise on 
groundwater charging, but with mandatory monitoring of usage, could be seen 
as a stepped approach to WRM. 
 
7.10 Chapter Summary  
 
This Chapter has examined the nature of the WRM and WSS reforms. These 
are proposed to originate from a new AC led by the President described in 
Chapter Six. The water reforms were proposed to be based on equity, efficiency 
and sustainability and were worked through in detail in a stakeholder process of 
consultation and finally negotiations in Cabinet. The strength of that consultation 
and the nature of the coalition are explored in Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter 
Eight explores the changes from the viewpoints of traditional and local 
government institutions.  Chapter Nine looks at the policy choices and actions 
from the water reforms that could impact on the poor in Botswana. 
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Chapter Eight: What are the outcomes of the reform process in terms of 
institutional responsibility for WRM and WSS?  
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter seeks to understand the changes in the delivery of Water 
Resource Management (WRM) and Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) in 
the post Independence Advocacy Coaltion (AC) and then in the new AC which 
could be perceived to have driven the water reforms since 2009. It examines 
the interplay between traditional and modern governmental structures (Section 
8.2), and local authorities and central government and other institutions (Section 
8.3), in the delivery of WRM and WSS in Botswana. It closes with an analysis of 
views from Batswana on these changes, particularly the centralising of power 
under the Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) on WSS from 2009. The data 
sources are described in Appendix Three (E) 
 
8.2 How have the traditional forms of government reacted to the change in 
their authority over land and water brought about by the elected 
government in Botswana? 
 
8.2.1 Traditional authority structures for water management  
 
The pre-Independence AC was based around the tribal structure for the Tswana 
(as noted in Section 2.3.) which has always been centralised around the Chief 
and his146 family who, subject to the overriding final power of the people 
expressed through the kgotla, had power over water and sanitation 
management. After the 1885 declaration of UK protection, the “tribal authorities 
were allowed [to have] maximum independence in their tribal areas to maintain 
the rule of law and order” (CS 2011:19). The traditional elite were left in control. 
In its 1965 Independence Election Manifesto, the Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) committed itself to a ‘gradual but sure evolution of a national state in 
                                                 
146
 Since Independence in 1966, the position of chief has been filled in three cases by women  
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Bechuanaland, to which tribal groups will, while they remain in existence, take a 
secondary place. This is an unavoidable development; an evolutionary law to 
which we must yield to survive or resist and disappear as a people’ (Parsons 
1984:43). 
 
The AC of interests represented by the power of the chiefs thus clashed with 
the new AC of interests represented by those elected to power. ‘The traditional 
elite and the new elite represented two contrasting world views – one 
traditional-authoritarian and the other Christian-liberal tending towards a 
democratic system of government. These [world views] were evident in the 
Advisory Council [in 1965] which had brought the modern and traditional elites 
together as advisers to [the outgoing Colonial] Government’ (Sebudubudu and 
Molutsi 2011:13) 
 
8.2.2 The post independence interplay – governance in parallel  
 
The post independence (post 1966), AC structure which controlled WRM and 
WSS (Figure 5.1), shows the retention of both the tribal institutions and the 
colonial institution of the DC, overlaid by the then newly elected institutions of 
local members of the new NA and the new local authorities. There was what 
has been called a ‘parallel or dual political system with both hereditary chiefs 
and elected officials’ (Durham 1999:193). 
 
At the national level, the establishment of the House of Chiefs as a second 
chamber within the constitution alongside the elected NA brought together the 
traditional and modern in delivering legislation for the new state of Botswana.  
But as the second President of Botswana in his autobiography makes clear 
again and again, he and the founding President HE Seretse Khama, did not see 
the Chiefs as having legislative powers (Masire 2005).The extinguishing of tribal 
power of land allocation in the passing of the Tribal Land Act (1968) and 
subsequent legislation in 1992, did not engage in the issue of riparian rights 
under the land. This was covered in the Water Act (1968) which formally took 
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away the responsibilities of the individual Chiefs on water rights and handed 
them to the national Water Apportionment Board (WAB).    
 
A similar constitutional settlement on the traditional and modern forms of 
government, impinging on the provision of WSS, was reached in the post 
apartheid constitutions of South Africa147 and Namibia, in the 1990s, building on 
the experience of Botswana. However neither country had embedded, in their 
consultative mechanisms, the concept of kgotla based, chief led, village 
meetings for traditional patterns of bottom-up participation in change. 
 
At the local authority (LA) level in Botswana, the power of the Chief remained 
high, often based on the Chief’s persona and the deference to the Chief 
expressed by the elected LA members. Sandy Grant, as a commentator on the 
interplay in Kgatleng District and Tribal Adminitstration(TA), is quoted as saying 
in 1981 that the LA ‘cannot function adequately if the Chief Linchwe II opposes 
it; Linchwe’s power has been steadily increasing since Independence when in 
theory he has been losing it’ (Grant, quoted in Tordoff 1988:196). The Chiefs’ 
influence remained high over both District Council provision of WSS and also 
through his powers of adjudication over land disputes and therefore borehole 
allocation and borehole policy (Key Informant (KI) TAC 1). The resilience of the 
institution, as measured in the Afrobarometer survey of 2008-9 remains high 
(Logan 2013: 363 Figure 4) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147
 The Traditional Courts Bill in South Africa sought to replicate the Botswana system of 
customary courts. It was tabled in the South Africa parliament in 2008 and was to be operational 
from 2013. However, it has been subject to challenge as unconstitutional by civil rights groups 
who believe it does not allow equal rights to women. It also differs from the Botswana position in 
not allowing the option to try legal cases in either customary or mainstream courts (reported in 
IPS 28
th
 May 2012 “South Africa Traditional Courts Bill impairs the rights of 12 million rural 
women”) 
 211 
 
8.2.3 What happened following the implementation of the new post-2009 
AC? 
 
As has been explained in Section 7.5, the changes to the delivery of WSS were 
not formally reported, prior to their introduction in 2009, or subsequently, to the 
House of Chiefs for comment. In November 2010 a presentation of the full water 
reforms, including those for WRM, was made to the House of Chiefs and in 
December 2010 to the all party caucus of the National Assembly (NA) (at which 
the Researcher was present. 
 
But the proposed changes were explained from 2009, kgotla by kgotla, across 
Botswana, by both Ministers and senior civil servants (Photograph 8.1). Each 
settlement has a kgotla (neutral meeting place, the location of the TA) and the 
kgotla meetings are advertised well ahead and open to all.The meetings were 
moved when requested to evenings and weekends to enable working people to 
attend after work (KI TAC1). The high level of understanding of the reforms was 
registered both in Table 7.2 of KIs and in the understanding by the Focus 
Groups (FGs) analysed later in this Chapter. The Kgatleng District Kgotla 
meetings at Olifants Drift in December 2010 and at Artesia in June 2011 were 
both addressed by the then Minister for Mining, Energy and Water Resources 
(MMEWR) the Hon. P. Kekilwe MP. Questions were answered at length by the 
Minister and the WUC representatives. “The TA organises kgotla meetings for 
the WUC and [Government] Ministers to explain the WSS changes. WUC uses 
the headmen in each area as the conduit for information and complaints” (KI 
TAC 1). 
 
This intensive kgotla by kgotla explanation of the reforms and need for Water 
Demand Management (WDM) was a move by the central government elite to 
ensure the traditional elite embraced the reforms and, it could be argued, were 
embraced within an advocacy coalition for change. The traditional leadership 
role remains. The role of the rainmaker may have vanished but “the Kgosi (tribal 
leader at all levels) still announces the commencement of the ploughing season 
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in the kgotla, not waiting for the coming of rain but when it is coming. It is 
normally in November or early December” (KI TAC1). 
 
While there was no major disagreement but rather an embrace of the water 
reforms, there was a break in 2010-11 in the coalition of the traditional and 
elected government over the reduced role of the Chiefs over land, and thus 
water, since the 1966 independence settlement. This came from the Kgosi of 
the BaKgatla, traditional rulers of the Kgatleng tribal area and thus Kgatleng 
District148. Kgosi Linchwe II149 died in 2009 and his son Kgafela, a human rights 
lawyer, succeeded to the throne and was endorsed by the President of 
Botswana.  
 
However, the new Kgosi, advised by among others, Unity Dow, a High Court 
Judge, decided to challenge the diminished role of the Chief and he refused to 
act as Chief and receive salary as such. The Chief up until Independence had 
the main responsibility for WRM and WSS in Kgatleng District. “The court case 
instigated by Kgosi Kgafela in Sept 2011 [sought] to negate that Independence 
Constitution and return all power, including that over land and water, to the 
Chiefs” (KI TAC 1). He sought to get support country wide from all the Chiefs 
during the period September 2010 to March 2012.Prior to independence, the 
Kgosi allocated land and water rights in his area. Kgosi Kgafela of the Bakgatla 
further challenged the Government in 2011 over its power on land allocation 
through the Land Boards which at independence (1966) took over land 
allocation from the Chiefs. The WAB subsequently took over water rights 
allocation in 1968. But, without ownership of the land, no water rights could be 
issued. The Land Board was thus the vital first step to gaining water rights. 
Kgosi Kgafela (as with all Chiefs) was entitled to be an ex officio member of 
both the KDLB and KDC but with no voting powers. “The tribal administration 
                                                 
148
 He further ruled the Bakgatla in SA where 320,000 tribal members lived around Moruleng in 
the Moses Kotane Local Municipality (MKLM) in NW SA (Hamilton 2012) 
149
 Linchwe II was in opposition to the BDP at independence and campaigned against the 
removal of Chiefly power. The opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF), was 
launched in Mochudi in 1965. (Picard 1987:156) 
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has to sign off all allocations for land going to the KDLB for decision but has no 
veto” (KI LBCS 1). 
 
 
Photograph 8.1 The Mochudi Kgotla in operation, May 2011 
 
“I [the Subchief in Mochudi] discuss (as does Kgosi Kgafela) cases with the 
Land Board Secretary, but I do not have a veto. The proposals (from the GOB  
to have bogosi (chiefs) as observers, not voting, on Land Boards, are not 
accepted by Kgosi Kgafela as he felt he should have a veto, as the 
Independence Constitution is not legal, as there was no consultation with the 
Chiefs, before its adoption” (KI TAC 1). 
 
The bogosi were not represented on, or consulted by, the KDLB after December 
2011, as all the chiefs and subchiefs appointed by Kgosi Kgafela, had been 
stripped by the GOB of official recognition as a result of his challenge to the 
Constitution. In May 2012, the KDLB removed Bakgatla from land at 
Mmamashia in Kgatleng District on the basis that they were occupying the land 
 214 
 
unlawfully. The Bakgatla concerned said they had been allocated the land pre-
independence by Chief Linchwe II and, if the Bogosi had been consulted, the 
Land Board would have known that. Kgosi Kgafela is quoted as stating “The 
government does not have power over Bakgatla land. We should chase them 
[the Land Board officers] out of Kgatleng. You [the Bakgatla] should unite and 
approach the Land Board as a united front; else it will take all the land and 
allocate it to foreigners150” (Botswana Gazette, 24th May 2012:1). In April 2013, 
at a Bokaa (KD) kgotla meeting, the President moved to ameliorate the tension 
and is reported in the Daily News, as stating that ‘Tribes should have first call 
on land allocated by LB in each TA’. However, water rights remained under the 
national WAB. 
 
A senior Chief commented in 2011 that “the main current [post the water 
reforms of 2009] role [of the Chiefs] is to adjudicate on cases that arise on 
borehole syndicate disputes where members of syndicates seek a settlement” 
(KI TAC 1). The Kgosi Kgafela has large land holdings in the NW of the KDC 
area where he has cattle ranches. He sought to expropriate additional land in 
the NE of the District for a proposed game reserve “to bring work for the 
Bakgatla through ranching and tourism” (ibid). This would have resulted in a 
number of residents losing their lands, and water rights to 13 boreholes 
allocated to them by the KDLB, and this expropriation was opposed at Kgotla 
meetings151. This issue is further pursued in Chapter Nine, looking at the actual 
and possible impact of the water reforms on cattle post water provision. 
 
Kgosi Kgafela’s case to the National Courts for the overturning of the Botswana 
constitution, made concurrently on the legal basis that there had been no chiefly 
agreement at the loss of their powers under the post Independence 
Constitution, was finally dismissed in March 2012. Unity Dow withdrew her 
support for the case in early 2011 (KI J1). The Kgosi decided in December 2011 
                                                 
150
 In April 2013, President Khama announced a change in Bokaa, Kgatleng District: ‘ a majority 
of plots will be allocated to native residents of a particular area’ Daily News April 26
th
 2013:1 
151
 According to the Sub Chief (KI TAC 1), “only 3 boreholes but there may be more due to the 
fencing”  
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not to receive Government Ministers at the Mochudi Kgotla or any other kgotla 
in Kgatleng District. The GOB stripped the Kgosi of his GOB designation as the 
Bakgatla chief and asked the Bakgatla to choose another Chief, but they still 
have not done so by 2013.  
 
Despite the boycott of meetings by the Bakgatla Chief and Subchiefs, the 
Kgatleng area kgotlas continued to disseminate information on, among other 
things, the progress of the water reforms. These kgotla meetings were run by 
the TA functionaries under the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) but the 
meetings seemed to be genuine and kept the Kgatleng Batswana stakeholders 
consulted on the progress of the WSS reforms 
 
8.2.4 How does Botswana society expressed in the KI views perceive the 
2009 water reform changes on the importance of traditional leaders?  
 
1) KI views of the 2009 water reforms and their impact on the role of traditional 
leaders 
 
Overall there is very little difference in KI views before and after the reforms. 
The position of the private sector (particularly the mining sector) and the water 
experts is that the traditional forms of government remain key to ensuring that 
water concerns are dealt with. It is insufficient to simply obtain the water rights 
from the WAB and ignore the role of the chiefs and the importance of customary 
law.  “All land used by DEBSWANA was previously tribal land and is leased for 
periods of 25 years. Compensation is given to the Land Boards and the TA and 
that is continuing into the future. DEBSWANA would meet with the Chief in 
conjunction with the Land Board when applying to prospect in order to gain their 
agreement” (KI I.1). Where the industry is based in the city, the link is not there, 
as in the case of Kgalagadi Breweries which negotiates direct with the WUC for 
its water needs (KI I.3). 
 
The kgosi KIs see a continuing important role, despite the changes. As one 
respondent explains, for example, “the Chief and the TA organise kgotla 
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meetings for the WUC/Ministers to explain WSS changes. WUC uses the 
headmen in each area as the conduit for information and complaints” (KI TAC 
1). As such, the main interface to consult with local stakeholders remains with 
the traditional form of government152.  
 
At a FG held for newspaper reporters153, there was some irritation expressed at 
this communication strategy. They felt that the use of the chiefs and the kgotlas 
was anachronistic and should be abandoned “We do not go the the kgotlas.... 
only old people and those not working go. None of us attend the five kgotlas in 
Gabs where we live. We should be consulted through our cell phones as we get 
holiday safety measures that way already”. But the owner of the main national 
weekly newspaper disagreed. “The meetings at the kgotlas are advertised 
ahead and are now held in the late afternoon and at weekends to enable those 
working to go to make their views known. The local kgotla is where you go to 
take up issues which are dealt with at the village level” (KI M 1). The 
government media spokesman makes the point that “at the kgotla, rich and poor 
have easy access to those involved in the water reforms. The President and the 
senior ministers spend many weekends at the village kgotlas, with the local 
chiefs and headmen, listening to everyone and dealing with their concerns”. 
 
Local Government also had to engage with the kgotla system, which is non-
political154 and open to all to obtain redress. The lower overall ranking in Table 
8.1 by local government KI of the importance of traditional forms of government 
may come from the irritation of the constraints imposed by the perceived need 
for consultation through the kgotla.   
                                                 
152
 The high opinion among Batswana on the continued importance of traditional kgosi 
alongside a commitment to democracy in Botswana was confirmed by a 2013 Afrobarometer 
survey available at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/press_release/bot_r5_pr10.pdf accessed 17th 
May  2013 
153
 This was held at the offices of the largest (by circulation) newspaper in Botswana ‘The Voice’ 
4
th
 December 2010 
154
 The kgotla area is not used at elections for political campaigning to get elected to “modern” 
local and central government. A separate area has been designated for political campaigning in 
each village since Independence in 1966 known as the ‘freedom square’. Chiefs and Headmen 
are required under the constitution to be non-political. 
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Key 
Informants: 
 
Private 
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(4) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Mean 
(29) 
Importance of 
Role of 
Customary 
Law/Chiefs: 
Pre-reform 
6 4 5 4 7 6 5 5 
Importance of 
Role of 
Customary 
Law/Chiefs: 
Post-reform 
6 4 4 3.5 7 6 5 5 
 Likert scale of 0-7 is used where 0 is no importance and 7 is very important                                                
 
Table 8.1 KI Views on the importance of customary law and the role of Chiefs 
on WRM and WSS in Botswana before and after the 2009 changes.  
Source: KII interviews September 2010-July 2011 
 
The Researcher accompanied the then Chairman of Kgatleng District Council 
(KDC), Cllr Stephen Makhura to a kgotla meeting at Olifants Drift hosted by the 
Subchief and the Headmen of the village in March 2011 (Photographs 8.2 and 
8.3). The four hour meeting (0800-1200) was opened by and run by the 
Subchief, the senior representative of the TA in the village. The Chair of the 
Village Development Committee155 (VDC) spoke first, followed by a large 
number of the villagers. The Chairman of KDC had all his senior heads of 
department with him to answer the questions. The Researcher reflects on the 
                                                 
155
 This was a lady. Until Independence the rights of women to speak at kgotla meetings were 
very restricted and it was expected that men only could speak. It is still normal at kgotla 
meetings for women to speak after men have been called. However, female speakers were in 
no sense constrained and were given a full hearing. 
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high level of accountability and the extent to the AC of change on WSS was 
accepted at this and the other kgotla meetings he attended. 
 
 
Photograph 8.2 Interior view of the debate on WSS reforms at the Olifants Drift 
Kgotla (March 2011) 
 
The lower rating of importance given by civil servants to the role of chiefs (Table 
8.1) may again reflect the requirement by the GOB for civil servants to utilise 
the chiefs and the kgotla system to explain and resolve issues with consumers, 
on the working out of the water reforms. The researcher recorded that the WUC 
representative was summoned to appear at the Mochudi Kgotla on a number of 
occasions to answer for the WUC performance. If there was a need to restrict 
the provision of water to allow repairs to the water lines, it was to the kgotla that 
the WUC representative had to go. When the Government Minister or senior 
civil servant went to speak on the WSS reforms at the kgotla, the local WUC 
officials provided the briefing sheets to the Minister and were on hand at the 
kgotla for the follow up156. The media saw the interplay between the GOB and 
the Chiefs on the water reforms being resolved in the kgotla. The national GOB 
owned media, the Daily News (with free delivery across Botswana) and 
                                                 
156
 This was seen at the Rasesa Kgotla meeting in March 2011 
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Botswana Radio and Television, featured kgotla meetings each day and night in 
the news broadcasts. The weather forecasts of rain or no rain were preceded 
each night by a commentary from the village kgotla, chosen that day by the 
President or Ministers, to urge the community led by the Chief to mitigate either 
the flood or drought conditions. 
 
 
Photograph 8.3 The then Chairman of KDC addressing the Olifants Drift kgotla 
meeting (March 2011) 
 
All the key informants spoke of the continued interplay of traditional and modern 
forms of government in providing at the most devolved level of responsibility 
within Botswana, a consultative mechanism on the water reforms and in doing 
so, provided a voice for the very poorest members of the community, both men 
and women. In the latter case, this was the key way to ensure that female 
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concerns on the water reforms in the village were heard and acted on157. This 
consultative mechanism built on the continued deep underlying beliefs of the 
Batswana on the involvement of the chiefs in a matter as important as water. 
This could be seen as a building block towards a new advocacy coalition for the 
changes.  
 
2) The FGs’ views of the 2009 water reforms and their impact on the role of the 
traditional leaders 
 
In Gaborone, the role of traditional rulers is diluted. The location of Gaborone 
was chosen as the capital in 1964 in part because the land was not claimed by 
any of the eight main Tswana tribes. It is thus neutral ground.  The institutions 
of customary law are still available through the Court Presidents (CP) in each 
area of Gaborone but the CP is appointed from a range of tribal backgrounds. 
The CP for Old Naledi was a BaKgatla but this was secondary to his power as 
the appointed representative of the TA and thus the GOB. His female deputy 
was from Maun in the North. He had no responsibilities for dealing with WSS 
issues and the FG respondents concurred with this. They went direct to the 
WUC or GCC or through the councillors (GCC) or the local MP (NA). But the 
five kgotlas across Gaborone were still used as the consultative medium 
between the GOB, the WUC and the water users. 
 
In Kgatleng District, the respondents still saw the traditional rulers as their 
mediators with the WUC, who had to come to the kgotlas and, in front of the 
Chief, had made promises: “There is nowhere else to go. We go there, where 
you heard Bakgatla telling you, we go. We cry to them. The first thing is that we 
have our leaders and when it becomes tough we say, Bakgatla, we have run 
out of water then they run to those who give us water and say, Bakgatla are 
thirsty and that is when they would give us water” (FGMO 2). 
 
 
                                                 
157
 The Dublin Principles require that women’s views are taken account of in any changes on 
WRM and WSS and this is committed to in the draft water policy (GOB 2010a) 
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Summary 
There was a constraint on the power of central government experts over the 
WRM and WSS reforms by the continued consultative power of the traditional 
leaders. This was largely unwritten in the Constitution but was real on the 
ground. The statutory courts may be the medium for action by the WUC on 
miscreant users of WSS. However, the customary law exercised through the TA, 
was still recognised in its traditional arbitration role on land ownership and water 
rights, particularly in the individual land rights of the masimo (farmlands)  and in 
common lands of the maruka (common grazing areas) (KI I.1) 
 
8.3 What has been the response of local government to the change in their 
powers on WSS ? How was the centralising of power on WSS becoming 
accepted in Botswana? 
8.3.1 South African approaches to decentralisation to local government 
for WSS 
 
The problems of WSS delivery by local government (LG) in South Africa were 
cited by a number of policy makers as a reason for Botswana to move towards 
centralisation of WSS functions (SAHCR 2014). The so-called ‘toilet’ local 
elections in South Africa (SA) in May 2011, (repeated again in the General 
Election of 2014), focused on the failure of WSS delivery by local government, 
with the centralised water ministry providing, as proposed in Botswana, the 
WRM functions. There has been questioning of the permanence of the 
advances being made. It is reported that ‘about two thirds of rural water projects 
in South Africa are currently not working. As fast as new projects are being 
launched, established projects are reported to be breaking down’ (Johnson 
2010:104). The critique is that as ‘a water- shortage [sic] country, the [South 
Africa] government had hopelessly mismanaged its inheritance of dams, 
pipelines, pumps and treatment facilities. No less than 43% of the dams ,,,were 
unsafe and required urgent care. Immediate intervention was needed at 30% of 
all municipal wastewater treatment plants to prevent further outbreaks of 
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waterborne diseases such as typhoid’ (ibid: 480). The South African 
government claimed  ahead of the 2014 Election that ‘an additional 176 million 
litres of drinkable water day was available for South Africans to consume, 
thetough new or expanded water treatment plants that were completed’158Could 
the SA problem on the WSS delivery be the delivery mechanism itself?  
 
ICLEI /LoGo IWRM Survey 2008  
 
The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) organised 
the Local Government (LoGo) water project between 2005 and 2008. It 
explored the use of IWRM at the local level in Southern Africa (ICLEI 2008). 
ICLEI recognised that that there were ‘various institutional levels within the 
water governance framework. These [were] organised according to 
administrative and hydrological boundaries. They include international 
organisations such as SADC, RBO commissions at the trans-boundary river 
basin level, national and provincial government departments at the country level 
and catchment councils or agencies. These institutions are responsible for the 
development of policy, legislation and institutional framework within which 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) is undertaken. Local 
government is seldom represented at these levels and does not have a direct 
mandate for water resource management’ [researcher’s emphasis] (ICLEI 1:13). 
The ICLEI research goes on to espouse a twin track approach for IWRM at the 
local level and then beyond this (Figure 8.1).  
 
The ICLEI report pointed out the then current (2008) failure of South Africa[n] 
local government to collect the water arrears, amounting in 2007 to R 28.5 Bn. 
(ICLEI 2008 1:18). It cited a loss of 29% of the water supplied but not charged 
for, in 62 municipalities in South Africa (ibid 1:5) and the sewerage problems of 
local authorities in KwaZulu Natal province (ibid 1:19). But it also pointed out a 
success story in Durban/ Ethekwini on sewage treatment.159.  
 
                                                 
158
  PICC advertisement in Cape Times March 14
th
 2014,11 
159
 This subsequently led to the WUC seeing Durban as the exemplar on sewerage treatment 
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Figure 8.1 IWRM from the point of view of the local level of government. 
Source: ICLEI LoGo Report 2008 1:13  
 
The ICLEI/LoGo project worked in Botswana with Selebi-Phikwe Town Council 
and the Serowe/ Palapye Sub-District, utilising the Kalahari Conservation 
Society (KCS) knowledge on IWRM. The work provided a context for the 
Botswana Integrated Water Resource Management-Water Efficiency (BIWRM-
WE) initiative in 2009 again organised by KCS. The reason given for the choice 
of locations was the river system flowing through both Botswana towns, albeit 
ephemeral, ending in the Limpopo River. The position of the towns in the large 
powerful Central District, home of the first and fourth (and current) President of 
the Republic, may also have played its part. It is noticeable that the major 
Botswana perennial river system that flows into the Limpopo is the River 
Notwane, flowing through Gaborone and Kgatleng District. It was not covered in 
the data collection in this project. 
 
The records of the ICLEI/LoGo research held at KCS in Gaborone into the two 
studies in Botswana are sparse, but they do record the enthusiasm of local 
government officials, seen as central to the delivery of WSS in their areas. The 
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respondents were not representative of the elected politicians or of senior civil 
servants for the areas. They were instead the senior Town Planner from Selebi-
Phikwe Town Council and the District Officer, Lands for the Serowe–Palapye 
Sub- district. It could be said that ICLEI under-resourced the collection of the 
Botswana data. The subsequent BALA survey in 2010 showed that Central 
District and the two towns examined had not followed through on a local IWRM 
plan (KI LGCS 3). 
 
8.3.2 Engagement in Botswana by elected LAs, the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWA) and the WUC on WSS before the 2009 Reforms 
 
The engagement on WSS, before 2009, of elected local authorities with central 
government, could be seen as complex and almost baffling, but in its richness it 
could be seen as a democratic outcome which was both resilient and robust 
(Swatuk 2008). However it appeared that there was a lack of clear 
accountability for WSS. The Botswana Association of Local Authorities (BALA) 
formed an institutional forum for local authorities, both politicians and civil 
servants, to be represented to central government but the views were filtered 
through the sponsoring central government Ministry of Local Government 
(MLG).  
 
Further weakening of local accountability came from the nature of the central 
government run Unified Local Government Service (ULGS) which was and is 
centrally recruited, and staff allocated on merit throughout Botswana. It has 
been said ‘most of those who wield power in the Districts belong to the same 
[GOB] politico-bureaucratic elite group sharing similar values, interests and 
objectives. Whether they are civil servants of the District administration, or 
either elected or appointed members of the LA – the Councils, the Land Boards 
or the TA – while a relevant question - is less important than their association 
with a powerful [GOB] socio-economic elite’ (Wynn Reilly quoted in Picard 
1987:197). The observations during fieldwork support that view of an elite 
centrally controlled civil service with allegiance to the national Government 
through the ULGS. 
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A) Country wide views on WSS 1966-2009 
 
Section 5.4 has explained that, post independence, local government had the 
role of delivering WSS to areas outside the towns and major villages. Local 
supply of untreated water was provided by the MMEWR/DWA and the WUC. 
The local authority was able to augment these supplies by drilling their own 
boreholes. Standpipes to provide unlimited free water were erected, after 
Independence, progressively across Botswana in all villages, enabling the 97% 
achievement of access to water with only very rural dwellers unable to access 
potable water (UNICEF/WHO 2012). The latter, designated remote area 
dwellers (RAD), who were often from the minority tribes such as the Basarwa, 
were supplied by LA water ‘bowsers’ (water tankers) as “they were seen as 
uneconomic to be supplied in any other way” (KI LGP 3). The MLG reimbursed 
local authorities for the costs of the standpipes and the water. Individuals took 
water not only for their personal needs but also their livestock in the village, and 
used donkey carts loaded with filled water containers for transport to the lands 
and the cattle posts. Local entrepreneurs also filled up at the standpipes and 
sold the water on. Fieldwork observations found the wider role of water 
entrepreneurs on the numerous visits to the environs of the Gaborone Dam 
where large tankers were continually filling up from the Dam or its feeder 
streams. But it is possible that, unlike elsewhere in SSA, there has been free 
water available for nearly all Batswana through the standpipe system  
 
Sanitation was overwhelmingly 160 self provided pit latrines (SPPL) in malapa or 
at the kgotla by the TA. The planning agreement for location was agreed by the 
LA, together with the local arm of the Department of Waste Management 
(DWM/ MEWT). Despite the potential impact of their siting, potentially polluting 
the aquifers, there was no clearance mechanism at either local or national level 
with DWA/MMEWR. Examples of this given to the Researcher were the closure 
                                                 
160
 Water borne sewerage systems were available in limited areas of the towns and larger 
villages but because of cost were not often taken up: “It is their choice” (KI CGCS1) 
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after pollution by SPPLs of the Ramotswa aquifer SE of Gaborone161 and 
problems in the Ghanzi area (KI CGCS 3). The RAMSAR designation of the 
Okavango River Delta, campaigned for by Ministry of the Environment, Wildlife 
and Tourism (MEWT), has led to problems in the agreement between central 
government and local government on the provision of WSS.162 
 
The recurrent droughts led to water demand controls over household and 
livelihood use. The controls, laid down by central government, were imposed 
locally through the local government structures. The village voice was seen to 
be expressed post independence through the establishment of Village 
Development Committees (VDC). While the committees met at the kgotla in 
each village, they had a stakeholder membership, encompassing both the 
traditional headmen representing the tribal organisation and elected/appointees 
of the political parties represented at the District Council. It has a role in 
identifying the candidates for free water, electricity and housing under the 
Destitute legislation of 2002 (see Chapter Nine). However it is unclear how 
successful VDCs have been in delivering grassroots bottom up participatory 
responsive planning of the District Development Plan (DDP) (and within that of 
WSS) (Mokwena 2009:25). But the concept of the VDC has the ‘potential’ to 
deliver this (ibid). Concern was expressed by Minister Masisi in January 2013 
on the lack of public accountability163 of VDCs for their decisions and their 
projects but other voices called on VDCs to “stand up for the villages”164. The 
VDCs, however flawed, do represent the poor, and the water users in the small 
villages had no separate voice. The WUC local representative would go to the 
                                                 
161
 This was closed in the 1990s but partially reopened in August 2012 when the nitrate levels 
had fallen to acceptable drinking water levels (Botswana Daily News 3
rd
 April 2012). It was fully 
reopened in 2014 with a dedicated treatment plant. 
162
 The extent to which water can be extracted from the Okavango Delta and the treated 
sewage water be put back into the Delta is in question. There has been a problem in the costs 
of the proposed water treatment plant in Maun inherited by MMEWR/WUC from the centrally 
driven tender process (KI GCS1). 
163
 http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=375 
164
 http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=402 
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local kgotla to meet both the sub-chief and the VDC to explain the actions of the 
WUC and to seek approval. The FG data used in this thesis came through the 
participation of the VDC in five of six FG areas.  
 
In the DWA water administered areas in the large villages (such as Mochudi), 
there had been a Water Consultative Committee in each village, established 
since Independence, to ensure there could be discussions on water allocations 
and water reforms. Unfortunately, while the DWA and BALA both agree that this 
semi-formal structure existed, there were no records available to the 
Researcher as to what was discussed and what actions took place. When the 
WUC took over, it did not inherit strong local accountable water consumer 
committees either at the local or national level. As a result, no new WUAs were 
set up. WUC asserted “we can deal with that when we have got the situation 
under control” (KI WUCO 4). Still, in 2014, no WUA had been recognised by the 
WUC anywhere in Botswana. 
 
B) Gaborone City Council (GCC) WSS 1966-2009 
 
Potable water had been supplied by the WUC (and by its predecessor 
parastatal Gaborone Water Works) since the founding of the City in 1964. The 
establishment of the WUC in 1968, extended in 1970, codified an existing 
centrally delivered water service. Untreated water was provided by 
DWA/MMEWR initially via the Gaborone Dam (opened in 1964) and from the 
1990s utilising other dams and the North–South Carrier (NSC) pipeline. 
 
Responsibility for sanitation was that of the locally elected city council (GCC) 
under the regulatory eye of the MLG and DWM/MEWT. The new city was 
planned to have water-borne sanitation in all government buildings and the 
more expensive accommodation areas, but otherwise by individually paid for 
VIP pit latrines laid out in accordance with the planning department of GCC. 
There had been a growing perception after 2000 that there was corruption, 
particularly concerning ‘open tenders for the collection of water-borne waste 
through council-based vacuum tankers’ (Maundeni 2004: 28). 
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Piped potable water and water borne sewerage became available from the 
beginning to the ‘Village’ and ‘Central’ districts in Gaborone to serve the then 
new government functions. Water came from the Notwane River into the 
Gaborone Dam, augmented by Molatedi Dam water from South Africa as shown 
in Table 5.1. The treated effluent from the Gaborone sewage works was 
discharged in the continuation of the Notwane River flowing North into Kgatleng 
District and ultimately into the Limpopo River. 
 
The WSS distribution showed a ‘rich-poor feature [in] the early new capital’ 
(Maundeni 2004:15). ‘The policy of denying urban-based services such as 
home connected clean water [and] centralised sewerage systems to the poor 
areas marked differential local democracy within Gaborone in the colonial and 
early years of independence. Upgrading is now on and it’s a painful exercise –
plot owners are now legally required to connect water to their houses and 
standpipes have been disconnected; upgrading Old Naledi is leading to the 
relocation of some people who have lived there for many years’ (ibid: 14). 
These changes are explored further in FG reports from Old Naledi (FGON) and 
Broadhurst (FGB) in Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2.  
 
Consultation with Stakeholders in the GCC area before 2009 
 
There were no formal arrangements for discussion with the WUC by users of 
WSS beyond the occasional breakfast meeting with larger users to explore their 
future needs (KI WUC 4). The Urban Development Committees (UDCs), the 
equivalent of the VDC structure in rural areas, were not consulted by the WUC. 
The role of the DC in mediating the response to WSS concerns to central 
government was diminished by the immediacy of the central government 
institutions residing in GCC area and seeing their right to decide over the heads 
of local institutions. The same diminution of consultative status to the WUC or to 
the GCC is repeated by civil society in Gaborone, which has ‘very little 
interaction with the GCC councillors. [The BOCONGO members] hardly ever 
attend council meetings and [had] never attended meetings of the UDC’ 
(Maundeni 2004:36). It is likely that there was no attempt by the WUC to 
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engage with women or a CSO representing women. Emang Basadi165 , at their 
meeting with the Researcher, had no concept that they should be consulted. 
 
C) Kgatleng District Council (KDC) WSS 1966-2009 
 
Potable water was reticulated in Mochudi by the DWA/MMEWR and elsewhere 
in the KD by the LA. Standpipes were erected in each area to provide free 
unlimited water and it is on this basis that the high levels of access to water in 
Kgatleng District (and Botswana) have been achieved. This same potable water 
was loaded into drums and conveyed by donkey carts to the masimos or 
moraka.  
 
The collection of water charges for that provided by KDC was the responsibility 
of KDC. While the charges were low (see Chapter Nine), the collection levels 
were also low (Table 8.1). This is stated to be because there was no incentive 
for KDC (or any other LAs) to collect the monies. The amounts were seen small 
and costly to collect. It is further alleged that the politicians, in their wish to be 
elected, did not press for the collection to be made from individuals or 
organisations potentially supporting their Party (KI M2). 
 
Allocations of land by the Kgatleng District Land Board (KDLB), with the often 
challenged right to erect a house, did not take account of existing water 
reticulation lines. The KDC in authorising the reticulation of the water to the 
land, allowed the owner of the land to do their own connection (KI KDLB1). 
Latterly the KDC took monies from individuals who wanted KDC to do the 
connections, but then, having not done the work, repaid the money after a 
number of years (KI M2).  
 
Delivery of sanitation in KDC was chiefly through pit latrines emptied by the 
KDC. As part of a development focus under District Development Plan 5, water-
borne sanitation was made available by the DWA in central Mochudi. This 
                                                 
165
 The main Gender CSO in Botswana 
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involved the upgrading of Mochudi Water Works and the project was completed 
in 1999 by the DWA. It was handed over to the MLG and then delegated to 
KDC to administer, reticulate and charge fees for both connection and usage. 
This was extended from 2003 with the construction of secondary and tertiary 
sewerage lines and eight pumping stations (KDC 2002:14). The main users of 
this facility were public bodies such as district administration offices, schools 
and hospitals. There were very few private households connected. “It is their 
choice” commented a senior DWA WRU civil servant; “we do not force them to 
connect” (KI CGCS1).  
 
The discharge of effluent from Gaborone Sewage Works from the GCC area 
was of great concern to KDC but no action was taken by the regulatory authority 
of the DWM/MMEWT166. The perception of  participants in the KD FG in 2004 
was that ‘Gaborone City has constructed its dam in such a way that water 
flowing within the city, with its industrial pollutants, flows out into Notwane River, 
flowing into the Kgatleng District, providing polluted water and endangering the 
livestock industry in the district’ (BALA 2009:51). There was seen to be a direct 
confrontation between the politics of environmental planning for Gaborone City 
and its recipient, passive KDC neighbours. Official documents confirm that ‘the 
River villages are faced with poor water quality problems. Residents complain 
about the taste of water’ (ibid: 51). However ‘the water quality had been within 
WHO guidelines on potable water standards’ (ibid: 51). 
 
Consultation with KDC Stakeholders by DWA and KDC before 2009 
 
The decisions on WSS reticulation came down from the DWA and upwards 
from the VDC review to the District Commissioner (DC). The latter, in the 
District Development Committee (DDC), similarly reviewed progress on WSS at 
regular meetings of herself167, the Chair of KDC (and Chief Executive), the 
Chair of KDLB and the Bakgatla Chief. The DWA met with the DDC on a regular 
                                                 
166
 This view had academic support (Mladenov 2005)  
167
 The DC of Gaborone was a lady who moved in January 2011 to Kgatleng District as DC. She 
provided a critique to central government on the WUC progress on the water reforms.  
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basis normally monthly to discuss any concerns about the delivery of WSS in 
KDC. No Water User Associations (WUA) existed and this forum was the only 
one for discussion of wider agricultural, livestock or mining needs. The 
proposals for the Mmanabula coalfield and its needs for water were discussed 
at these meetings (see Colman2010).. 
 
The dysfunctionality of the institutions that should have planned and reviewed 
the delivery of WSS in KD was recognised. ‘Poor institutional coordination was 
a serious problem facing the public corporations such as the DWA, the KDLB 
and the (KDC) Town Planning Committee. The strong perception is that there is 
no shared responsibility for good governance between them (and) there was 
policy confusion between these institutions’ (BALA 2009).  
 
8.3.3 The Local Government response to the 2009+ AC Reforms 
 
A) Countrywide 
 
The position of local government is not entrenched in the Botswana constitution. 
It is the creature of subsidiary legislation (Commonwealth Secretariat 2011:51). 
While the GOB had expressed interest in decentralisation, and, in the case of 
WSS, before 2009 had done so, it was not codified in the Constitution, as the 
normal way forward for the delivery of services in Botswana (ibid: 52). 
Decentralisation reforms were proposed in the Report on the Second 
Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana 
(2001), known as the Venson-Moitoi report.  In the government’s formal 
response in 2003, it ‘rejected almost all of the recommendations that would 
have enhanced the authority and autonomy of the councils’ (Poteete 2010:7).  
 
Since his election in 2008, HE S K Ian Khama has placed the emphasis of 
Vision 2016 on better delivery of services (as shown in Chapter Six) in his prime 
role in pressing for the WRM and WSS reforms. He sees local government as 
inefficient (KI M2). Recent changes since then, involving recentralisation, 
besides the phased takeover of responsibility for WSS by the WUC, of 
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responsibility for primary health clinics from the councils to the MoH, the 
transfer of resource royalties related to tourism from the councils to the MEWT 
in 2008-2009 and the ‘planned transfer of responsibility for the education 
department to the Ministry of Education and Skills Development’ (Poteete 
2010:9). Responsibility for the Self Help Housing Agency (SHAA) was moved 
from local councils to the Ministry of Housing in May 2012 (Botswana Gazette 
9th May 2012). The progressive removal of WSS responsibilities could be seen 
as a part of a wider pattern of dealing with what was seen as the 
underperformance of local government168. 
 
The WSS changes arising from the NWMP and the NWMPR were imposed on 
LG (KI LGP1). The stakeholders’ meeting to inform169 LG took place in Maun in 
October 2010. The process of the takeover of the villages’ supply by the WUC, 
from DWA and local councils, had commenced in 2009. At the Maun meeting, 
only LG officials were invited and there were no elected councillors present. 
This was explained by the Water Reform Unit (WRU) in that DWA/MMEWR 
ministers and civil servants had and would address council meetings in each 
area and that then the local politicians could ask their questions and get 
answers.  
 
The BALA was asked to engage in a review of the provision of WSS across 
Africa170. The BALA Finance Director, Mr Stephan Pheko, conducted surveys of 
Botswana LA views of WSS delivery in October 2010. But the GOB had little 
interest in the surveys as the decision had already been taken to irrevocably 
handover all WSS to the WUC in 2009, and the GOB had secured the support 
of civil servants both at the centre and at local government level for the WSS 
                                                 
168
  Centralisation of WSS to the WUC was proposed in the NWMPR (SMEC 2006) and fully 
pre-planned 2007-10. It could have been the catalyst for the other moves which appeared to 
have happened with almost no pre-planning such as the removal of health clinics from local 
government control in 2010 (KI M2). 
 
169
 Officially to consult but the GOB presentation was “an information giving event” (KI LGCS 3). 
Points raised however did get aired at the Kasane Meeting of June 2011.   
170
 This was part of a Pan-African survey organised by UCLGA and published in January 2011 
and is available for Botswana, Namibia and SA in Appendix Five 
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changes. The building of the new advocacy coalition for change was made over 
a long period of consultation within the civil service, since the publication of the 
NWPR (SMEC 2006), before it was rolled out. 
 
The outstanding uncollected debt owed to BALA member authorities was to be 
passed as a ‘dowry’ to WUC at the handover points (KI WB1). However, there is 
a view that much of this debt would never have been collected. In one year 
alone, 2009, the uncollected amount was BP20 million (Table 8.2). The KDC 
shortfall on collection was over 30 % (ibid). In addition, the billed totals in Table 
8.2 from LAs were seen as low, compared to the amounts of water supplied by 
the WUC to LAs in 2009 (KI WUC1). Arrears going back many years had been 
left uncollected, because, it was said by councillors, “we do not have the money 
to employ debt collectors” (KI LGP 3). Compensation for payments already 
made for bulk water in the past by the MLG to the WUC was not agreed (KI 
BALA1). 
 
There appeared to be a view of central government that these debts would not 
be fully recovered by LG and it was better to leave the outstanding debts to be 
recovered through the WUC accounts department. To emphasise that there had 
been a change to a central government parastatal, at the point of takeover, all 
residents in the area had to sign new contracts with the WUC to enable the 
continuation of WSS previously provided by either DWA or BALA members. All 
consumers, except destitutes, were expected to pay. 
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District Councils  
 
M. PULA, 2008/2009  
Actual collected 
M. PULA, 2008/2009  
Total billed  to 
customers 
Central 15.5 24.8 
Chobe  0.3 0.5 
Ghanzi  0.8 1.3 
Kgalagadi  1.5 2.4 
Kgatleng  1.4 2.2 
Kweneng  3.9 6.2 
Ngami  2.7 4.3 
NE  2.3 3.7 
SE  0.7 1.1 
Southern  4.0 6.4 
Total 33.1 53.0 
Source: GOB 2010b: 5 
Table 8.2 Water Bills 2008/9 Collected (Actual) and Billed (Potential) 
 
B) Gaborone City Council (GCC) after the 2009 reforms 
 
The WUC was the existing provider of potable water prior to 2009 WRM 
changes. The policies of the WUC in the GCC area appear to have been 
adopted elsewhere. This included a lack of systematic consultation with 
consumers, beyond an occasional meeting with large consumers (KI WUCO 4). 
There does not appear to be any criticism by consumers of a neglect of 
consultation in the GCC area. GCC officers met with the WUC on an informal 
 235 
 
basis but there were no formal meetings, either privately or to which the public 
were invited.  
 
The policies of the WUC in closing standpipes and pushing for house 
connections had been pursued for many years. Only the oldest part of 
Gaborone, Old Naledi, the location of the original labour camp for the building of 
Gaborone, remained almost wholly dependent on standpipes in 2010. The 
upgrading of WSS in Old Naledi 2010-13 is the backdrop to FGON in section 
8.3.4..The policy of GCC to not pay WUC bills for the very poor or ‘destitute’171, 
is explored further in Section 9.3.1. 
 
The transfer of responsibility for water borne sewerage services from GCC to 
the WUC took place in March 2011. This was greeted with relief from the 
councillors (KI LGP 2). The sewerage system was considered to need 
upgrading. The contentious issue of payment for WSS connections for new 
building sites to the North of Gaborone were no longer of concern to councillors. 
At the Council meetings, the Researcher attended after the handover, the 
councillors now complained about the lack of action by the WUC to deal with 
matters that had been their (GCC) responsibility during the forty years before. 
 
In February 2012, the GOB gave all responsibility for self provided pit latrine 
(SPPL) permits and emptying to the WUC with no notice. The WUC asked that 
GCC continue with the emptying of SPPL and all other pit latrines until 2013. 
The GCC had a backlog of collecting sewage from pit latrines around the city. It 
was reported that the ‘GCC has a total of five vacuum tankers, but only two are 
functional while the rest are reported to be broken down. Pit latrines were full 
beyond capacity, leaving the public with no choice but to dump toilet waste 
illegally on the river bank and in the bushes’.172 The GCC Town Clerk 
(Technical Services), Lebuile Israel, is reported as saying disingenuously that 
                                                 
171
 As defined in GOB 2002 
172
 Botswana Gazette 28
th
 June 2012 
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“the WUC seemed not ready as the backlog has not been solved. The 
government asked the GCC to help the corporation from June until October 
[2012] while it gets ready to fully take over”. 
 
The GCC was controlled from 2009 to 2012 by the Government Party, the BDP, 
and supported the changes on WSS delivery. From 2012 the GCC was 
controlled by opposition parties and then called on all Councils to resist the 
takeover of sewerage services by central government through the WUC. 
 
 “We [GCC] are challenged by the continuous directives we 
receive from central government. Such directives undermine the 
core principles of democracy as they are done without our 
consent. Water Utilities’ response to emergencies is very 
disturbing; the city is no longer habitable as we have sewerage 
drains spilling for over two to three days with no response. Ladies 
and gentlemen, how do we plan in such circumstances? The end 
result is loss of confidence in us by the community we represent. 
This kind of governance needs to be condemned”  
Mayor of Gaborone, Cllr Haskins Nkaigwa  
(Mmegi 4th July 2012)  
 
But the Researcher heard councillors of all parties on the GCC, prior to the 
handover, wish for such a transfer of responsibility for sanitation to take place 
because of their inability to cope. 
 
C) KDC response after the 2009 reforms 
 
The KDC performance as a Council has been seen by observers in different 
ways. A 2004 KDC based workshop, held to enable stakeholders to critique the 
council, expressed concern on its performance (BALA 2009:49-67). In March 
2011, KDC received the award for best performing council in Botswana for both 
2009 and 2010 (out of 16 District Councils in Botswana). But the central 
government decision had already been made to remove all responsibility for 
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WSS from KDC. This had been put forward on the MMEWR website in 2009, for 
KD water resposibilities to be handed to the WUC in phase three on October 1st 
2010. The then Minister for MMEWR, the Hon Kedikilwe MP addressed the 
Mochudi Kgotla in September 2010 (Olifants Drift in November 2010 and Morwa 
in May 2011). The MPs for Kgatleng East and West were formally briefed in 
December 2010 (see Section 7.5.1.). Following these meetings, the outcome 
was unchanged; national government policies of WSS were to be imposed on 
KD with no exceptions.  
 
The WUC took over responsibility for water delivery in October 2010, water 
borne sewerage in March 2011 and pit latrines in January 2013. At the October 
2010 water handover, the DWA and KDC and the national TU representatives 
were present along with the Researcher. No central government 
representatives were there, nor any KDC elected councillors or MPs. The KDC 
was represented by the Deputy Chief Executive.173 
 
A decision of central government to take away the outstanding money balances 
for water supplied before the handover (but paid for by KDC) was contentious. 
KDC had asked the MLG/GOB for compensation but there was none. In view of 
the low collection rates and subsequent need for write-offs by the WUC as 
uncollectable, this decision appears understandable (Table 8.2). But the 
problem at takeover was the lack of a common accounting system between the 
WUC and the KDC, to charge the water users, many of whom had never been 
pressed to pay before (KI WUCO 5). As is seen in the next Section, the concern 
of users after the takeover and the signing of new contracts with the WUC was 
how to pay. By June 2011 the WUC billing system was working in the KDC area 
but the bills that should have gone out regularly did not, and the balances 
became significant. The WUC management had to get involved in detailed user 
by user payment plans. The information on water users inherited from DWA and 
KDC did not include all users. WUC KD was involved, for the first few months, 
in mapping exactly who was receiving water supplies. A number of users’ 
                                                 
173
  From May 2011, WUC GM for Kanye, Southern Province 
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houses were unoccupied much of the time, but still consuming significant water 
levels. This led to challenges over the size of the resultant water bills. 
Government institutions and even commercial banks had to be chased to 
ensure payment of bills with threats of disconnection. Each WUC KD monthly 
management meeting had a list of significant non payers to be chased for 
payment. The poor planning of a single national billing system with the use of 
SAP dogged the WUC takeovers across Botswana until mid 2012. The fact that 
many consumers were receiving bills for the first time, and the wish by the WUC 
to cut off water supplies for non payment did not lead to a harmonious first 12 
months of the takeover. The impact of this on the poor of KD, and Botswana as 
a whole, is explored in Chapter Nine. 
 
The WUC took over the water borne sewerage responsibilities in March 2011 
and all other sewerage from January 2012. The KDC had done minimal 
maintenance since the installation of the sewerage system by DWA/MMEWR in 
2003. Beyond the government institutions in Mochudi, very few connections to 
private users had gone ahead. But the GOB, in its national legislation allowing 
the WUC to take over sewerage, had not empowered the WUC to charge for 
sewerage connections or use. Therefore beyond ensuring that the effluent 
disposal was at the now imposed central government standards of the MEWT, 
little expansion took place. As in the GCC area, collection from overflowing pit 
latrine sewage pits had been slow when it had been under the KDC control174 
and continued to be so. 
 
The backlog of applications for water connections had been lengthened by KDC 
not going ahead with connections to their supply for the previous two years 
before the takeover in October 2010. The connections that had been allowed to 
be made were by consumers using their own piping and equipment. The WUC 
for KD thus inherited a non-standard, badly leaking household water supply175. 
                                                 
174
 Cllr Mooketsi, then KDC Chairman, stated, ‘The effluent removal service by KDC has not 
been satisfactory due to the persistent breakdown of our service vehicles and ...we have a long 
backlog to clear’: Address to KDC Council 26
th
 November 2012:16 
175
 In a speech to the NA in March 2012, Hon P H Kedikilwe MP stated that 40% of the water 
was lost because of this previous policy. 
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Many houses with DIY connections were a long way from the existing lines 
(BALA 2009:64). The national policy was laid down that only WUC would now 
do the connections and charge for them. The changes took responsibility for 
WSS from KDC. The Researcher notes in discussions with KIs that there was 
no bitterness at the ending of that responsibility; KDC stood back to let the 
WUC KD go ahead with the central government remit. The WUC KD reported to 
council meetings176 and the KDDC under the DC, and as such, KDC councillors, 
the researcher observed, were pleased to be able to handover the responsibility 
for WSS to the WUC and now to be able to criticise a central government 
parastatal instead. 
 
8.3.4 The view from central government (and its agent the WUC) of local 
government performance on the delivery of WSS in the new AC post 2009 
world  
 
A) Countrywide 
 
Central government appeared to be driven by a view of incompetence in LG in 
delivering WSS. This driving force for the removal of local power has been 
explored in Chapter Six. But the central body chosen for WSS delivery was not 
the DWA but the WUC. The use of the WUC as the agent of central government 
was observed by the researcher as not universally welcomed, particularly within 
the DWA/MMEWR. The WUC senior management had had a successful period 
of delivering profits to GOB, its sole shareholder, and receiving in return cash 
bonuses over and above their base salaries (WUC Annual Reports 2000-2008). 
This rankled with senior civil servants in MMEWR who did not receive such 
bonuses for performance (KI CGCS 6). The WUC reported to the Minister in 
charge of MMEWR and not to the DWA or senior civil servants in MMEWR. The 
joint working on the reforms, across the Gaborone ministries and with the WUC, 
creating the WRU, sought to deal with this jealousy. But it did mean that, if 
things needed to be sorted using the senior civil servants’ clout, there was a 
                                                 
176
 The Researcher attended meetings of KDC and interviewed both the Chair and Vice Chair of 
the Council and senior officers. 
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reluctance to get involved. Thus the contestation over the transfer of assets 
from DCs to the WUC, which should have been resolved between the MLG and 
DWA/MMEWR through the WRU meetings, did not take place in the case of the 
WUC KD and KDC (KI WUCO 1 and 5). 
 
The transfer of responsibilities for all other sanitation from local government to 
WUC took place in May 2012 –January 2013 by government decree of 
February 2012 and charges for emptying of pit latrines could be levied by the 
WUC or their agents177. In May 2013, after consultation with, and agreement 
from, Council Chairmen and Chief Executives, MMEWR proposed to Cabinet 
the outsourcing of pit latrine emptying to the private sector providers, as 
proposed in the original WB report of September 2010. The view of BALA 
officials was that, despite the consultation, the Council Chairmen would strongly 
oppose’ this privatisation on principle’ (KI LGCS 3), despite the ‘long backlog’ 
WUC inherited. 
 
B) GCC 
 
The movement of responsibility for water borne sewerage services from GCC to 
the WUC took place in March 2011. Existing GCC sewerage staff transferred to 
the WUC, and they set about clearing the site and machinery. At that time, 
significant numbers of foetuses and dead new born babies were cleared from 
the sumps. It is perceived that the flushing away of such through water borne 
sewerage provided the anonymity that other forms of disposal would not (KI 
LGP2). A South African based consultancy was brought in immediately to 
review the performance of the Gaborone sewage works which were upgraded 
to the effluent discharge standards set by the MEWT. The machinery at the 
sewage works had been installed and upgraded in the 2000s. GCC at that time 
were pleased to handover the responsibility for sewerage to the WUC (KI 
LGP2). GCC had set a policy that all pit latrines should be phased out and 
                                                 
177
 The transfer of responsibilities from MLG and MEWT to WUC reporting to the Minister of the 
MMEWR in 2012 contrasts with the South Africa Government transfer from DWAF to DEAT in 
2005 (Godfrey 2007:2) 
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replaced by water borne sewerage by the end of 2011. The work in Old Naledi, 
utilising Chinese Government contractors, was intended to complete this vision 
at the end of 2012 (FCON and KI LGP2). 
 
C) KDC178 
 
The WUC office in Mochudi previously had been the DWA office for the 
provision of services to Mochudi only.  KDC had delivered all WSS services 
outside Mochudi from their local government offices also in Mochudi but on a 
different site. Very few KDC staff transferred to the WUC KD (formerly DWA) 
administration. The key WUC management were appointed on merit by the 
national WUC recruitment team, from applicants both local to Kgatleng area but 
also from across Botswana. There was an instance of a water engineer turning 
up in Mochudi at the handover in October 2010 instead of a different location 
400 miles away. The increase of up to 20% in wages and the wide range of 
special allowances paid by the WUC, compared to that of the previous water 
deliverers, encouraged the process (KI WUCO 3).  
 
The WUC inherited poor infrastructure, which had been badly maintained. Much 
of it dated back 50 years with little maintenance having been done in the 
meantime. Standpipes in the main villages had already started to be closed as 
per the National policy of DWA/MMEWR. There was a battle as to who should 
pay for the water being used from the remaining standpipes, KDC saying “this 
cost now had to be met from the WUC resources” (KI LGP3). KDC finally 
accepted responsibility in 2011 along with the long contested costs of destitute 
WSS fees (see Chapter Nine). 
  
The handover of WSS equipment and vehicles proved particularly contentious, 
with KDC holding back for themselves, the machinery that could be justified as 
                                                 
178
 The Researcher attended the monthly management meetings of the senior WUC team 
based in Mochudi from October 2010 to June 2011. This section reflects the access to data 
obtained in those meetings 
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useable for continuing responsibilities for water tankering179 or ‘bowsing’ 
functions of the KDC and in one case, for use to fight fires. What was 
transferred was that which did not work, even vehicles with no wheels that still 
remained on the KDC inventory. A particular problem for WUC KD was the lack 
of transfer of a functioning water tanker/bowser so they could deliver water to 
areas when there was a halt to piped supplies. KDC retained the responsibility 
of supplying Remote Area Dwellers (RAD)180 with water, and to provide cover 
for the existing fire engine. Despite appeals through to MMEWR and thence to 
MLG, KDC stood firm and the WUC KD had to tow water tankers with 
inoperable engines to the point of needed water supply. In one case, it was 
reported that a transferred water tanker had no wheels. 
 
8.3.5 How does Botswana society through KIs perceive the changes since 
2009, with WSS now not being delivered by local government, but by a 
central government parastatal? 
 
This analysis draws from data provided from FGs, KIIs and surveys to enable 
tentative conclusions to be drawn on how Botswana society perceives the 
changes.  
 
A) Public Surveys 
1) The WUC Surveys (2009 and 2012) 
 
There have been very few surveys done of the views of Botswana society on 
their attitude to the WSS changes around them. WUC carried out limited 
surveys in 2009181 and again in 2012182. These surveys showed considerable 
                                                 
179
 This residual responsibility was confirmed in the Local Government Act 2012 (Statutory 
Instrument No 6 of 2013) Schedule 1 section 5  “to provide public water outside an area for 
which a water authority [WUC] has been appointed by law “ section 4 to set user fees for 
“sanitation services” 
180
 Remote Area Dwellers who were often minority tribes including the Basarwa  
181
 Briggs 2010 
182
 WUC 2012. The study was conducted between the 19
th
 March and 13
th
 April 2012 and 
included face-to-face quantitative research involving 250 commercial entities and 2,252 
 243 
 
support for the performance of the WUC (and in 2009 for the then existing non 
WUC supplier of DWA) across the country, but, in many areas, the respondents 
to the survey were less than five in number and were often commercial 
customers (KI WUCO2). The 2012 survey was more broadly based and gave 
wide support for the WUC performance after the takeovers: the thesis uses data 
from the surveys where it is helpful in answering the research questions. 
 
2) The Vision 2016 Survey (2010) 
 
The Vision 2016 (see Section 6.3.3.2) survey of August 2010, after the start of 
the water reforms in 2009, was gathered from the responses of 1,200 
households (Vision 2016 2010:11) and it is intended to be an annual survey 
leading up to 2016. The survey is wide-ranging, covering all aspects of the 
seven pillars of Vision 2016 (1997). In the survey, in Pillar 3: A Compassionate, 
Just and Caring Nation, ‘government was perceived to be doing well [on WSS]. 
78% of the respondents were of the opinion that government is doing a good 
job in the provision of water, while only 20% were of a contrary opinion’ (ibid 
2010:23)183. In other areas of service delivery, there are much lower satisfaction 
levels with Central Government (54%) and even lower for Local Government at 
45%. The high WSS results indicate a higher level of satisfaction compared to 
other governmental institutions. The comparative surveys for 2011, 2012 and 
2013 are not yet available so the researcher cannot vouch for a continuation of 
the 2010 levels of satisfaction. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
domestic customers. Furthermore 30 In-depth interviews were conducted with key stakeholders. 
The survey is not published but the Researcher was given privileged access.  
183
 ‘Most of the age groups interviewed were consistently in the upper 70% in this response, 
except for the two older [age] cohorts, which are higher being in the 80%s. For the rest of the 
cohorts, the results are as follows: under 19 (76%), 20-29 (77%), 30-39 (77%), 40-49 (73%), 50-
59 (82%), and over 60 (87%)’ (Vision 2016 2010:24). 
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3) The Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) Index (2012) 
 
The IDASA 2012 Democracy Index184 gives a more critical rating to current 
WSS provision (IDASA 2012:87). By this date, the WUC takeover of stages 1-4 
had been implemented. The rating of four out of ten was given denoting a rating 
of inadequate185.This rating was to the following questions: 
 
Q 84 “How effective are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, including 
clean, adequate and reasonably accessible water?” 4/10 (Inadequate) 186 
 
Q 93 “Are public goods, (examples; water provision; local services such as 
waste collection), equally available to citizens and communities at similar levels 
of efficiency and competence?”4/10 (Inadequate) 
 
Yet Q 97 “To what extent do citizens feel that they are receiving equal access to 
public resources regardless of their social grouping?” received a score of 8/10 
(Excellent) 
 
The IDASA Index appears to the researcher to be driven by the concepts of the 
lack of human rights to WSS in the Botswana Constitution187. It takes no 
account of the GOB (2011a) Court of Appeal Judgement. This will be explored 
further in Chapter Nine which addresses the issue of poverty reduction and the 
water reforms. 
 
 
 
                                                 
184
 The index is formed by nine Batswana authors’ opinions on each section, tempered by a 
validation workshop meeting in 2011 
185
 The IDASA 2012 Democracy Index is based on an authors’ scoring system between 1 to 10, 
using the following guide: 1-4, inadequate or falling short of the democratic ideal, 5 stable but 
insufficient, 6 stable and adequate,7 improving and 8-10 excellent, and as close to the 
democratic ideal as possible. The rating overall for Botswana was 6. 
186
  In each case, out of 100 questions 
187
 This was confirmed in a discussion with one of the Batswana authors NGON 3 after the 
report was published 
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B) Original Data Collection 
 
The key informant interviews (KII) support a more positive view than that of 
IDASA, but the FGs drawn from poorer members of Botswana society provide a 
more nuanced view. The survey at a Mochudi supermarket provides a middle 
class and positive view of the reforms. The data is augmented by individual 
ethnographic interviews in Mochudi and Matebeleng188.  The data collection 
methodology has been covered in Chapter Three and the detail is laid out in 
Appendix Three. Table 8.3 shows a data summary of KI views obtained by the 
Researcher. 
 
1) KI Views on the importance of LG on water reforms pre and post the 
reforms 
 
The rating by KIs from Local Government on their assessment of the 
importance of Local Government on water governance remains high (6.5 to 4.5) 
despite the removal of direct responsibility for WSS delivery. This could be seen 
as endorsing the role of Local Government in holding the WUC to account. Civil 
Servants and CSOs maintain a high view of local government post the WSS 
reforms but the private sector less so. This is reflected in the FG responses 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188
 A 99 year old Bakgatla (KI BR 7) with a knowledge of the changes in WSS in Kgatleng since 
1910  and a Matebeleng grandmother and entrepreneur (KI BR 3) who has built a series of 
water tanks for rainwater harvesting to self irrigate her backyard garden 
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Key 
Informants: 
 
Private 
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(4) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Mean 
(29) 
Importance 
of Role of 
Local Govt: 
Pre-reform 
5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 4.5 6 6 6.5 
Importance 
of Role of 
Local Govt: 
Post-reform 
3.5 5 5.5 4.5 3.5 4 5 4.5 
Likert Scale: where 0 is no importance and 7 is high importance 
Table 8.3 KI views on the importance of Local Government to the Water 
reforms before and after 2009 
 
2) The responses from the Focus Groups189  
 
The responses of the FGs to the changes in responsibilities from local to central 
government are summarised where there was a clear view expressed by the 
group: 
 
The FGs believed that, with the changes, the Government and the WUC 
should realize their responsibility for there always to be enough water: 
“The government should make sure we have water. It is straight 
forward like that. Even if God causes rain, government is 
                                                 
189
 The coding for the focus groups used in this section are: FGA (Focus Group Artesia, 
Kgatleng District); FGB (Focus Group in Broadhurst, Gaborone); FGM (Focus Group 
Matebeleng, Kgatleng District); FGMO (Focus Group  Mochudi: Tsukududu  ward, Kgatleng 
District); FGOD (Focus Group Olifants Drift, Kgatleng District); and FGON (Focus Group in Old 
Naledi, Gaborone). The different voices are identified by numbering where appropriate. 
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responsible. Government talks to WUC to give us water, because 
there was rainfall to start with and dams were built to collect it. God 
brings but when it falls down, the government through WUC gets it to 
us so that we can be helped” (FGON 2). 
“Water is made by God...it is made by WUC. If it wasn’t for WUC or 
Water Affairs digging or when the dam is dry... that means WUC is 
the one...even when God has made water...but it’s the one that 
ensures that... actually.... to make water... because when we talk of 
water we talk about pipe supply. That water is scarce, we are talking 
about the distribution of water” (FGB 1). 
“So, in actual fact when we talk about what makes water, we say it is 
WUC because if we say it’s God... God yes, we know he makes 
everything that’s present because he makes rain fall. But what we 
are talking about and wanting to work for us, is WUC because it is 
the one that supplies water; makes sure there is no shortage... it is 
the one that brings water, because if we don’t make sure WUC 
supplies pipes, if we talk about God, it would just be the dam and we 
would be referring to the dam only” (FGB 2). 
 “God is supposed to bring water to the ground, right? Yes, then 
WUC get it from the ground and give to us to drink, right? Yes, so the 
council should make sure that WUC give us enough water and they 
should tell us in time that the there is a broken pipe. They shouldn't 
just sit there when there is a shortage” (FGM 1). 
 “It's the company that is helping us now, WUC. I think it's the one 
that ensures that we have water because it is the one that took the 
power from Water Affairs. What I mean is that this company is the 
one that is holding us in matters of water” (FGA 1). 
“Water Utilities is the one that can give enough water. Water Affairs 
used to ensure that we have enough. WUC should also tell us in time 
when water is not going to be available. They never tell us” (FGA 2). 
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Their view of the takeover by WUC from LG was a questioning of the 
benefits of the change: 
“When Water Affairs was leaving us, a meeting was called at the 
kgotla - it was the Paramount Chief's meeting - and we were told 
that the company which was giving us water before was leaving, 
and WUC was coming in. Yes Rra, its true what the lady just said. 
They had called us to the kgotla. Yes we were all called to the 
kgotla. Yes, they called us all” (FGM1-5). 
“I say WUC should shape up. They have just come in. They came 
in end of last year. So I say they should fix things so that they are 
like Water Affairs. Water Affairs also, had their own problems, 
these ones we haven't been that long with them but we are 
already complaining. So we say they should shape up so that we 
can see how it goes and compare it to the other and see how it 
goes. I have asked people who have dealt with WUC in other 
areas and they said it was nice. I asked how so and they said it 
was nice because we would never pay a lot of money, so I was 
shocked when I had to pay a lot of money. So I got that man again 
and asked him, you told me that WUC is nice but I have paid a lot 
of money, you were not telling the truth. He laughed and said, no, 
but this company is good” (FGM 4). 
 “WUC, their bills are really high. When you go there you find that 
the money is high. It's not the same as we used to pay Water 
Affairs. With Water Affairs we used to pay around 45, P30, 30 
something. Now it's 100 and 300 with Water Utilities. We really 
don't want Water Utilities” (FGM 1)190. 
 
                                                 
190
 P100 = £1. There has been no increase in water charges beyond the 10%VAT charge 
subsidized by the WUC by GOB directive in June 2011 from the lowest tier of usage of water. 
But in the past, the DWA and KDC had not always sent bills or required payment.  
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But billing was a problem with the perceived inefficiency of WUC: 
“Rra, WUC bills, ever since they came in, don't come in time. What 
we see is that they read after 3 months. I asked one lady which 
month she was reading for and she told me she was reading for 
January. I am talking about something that happened in March. So 
these are the challenges we come across” (FGM 2) 
“Yes. I say those WUC people should come here and explain to 
us. When they took over we had paid the council but in these bills 
of theirs, there is money which they say is for the council. So they 
should come and explain to us why we are paying the council 
even though we finished paying them. They should come” (FGOD 
1) 
A majority of FGs respondents still felt that the local councillor would be 
the person that they would go to, to get redress 
This was particularly true in Gaborone where WUC had always been in charge 
of water supplies:  
“He is the one elected to be sent because he works with the council. He [the 
councilor] knows who is responsible for toilets and sewage. It’s still council” 
(FGON 1).  
“I agree with her because the people we go to are the councilors and MPs. 
They are the ones we tell problems of things like water and toilets, they are the 
ones we are supposed to tell about the problems” (FGB 1).  
“The councillor is the one who goes to WUC, he goes to everything that... we 
voted for him to be our eyes and our parent” (FGB 3). 
In the KDC, where WUC had taken over in 2010, the parastatal was seen as 
accountable, regrettably:  
 
“Even if their name [WUC] beats my tongue, we will only go to 
them because they told us that we were no longer going to be 
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dealing with the council but with them. So whatever is lacking we 
should cry to them. Even if they are killing us, there is nowhere 
else to go but to them” (FGOD 1). 
 
But the VDC also had a role in the villages where it formed a stakeholder group 
in its own right191: “When there is a problem with water, you complain to the 
water company called WUC. In the village, when there is a problem, you go 
straight to the VDC” (FGA 1). 
 
3) The Response from the Survey of WSS users outside a Mochudi 
supermarket in June 2011192 
 
The 99 interviewees (n axis in the Figures 8.2-8.6) were interviewed over three 
mornings on leaving the supermarket in Kgatleng District, the area in which four 
of the Focus Groups took place. The respondents were by nature of their visit to 
the supermarket not in the lowest income quartile, although with a broad range 
of income levels (see Chapter Four, File Five)193.  
 
 
Figure 8.2 How do you use the water? 
 
                                                 
191
See Section 6.3.3.4 
192
 The questionnaire is in Appendix.Three 
193
 In all survey figures, n=99, x axis is frequency and y axis is the alternative responses to the 
question.  
 251 
 
Figure 8.2 reflects consumers polled in an urban village outside the traditional 
water users for the masimo and cattle post. 90% were mainly household users. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Who is your current supplier? 
 
All the respondents would have had to move from their previous supplier to the 
WUC, be it DWA in Mochudi or KDC outside Mochudi. Over 95% recognised 
that the WUC was now their new supplier. However only 30% of those 
interviewed thought the change had been for the good. Given the chaotic nature 
of the takeover by the WUC from October 2010 and the need to move to a new 
billing system, it is surprising that the approval rating was actually this high194. 
The changes required every water user to go to the WUC office to sign a new 
contract: it is unknown how many had had a contract with the DWA or KDC. 
When asked about the continuity of supply, the respondents believed there had 
been a significant improvement (Figure 8.4) despite the difficulties experienced 
by the WUC mechanics to get equipment from KDC (see above). The overall 
level of satisfaction remained high.  
 
                                                 
194
 The 2012 WUC survey detail for Kgatleng District shows over 70% support for the change. 
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Likert Scale: 1= Better, 7=Worse   
Figure 8.4 Has there been an improvement in the continuity of supply in the last 
12 months? 
 
 
Figure 8.5 In your view, has the water quality improved over the last 12 
months? 
 
The perceived quality of water also remains high, with 30% recognising an 
improvement (Figures 8.5 and 8.6).  
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Likert Scale: 1= very poor, 7=very good 
Figure 8.6 What is your current view of water quality 
 
The Researcher reflects on the monthly meetings of the WUC KD team 
struggling to deal with very old and inadequate equipment, waiting for chemical 
supplies to come through from SA suppliers. The WUC team worked most 
weekends and often late to keep the quality and quantity of water high and 
flowing. By 2013, some problems still remained with a lack of chlorinators and 
poor quality of water complained of at the river villages195. The diarrhoea 
outbreaks, from before WUC took over, were used to beat WUC in the 
newspapers in March 2013196. The Botswana Bureau of Standards (BOBS) 
water standards for potable water (BOS 32:2009), for bottled water (BOS 
143:2011) and, unusually, standards for irrigation (BOS 463:2011) and water for 
livestock and poultry (BOS 365:2010) were brought in and enforced by the 
MOH as part of the water reforms (NDP 10 2009:235197). 
 
Conclusions on the change in WSS delivery 
 
The national surveys, KIIs and Mochudi survey showed some support for the 
changes. The FGs were concerned about the movement away from local 
accountability to a national provider. The WUC/GOB still needed to convince 
them that the reforms are good for them. 
                                                 
195
 State of the KDC Address March 2013  
196
 Sunday Standard March 3
rd
 2013: 
197
 20% compliance in 2008, planned to go to 100% by 2016 
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8.4 Key issues arising in this chapter related to a new agreed AC 
 
There appears to be a permanent accommodation between the chiefs and 
the GOB not only on land and water rights, but on the primacy of elected 
institutions. The 2011 challenges to the central government observed in 
Kgatleng District failed, but this could leave a ‘local-central gap’ (Picard 
1987:14). ‘Traditional leaders still control the local judiciary and the flow of 
information to the people’ (ibid).The deep beliefs on land and water felt by the 
Chiefs pre Independence still have influence over the elected GOB . 
 
The removal of formal accountability from tribal and local institutions to a 
central government parastatal has not been replaced by accountability 
mechanisms beyond the tribal and local government meetings. The kgotlas 
have been used to consult on the big changes and to cement the new AC on 
WSS. But there is a lack of a more systemic method of accountability such as 
water user associations and consumer consultative committees in each District 
to ensure that ‘botho’ (together we respect each other and sort out our 
differences) is the way forward on the detailed implementation of the WSS and 
WRM reforms.  The village committees are weak as a counterpoint to a national 
Parastatal in resolving local access to water, required in gaing local agreement 
to the new AC (see Chapter Nine). 
 
The UNDP/GEF financed BIWRM-WE, described and analysed in Chapters 
Six and Seven, in support of the new AC, did not challenge the GOB 
centralising water policy in that it did not envisage LG having a significant role in 
delivering IWRM in Botswana, unlike the situation in SA and Namibia. Figure 
8.1 shows the ICLEI concept of IWRM at the local level and IWRM beyond local 
boundaries. But in Botswana the policy was for central government to take key 
decisions and for local government to act on those decisions. The delivery of 
WSS was not now seen as a role for LG. Centralisation of WSS (and other 
services) in Botswana flies in the face of WSS policies in South Africa. 
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The Local Government KI politicians in Botswana, as observed by the 
Researcher, were pleased to hand over their responsibility for WSS to the 
central GOB parastatal. The view from the kgotlas attended as part of the field 
work process, was that the WUC could not be worse than LG in supplying WSS. 
Despite the proclaimed achievement of 96% access to water (100% in Mochudi) 
(WHO/UNICEF JMP 2012) the supply to individual households beyond the 
public standpipes had been poor. WUC KD is a case study of operational 
change, to piped supply to the individual lapas (yards), from the public 
standpipes that had previously formed the standard of potable water supply in 
Botswana. It is doubtful that LG, given their performance prior to the changes, 
could have made this change more effectively than a central government 
parastatal. But LG now had a new role as the point of complaint against national 
institutions on WRM and WSS that previously had been delivered through local 
government locally and now holding WUC to account. 
 
8.5 Summary 
 
This Chapter has answered several key research questions. Institutional 
responsibility for the delivery of WSS has changed as set out in this chapter. It 
has considered how the traditional forms of government reacted to the change 
in their authority over land and water brought about by the elected government 
in Botswana and the interplay between the traditional and the modern 
governmental structures in these WRM reforms. It has been tense in Kgatleng 
District but ultimately the conflict was resolved. There, and elsewhere in 
Botswana, the key role of the traditional structures has been to both explain, 
and provide a conduit to smooth, the introduction of the changes brought about 
in the new AC.  
 
The Chapter then moved on to consider the response of local government to 
the change in their powers on WSS. This also appeared to being resolved as 
local government accepted an observational role able to critique the 
performance of the WUC at local level. But it has been an uneasy changeover, 
with local government institutions not making it easy despite their previous poor 
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performance on WSS. But the researcher proposes that, from the analysis of 
the data, the centralising of power on WSS as set out in the new AC in 2009 
had largely become accepted in Botswana.  
 
The next Chapter, Chapter Nine, assesses the impact of the proposed policies 
and delivery of WSS on the poor of Botswana 
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Chapter Nine: What was the impact on the poor of the water reforms in the 
post Independence AC and the post 2009 AC? 
 
9.1 Chapter overview and the context of poverty reduction in Botswana 
 
This Chapter seeks to understand the context of whether and how a new 
advocacy Coaltion (AC) on water reform recognised the poverty eradication 
objectives of the Botswana government, It looks at the recognition of the right to 
water, incentives to address poverty and economic inequalities through the lens 
of the availability of water in the post Independence AC and the extent to which 
these changed in a new post 2009 AC. The Chapter considers the impacts of 
the changes at the village, masimo (the lands) and moraka (the cattle post). 
 
There is a deep-seated feeling within Tswana society that poverty should be 
addressed within the traditional family and the tribal value system (Shapera 
1971; 1970; 1938 a and b; KI TAC 1, 2). The modern state of Botswana has 
sought to cover what it sees as the retreat of the responsibility of the family for 
its poorer members, in providing a safety net to both those permanently unable 
to earn their way out of poverty and those temporarily unable to do so (KI 
CGCS 1). This chapter provides analysis as to the success of the Water 
Resource Management (WRM) and the Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) 
reforms in continuing the provision of that safety net despite the withdrawal of 
free water previously available from stand pipes in the villages. 
 
The Gini coefficient of cash income inequality in Botswana is high198. Between 
1980 and 1991, Botswana had ‘the highest degree of [income] inequality in the 
world’ (Maundeni 2003:99). However, there are other important factors in 
defining poverty in Botswana.  The provision of universal public goods with 
universal free healthcare and near free education at primary, secondary and 
                                                 
198
 The mean estimated household income inequality (EHII) Gini Index Score is Botswana: 
46.52, Namibia: 43.28 and South Africa: 43.35 (Nel 2008:158) 
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tertiary levels provide a safety net for all Batswana199. The definition of poverty 
in Botswana without taking into account these public goods makes international 
measurement of poverty in Botswana flawed. Alongside this is the entitlement to 
free land200 for all Batswana allocated by the Land Board and the nearly free 
provision of agricultural inputs. The February 2012 poverty figures on a broader 
definition demonstrate a reduction to 21% of the population and on the MDG 
cash target of $1.25 per day to fewer than 5% of the population. This compares 
to the latest SSA figure of 51% in 2005 with WB projections for SSA of this 
falling below 36% by 2015 (UN MDG Report 2011).  
 
It could be said that few people in Botswana are very poor after taking account 
of the public goods available to all. A KI at the University of Botswana gave her 
opinion: 
 
“poverty [is] exaggerated in Botswana. Batswana are resource rich 
but cash poor. The latter have land and often cattle which they do 
not sell or use. They also have the benefit of free health and free 
education. There are a range of grants for farming, which they do 
not take up. I would oppose an increase in income tax from the 
current maximum of 25% to 40% or 50% so as to pay for 
increased social transfers to the poor.” (KI UB 4) 
 
However, the New Economics Foundation (NEF) Happy Planet 2012 rating201 
for Botswana is the lowest rated in the world, 151 out of 151. While the low life 
                                                 
199
 “The lack of Botswana tribal (both majority and minority) cultural and language education has 
not been addressed. Teaching after the age of 8 is only in English” (KI NGON 3) 
200
 “This may not be able to continue with the population increases” (KI LBCS 1) 
201
 The data for average levels of well-being in each country are drawn from responses to the 
ladder of life question in the Gallup World Poll, which used samples of around 1000 individuals 
aged 15 or over in each of more than 150 countries. The question asks: Please imagine a 
ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at the top. Suppose we say that the 
top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder 
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you 
personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel 
about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to 
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expectancy of 53.2 years is seen as arising from the continuing (but decreasing) 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, the survey rating by Gallop carried out in December 2010, 
on Batswana citizens’ view of their experience of well being202, defined as ‘the 
possibility of upward mobility on the ladder of life’, is one of the lowest in the 
world. It is possible that the GOB emphasis on self help to achieve poverty 
eradication may not be seen as easily achievable by the ordinary Motswana203. 
Perhaps the changes in the delivery of WSS outlined in Chapter Seven have 
contributed to this change of view, as they could be seen as challenging to 
those who see themselves as poor. The 2012 Afrobarometer survey204 does 
show increased satisfaction in the Botswana Government in improving the living 
standard of the poor up from 62% (2008) to 73% (2012) but only 10% of the 
rural respondents see their living standards as good compared to 27% of the 
urban respondents. 
 
The right to water from boreholes has always been construed as a conditional 
right and it is not in the Botswana Constitution. The rights to drill for water by the 
Basarwa/San in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) (subject to WAB 
approval), has been accepted by the Government of Botswana (GOB) in not 
challenging the January 2011 Court Judgement (see Section 9.3.1 in this 
chapter).  
 
However, water was not seen by KI and FG discussants as an unconditional 
free common good, and in this view, supported the new Advocacy Coaltion (AC) 
view on the value of water and the moves towards cost recovery. The universal 
subsidy of water to all Batswana was questioned by the new AC supporters, as 
“the subsidy does not encourage WDM” (KI CGCS 1). “If water is so cheap, 
                                                                                                                                               
the way you feel? Available at: http://www.happyplanetindex.org/assets/happy-planet-index-
report.pdf .accessed 12th June 2013 
202
 SA 4.7; Namibia 4.9 
203
 While no research has been done on the wellbeing rating of the Bakgatla in Botswana, 
research has been carried out on the South African Bakgatla (Hamilton 2012) with slightly 
positive ratings of wellbeing.   
204
 Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/press_release/bot_r5_pr9.pdf 
accessed on 17th May 2013 
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what incentive is there to use it wisely?” (ibid) The alternative methods of 
protecting the poor are explored in this chapter. 
 
9.2 The legal right to water in Botswana 
 
There is no right to water written into the Botswana Constitution (see Chapter 
Five).  This absence is ameliorated by the Water Act (1968) which provides 
comfort in Sections Six and Nine as noted below: 
 
Section Six: ‘The owner or occupier of any land may without a water right, sink 
or deepen any well or borehole thereon and abstract and use water there from 
for domestic purposes not exceeding such amounts per day, as may be 
prescribed in relation to the area where such well or borehole is situated, by the 
Minister after consultation with an advisory board [the WAB] established in 
pursuance of section 35 provided that this paragraph shall not authorise the 
sinking of a borehole within 236 meters of any other borehole other than a dry 
borehole’ (Water Act 1968:6)  
 
But the rights under Section Six of the Act were caveatted by Section Nine 
which states: ‘Subject to the foregoing provisions, no person shall divert, dam, 
store, abstract, use water or discharge any effluent into public water or for any 
such purpose construct any works except in accordance with a water right [from 
the WAB] granted under this Act’ (ibid: 9).  
 
The rights of the citizen, and thus of the poor, to water were therefore restricted. 
No right to water existed beyond this until the High Court Judgement of January 
2011. 
 
9.2.1 The Basarwa right of access to water judgement, January 2011 
 
This section reviews the history of recent events in the struggle for rights of 
access to water in the CKGR for the Naro speakers, referred to by the GOB as 
Basarwa but also known as Bushmen, who live in Namibia, South Africa and 
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Botswana. In Botswana, they have become spread in small pockets of 
population often working as cattle herders or ‘boys’ and are thought to be the 
main recipients of Remote Area Dwellers Programme (RADP) benefits, with the 
right to free water delivered in bowsers (water tankers). 
 
The Ghanzi District in western Botswana was the most highly populated by 
Basarwa who were estimated at up to 5000 individuals205. Ghanzi WSS was 
taken over by the Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) in 2012. The World Bank 
(WB) (2010)206 research in villages surrounding Ghanzi Town showed that the 
Basarwa dominated households expressed a ‘profound fear of the research [on 
potential water reforms], as being the precursor for [re]settlement and /or the 
loss of land’. But the majority of the population there said ‘the Basarwa received 
privileged services from the government and that they [the non-Basarwa] were 
just as needy’ (ibid: 3). Water was intermittent [from the standpipes], and 
connections to piped water supply were [seen as] unaffordable (ibid: 2).  
 
The Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) position 
 
The CKGR was established in 1961 under the Colonial Government. The 
Basarwa remained there, pursuing a life of hunter-gathering207 without water 
from boreholes other than intermittent streams being available, except in 
utilising the vegetation and indigenous plants (Walkman 2010). But after 1961, 
they increasingly lived in organised settlements in the CKGR, with the GOB 
supplying water in bowsers. 
 
De Beers dug a borehole in 1986 at Mothomelo in the CKGR to provide local 
water for the prospecting staff. They allowed the Basarwa to utilise the 
                                                 
205
 The Basarwa have refused to take part in any GOB census. The figure is a best estimate of 
Basarwa in Botswana given by KIs. 
206
 Ghanzi Household Interview Summary of April 2010 unpublished to which the researcher 
was given access. 
207
 The concept of the Basarwa only ever being hunter gatherers is contested through an 
exploration demonstrating a ‘spectrum from extensive foraging to an intensive agro-pastoralism’ 
(Wilmsen 1989:32).’The appearance of isolation and the reality of dispossessed poverty are 
recent ‘(ibid:157) 
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borehole. De Beers withdrew subsequently from the CKGR. In 1990, the GOB 
decided to close the Basarwa settlements in the CKGR, withdrawing the water 
bowsers, and to relocate those living in the settlements to new ‘impoverished’ 
ones outside the CKGR (Good 2008:120)208. It also closed the Mothomelo 
borehole and no new boreholes were allowed. The Basarwa could continue 
hunter-gathering but with limited hunting licences and only the water they 
carried personally into the CKGR. Roy Sesana a self styled leader of the 
Basarwa in the CKGR took the GOB to court in 2002 to reopen, and to have full 
access, to the Mothomelo borehole (GOBb 2002). In a 2006 judgement (GOB 
2006) the High Court declared the GOB had acted within their rights in 
withdrawing the right to use the borehole but also stated that the individual 
Basarwa suing in the 2002 case had the right to reside in the CKGR in the 
traditional manner (Morinville 2013). This was again appealed, funded by the 
US based International Non Government Organisation (INGO) Survival 
International (SI), who threatened to organise a world-wide boycott of Botswana 
diamonds, if the borehole was not reopened. The campaign was conjoined with 
concerns over USA water policies in the book ‘Heart of Dryness’ (Walker 2010).  
 
There was very little support from KI across most areas of Botswana society for 
the Basarwa right to special treatment and access to water points/boreholes 
inside the CKGR. There was a strong belief by Batswana KI that SI wanted 
Batswana “to live according to a pre-conceived Western view of the primitive 
African” (KI M 1). But there was unease among prominent legal experts (KI J1) 
and religious leaders. The Botswana Council of Churches provided the 
President in November 2010 with a graphic, detailed picture of life for the few 
Basarwa, particularly women, who were sticking it out in the CKGR wilderness 
                                                 
208
 The Researcher visited Khutsi village on the southern boundary of the CKGR on 5-6
th
 
February 2011 and interviewed a group of Basarwa. Khutsi village was expanded by the GOB 
with modern facilities and a game lodge. The group was very positive about the village and its 
facilities. There was no observable ill health or malnutrition. The villagers provided game 
wardens and admitted to poaching game. A  Basarwa-run cultural centre to explain Basarwa 
traditions was planned. Water comes from a DWA borehole outside the CKGR. Solar driven 
small borehole water points for animals have been installed inside the CKGR by the KCS.  
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without water (KI LGP4). This may have influenced the stance of the GOB on 
the issue. 
 
In 2011, a Botswana Appeal Court judgement (GOB 2011) proposed the right of 
all Basarwa to reutilise the Mothemelo borehole, or an alternative borehole 
(subject to the WAB agreement). Section Six of the Water Act (1968) was seen 
as superior to Section Nine in the right of Batswana to dig /utilise a well for 
household purposes (ibid:14). It could be argued that this judgment established 
in Botswana an overriding right of access to water for all Batswana209. 
 
The 2003 United Nations Economic and Social Council on Rights (UNESCR) 
and 2010 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on the right to 
water were quoted in support of the decision of the Appeal Court judgement 
(GOB 2011:21.22.23). Justice Romodibedi said in his judgement that he 
‘approached the matter on the basis of fundamental principle whether a person 
has been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment involves a value 
judgement. It is appropriate to stress that in the exercise of a value judgement, 
the Court is entitled to have regard to international consensus on the 
importance of access to water. Reference [he wrote] to two important 
documents will suffice’: 
 
1) ‘On 20 January 2003 United Nations Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights submitted a report on what it termed substantive issues 
arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
In its introduction, it stated that water is a limited resource and a public good, 
fundamental for life and health. The human right to water is indispensable for 
leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realisation of other 
human rights. 
 
                                                 
209
 This view was supported in May 2013 by KI CGCS 6 who felt the impact of Judgement had 
not been appreciated other than in GOB circles. 
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In paragraph 16 (d) of its report the committee said the following:  
 
‘Whereas the right to water applies to everyone, States’ Parties 
should give special attention to those individuals and groups who 
have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising this right, including 
women and children, minority groups, indigenous peoples, 
refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, 
migrant workers, prisoners and detainees.  
 
In particular, States should take steps to ensure that indigenous 
peoples’ access to water resources on their ancestral lands is 
protected from encroachment and unlawful pollution. The State 
should provide resources for indigenous peoples to design, deliver 
and control their access to water.’ 
 
2) In July 2010 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
recognised210 the right to safe and clean drinking water as a fundamental 
human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human 
rights. Accordingly, the UNGA called upon states ‘to ensure full 
transparency of planning and implementation process in the provision of 
safe drinking water and sanitation and the active, free and meaningful 
participation of the concerned local communities and relevant 
stakeholders’ (GOB 2011:22-24).’ 
Botswana abstained from the UN votes on the right to water both in 2003 and in 
2010. However the Botswana Appeal Court delivered its judgement on the right 
of access to water, based in part on these UN resolutions211.  The GOB 
accepted the judgement of the Court and, by doing so, became the first country 
in the world to accept the right to water under UN resolutions, in this case for all 
Batswana. Thus the right to water, through Basarwa/San rights to water, could 
be considered to have entered Botswana Common Law. 
                                                 
210
 122 in favour , none against but 41 abstentions including 18 EU countries 
211
 The right to water was reconfirmed in the UN RIO+20 final statement in June 2012  
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These Basarwa (San) rights to water in Botswana do not apply to the water 
rights of the San in Namibia and South Africa. The Declaration of San Rights 
made at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) on 7th May 
2012 states ‘In a world threatened by climate change, loss of biodiversity, water 
shortages and threats to food security for billions of people, we submit that our 
[San] land use systems should be protected and supported in the legislative and 
policy frameworks on our continent and beyond’212. 
 
A three day Pitso (stakeholder meeting) for Basarwa213 was held in June 2012 
in Botswana in Diphuduhudu, a Remote Area Settlement  Basarwa relocation 
village located at the eastern edge of the central Kgalagadi District. It was 
addressed by the President and Vice President with over 1000 RADP being 
bussed into a community of 300. This followed up on a Ghanzi District Pitso in 
October 2011 which, among other matters, required land boards to give priority 
on land allocation to RADP recipients. The GOB sought to address RADP 
(including the Basarwa) with affirmative action to deal with poverty eradication 
such as land rights that they saw as working elsewhere in Botswana. But land 
allocation without water rights is hollow and the 2011 Judgement provided the 
right to water. 
 
The Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) Democracy Index was published 
in 2012. It still rated Botswana as at level 4 ‘inadequate’ in not having a right to 
water (IDASA 2012:86). When questioned why the rating had not changed, the 
                                                 
212
 [The] recommendations [were]: Free, prior and informed consent should be observed in 
relation to the lands of the San, and their values of reciprocity and equitable sharing of 
resources should be embedded in policy; Southern African governments - in particular, 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia - must be encouraged to hold proper continuous dialogue 
and consultation with the San on issues affecting their lands and livelihoods, especially in 
relation to development projects, extractive industries and the commercial farming sector; 
African Governments must honour the rights of the San as embodied in the UNDRIP, 
particularly as these relate to our lands” (Lee 2012) 
213
 J. Ramsey (KI M3) “Affirmative Action in Diphuduhudu” Botswana Weekend Post 9/6/12:  
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representative of Ditshwanelo214 as a KI on the IDASA panel said in April 2012 
that:  
 
“this [the acceptance of the Appeal Court ruling] is not sufficient in 
terms of safeguarding those gains and working for improvement. 
There is need for a fundamental shift in terms of how government 
sees and implements 'development' which is not premised on 
'doing the right thing'. It is within this broader ideal or 'people-
centred or sustainable development', that we tended to score our 
performance” (KI NGON 3)215 
 
The constitutional rights approach to water of civil rights commentators as 
expressed by IDASA authors, may obscure the real achievement of “what is 
seen by everyone as the right thing” (KI NGON 3) in the Botswana Supreme 
Court judgement on the rights of access to water by the Basarwa216. There does 
not appear to be an appetite by the GOB to reopen the drafting of the Botswana 
constitution to clarify the right to water, particularly at the concurrent time of the 
challenge to the Independence constitution by Kgosi Kgafela (see Section 8.2). 
However, the judgment did provide a positive background within which to review 
the traditional and post-Independence approach to the right to water. 
 
  
                                                 
214
 This Botswana NGO fought for the rights to water for the Basarwa but objected to what was 
seen as heavy handed tactics by SI. 
215
 The IDASA Namibia report similarly rates water provision on Namibia as inadequate but 
there, there has been no movement in rights for access to water. 
216
 Movement of Basarwa from Ranyane in 2013 was the subject of an agreement between the 
GOB and residents represented by the Botswana HR NGO Ditshwanelo on 18
th
 June 2013 
lodged and commented on at the Botswana High Court. The NGO press release is at 
http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/DITSHWANELO%20Press%20Statement%203%20on%20the%
20Ranyane%20Case%2018%20june%202013.pdf.  
The GOB claim never to have ceased water supply to Ranyane(GOB Tautona Times 
Vol.11,No.19 C5) and never agreed to ‘coercive removal’( see 
http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=4722 accessed 8
th
 August 2013) 
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9.3 The pre-Independence approach to poverty reduction and the role of 
access to land and water  
 
The Tswana traditional approach to poverty reduction through access to land 
and water has been within the structures of traditional tribal administered 
customary law (see Section 8.2 and Box 9.1). The infrastructure for water was 
built through ‘the age regiment digging of communal wells and reservoirs under 
the direction of the Chief’ (Schapera 1938a:196). The lack of surface water 
within Botswana arose from the lack of perennial rivers flowing through 
Botswana (see Section 2.3). Drinking water traditionally came from shallow 
dams, wells and, later, post-1930s, boreholes.  
 
Box 9.1 Kgatleng District Water Provision pre Independence 
‘Wells are sunk for domestic use in the riverbed close to the village. Many wards 
have their own special part of the River [Notwane] in which they dig such wells. 
Outsiders wishing to make wells there must obtain their permission, failing which the 
chiefs must be asked for permission to dig somewhere else. Such wells are 
sometimes owned in common, by all the members of the ward, who contribute 
towards the cost and assist in sinking them; sometimes they are owned collectively 
by number of families together and sometimes well is owned by a single family. The 
owners of a well have sole control over it. They may allow friends to water from it for 
domestic purposes or to water cattle there; but no one else can use it without their 
permission. Water is not usually sold. During the dry season, when  there is no 
standing water in the rivers, people rely mainly upon these wells which always kept 
locked up by the owners at this time to prevent them from being used without 
permission. All wells were formerly regarded as common property where anybody 
grazing his cattle in that area could water them. But it has gradually become the law 
that only the people digging the well are entitled to water the cattle there.’ 
                             Source: Schapera 1938a:211 
 
The description in Box 9.1 of a largely egalitarian pro-poor approach for all to 
have access to water, belies a pre-colonial class structure of restricted access, 
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that has been seen as still overhanging water access rights under the water 
reforms (Good 2008:85). 
 
9.3.1 The AC approach pre 2009 to access for the poor to water  
 
Section 8.1 explained the changes in responsibility for land administration from 
the tribal leaders and headmen to a central government institution of Land 
Boards (LBs) and Local Authorities (LA) and the Water Allocation Board (WAB). 
The allocation of land and water rights before 1968 was in the gift of the chief 
and those closest to the royal family were most likely to receive land and water 
rights under that land, both in the ploughing lands and in the cattle post areas 
(Peters 1994). With Independence came the introduction of equality before the 
law including the allocation of land and water rights. The right to land for all 
tribesmen in the District217 (1968) and then all citizens anywhere in Botswana 
(1990) gave an underpinning of support to the poor. The Tribal Land Integrated 
Management System (TLIMS) brought in progressively from 2005 codified 
those land rights that could not be taken away from a citizen unless no working 
of the land had taken place (UN HABITAT 2010). 
 
However livelihoods, particularly in rural areas, have been difficult to sustain 
due to the recurrent droughts which led to a range of responses from the GOB 
as outlined in Box 9.2. The labour based payment programmes, Ipelegeng were 
adopted in the period 1982-1990 and institutionalized from NDP 7 in 1991 
(Munemo 2012:37). 
 
The post Independence AC enabled access to water for the poor outside the 
drought periods by supplying free water for all from standpipes and separately 
there was paid-for water supplied through connections to individual lapa. Each 
villager had access to water standpipes within no more than 500 metres walking 
distance (Photograph 9.1). For individual connections, the price of water 
                                                 
217
 The post-Independence District Council areas continued to follow the tribally designated 
areas set by the colonial government 
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covered only the operational cost.  As cited by Arntzen (2000:8), ‘the main 
features of rural water pricing in Botswana were:  
 
 Partial cost recovery and high subsidies, as supply costs tend to be 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas;  
 The water tariffs staggered with a low-subsidized unit price for low 
consumption (up to 5m3 /month /connection) and a higher unit price for 
higher consumption levels;  
 The same price applies throughout rural Botswana, irrespective of the 
costs of water supply in a particular village’. 
 
 
Photograph 9.1 Standpipes old and new (May 2013) 
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There was a view from all KIs that everyone abused the standpipe provision by 
not only using the free water for personal drinking and washing but also for their 
livestock, gardens and lands and for construction of buildings. This dual right to 
water (through the standpipes and individual connections) gave the opportunity 
for individual users to avoid paying for water at all (Arntzen 2000:10). The 
progressive removal of standpipes under a post 2009 AC was therefore seen by 
Key Informants (KIs) and Focus Group (FG) participants as shown in Section 
9.4.2 as justified. The GOB considered that their social obligation to those who 
could not afford the water prices as being covered by the setting of a low tariff at 
the minimum household requirements. The tariff aimed at 33% recovery of the 
operating costs in smaller villages (ibid). 
 
There has been a view that the lack of provision of water connections to malapa 
by the GOB in rural areas was a deliberate policy to encourage the rural 
population to move to the towns (Swatuk 2007). The field work for this 
proposition was carried out in Ngamiland which has been the last area to move 
to WUC control in 2013218. 
 
The cash definition of poverty 219 in Botswana at the time of Independence 
encompassed virtually the entire population as the national per capita income 
was $50 per annum (WB 1966). The tribal structure continued to provide a 
safety net within extended families. The per capita income moved up to $1000 
per annum by 1980 (UNDP 2011) with the distribution of the royalty income 
from DEBSWANA through the provision of the public goods, including free 
healthcare and free education.  However, Botswana had the ‘world’s third 
highest Gini coefficient ratio at 5.7 in 2003’ (ILO 2011:11). The ‘poor [quality] of 
the statistical basis for analysis’ (GOB 2003:13) was compounded by the range 
of over 100 poverty predictors chosen to provide the Poverty Map Results (GOB 
2008:2). The WSS predictors chosen were households reliant on ‘piped indoors 
or outdoors to the yard, communal tap or borehole, as the main source of 
                                                 
218
 It is reported that WUC has agreed to keep standpipes in Maun, Molepolole and Mahalapye 
but operable only by prepaid tokens ‘as with electricity supply’ (Daily News 13
th
 February 2013)  
219
 WB purchasing power (PP)  equivalent of US 1 per day was set in 1990 
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water’, and for sanitation, reliant on ‘flush toilets, ventilated improved pit latrine 
(VIPL), latrine or other types of toilet’ (ibid: 26-7). It is on the basis of these very 
broad definitions that Botswana has been seen as achieving its high levels of 
access to potable water and improved sanitation. The poor, however, relied at 
best on the communal tap or borehole and for sanitation on latrines. The new 
water policy (GOB 2010a) was said to seek to move the provision of WSS for 
the poor to the higher standards of connection to the lapa with the option of 
flush toilets. But with the exception of the destitute, the poor would have to pay. 
 
The decision was taken in 1980 to introduce a minimum entitlement scheme, 
which included free WSS, for the very poorest. ‘The 1980 National Policy on 
Destitute Persons recognised that not every member of our society was able to 
provide for their own needs. The breakdown of the traditional extended family 
support system had also adversely affected our society’s willingness to assist 
those less able to provide for themselves’ (GOB 2002: Introduction). The 
definition of a destitute person in 1980 was very detailed220. This was judged in 
2002 as needing to be changed after stakeholder consultation. It was widened 
to ensure it included the poor with up to four livestock units (ibid: 4) to take 
account of the Motswana concept of livestock as a cultural need even for the 
poor (KI). Often the poor in Botswana did not slaughter or sell their animals221 
so these were not seen as cash income. The revised definition of those 
considered ‘destitute’ under the 2002 revised policy gave exemption ‘from 
payment222 of publicly provided services. These include... water charges, 
services levy and electricity charges’ (GOB 2002:8). The cost of this policy was 
met under the budgetary head of the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and 
                                                 
220
 It was defined as ‘an individual who is without assets.... defined as cattle, other livestock, 
land, cash, cannot plough due to ill health, handicap, close family members cannot/will not 
assist him/her’ (GOB 2002:4.1); ‘and is physically or mentally incapable of working due to old 
age, physical or mental handicap’ (ibid:4.2); ‘or is a minor child or children whose parents 
has/have died or deserted the family, or is/are not supporting his/her family’(ibid:4.3); ‘or is an 
individual who is rendered helpless due to a natural disaster or  temporary hardship’ (ibid:4.4). 
Thus defined, destitutes were entitled to a food ration ‘designed to supply not less than 1,750 
calories per adult per day, as per the WHO standards’ (ibid: 2). 
221
 The view of KI M1 
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the allocation of monies each year to each local authority took account of these 
costs. In the WUC areas of WSS provision, after 2002, bills continued to be sent 
to those classified as destitute. The view of the social workers spoken to by the 
researcher in the GCC area was that they gave a small cash component to 
destitutes to help them pay their water bills. When the official policy was pointed 
out by the Researcher, the social workers said the destitute persons they 
worked with could not read and they were not going to tell them their 
entitlements. In the Kgatleng District Council (KDC) area, (the location of four of 
the FGs) and other previously non WUC supplied areas, water bills had often 
not been sent out, not only not to the destitute but often to others outside the 
major villages (KI LGCS 3). The WUC bills for destitute use of WSS were 
initially resisted by the Councils responsible for their payment under the 2002 
legislation.   
 
The absolutist concept of no cash income in the 1980 legislation changed in 
2002 to an income below BP 120223per month or Pula 150 per month with 
dependant relatives (ibid: 4). Since 2002, a cash component has been paid in 
addition to the continued ‘food basket’ of 1,750 calories per adult per day. The 
cash entitlement was set in 2002 and remained unchanged in 2012 at BP 
211.90 per month. This was seen in 2010 as ‘unrealistic’ (BIDPA 2010:38), ‘it 
should have been revised to keep up with inflation’ (ibid). But, despite the freeze 
on the cash component, the basket of free food each week224 and free services 
including free water and electricity, maintained a credible safety net. 
 
The GOB makes clear that the ‘destitute’ advantages are ‘targeted and 
conditional’ (GOB 2002:6). ‘Eligibility is through self identification or more 
                                                 
223
 10 Pula = approx £1.00 (2010-11) 
224
 The Researcher saw that the social workers on strike April to June 2012 came in each week 
to ensure the destitute could collect their food baskets from the community halls. In the 2013 
UN Awards competition, the MLG "Smart Switch Food Coupon System, obtained second place 
worldwide under the category "Promoting Whole- of-Government Approaches in the Information 
Age."Smart Switch is an automated system for the provision of funds to beneficiaries of social 
safety net support, in this case food baskets, to pre-approved merchants, which combines the 
qualities of e-efficiency and accountability. The system has also now been adapted to provide 
banking services to some of the poorest of Batswana. Source:Tautona Times 13
th
 June 2013 
 
 273 
 
normally by nomination by household members or community leaders or a local 
organisation’ (GOB 2002:6). The Village Development Committees (VDCs) 
have a particular role at village level to recommend to the District Council (DC) 
who are destitute and who do not qualify. The numbers of destitutes in 
Botswana remained low at 38,768 in 2009/10 (Table 9.1 and 9.2) with 1,726 in 
Kgatleng District. They do not include those in receipt of government pensions. 
However, a comparison of the 38,768 destitutes (2009/10) could be made with 
the 23,599 count of those with an income of less than WB PPP $1.00 (BP 8)225 
per day (2010/11) (Table 9.3 below). The April 2012 national figure for 
destitutes was reported to Parliament in March 2012 as 30,294 (Parliamentary 
Question 717), which was a significant reduction and was claimed to be based 
on the success of poverty eradication measures. However, it was suggested by 
opposition councillors that the number of destitutes allowed in each district was 
set by the MLG in the budget they allowed to each district council (KI LGP1), 
but this could not be substantiated by the Researcher.  
 
Concern about the supposed fecklessness of the destitutes or would-be 
destitutes led to almost unanimity by both KI and FG participants that all should 
pay something for WSS. The very low numbers of the poor (destitutes), able to 
get free WSS, usually not more than 5%, were contrary to the overall view from 
the FGs that the destitutes were much higher as a proportion of the population. 
This seems to have led to less societal support for pro-poor policies on WSS 
than otherwise would have been expressed. This view echoed the official line of 
the GOB: ‘There exists a fine line between providing destitute persons with a 
reasonable level of benefits that will motivate them to use their best efforts to 
escape the poverty trap on the one hand and reaching a level where those very 
same benefits serve as a disincentive to such persons making an effort to 
obtain a sustainable livelihood on the other hand. The extent of assistance and 
opportunities.... has been set to allow for some latitude before the disincentive 
level is reached. It is therefore important that the rights, responsibilities and 
                                                 
225
 1 USD = 8 BWP approx (2010-11) 
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obligations of family members receiving assistance are clearly understood by all 
stakeholders, including destitute persons’ (GOB 2002:10). 
 
In addition to the provision and payment by the MLG/DCs for free WSS for the 
destitute, was the free provision of WSS under the Remote Area Dwellers 
Programme (RADP). This was started in 1977 to replace the Bushmen 
Development Programme (Good 2008:120). By 2003, it involved 38,000 people, 
operating in 64 small settlements across Botswana including the northern areas 
of Kgatleng District.  The ‘inadequate destitute allowance and the small old age 
pension constituted the dominant source of income in most Basarwa 
Settlements’ (ibid: 122). Water was free, either provided by standpipes from 
district council boreholes or provided regularly from water tankers. The RADP 
provision of WSS remained with the MLG/DC. There was some criticism of the 
perceived failure of the Basarwa in the settlements of being “unwilling to work in 
the wage economy and many of those who claim to be RAD are not” (KI UB 4). 
 
Outside those defined as destitute and RAD, the poor who were employed were 
protected by minimum wage legislation. The GOB revised the minimum wage 
rates at intervals, for example in 2007 the minimum wage rates were adjusted 
by 6.0%, in 2008 by 7.1%, but were not adjusted in the years 2009, 2010 and 
2011. This meant that over the period 2007-12, the average increase in 
minimum wage rates was 4.4%, substantially lower than inflation for which the 
average increase was 8.7 per cent. An increase of 9% in 2012 226 was the first 
since 2008, with a further modest increase in 2013227 to a general rate of BP 
4.50 per hour. The 2013 domestic service sector rate was set at the perceived 
low rate of BP 2.50 per hour (BP 2.35 in 2012). There was a view that “an 
increase in [that] minimum wage would lead to unemployment among domestic 
workers” (KI UB 4).  
 
                                                 
226
 SI No. 36 of 2012 effective 3
rd
 July 2012  
227
 SI No. 55 of 2013 effective 17
th
 May 2013 
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The minimum wage in the agricultural sector, mainly employees at the cattle 
posts, rose to BP 500 per month (2013) from BP 445 (2012) and BP 420 (2008) 
per month. That acceleration may have been linked with the General Election in 
2014 and the need for rural votes. By international comparison, a BP 500 
minimum per month is BP16228 or $2 per day; the Motswana argument would be 
that the additional non cash income of provided food and a share of the cows 
(and nationally available public goods) make for a significantly higher real 
income for those at the cattle post (Peters 1994). 
 
                                                 
228
 Exchange rate  P8.66 =$1 quoted in Mmegi Vol.30 No81 5
th
 June 2013 “Bittersweet 
outcomes as Pula swings high and low” 
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 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 
District Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp 
Kgatleng 703 150 602 267 1271 175 679 283 1265 168 1726 266 1456 39 
Gantsi 1709 772 1825 724 1587 831 1690 772 1591 830 1560 902 1149 195 
North East 620 153 653 203 614 149 572 153 614 149 733 194 635 85 
North West 3110 45 2948 17 2912 196 2943 54 2886 187 3457 366 2908 182 
Southern 4485 560 4794 778 6641 841 5379 766 6641 841 7577 1014 4896 79 
South East 940 0 885 8 0 0 806 4 774 0 880 67 659 10 
Kweneng 7962 327 5586 267 6293 199 7361 154 6296 190 6444 271 4620 253 
Kgalagadi 2049 44 1725 20 1486 1 1348 42 1486 1 1611 31 1529 12 
Chobe 208 11 269 10 262 4 258 8 263 4 290 25 263 1 
Central 12684 494 12814 652 12221 726 12743 786 12221 726 13026 1428 11392 650 
TOTAL 34262 2545 31832 2486 34061 3122 33785 3022 34037 3096 37304 4563 29506 1506 
 
Table 9.1 Destitute Numbers in Rural areas in Botswana 2004/5 to 2010/11  
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Table 9.2 Destitute Numbers for Urban areas in Botswana 2004/5 to 2010/11    Source: MLG 2012 
 
 
2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 
District Perm 
 
Temp Perm 
 
Temp 
 
Perm 
 
Temp 
 
Perm 
 
Temp 
 
Perm 
 
Temp Perm 
 
Temp 
 
Perm Temp 
Gaborone 150 53 147 11 161 11 152 14 155 12 184 27 150 64 
S/Phikwe 81 16 81 2 91 18 80 14 89 17 104 24 122 35 
Francistown 346 11 494 318 476 36 235 161 469 31 682 130 420 16 
Lobatse 140 3 157 11 158 16 162 10 159 14 185 45 140 9 
Jwaneng 6 9 6 6 8 7 8 8 8 7 9 4 1 0 
Sowa 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 723 93 885 348 894 88 637 207 880 81 1164 230 833 124 
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9.3.2 The post 2009 AC on water reforms potential impact on poverty 
reduction 
 
President Ian Khama, in his inaugural address in 2009, announced there was to 
be a policy shift from poverty alleviation to poverty eradication. The then Vice 
President Merafe said in April 2012:  
 
“Owing to this policy shift, we have committed ourselves to 
taking on the challenge of poverty eradication head on. In 
essence, we will not rest until all (I mean all) Batswana are 
living dignified, sustainable lives out of poverty. The policy of 
the GOB is to encourage self help, based on the perceived 
advantages of being a Motswana. This includes open access 
to land both on an individual [ownership/title to allocated tribal 
land] and common land basis. It is [through] the use of that 
land, in the village, at the lands and at the cattle post for 
agriculture and livestock that poverty is to be tackled.” 
(Tautona Times, April 2012).  
 
In 2009, 96% of the food consumed in Botswana was imported, with rising 
prices causing the poor in urban areas to depend for their food on their rural 
relatives’ agricultural production (Moseley 2012). The need to ensure food 
production in the peri-urban villages became a priority. The new post-2009 
policy of poverty eradication was to be particularly from backyard agriculture, 
based on paid for water availability, as set out below in Box 9.3. 
 
This was in addition to six existing programmes: ‘Small Scale Horticulture 
Development, Expanding Opportunities through Rain-Fed Crop Production, 
Increasing Small Stock Production, Strengthening the Community Based 
Natural Management (CBNRM) Programme, Creating Employment 
Opportunities in Tourism Industry and Building Capacity for Small and Medium 
Citizen Businesses’ (GOB 2003:15). The GOB plan was to develop income 
opportunities for the poor ‘to strengthen their technical and operational 
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capacities [so as to] increase yields in their production, thereby helping to 
achieve food self sufficiency and to provide economically sustainable 
employment opportunities’ (ibid: 14). However, the first four programmes 
depended on water and the Water Resource Management (WRM) reforms 
impinged on their success (Kethoilwe 2013). The phasing out of free water from 
the removed standpipes meant hard decisions by individuals who qualified as 
low earners for these water dependant programmes; they had to decide 
whether these programmes were viable after the water reforms. 
 
In addition, temporary employment Drought/Flood Relief Programmes was 
recast as the Ipelegeng229 programmes providing workfare for those able 
bodied and not categorised as destitute. This, in 2011, paid BP 500 per month 
(from BP450 in 2010) and was budget limited. This meant the Ipelegeng income 
could only be accessed by the poor on a rotational basis. Observation in the 
field showed that the most evident workfare task was the removal230 of all grass 
cover from the surrounds of roads and kgotlas, leaving the public space in 
villages and on the roads, devoid of vegetation by choice and often not from the 
lack of rainfall. No use such as composting was made of the vegetation 
cleared231. 
 
Codification of the legislative framework on poverty eradication was published in 
2012 (GOB 2012c). It was used to promote a series of business models for 
small community businesses. It stated the programme was for ‘amongst others, 
registered destitute persons, potential destitute persons, those engaged in the 
Ipelegeng program, people with disability and other vulnerable groups. Other 
community members who are not included in these categories will be given 
technical advice’ (GOB 2012c:8). The water needed for most of the business 
                                                 
229
 The name given to the scheme is still ‘Ipelegeng’ translatable as ‘the people must carry 
themselves on their own backs’ (Selolwane 2012:11) 
230
 The KIs made it clear that this was part of their culture, which meant that land around huts 
(lapas) should be clear of all vegetation. This culture did not help the expansion of income 
generating horticulture in back yard gardens (Box 9.3) 
231
 The Ipelegeng programme of work was extended in 2012 to include inter alia desilting of 
[small] dams, strengthening of storm drains and VDC/WDC are to decide on the work in each 
area: Daily News No.81, May 2
nd
 2013;8  
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models was priced in the models at WUC Gaborone tariff levels and as such 
must have made the business models less attractive. There was no mention of 
the entitlement of the destitute to free water and connections. This is despite 
this 2012 document citing the 2002 Destitute Guidelines (GOB 2002a). The 
main poverty eradication initiative during the fieldwork was that for horticulture 
in backyard gardens to be sold at market days in each large village, launched in 
April 2011 at a market day attended by the President in central Gaborone. 
There was planning for organised purchasing of this produce by government 
departments such as schools and hospitals, and private food retailers and 
supermarket chains. But it depended on affordable, available232 water. 
 
 
 
The GOB position on poverty reduction in 2013 
 
The GOB does not provide an annual statistical commentary. But the Budget 
report of February 2012 quoted the then newly released Botswana Core 
Welfare Indicators (Poverty) survey of 2009/10. This indicated that the national 
estimates for persons living below the internationally comparable measure of 
                                                 
232
 The water restrictions imposed by the GOB in October 2012 excluded backyard garden 
water use. See  http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=383&dir=2012/October/Friday26 
 
Box 9.2 The Backyard Garden Initiative 2009-13 dependent on water 
 
“Those beneficiaries identified for backyard gardens are connected with water and 
their plots are fenced” (NA PQ 717 of the 27th March 2012).  
 
“Under Phase One, extended to 30 constituencies, 319 backyard projects have been 
completed 592 are under construction. Under Phase Two, 7000 backyard gardens 
will be rolled out to cover all constituencies starting this month. Out of these backyard 
gardens, many families will be able to put food on their tables on a daily basis. Many 
families will be able to generate income of about BP2,000 to BP5,000 a month from 
selling their produce, depending on crops planted.   
 
Amongst the major milestones we [GOB] intend to achieve in the current financial 
year [2012-3] are the rollout projects to at least 1,200 families thus aiding 
approximately 4,800 Batswana to step out of poverty.” 
Source: V-P Merafe, Daily News April 2012 
 
 
 
Permanent markets will be established in districts to enable the beneficiaries to [sell 
the food they produce].
1
. An effective government purchasing programme will be put 
in place to enable purchases from beneficiaries. 
Poverty Eradication Policy will be completed which will harmonize current social 
development policies.  
Research
1
 will be undertaken to identify other advanced technologies for water 
harvesting and conservation.” (Ibid, 2) 
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US$1 per day dropped from 23.4 to 6.5 percent from 2002/3 to 2009/10 (GOB 
Budget 2012: 2, 37; Table 9.2). The same survey showed  the number of 
individuals falling below the Botswana Poverty Datum Line233 had declined from 
30.6 percent of the population in 2002/03 to 20.7 per cent in 2009/10 (Box 9.3). 
Both surveys show the biggest drop in poverty taking place in the rural areas. 
 
The Finance Minister saw this success in poverty eradication coming from the 
Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agriculture Development (ISPAAD), 
Livestock Management and Infrastructure Development (LIMID), Ipelegeng and 
other poverty eradication programmes. He said, “Since 2010/11 to date a total 
of BP19.7 million has been spent on LIMID and over the past four years, BP660 
million has been spent on ISPAAD, while BP278 million was spent on Ipelegeng 
during the 2010/11 financial year”234 (ibid: 38). 
 
However, fieldwork tends to show that livestock rearing and wider agricultural 
programmes were dependent on cheap or free water from standpipes in the 
villages. A key question is whether the charging policy for water will lead to 
increases in poverty in the rural areas by the next survey (due in 2018/19) The 
increase in poverty levels in urban areas noted in Box 9.3 may have resulted 
from the start of charging for water (for Stages One, Two and Three) and the 
GOB decision to insist on removal of income earning animals from the villages 
(such as Mochudi) in 2010. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
233
 The Poverty Datum Line was recalculated each year based on the then monetary value of a 
basket of commodities. In March 2013, it was estimated to be an average across Botswana of 
P486.75 per month but varied across seven regions, by age and by sex: on the latter point, ‘the 
total cost of clothes for an adult male is higher than that of a female’ Daily News No 76 April 24
th
 
2013:2 
234
 1 USD = 8 Pula (2010/11) 
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Strata 
Total 
number of 
households 
Total 
number 
of 
persons 
estimated 
Number of 
households 
with 
persons 
below 
US$1 a day 
Number 
of 
persons 
below 
US$1 a 
day 
Proportion 
of persons 
below 
US$1 a 
day (%) 
2009/10 
BCWIS 
     
Cities/Towns 132,362 368,807 4,361 12,022 3.3 
Urban 
Villages 
170,632 654,113 6,573 39,974 6.1 
Rural Areas 218,333 778,486 12,665 64,391 8.3 
National 521,327 1,801,406 23,599 116,388 6.5 
 
2002/03 
HIES 
     
Cities/Towns 109,556 369,812 3,449 18,699 5.1 
Urban 
Villages 
121,321 545,253 15,398 105,118 19.3 
Rural Areas 163,395 717,857 41,850 258,915 36.1 
National 394,272 1,632,922 60,696 382,733 23.4 
 
Table 9.3 Proportion of persons living below PPP US$1 a day (2002/3 and 
2009/10)         Source: BIS 2012 
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Box 9.3 The 2009/10 Poverty Survey on the basis of the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) 
There was a decline in the overall number of persons living below the PDL, from 
499,467 in 2002/03 to 373,388 in 2009/10. The 2009/10 Botswana Core Welfare 
Indicators Survey (BCWIS) commonly known as the Poverty Survey, is based on a 
12-month long survey which allows estimation of factors that are highly affected by 
seasons such as poverty and employment measures. 
PDL was the cost of a basket of goods and services deemed to be necessary and 
adequate to meet basic needs for household members for food, clothing, personal 
items, household goods and services and shelter.Water was not part of the basket of 
goods as it was free from standpipes at the time of the survey. 
Source: Statistics Botswana, at 
http://mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=1105&dir=2012/June/Friday15 accessed 12 
June 2012 
 
The GOB poverty eradication campaign appears to depend on all year round 
availability of water. The removal of the standpipes has ended that source of 
free water. The 50% subsidy on water since independence for all still remains 
and the tariff decisions and the access to boreholes policy will require careful 
calibration to ensure that the poor of Botswana, rich with their access to free 
land and the GOB help on annual inputs, do not slip back due to lack of 
affordable water. The urban backyard garden schemes are the main initiative in 
those areas. But again it depends on water availability and at a price affordable 
to the poor. 
 
In 2012 tax rates on income in Botswana commenced at 5% on income above 
BP36, 000 pa (P3000 pm) and rose to a maximum of 25% on income above 
BP144, 000 pa235. The GNI per capita income was $13640 pa (2010)236. The 
GINI index for Botswana remained above 6.0, if the right to public goods and 
land is ignored. The inequality of cash income in Botswana is reinforced by the 
                                                 
235
 Available at http://www.burs.org.bw/phocadownload/Tax_Rates/2011tax%20rates.pdf 
accessed 20
th
 September 2012  
236
 Available at http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=botswana accessed 20
th
 September 2012 
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lower overall proportion of tax coming from income related tax (7.9%) compared 
to South Africa (16.0%) and Namibia (10.1%). The potentially regressive VAT 
(12%) and sales tax revenues are comparatively low. The income from the 
mineral taxes provides the alternative to the use of progressive personal 
taxation in Botswana. Personal taxation is thus comparatively low compared to 
Namibia and South Africa; redistribution from the rich to the poorer paid by tax 
credits was not in 2013 a policy of the GOB. The pro-poor policies for WSS, 
beyond continued free provision for destitutes and RAD, came from the tariff 
proposals. 
 
9.4 Recognition of Poverty Reduction objectives through tariff policy by 
the drivers in the water reforms 
 
The national water policy’s (NWP) stated objective was to ‘promote social equity 
in access to water supply and sanitation services with protection for the 
destitute and vulnerable’ (GOB 2012:11 and 2010). The strategy for achieving 
this was to be ‘the development and implementation of multi-tiered tariff 
structures, fees and mechanisms to ensure social equity and affordability, 
supported by the implementation of pro-poor strategies’ (ibid). The result of this 
charging policy was to be monitored, looking at ‘household expenditure on 
domestic water supplies to ensure affordability such that the maximum 
household expenditures [on water] account for less than 5% of household 
disposable income’ (Ibid: 11). No data was available from the GOB in 2014 on 
whether it is below or above the 5% benchmark. However, the cost recovery 
policy proscribed by the WB (2010), which had an important role in the reform 
process, did not recognise poverty reduction objectives in their proposals for a 
new tariff policy. 
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9.4.1 The assessment of alternative pro-poor tariff policies for Botswana 
 
9.4.1.1 The World Bank (WB) proposals for Botswana 
 
Water Tariffs in Botswana had been largely stagnant over the period 2004-10. 
The Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) and both the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWA) and District Councils (DC) last raised tariffs in November 2003 
and December 2004, respectively237. This tariff standstill was not claimed as a 
pro poor policy by the GOB. The WB, as part of their remit in 2009/10 to review 
the implementation of the National Water Master Plan Review (NWMPR) (GOB 
2006c), came forward with recommendations for the revision of the WUC tariff 
structures (GOB 2010b:11).This was based on an international comparison of 
tariffs which demonstrated the low level of Botswana tariffs both within SADC 
and internationally (Appendix Five). 
 
The WB had two core scenarios: of A) a Baseline Scenario with no tariff 
increases and ever increasing annual deficits and B) a Solution Scenario with 
tariff increases. The latter was based on full cost recovery with a ‘20% increase 
in water tariff revenues and a new wastewater tariff, both to be effective 1 April 
2011, and annual tariff adjustments after that to yield additional WUC revenues 
in line with the level of inflation. [On this basis] ‘WUC can operate with annual 
surpluses, 100% annual debt service coverage, and maintain adequate cash 
reserves. It can finance BP1.4 billion of the total P15.5 billion projected 10-year 
capital budget – approximately BP100 million each year, adjusted for inflation’ 
(GOB 2010b:2). The WB was very critical of the GOB policy on water subsidies 
(Box 9.4) and proposed the elimination of the subsidies. This depended on the 
adoption of the WB tariff proposals. 
 
                                                 
237
 Report to the NA by B K Paya, 2
nd
 December 2010 
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Box 9.4 The WB critique of water subsidies (2010) 
‘The GOB has been subsidizing the water and wastewater sector at increasingly 
large annual amounts, as most costs have increased at the general level of inflation 
or higher, while tariffs have not been increased for six years. The GOB directly 
subsidized the DWA, DCs and Urban Centers [sic] water and wastewater recurring 
operations by at least BP310 million in 2007/08 (the difference between total 
recurring actual expenditures and revenue collections), and funded 100% of their 
capital budget requirements plus a substantial portion of the NSC1 project. GOB 
received a BP50 million dividend from WUC in 2007/08, partially offsetting this 
subsidy. Under the reformed water and wastewater operations (Solution Scenario B), 
the GOB recurring subsidy is automatically eliminated as WUC takes over recurring 
budget expenditures from GOB – the majority of this subsidy has already been 
eliminated, effective 1 February 2010 when WUC completed its Phase Two takeover 
in addition to Phase One completed in May 2009. All of this subsidy will be eliminated 
effective 1 September 2014.’  
Source: WB 2010b:2 
 
This was not agreed to by the GOB, who opted for the Baseline Scenario and 
continued the six year freeze of the water tariffs at the level they were at in each 
district. No additional charge was allowed to be levied by WUC for sewerage, 
when they took over in March 2011. The only change was the imposition of VAT 
at 12% in newly taken over areas by WUC as it was a VAT levying utility. 
Despite this ‘no increases beyond VAT’ policy, Ministers were still berated for 
the non-existent increases in tariffs in the kgotla meetings the Researcher 
attended. But perhaps for some people, it was the first time they had been 
chased for any payment. 
 
9.4.1.2 The potential embedded pro-poor role of the Water Regulator  
 
Mott Macdonald (MM) was asked in 2009 to report on the need for an energy 
and water regulator, independent of government (see Chapter Seven). In their 
final approved report in 2011, MM proposed that the Botswana Energy and 
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Water Regulatory Authority (BEWRA) be required within the final legislation to 
‘ensure that the public supplier introduces or maintains a tariff category for the 
sale of electricity and/or water to domestic customers with low incomes or 
consuming small quantities - especially in rural areas’ (Mott Macdonald 2011). 
‘Tariffs charged to this tariff category may be set below the costs of delivery to 
these customers. Assuming full cost reflective revenue requirements are being 
sought, this creates a need to make up the revenues from other sources.’ The 
MM report commented that it is important for financial sustainability that ‘the 
mechanisms for funding wider policy objectives [are] set out transparently in 
advance.  
Broadly, there were two options for a subsidised pro-poor tariff: cross subsidy 
from other consumers; or subsidies from the public purse. The formula 
proposed by MM ‘can be adapted to form the basis of any central subsidy 
where the cost reflective price exceeds the final price Government wishes 
consumers to face, for example, rural connections’ (MM 2011:122). 
 
Block tariffs and, in particular, rising block tariffs (RBTs), are a type of tariff 
structure under which consumers face a per unit tariff that is less than the cost 
reflective tariff for low levels of consumption before switching to a tariff that is 
above the cost reflective tariff for higher levels of consumption. This is illustrated 
in Figure 9.1. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Rising block tariff   Source: GOB 2011b 
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If the total amount of revenue collected is to be cost reflective, then the revenue 
collected from the higher tariff above the cost reflective price must be sufficient 
to offset the shortfall in revenues from low volume consumers facing a tariff that 
is less than the cost reflective tariff. 
 
The current WUC tariffs are RBTs to protect the poor. This was the policy set by 
the GOB at the inauguration of the WUC in 1968. The requirement was for 
WUC to operate commercially with full cost recovery, but the rising block tariff 
has since 1968 protected the poor where the WUC operated. Prior to BEWRA, 
tariffs were proposed by the WUC and the DWA to the MMEWR for review, with 
final approval at Cabinet level as took place with the June 2013 tariff changes.  
 
The final 2011 report into the implementation of a BEWRA  emphasised equity 
as being equality between the consumers of the WSS, with the economic 
function being taken account of. However, the MM report continues that ‘at the 
end of the tariff setting process, tariffs have to be affordable. The ability of 
customers to pay for the energy/water they consume is an important 
consideration in maintaining the long-term financial viability of the utility. We 
have seen too often in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union that during the reform process, utility prices have increased so fast 
that in many instances they were no longer affordable, they were beyond 
customers’ ability to pay and collection rates were very low, to the point that the 
utilities involved were technically bankrupt’ (GOB 2011b:10). The new regulator 
is proposed to have the power to set prices to take account of the traditional 
pro-poor policies of both a rising block tariff and the continuation of government 
subsidies (KI CGCS 6). 
 
9.4.1.3 The June 2013 Botswana ‘national’ tariff 
 
In June 2013, the GOB Cabinet agreed the first stage towards a coordinated 
tariff for all Botswana WSS consumers to replace the eighteen different tariffs 
set by the previous eighteen different water authorities. The WUC pointed out 
that it meant some consumers were paying up to ‘300% higher tariffs for the 
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same consumption and quality of water’.238 But the so-called ‘national’ rates, 
while moving towards equalisation continued to vary, albeit less than before. 
Appendix Five shows the tariff structure that for the usage of 0-5 Mm3 the rate 
was to be BP1.50 where the previous rate was at or below BP1.50 and BP2.00 
where the rate had been BP2.00 or higher. The tariffs were the same for 
domestic and business consumers. The changes overall appear to be a move 
towards cost recovery from the wealthier village consumers, previously supplied 
by local authorities and the DWA, with increases of up to 50%. But large users 
in the pre 2009 WUC areas also have increases above 50%  
 
The increases in tariff of over 20% to government users such as ministries, 
schools and hospitals, signal a wish by the GOB to reduce the distorting water 
subsidy in the government system. This move coincides with the final report of 
the BIWRM-WE and implements its recommendations for water demand 
management in the public sector (DWA 2013). 
 
The view of the MMEWR was that within a five year period there would be a 
standard tariff throughout Botswana to reflect full cost recovery (KI CGCS 6 
May 2013). 
 
9.4.1.4 Comparisons with South Africa and Namibia 
 
Provision of free basic water in South Africa at 25L per person per day appears 
not to have resolved the issue of pro-poor provision of water in South Africa. 
Part of the difficulty of affordability was the much higher level of RBT above this 
level in South Africa, compared to Botswana (Appendix Five). But this has 
changed with the Botswana tariff increase of June 2013 (ibid). Outside the main 
centres in Namibia, collection rates were low (ibid). In Namibian towns such as 
Windhoek, Swakopomund and Walvis Bay, water tariffs sought full cost 
recovery to reflect the scarcity of water and the high costs of recycling. For the 
                                                 
238
 WUC website http://www.wuc.bw/read_more.php?newsid=81 accessed 22
nd
 May 2013 
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poor in both Namibia and South Africa, the RBT was seen as the way forward 
(Appendix Five). 
 
9.4.1.5 The Botswana connection charges policy  
 
Before 2009, a primary reason many households did not have water service 
was that no piped water distribution system was in place in their areas and 
streets.  While the DWA and LG supplied villages and wards, except 
unrecognised settlements, the Land Board239 allocated plots where WSS lines 
did not reach. They also haphazardly allocated plots such that gates of the 
different residential units faced different directions and contributed to their 
inaccessibility. This exacerbated poor delivery of water and sewerage. But the 
Kgatleng Land Board (KLB) made a contrary observation to the effect that some 
allocated plots took so long to develop that the owners forgot the correct 
positioning of the house and gate. Other plot owners sent representatives who 
failed to guide them with fencing the plot and constructing the house. The other 
plot owners allegedly choose plots far away from services (KI KLB 1). 
 
Where connection was possible, the high levels of the connection charges by 
WUC, DWA and the District Councils (DC) were seen as another reason. Prior 
to the reforms, this had been done under a self help basis with no control over 
the materials used. It was said by the WUC to be a reason for the high loss of 
water.  WUC and DWA collected over BP5 million annually (2009) from 
connection charges, here they did all the work up to the prescribed standard; 
reliable information on DCs connection fee income if any was not available. The 
fee structure varied widely (Table 9.4). 
 
                                                 
239
 Kgatleng Land Board (KLB) policies only were researched but the allegation was made by 
many Batswana interviewed. New policies on a land register with title were successfully trialled 
by KLB in 2011 for introduction across Botswana. This could enable clearer planning of new 
WSS pipes by WUC 
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BP  Fee Fee with Customer Labour 
WUC 950 N/A 
DWA 879 439 
DCs 
      Kweneng 700 375 
      WUC Supply N/A N/A 
      Malotwane N/A N/A 
      Central 845 422.5 
      Ghanzi 750 375 
      Kgalagadi 879 439 
      Kgatleng 919 479 
      NW 1,000 550 
      SE 650 439 
      Average 820 440 
Table 9.4 WB analysis of connection fees in Botswana (2010)  
Source: GOB 2010b:28 
 
After 2009, connection fees were to be nationally set. A significant part of the 
water reforms was to extend water services to all areas and to all regardless of 
income by 2016. It was proposed that after services were widely available, it 
would then be possible to determine whether a lower connection fee was 
necessary to achieve universal coverage, including the poor. Until then, the WB 
recommended maintaining and standardizing the connection charge and that 
the WUC should continue to offer, and expand, instalment payment plans that 
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make connections affordable. It further recommended a house to house 
programme offering an instalment plan to households who had not yet 
connected to the system. 
In April 2012 the GOB announced that ‘WUC has been allocated BP362 million 
to solve the water reticulation crisis and the standard charge for water 
connection would be BP1500 for individuals who are 50 metres from the water 
supply. Anything beyond the 50 metres distance [would] be the BP1500 amount 
plus P27 every metre thereafter. Customers [would] also pay a standard BP250 
for excavation and cost of material discounted at 15 per cent. The minimum 
charge for every standpipe connected at homes with water or no water [was] to 
be BP10.  WUC will renew standpipes and install meter readings to stop those 
that are watering their livestock from standpipes’ (Daily News 20th April 2012:1). 
This was not cost recovery, it was pro-poor but it did establish a national 
connection tariff for the first time. The WUC survey, taken before the new policy 
came into effect, found that respondents did not connect to the WUC because 
of  delay by the WUC to connect (42.3%), connection costs (23.1%), 
unavailability of service in the area (5.8%), bills still owing (17.3%), low water 
pressure and land certificate delay (11.5%). Because of the reluctance to 
connect or inability to pay, in February 2013, the WUC decided to retain 
standpipes in Maun, Molelopole and Mahalapye  only  operable by prepaid 
tokens ‘just the same as electricity meters’240.This was extended to throughout 
Botswana in April 2013.;’so every individual paid according to their usage’.241 
Disconnection by the WUC for failure to pay water bills was proposed by the 
WUC in the autumn of 2012, after a failure to get BP243M in arrears paid, much 
of it accrued from pre 2009 supplies never chased up by the predecessor 
bodies (LG and DWA)  ; it threatened a ‘massive disconnection’ exercise 
(Mmegi 12 September 2012:29.136). But it appeared the problem was not 
payment by the poor but by the rich; ‘some homes were inaccessible when 
people were away for various reasons such as screen walls, secured gates and 
vicious guard dogs, all which make it impossible for WUC workers to take 
                                                 
240
 Daily News 14
th
 February 2013 
241
 Daily News  22
nd
 April 2013 
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readings’ (ibid). It led to a commentator stating ‘where people or institutions fail 
to pay their (reasonable) bills in good time, they should be warned by name in 
the Daily News that if they fail to pay within a week, they will be cut off and 
advised that reconnection will take a minimum of three months to effect. That 
should do the trick’ (Mmegi 18 September 2012:29.139). It would appear that 
even with the very large tariff subsidy applicable to all, there is still a concern in 
Batswana society to protect the wealthy from press exposure for non-payment 
of the still very low WSS bills.  
 
By 2013, WUC decided that all water connections would be operable in the 
future only through prepaid water meters and tenders had been issued for 
supply to all WUC consumers (KI WUCO 4 May 2013). The success of prepaid 
electricity meters was seen as the driving force and given the widespread views 
that the WUC bills were wildly inaccurate; there was broad public support for the 
move when the researcher returned briefly for fieldwork in April/May 2013 (KIs 
LGP 4; M2; V2016 1; LGCS 3).The Researcher reflects that it was a new AC 
action that reflected WDM and fairness to ensure there no wealthy freeloaders 
and that the WUC could not claim back more than the water truly used. But 
consumers may feel that, after installation of the prepaid meters, there is a 
difference between the significance of the provision of electricity and that of 
water, because of the fundamental importance of water to life.  
 
In late 2013, the decision was taken by GOB to retain some free for use 
standpipes, particularly in the last area to changeover in Maun, to ensure the 
poor had access to water. 
 
9.4.2 Batswana views on pro-poor policy in WSS 
 
Section 9.3 has shown how water policy has evolved in Botswana and the 
extent to which these changes have been pro-poor. In Section 9.4.1, we have 
looked at the alternative ways in which tariff policies on WSS can be pro-poor 
with examples cited from the WB, South Africa and Namibia and the current 
situation in Botswana. As in the previous chapters, perspectives are now 
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analysed from three Batswana sources: the KIs, the FGs and the Mochudi 
supermarket survey.  
 
A) KI views on the right to water 
Key 
Informants: 
Private
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(4) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Mean 
Average 
(29) 
Is there a 
Legal/Moral 
right to 
water?  
7 3.5 5 4 7 5 6 5 
  Likert Scale: 0 = no importance, 7 = high importance 
Table 9.5 Data Summary of KI views on the legal or moral right to water for 
every Motswana  
 
Table 9.5 lists the responses from KIs. The Private Sector and the Kgosi KIs 
gave maximum importance to the right to water, with the Media rating the right 
highly too. But civil servants and local government KIs rated the right much 
lower perhaps reflecting the concerns over cost from the potential unlimited off 
take of water. The CSO view (5) is lower than might be expected; although it 
was noted earlier there was no general campaign over the right to water. 
Among the CSOs only Ditshanwelo campaigned for the right of access of the 
Basarwa to water.    
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B) The view from the Focus groups in Botswana on the right to 
water242 
 
There was little support for the idea of water being free. There was an 
overwhelming view that all should pay something, however poor, and the very 
poorest should be dealt with within the destitute entitlement: 
 
“I say we can't have water for free, but government should realize that water is 
God's gift and not over charge” (FGON 1). 
“The fact is; water shouldn’t be drunk for free because it is the government 
resources” (FGB 1). 
“I think we should pay a little something because WUC people spend a lot of 
money to bring us these developments we enjoy of water. We should pay bills” 
(FGM 1) 
All the Batswana interviewed felt some payment should be made but at a low 
level: 
“I think BP10 is OK because this water is not the Government’s or 
WUC's. This water was given to us by Jesus, it was given to us by 
God and then we take it. But there are some cases you find that 
somebody is alone and would not be given water and therefore 
would end up begging from the neighbours” (FGM 2). 
 
The concern about the ‘fecklessness of the destitute’ or would-be destitute led 
to almost unanimity by both KI and FG participants that all should pay 
something.  
                                                 
242
 The WUC 2012 National Survey data shows ‘no strong conviction that WUC water rates 
were unreasonable’. The study found that 53.9% commercial and 47.7% domestic respondents 
felt that the rates were reasonable for the services they received (WUC 2012). But equally there 
was no endorsement for a tariff increase.  
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‘There exists a fine line between providing destitute persons with a 
reasonable level of benefits that will motivate them to use their 
best efforts to escape the poverty trap on the one and reaching a 
level where those very same benefits serve as a disincentive to 
such persons making an effort to obtain a sustainable livelihood on 
the other hand. It is therefore important that the rights, 
responsibilities and obligations of family members receiving 
assistance are clearly understood by all stakeholders, including 
destitute persons’ (GOB 2002:10).  
 
It seems that the very low actual numbers of the poor, designated ‘destitute’, 
(usually not more than 5% of the community in Table 9.1), are contrary to the 
overall views of both KI and FG participants that their number is much higher as 
a proportion of the population. This is perhaps influencing their views and 
contributing to a lower willingness to provide support for free or very low cost 
water. 
 
C) The view from the Mochudi supermarket survey, June 2011 
 
There appears to be a view that at least something should be paid for monthly 
consumption with a spread up to BP70+ per month (Figure 9.2). There was no 
view that water should be free; however, those with earnings at the higher levels 
(BP5, 000 per month) still saw water as a product which should be priced low 
(Figure 9.3). 
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Figure 9.2 Survey Question: How much should each household pay for its 
water per month? (n=99 respondents) 
 
 
Figure 9.3 Survey Question: How much should each household pay for water 
each month? (with answers for each monthly income grouping of respondents) 
(n= 99)     Source: User Survey Mochudi, June 2011 
 
Those surveyed not only thought the poor should pay, and 67% felt that the rich 
should not pay more for their water. The poorest surveyed and the richest felt 
this but the lower income earners (P500-P1000 pm) felt the rich should pay 
more. A Chi squared test shows there is a relationship between earnings and 
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how people perceive how much the rich should pay to 95% confidence 
(Appendix Three). 
 
9.4.3 The GOB decision on pro-poor tariffs 
From the start of the reforms in 2009, the GOB stated there would no increase 
in tariffs anywhere WUC took over, except the imposition of VAT at 12%. In May 
2011, to attempt to demonstrate a pro-poor water tariff policy, the GOB told the 
WUC not to charge VAT on the first 5,000 litres of consumption per annum, 
while still requiring WUC to pay VAT on all their sales of water to the MFDP. In 
April 2012, MMEWR announced a 10% across the board increase in water 
tariffs as from May 2013. 
 
 
Figure 9.4 Increasing Block Tariffs in Southern Africa (2012/13) 
Source: after Grynberg 2013:35 and WUC increases June 2013 
 
In May 2012, the WUC increased tariffs by a further 12% on its original pre-
2009 customers, chiefly in Gaborone and Francistown, without announcement, 
with cross subsidy for the poorest on the basis of the rising block tariff. The only 
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comment on this increase came in December 2012 and this was supportive, 
pointing out the protection of the poor and the fact that the WUC tariffs were still 
lower than surrounding countries243. At that time, this policy still left in place the 
different tariff levels that WUC inherited at the takeover and left the tariffs in the 
entire takeover areas unchanged. The tariff changes of June 2013 (Appendix 
Five) established two tariff levels for the 0-5m3 of P1.5 and P2.0 with a 
reduction in the Gaborone tariff down from P2.10 to P2.0 and Francistown down 
from P2.40 to P2.00. Conversely the similar rate for Mochudi went up from 
P1.75 to P2.00 and for Ghanzi from P0.90 to P1.50. However the WB 
recommendation for a single unified national tariff has not yet been followed 
(GOB 2010b:21).  
 
Figure 9.4 shows how the pro-poor tariff policies compare between consumers 
in Gaborone, Johannesburg and Windhoek. While the Botswana capital water 
charges are initially higher than those for South Africa, they then fall below. The 
charges for Namibia’s capital are far higher. Furthermore, the view was that in 
2013 the Botswana water charges for the poor were lower than in both Namibia 
and Lesotho (Grynberg 2013:35). 
 
9.5 To what extent could the proposed new WRM/WSS structures have 
addressed poverty and equity, in the main locations of Batswana life,, in 
the villages, at the lands or masimo and at the cattle posts or moraka? 
 
The WRM/WSS policies have to be judged at the three points244 around which 
Botswana and Tswana social and economic life revolves. That life is based at 
                                                 
243
 Mmegi, 14 December 2012 | Issue: Vol.29 No.188 at  
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=10&aid=64&dir=2012/December/Friday14  
244
 The President announced at the BDP convention in March 2013 that in future livestock would 
be allowed to be kept at the masimo, so to help the poor not having to travel to the moraka 
(cattle post). It presages a significant change in Botswana culture. It would deal with problems 
over access to water for the poor from borehole syndicates and be an extended use to the 
water reform plans to pipe water from the villages to clusters of masimo (Mmegi 18
th
 March 
2013).This change will be discussed further later in this Chapter. 
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the village where they were born and lived as a child. Their relatives are still 
there. In the growing season the females of the family move to the masimo or 
lands allocated to them by the Kgosi and after 1966 by the Land Board (LB). 
The males of the family looked after the family cattle where they stood at the 
moraka in the common tribal grazing grounds, sometimes with access to a 
nearby borehole. This three part society within the development of Botswana 
has had a fourth element which was the urban home where the cash based jobs 
normally were located. But at all holidays, Batswana usually migrated back to 
the villages and the lands and each weekend, the men sought to visit the cattle. 
The poor were always represented in these traditional places, often paid a 
retainer by the richer town dweller. Did the WRM/WSS reforms help the poor in 
the three locations outside the city?  
 
9.5.1 WSS changes in the villages 
 
All had had free water in the villages. The standpipes had given free water to all 
since they were progressively installed after Independence, paid for out of the 
BP 500 M GOB subsidy in which all, rich and poor, shared. But WDM did not 
exist: “high levels of water wastage were associated with standpipes”245 (KI 
CGCS 5). By 1990, there were standpipes in each village within a certain 
distance of the traditional inner village malapa (yards). Outside this inner village, 
provision was low and donkey carts were used to transport the water. In the 
more remote areas of the village, bowsers/water tankers delivered water (and 
still do). A ban on the keeping of small livestock in the village was announced 
from the kgotlas in Kgatleng (and elsewhere in Botswana) in November 2010. 
This appeared to be connected to the phasing out of the standpipes, around 
which small livestock gathered for water.  
 
                                                 
245
 Budgeted and paid for by DWA and LG from their central government grants. It was a cause 
of friction that when WUC took over, these budgets were not passed to WUC. The cost of 
access of destitutes to the remaining standpipes was reluctantly accepted by KDC and the other 
Councils. 
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FGs, all composed of poor individuals, expressed concern about the speed of 
the phasing out of the standpipes. This had been progressively happening in 
the cities and from 2009 in the villages and the rural areas. 
 
One of the oldest and poorest urban villages in Gaborone is Old Naledi where 
the FG views were concerned about the impact of the closure of the standpipes 
on the poor: 
 
“I say they should be closed only after the poor have been 
identified like this lady said earlier. Like, I don't have a tap at 
home.  Everyone should have a tap before they are closed. 
Otherwise those without taps would suffer. They would have to go 
around the neighbours and will be charged even though they don't 
have any money.” (FGON 1) 
“I don't want public standpipes to be closed. People just 
mentioned that people are not equal. If they are closed.... some 
will not manage to connect pipes to their homes. Where would 
they go? They would suffer. I think they should rather be improved, 
fenced so that they can be safe. I don't want them to be closed 
because it would bring suffering to some of us who can't afford to 
connect water to our yards.” (FGON 2) 
“No, public standpipes shouldn't be closed because while some 
people are well off, others are not. People would suffer. They 
(standpipes) just need to be protected from vandalism so we can 
continue getting water and live. Without water we can't live, water 
is life.” (FGON 3) 
Whilst this concern was felt by some, the majority saw advantages from the 
ultimate closure of the standpipes: 
“I say they should be closed, but after people have connected their 
own taps. Those who can't afford will see the relevant people who 
can help them. These taps [standpipes] are not as safe as they 
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would be if they belonged to someone. Some people just wash 
their heads there because nobody can say this is my tap and you 
should stop doing that.” (FGON 4)  
“Some steal the copper which they sell leaving the taps dripping. 
But if it is somebody's property, they would make sure it is 
protected by looking after it and having an arrangement with 
tenants for the use of it. They should be closed because all the 
bad things that you can think of happen there.” (FGON 5) 
“Standpipes should always be clean, but sometimes you find 
children's poo there, you see. We just drink because there is 
nothing else we can do. So we end up cleaning and then fetch 
water because we don't have a choice. They should be closed, but 
after everybody has a tap in their yard.” (FGON 6)  
“I think she has cleaned the issue.” (FGON 5) 
“They should be closed but after a long time because some of us 
will take a long time before we can connect taps to our homes” 
(FGON 4).  
“Yes, it's like that. I also want them to be closed after everyone has 
connected water to their homes” (FGON 6).  
“I agree” (FGON 7). 
Other views expressed were for the closure:  
“I want them to be closed. People are very difficult. If a certain 
section was given a deadline by which to have connected, some 
would not meet it, not because they can't. I think they should be 
closed so that we can also be like other people in other areas 
where they have been closed. The poor have somebody 
responsible for them, but most people are not really that poor. It's 
just that when they are asked to do something, they do it in their 
own time even though government has decided. I say they should 
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be closed after everybody has been connected” (FGON 8). 
“There are place like Extension 14 [suburb of Gaborone] where 
they were closed and most - let me say most of the [private] yards 
I have seen - there, have a standpipe but before, there were 
[public free] standpipes outside. That's why I say people are 
difficult. They will just relax knowing that there is a standpipe 
outside even though they can afford to water” (FGON 9). 
“If it so happens that the government leaves standpipes for those 
who are not able, they should be given keys or something instead 
of just letting them be used by everyone. Otherwise I would just 
fetch from there to keep my bill low even though I have a tap at 
home” (FGON 10)246. 
Broadhurst was originally a farming community, now subsumed within the 
northern areas of Gaborone City. It is an urban village of self help housing 
agency (SHAA) financed private housing often with further accommodation for 
rent in the yard, where the standpipes have already been closed. Here the 
opinion was that:  
“The effect of the closed standpipes is felt by those without taps in 
their yards because they are suffering since the standpipes were 
closed. They ask for water from next door and sometimes they 
cross the tarred road to go and ask for water very far. But you hear 
people saying, “then I will charge you BP50 per month” not 
because they will pay the BP50 to WUC. Meaning that the one 
who is asking for the water is the one who will take care of the bill” 
(FGB 1). 
“It’s true since water was disconnected from the standpipes people 
have big problems. Some of us [are] without pipes.... which means 
you get from your neighbour, which means we need to contribute 
                                                 
246
 In May 2013, the WSS to all properties in Old Naledi was complete but the Researcher 
observed the two remaining free standpipes on the edge of the community which had a 
numbers of users.  
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because if you don’t, he won’t understand you were not able. They 
charge from BP50 up. They look at the number of people living in 
your home, like me, I stay alone because the children have fled 
the drought to the village, but I pay BP50. But they promised that 
when the children come they will increase to BP70. So, these are 
the challenges we face since standpipes were closed” (FGB 2). 
But again there was support for the closure, which appears to reflect basic 
differences in opinion between individuals in the group. Key factors mentioned 
included:  
 
“No, I say standpipes should be closed. Like we were told, water 
was being wasted in the streets, even though we needed it. There 
are some evil kids who would open these standpipes. Every 
morning you would find water flowing very far from the tap” (FGB 
3). 
 
“But it’s been expensive for we as Batswana. The fact is, they 
have been closed, but we were consulted. So those who were 
thought to be unable to connect are the ones government or WUC 
should have considered and have them pay in instalments. You 
see?” (FGB 4) 
 
The standpipes were being closed as part of the water reforms in the four FG 
villages in Kgatleng District during the period of fieldwork. There too, were 
concerns that the WUC was not listening to the poor people: 
 
“We are in Botswana, there is freedom of speech. I say WUC 
should read their constitution and change management. The DWA 
was better” (FGOD 1).  
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“Standpipes shouldn't be closed. We are not the same, we are not 
teeth247. Other people are not able to connect taps to their yards 
because they are poor especially that WUC is so expensive” 
(FGOD 2).  
 
But in Mochudi and elsewhere, vandalising of the standpipes was seen as a 
reason to close them:  
 
“Yes, there is no adult who can do that. It was the children and 
those who go out at night who were just being naughty without 
consideration for what adults want” (FGM 1) 
 
“Standpipes, we want them to return because, like the ladies were 
saying, we are not equal. There are those who still haven't 
connected pipes to their yards and so they are really suffering. 
The problem is that children vandalise them. And also the children, 
especially those who go out at night, when you wake up you find 
that they have left their things there. I suppose they got disgusted, 
but we are asking for their (standpipes) return.” (FGM 2) 
 
“I want to comment about the standpipes being vandalised. They 
were vandalised before they built shelters for them and it was 
mostly donkeys which broke them. After they were sheltered they 
were just OK. They are sheltered and nothing has happened to 
them.” (FGM 3) 
“I am adding to what the lady here said, and I say she is telling the 
truth There are things that used to happen at the standpipes which 
are not good which maybe caused the government to close them.” 
(FGM 4) 
“Like the lady was saying, you find some disgusting things put in 
                                                 
247
 A Batswana concept that teeth are given to everyone equally.... but money is not distributed 
equally. 
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there. I also could go out and talk to someone and put bad things 
there. Such things were disgusting to us. There is a disease.... our 
children move around at night and do whatever.... and when that 
thing is removed you wouldn't know whose it is.” (FGM 5) 
 
The general feelings in Kgatleng District expressed at the FGs were that the 
standpipes were being vandalized and were a problem but there was concern 
that the water from the taps would not be affordable in the way the [free] 
standpipe water was. It was seen as a necessary but undesired change in the 
nature of village society. It was a move from collecting at a standpipe each day 
to a situation where, if they could afford it, water was available by a turn of the 
tap in the lapa. The interviewees were the poor remaining in the villages. They 
had had the time and accepted the labour involved in the collection of the water 
each day. What would replace the social elements of this? 
The concerns expressed on the removal of standpipes are not only expressed 
by the poor. The survey of the richer individuals, outside the Mochudi 
supermarket confirmed that there was societal concern. While a small 
proportion of those surveyed used standpipes (20%), 60% of those asked 
believed free water standpipes should remain (Figure 9.5). 
 
 
Figure 9.5 The use of standpipes from the Mochudi supermarket survey 
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Summary of the impact of the WSS reforms on the poor in the villages 
 
The removal of the free water standpipes248 and the charging for water to all but 
the destitute (and often them too) could mean that the WRM/ WSS structures in 
the new AC do not address poverty and equity beyond the implementation of 
the stepped tariff. Tap sharing249 could be seen as a limited stopgap within the 
community, but the closure of standpipes was nearly completed in 2012250.  
 
The decision was then made in 2013 to keep all remaining standpipes open but 
all would be only accessed by prepaid cards as part of the rollout of prepaid 
meters to all connections. By this time very few standpipes remained in the 
villages WUC had taken over during 2009-12.The final area of takeover, in 
2013, Ngamiland, benefitted as more standpipes remained.  
 
The richer KIs and FGs of the poor all felt that everyone (except the destitute) 
should pay something for their water in the villages but expressed concern at 
the phasing out of the standpipes before everyone had been connected to the 
water system.  
 
9.5.2. WSS changes at the fields or ploughing lands (masimo) 
 
All Batswana families and now individuals had the right to a masimo. Originally, 
it was allocated by the tribal chief to members of his tribe, but now was 
allocated by the District Land Board to whomsoever Batswana citizen applies, 
who can show some residency in the District concerned (Section 8.1). The core 
assumption of the traditional land tenure system is that there will be enough 
                                                 
248
 ‘Domestic users were first asked about their main source of water. The majority of the 
respondents’ (97.4% [2193]) main source of water was household connections to WUC, 1.8% 
(40) used their neighbours’ tap while only 0.8% (19) used standpipes’ (WUC April 2012:44). 
249
 ‘The phase out of standpipes has given birth to a new phenomenon of using or sharing 
neighbours’ taps as a source of water. This trend is more visible in Francistown where 
standpipes have been phased out in many locations/ areas and where 32.5% of people use 
neighbours’ taps’ (WUC April 2012:45). 
250
 WUC Water Survey April 2012 
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land for all. This aspect of customary law [in allocating a right to land] provides a 
crucial link in making the traditional survival strategies compatible with those 
imposed by the modern state (Tiot 1995:60). 
 
Before Independence, rainwater harvesting was practiced through the digging 
of shallow dams and wells (Section 5.2).  
 
‘Under Tswana customary law, open surface water was free to be 
used by anyone who wished. Where water was obtained through 
the expenditure of capital and labour as in the case of dam 
construction and well digging, people were able to keep that water 
for their own personal use. Once they had invested in the water 
source,  they gained essentially private rights of the resource’ (Tiot 
1995:60).  
 
Only those poor who were of the morafe who had established those rights could 
have access to the water by right. 
 
Rights to drill a borehole for irrigation purposes and for human consumption can 
be given by the WAB on the masimo, if the nearest existing borehole is more 
than 236m away (Section 5.4). But the borehole cannot be used to water cattle 
(KI LB1) [until the announcement of the President in March 2013, see footnote 
59].  
 
The Waterpoint Survey of 1980 analysed the provision of water for the poor at 
the masimo since Independence (Fortmann 1981). Both rich and poor 
benefitted from the MoA-provided dams, haffir-dams, pans and seep wells (ibid: 
57). However, these sources are all dependent on rainfall. The Botswana 
tradition of keeping cattle at the cattle post (with access to a borehole or other 
water source) separate from the lands used for growing crops has meant that 
the masimo, which includes the ploughable  and cultivable lands, have been 
without potable water. Water has been provided outside high rainfall years and 
before the reforms, by the filling of containers, normally drums, at the standpipe 
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in the village and then transport by donkey cart to the masimo. This was fair for 
the poor, as everyone had the same access to the water. A new policy, that the 
donkey cart should be loaded up from paid for water connection in the lapa of a 
house in the village, presupposes affordable access to that water. The pre-
Independence rainwater harvesting at the masimo largely ceased and the new 
policy does not yet encourage the poor to return to rainwater harvesting for their 
water needs at the masimo. 
 
In Olifants Drift, the FG members bewailed:  
 
“Like now, with the WUC you can't even take water to the masimo. 
It’s water you fetch with just a 20 litre container. I find it hard that 
we are being encouraged to plough while at the same time we are 
being made to strive for water. That means you can only bring one 
container for the masimo. This is where it becomes hard” 
(FGOD1). 
 
Botswana has little tradition of irrigation at the masimo. That land has been 
used for rain fed crops and if there is a drought, crops can fail, even alongside 
the Limpopo River because of a lack of licenses for abstraction. The Limpopo 
River Basin Commission (LIMCOM) irrigation agreements (see Section 5.6.) 
established under the apartheid hegemony of South Africa have not been set 
aside. Freehold farms in the small Tuli Block further north in Central Province 
are often leased by South African farmers. The land has a pre-Independence 
riparian rights for Limpopo water withdrawal, negotiated by the colonial 
government. This was augmented with free authorised borehole extraction. The 
farms here have the same soil conditions as those in the tribal lands but, with 
available water, they are growing up to 6 crops per annum251. There is an 
incipient WUA of Tuli Block farmers, who lobby the MoA and DWA to ensure 
there is fair allocation of surface water from the Limpopo River. The use of 
                                                 
251
 The Researcher visited the Tuli Block farms in May and June 2011 and found 6 crop pa 
irrigated agriculture with exports abroad, particularly potatoes to Angola. 
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illegally252 extracted Limpopo water by a mining company in June 2011 was 
halted after complaints by this grouping of irrigation based farmers. 
 
The Pandamatenga proposals for irrigation in NE Botswana with water from the 
Shashe River (linked with infrastructure for the NSC 1, 2 and 3) could give 
Batswana farmers the chance of large scale irrigated farming. Only Batswana 
citizens can lease the land; there have been a large number of non Batswana 
(mainly South African) applicants. ‘Poor farmers are encouraged to apply’ (KI 
CGCS 9). The rain fed agricultural possibilities for sorghum, sunflowers and 
maize have already been proposed (Alemaw 2006). 
 
The draft GOB policy (2010a) was to move to irrigated crops being able to be 
grown at all masimo all year round through the provision of non saline water by 
the WUC, either by piping from the nearest village, or new WUC boreholes with 
piping out to each group of masimo. The proposal in the reforms was to ‘cluster’ 
the individually owned lands or masimo around a WUC organised, all year 
round, water point. The masimo allocations were planned to be reconfigured by 
the Lands Board to bring together 8-10 plots around a central supply. The policy 
outlined in the National Water Policy (GOB 2010a) was for ‘water [to be] 
available to support economic diversification, ensure food security and promote 
employment at the national and household levels’. The strategy amongst others 
is to ensure water for agriculture, livestock and farm lands [masimo]’ and to 
‘develop guidelines and regulations for facilitating the development of cluster 
farming groups, smallholder schemes, small-scale syndicated dam 
developments and cooperative well–field developments’(GOB 2010a:14). 
 
This plan did appear ambitious and the irrigation of all the masimo in Botswana 
with Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and WUC support would have led to the need 
for additional water resources. The final water policy (GOB 2012d) deleted the 
proposal, to ensure water for the commercial ‘farmlands’ as has been seen in 
Section 7.7. The review of ‘national’ integrated water related issues to 
                                                 
252
 This is the only example the researcher found of WAB action albeit not on levels of borehole 
extraction but from the LIMCOM Botswana allocation. 
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agriculture were  restricted to existing GOB MoA schemes, thus restricting the 
remit of the new WRB. Further, there is no commitment by the MoA to provide 
general support through the final water policy (GOB 2012d) to the poor who 
might decide to cluster their land with other land owners. MoA emphasis is on 
the ‘commercialisation’ of existing successful farmers (GOB 2012d) rather than 
‘economic diversification’ (GOB 2010a) which was GOB code for poverty 
eradication. 
 
But the KIs are confident that WUC supported water supply, without MoA 
support, to the masimo poor could come from several sources: 
 
1) Rainwater harvesting, and water conservation. The WRB propose a 
major expansion in subsidised tanks (JOJOS) for the poor with gathering 
systems. 
2) Reuse of treated sewerage water from the various sewerage works close 
to the large villages (Section 7.1.9). The very high rate of refusal to use 
reclaimed water registered by both the FGs and the Mochudi survey 
made this option appear difficult to implement to allow use by the poor on 
their masimo. Commercial enterprise land users were unlikely to object if 
the reused water is subsidised. A trial at the Glen Valley farming area 
just north of the Gaborone sewage works showed it was possible. The 
WRM reforms aimed to recycle 96% of the water by 2030 (GOB 2012 
Section 5.1.15). It was likely that the GOB will make it a priority to reuse 
the water to irrigate the masimo (KI CGCS 6) 
3)  Potable water from WUC sources for use at clusters of masimos all year 
round. It is the preferred option for the main drivers of the reforms in 
MMEWR.  
4) But there will need to be careful choice of cluster layouts to ensure the 
lands chosen do not exclude the lands owned by the poor. A land 
registry trial, that was carried out in the Oodi area of Kgatleng District in 
2009-11, has been proposed to be extended to the whole of Botswana. 
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Such registration of all land would help enable the poor to ensure their 
registered land is not excluded from any cluster irrigation. It would have a 
wider effect too in providing a registered potentially leasable asset. 
The President announced at the BDP convention in March 2013 that in future 
livestock would be allowed to be kept at the masimo, so as to help the poor not 
to have to travel to the moraka. It presages a significant change in Botswana 
culture. It would deal with problems over access to water for the poor from 
borehole syndicates and be an extended use of the original (2010) water reform 
plans to pipe water from the villages to clusters of masimo (Mmegi 18th March 
2013). But the work on clustering of ‘commercialised’ masimo was proceeding 
slowly under the MoA aegis but not for the poor.253  
 
Summary of the impact of the potential WSS reforms on the poor at the 
masimo 
 
The removal of the water standpipes in the villages that provided free non saline 
water that could be loaded up on the donkey carts for use at the masimo has 
been a blow to the poor. The replacement water policy proposed by the GOB in 
2010 could have been revolutionary in allowing all year round irrigated 
agriculture to all, including the poor. But it was ambitious and was in 2013 only 
being trialled for ‘commercial enterprises’ (GOB 2012d). The commitment of 
MMEWR to this policy to help the poor at their masimo was seen by the 
Researcher as genuine and this commitment to continue the policy outside the 
final water policy proposal was real in May 2013. The decision announced in 
March 2013 of livestock being allowed at the masimo to utilise water from 
rainwater harvesting, reuse and, where affordable, the WUC, would be a 
considerable benefit for the poor.  
 
  
                                                 
253
 The MoA in answering a NA PQ in March 2013 stated that only nine clusters had as then 
been established. 
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9.5.3 WSS changes at the cattle post (moraka) 
 
The third location for the poor in Botswana has been living by right at the cattle 
post or moraka on the common lands.Boys were expected to spend significant 
periods at the moraka tending the family cattle. Living with the cattle at the 
moraka is part of the Motswana identity (Head 1969). There has been and still 
is a deep love affair between the Batswana and their cattle. Rich and poor love 
their cattle. It has been said that a ‘high correlation exists between status within 
the civil service and the ownership of cattle’ (Picard 1987:147).  
 
‘The nature of the state [was] closely intertwined with the country's 
cattle economy. The traditional response to shortage of grazing 
land has therefore always been to open [up] new grazing areas 
mostly westward into the Kalahari. As long as this could be done, 
communal ownership of land for use by individuals was 
ecologically sustainable. By 1966 there were an estimated 5,000 
boreholes in the country, which rapidly grew to 8,000 in the late 
1970s’ (Tiot 1995:60)  
 
However, the dependence by the GOB on wealthy syndicates or cooperatives 
to drill many of these boreholes led to ‘gross inequalities in access both to the 
water and the land around the borehole’ (Selolwane 2012:3; Swatuk 2010). The 
Waterpoint Survey of 1980 analysed the use of MoA publicly provided 
boreholes at the moraka. This showed that richer cattle owners benefitted more 
from the water than the poor, particularly in ‘having the labour to take cattle to 
distant or back-up water points [in the event of the borehole running dry]’ 
(Fortmann 1981:58). The expansion of boreholes for all after Independence and 
‘the increase in better veterinary support, led to a dramatic increase in the total 
number of cattle on land; from about one million at independence to almost 
three million ten years later. This increase coincided with the closing of the 
grazing frontier and has unavoidably exceeded the carrying capacity of the land 
(ibid). By 1991, the entire Eastern Kalahari has been covered by boreholes 
located less than five miles apart (KI WEN 5). The result was asserted to be 
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large-scale environmental degradation visibly measurable in the dramatic rise in 
overgrazed land from 2% of the country in 1975 to 25% in 1986 (ibid). The only 
escape from the tragedy of the commons254 was seen to be through public 
policies that ‘apply restraint to all and effectively protect the commons’ (Toit 
1995:218-219).  
That restraint came through the introduction of the tribal grazing land policy 
(TGLP),  initiated in 1975 and widened in 1991, which ‘privatised communal 
resources’ (Good 2008:114). The 5 mile separation required between boreholes 
by the WAB meant that the distance from LA and MoA owned boreholes and 
privately owned syndicate boreholes would allow water source owners to gain 
de facto control over the common land grazing surrounding their wells (Peters 
1994). De jure control followed with the advocacy of commercial ranching with 
‘subsidies worth round 50% of the ranchers costs’ (Good 2008:72). ‘All people 
who possess boreholes in the [demarcated communal land] are automatically 
allocated ranches there. Minimum development for a ranch is a perimeter fence 
and a borehole’ (Newsletter MOLAH 2010 (1):17).  
 
However, this policy was not seen as excluding the poor. The Minister of Lands 
and Housing (MOLAH) in a Ministry newsletter (2010) stated that a ranch was 
possible for the poor. ‘No,  not at all, the fact is we need to see financial proof 
[of ability to finance the enterprise] but if someone is sponsored by some 
financial agencies like CEDA255, banks, etc , they should produce supporting 
documents and we can go ahead’ (ibid). In Kgatleng District, local politicians 
have opposed fencing off of the common lands: in 2011, only the Kgosi’s256 
ranch in NW Kgatleng District was fenced off for use for stock breeding. 
 
                                                 
254
 This assertion is contested both in Botswana and internationally: See Hardin 1991, 1968; 
Ostrom 1990; Abel and Blaikie 1989; Arntzen 1990; Muller 2012.  
255
 CEDA: Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency since 2001 offering soft loans for 
agribusiness to Batswana as part of a pro-poor policy 
256
 A proposition by the Kgosi Kgafela in 2011 for a fenced off commercial game ranch was 
blocked by borehole owners who would have to give up their rights. The poor would also have 
been excluded. 
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The degradation of the common lands is asserted by a water expert, and post 
independence senior civil servant, who commented in June 2012:  
“The paradox for cattle post based cattle is that they have to trek 
so far to find grazing that they cannot do a round trip in day. Lots 
of sand veld cattle posts are so degraded for a radius of 4-5 km 
that even with very good rain, there are no seeds to germinate the 
perennial grasses, and winds do not deposit seeds from further 
out” (KI WEN 5).  
 
There is also the issue of droughts and fall back water points:  
 
“Any cattle owner worth his salt has to have a fall back strategy for 
drought purposes when his primary water point may either dry up 
completely or have such a reduced yield that it will not supply his 
herd. The resultant increased density of cattle around fewer water 
points can undo, especially during a drought period, any partial 
recovery of the grazing around that point” (KI WEN 5). 
 
Not everyone who develops a borehole or other type of water point bothers to 
get a water right257.  
 
“The mineral exploration companies drill hundreds of bores every 
year that often intersect an aquifer. It is not only exploration 
companies; so many kms of road have been built in Botswana in 
the last 20 years that many, many boreholes have been drilled to 
obtain water for construction. These often end up as pirate 
                                                 
257
 The Researcher went to an isolated cattle post (CP) north of Artesia. It was alleged that there 
were a number of unauthorized boreholes within 5km of the borehole he saw. He asked the 
organizer (cattle boy) at the CP: “What would you say if the Government were to drill a borehole 
for the community?”  “Good idea, but we once tried to ask for water from the government 
boreholes but they are refusing with them. There are government boreholes in this area? Yes 
they are quite many, but they are refusing with them” (KI BR11) 
. 
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boreholes when the road is complete [or the companies withdraw]” 
(KI WEN 5).  
 
There appears to be almost no knowledge of how many boreholes there are. 
Many may be abandoned but may be useable. The Researcher found at two 
moraka near Artesia arrangements had been made to sublease the use of a 
borehole, the costs of which was shared by a group of poorer Batswana, but 
these boreholes had not been known about by the LB; they were claimed to 
have been originally allocated prior to the introduction of the LB. There was a 
block on new land allocation for boreholes in KD by the KLB (2010- 2011) to 
enable a census of boreholes to take place. The results have not been 
published. The size of the herds were said to be decreasing because it was 
claimed to be less culturally important, especially given the President has no 
cattle (KI CGP5). But the poor need cattle to pay and receive the bride price258, 
to slaughter for weddings and funerals and in general to maintain their position 
as a Motswana. They can serve as cattle boys and be paid in part in calves and 
water access. They can use the tribal morafe connection to persuade the owner 
of the borehole to allow affordable access. But the progressive exclusion of the 
rights of the poor from the grazing lands and access to affordable water before 
the water reforms made a review of the water policy important. 
 
The FG general view was that the GOB should provide new boreholes. Mochudi 
participants were united in this:  
 
“There should be a water source drilled for the poor at the cattle 
posts, because there is nothing they can do for themselves. A 
borehole should be drilled for them and they are told, you poor 
people, here is your borehole, it should be used only by them, just 
like the lady said people with 5 cattle could come together and 
suffer with fuel only” (FGM 1). 
                                                 
258
 Brideprice or bogadi in Setswana payable to the uncle of the bride before the marriage can 
go ahead. Currently it varies from two to twenty. This can be commuted into Pula but at least 
two cattle are physically exchanged. 
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“But the government should assist us with the engine and say 
there is a borehole, there is your area, and there is your cattle 
post. Right now we are just crying, we are being chased from the 
village” (FGM 2). 
“This syndicate I am talking about, we would go out and look for a 
space where there is no masimo and we would run there. So if 
they could find us a borehole at Semomotwane, and say this is for 
so many poor people and this is for so many poor people because 
there are many of us poor people. I mean, we want the 
government to help us with a borehole” (FGM 3).  
 
“To be poor is to be someone with less than 10 cattle” (FGM 4). 
 
The view from the riverine village of Olifants Drift with many cattle posts in its 
surrounding area was a choice between the mass free watering at the Limpopo 
River, with a resultant quagmire where up to 1000 cattle came in every day to 
the river bank or using the private boreholes run by syndicates. The degradation 
of the areas close to the river stretched up to one mile inland from the River. 
The cattle are managed by cattle boys who have to go into the River to haul out 
the cattle that are stuck in the mud.  
 
“When we talk about river water... river water is helping the whole 
tribe, all these cattle posts and I am talking about livestock. All this 
livestock. There is nobody who can afford the syndicates and so 
even those who tried their syndicates have broken down because 
there was nothing to fix their engines” (FGOD 1). 
 
“Syndicates are a problem. This river will help us rather than us 
having to go to the syndicates. With syndicates you need a lot of 
money. You just have to sell cattle” (FGOD 2).  
“There are those who come and ask for water from the members, 
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they also pay yearly. They pay P2,000 each year. It doesn't matter 
if you have 2, 3 cattle or you fetch water with a donkey cart or with 
your head, they have only one price. I mean this syndicate issue is 
a problem” (FGOD 3). 
The nature of the Motswana life is shown by the answers to different questions 
in the Mochudi supermarket survey. While the thirty five cattle owning 
respondents (out of a total sample of ninety nine) saw themselves as only 
domestic consumers of water from WUC (Figure 8.2), they also paid the 
borehole syndicates for access to water at the cattle posts (Figure 9.6). There 
was no right to have free access for the cattle of the poor. Twenty respondents, 
over half, paid BP1,000 per annum or below and six paid in kind with calves. 
The latter route could be taken by the poor but only with the agreement of the 
borehole syndicate. On top of this borehole access charge, would be the cost259 
of cattle boys to manage that part of the herd. 
 
 
Figure 9.6 Payment levels per annum for non-syndicate members for use of 
borehole water at the moraka (n=35) 
 Source: Survey of cattle owning respondents, Mochudi June 2011 
 
                                                 
259
 P480 per month minimum wage plus food and water; but KI stated that many of the poor 
worked as cattle boys and thus built up a small herd with access to water. 
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The GOB draft water policy for the moraka was “to implement a raw water 
extraction fee for all water withdrawals to help fund water management activities 
and encourage conservation” (NWP 2010a:12). This was meant to apply not 
only to mining companies but also borehole syndicates who pay once at a de 
minimis level of BP 60 (UKP £6) for the WAB application and approval, and 
then absolutely nothing more. Discussion took place in the Water Reform Unit 
(WRU) of the DWA in 2010 as to how the borehole syndicate would seek to 
recover the costs coming from such a borehole charge. The belief was that 
charging of non syndicate users of the borehole would take place. The BEWRA 
water regulator in the draft legislation would have the power to set a pro-poor 
tariff for the syndicates at the boreholes and to require access to that water for 
those poor with smaller herds. But this charge was seen to be difficult to enforce 
and politically disastrous:  
 
“I think the concept of trying to assess payment for underground 
water abstraction on an individual source basis is well beyond 
even wishful thinking. In the late ‘80s and early ‘90s it was all the 
rage for each Land Board to conduct a Water Points Survey (using 
consultants). But no attempt was made to try to assess the 
borehole yield since many farmers only equipped their boreholes 
to reflect their needs rather than the maximum sustainable yield of 
the borehole. Even then, the data was terribly inaccurate since the 
consultants (who were usually young expats) did not have the 
investigative/interrogation skills to find the water points. Also, for 
an open well or a borehole fitted with a windmill, it is all but 
impossible to calculate a meaningful output” (KI WEN 5, June 
2012). 
 
“Since all possible water points will rarely all be used at the same 
time and some will have varying levels of use year on year, it is all 
but impossible to charge for the actual usage. I cannot imagine a 
Government here that would ever go forward with such a proposal. 
The locations of the water points are not known with any degree of 
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confidence, nor are the abstractions rates and there is no 
workable mechanism to collect any payment that might be 
calculated in some thumbsuck way. Anyway, every voter would 
vote the party out at the first opportunity” (KI WEN 5, June 
2012)260 
 
The discussions in Cabinet outlined in Section 7.7 involved a fight back by the 
cattle owning group of ministers and senior civil servants. The proposed 
volumetric charge to be made on all borehole usage for cattle farmers was 
removed and replaced in the proposed policy  by a ‘periodically reviewed 
graduated flat abstraction fee per borehole ’ for larger herds and feed lot 
farmers ‘(GOB 2012d:17). This enabled the policy to pass the Cabinet with the 
support of the BDP Ministers who had significant herds. The latter tended to be 
feedlot farmers of which there are only nearly 200 but they form more than 60% 
of the number of cattle going through the monopoly Botswana Meat 
Commission abattoirs (KI I 6). So the role of Botswana Electricity and Water 
Regulatory Authority (BEWRA) in setting the volumetric charge, and thus a 
potential stepped tariff for syndicate use to allow access to the poor, has been 
lost. But all boreholes are proposed to be registered and off-take measured. 
 
Summary of the water policy impact on the poor at the moraka 
 
Progressive exclusion of the poor from the common lands by the GOB polices 
on ranching and support for syndicate development of boreholes has happened 
over the last 30 years (Peters 1994). There was no right to free water. The only 
access came through work as a cattle boy or membership of the morafe of the 
syndicate borehole owner. 
 
The initial bold proposals of the GOB draft water policy (2010) coupled with the 
use of the new BEWRA powers could have provided a pro poor tariff by right 
and allow the smaller herds of the poor to have the ability to graze alongside the  
                                                 
260
 The Australian Government confronted the  same policy choice over identification and  
ownership of boreholes (Strang 2009:69) 
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big herds of the rich but the opportunity was lost (GOB 2012d). The proposals 
for a permanent water supply to the masimo may, with suitable fencing off, of 
the cattle, mean an easier way forward for the poor to herd their cattle closer to 
the village. This has been supported by the President in March 2013. This may 
reflect the difficulties for the advocacy coalition for the WRM and WSS reforms 
at the moraka, in getting support from the syndicate owners, who were, in 2013, 
prominent in the Cabinet and the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP). 
 
9.6 Discussion of the key issues 
 
The right to water is not contained within the Batswana constitution. The 
January 2011 Basarwa judgement provided that right in common law. The legal 
ramifications in Botswana have not yet spread beyond the one waterhole in the 
CKGR but could undermine the WDM policy laid out in the water reforms. If 
there is an unfettered right to drill a borehole for ‘household use’ (Water Act 
1968, paragraph six), there will need to be clarity in the Botswana Courts as to 
what constraints are to be put upon this (KI CGCS 6 May 2013) 
 
The statistical success of lowering the level of poverty below 6% on the 
WB definition, and below 22% on the Botswana survey definition, with the 
exclusion from the calculation of the wide range of public goods such as 
healthcare and education, is undoubted. But these welcome changes still 
require a pro-poor approach to the pricing of water. There is still poverty in 
Botswana. If the South Africa position on free water allowance is not supported 
in the Botswana water reforms, the closure of the standpipes that provided free 
access for the poor for the pursuit of livelihood agriculture could defeat the 
approach of the government to poverty eradication. A furore over backyard 
gardeners in the villages’ entitlement to subsidised water could change the 
stepped water tariff policy set out so far. The universal rollout of prepaid water 
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metering could allow for after the event pro-poor bill correction261. But requiring 
prepaid cards for the poor to access the remaining now metered standpipes 
needs to be monitored to ‘ensure that no more than 5% of household 
disposable income has to spent on domestic water needs’ (GOB 2012:18) 
The subsidies (over 50% of the cost in 2010) given to everyone have started to 
reduce with the June 2013 ‘national’ tariff moves, which entrenches the very low 
initial stepped tariff to protect the poor. The pace and detail of the change over 
the coming five year implementation period needs to be examined to ensure the 
poor do not suffer unaffordable tariffs. 
 
All Batswana, including the poor, have title to some land at the masimo areas. 
The clustering of masimo to enable all year round affordable access to water 
from the WUC and other sources could have provided a major improvement in 
irrigated  smallholder agriculture (NWP 2010:14g). There is an important 
question as to whether the removal of that power from the final water policy 
leads to the end of that idea (GOB 2012) 
 
The charging policy on the cattle post boreholes (NWP 2010:12, Strategy 
Point l) could have, through regulatory price control, provided affordable, 
guaranteed access to water for the poor. This could have reopened the 
communal range lands to the poor. But the elite, whose control of the 
rangelands rests on the existing ownership of boreholes, did not allow this to go 
ahead. It was not politically possible. 
This raises the question whether the President has given up on this with his 
March 2013 pronouncement that cattle could be kept at the masimo? The 
authorisation in the final water policy (GOB 2012d) for the metering of all 
boreholes...and for a ‘graduated flat abstraction fee’ for large users has given 
the WRB power to introduce WDM which could in the long term make the 
common lands more open to the poor with their lower water needs for their 
smaller herds. 
 
                                                 
261
 The 40% metering level of water consumers in England and Wales does not enable  pro-
poor bill correction (KI  WEUK 1) 
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9.7 Summary 
 
The starting point for the water reforms was the perceived need of the new AC 
to move to a regime of WDM supported by both the tribal leaders and the elite 
perceived a future return to a water stressed society (see Chapter Six). The 
requirement to make this politically and socially possible, by ensuring that the 
policy is pro-poor, could have been seen as contrary to WDM policies which  
require the reduction of water consumption, through the restriction on free water 
from standpipes in every village and community, and universal charging.. 
However, the deep beliefs of the Batswana, and the record of the GOB of 
reducing inequality within society, and coping with drought, tempered the views 
of the advocacy coalition as shown in this Chapter. 
 
The Researcher saw the evolution of a GOB pro-poor policy on tariffs that, after 
free water for the destitutes, was based on a low contribution rate for low usage 
and was still highly subsidised. The high volume users were paying more from 
June 2013. The view from a KI was that within five years that subsidy on high 
volumes/users will be severely reduced, while still protecting the poor and their 
livelihood raising policies (KI CGCS 6).The move to national prepaid metering 
was welcomed by all groups interviewed to stop what was seen as 
unsubstantiated and erratic billing from WUC. But this policy will need to be 
monitored to ensure the right to water is not undermined. 
 
New structures that could enable more equal access to water at the masimo 
and moraka were possible under the 2010-11 policy frameworks of the new 
WRC and the new water regulator. But the final policy proposal (2012-14), while 
entrenching a pro-poor stepped tariff, has at present seen the GOB step back 
from the original proposed pro-poor reforms outside the villages, in a  
compromise that does not fully support the WRM advocacy coalition. The post 
2014 Election GOB is likely to revisit these decisions. 
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Chapter Ten: To what extent has the conceptual framework used in the 
thesis been vindicated?  
 
10.1 Chapter Overview 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Theory (ACT) conceptual framework proposed in 
Chapter Three has been explored through the data analysed in Chapters Five 
to Nine. This Chapter integrates the analysis from those Chapters together with 
reflections of the Researcher as a participant observer of events analysed in 
paragraphs 10.5, 10.6 and 10.7. It seeks to assess if the water reform 
processes in Botswana were, as tentatively proposed in Chapter Three, an 
example of the playing out of a change in the dominant Advocacy Coalition (AC) 
(Weible et al 2009,2008; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999,1993), within a 
frame of unconstrained economic development, based on no limits to growth 
(Duncan 2012), to one seeing the need to take account of the ecological and 
resource limits of Botswana, particularly that of water scarcity (Blaikie 2010). 
 
10.2 ACT: The Belief Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Figure 
3.1): Does it apply in Botswana? 
 
In Chapter Three, the AC theory was initially proposed as the lens through 
which the water policy process in Botswana could be understood. This is re-
proposed. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) sought to codify the policy 
process into a system-based approach, with power moving both up-down and 
down-up. Their ACT sees understanding of the ‘black box’ of decision making, 
as being explained by changes in the beliefs of participants in the process and 
thus policy changes over a period of time (Figure 3.1). There are three belief 
levels and, from these beliefs, come sub-systems to support change:  
 
1. Deep core beliefs, predominantly normative across a society being 
analysed (such as in the case at hand in Botswana); 
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2. Policy core beliefs, which can be changed by evidence and can lead to 
coalition formation (such as on the Water Resource Management (WRM) 
reforms in Botswana); and 
3. Secondary beliefs, more narrow and subject to change over time, leading 
to fine tuning of reforms on an empirical basis (such as that on poverty 
eradication). 
Thus the assessments contained in this Section are to see if: 
 
1. there are deep core beliefs among Batswana on water and its 
importance to Botswana society, 
2. evidential policy core beliefs around WRM that aimed to deliver high 
levels of access to WSS to Botswana 1966-2009 have now changed, 
through the influence of new evidence, based on ecological 
considerations, particularly physical limits (GOB 2006c; GOB 1992), 
3. in the working out of 2) there were secondary beliefs on how the WRM 
reforms should be worked out in detail, and if  
4. ACT can be used to explain the establishment of the original AC of 1966 
onwards which is now defined as AC ‘A’, and the movement towards a 
potential new AC from 2009 onwards, which is now defined as AC ‘B’. 
 
In building the case to support the assessments that follow, the Researcher has 
called on the Files of data assembled as laid out in Chapter Four (Blaikie and 
Springate–Baginski 2012) and used throughout Chapters Five to Nine. He has 
then overlaid this by a qualitative reading of these multiple sources of data. The 
strength of the overall findings about the ACs, their changes and relationship to 
the theory is thus subjective and qualified. However, given the experience of the 
Researcher, noted in section 4.3, in observing the dynamic process of coalition 
policy formations and reformations in the UK 1974-2005, there is some 
confidence in his understanding of the process in Botswana 2010-14.  
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10.2.1 The post Independence Advocacy Coalition ‘A’ 1966-2009 
 
1) Deep Core Beliefs 
 
The concept of deep core beliefs were explored in Section 2.2 in the Literature 
Review and assessed in Chapter Five as to its applicability to Botswana. The 
indigenous Basarwa or San are proposed to have a deep religious belief in the 
power of water, given by the almighty deity (Workman 2009; Van der Post 
1961). The eight Tswana tribes, that form over 80% of the Batswana population 
today, formed a cohesive grouping following their move to the then 
Bechuanaland in the nineteenth century. There was a nationally accepted 
customary law on water alongside the colonial common law (Schapera 1938b). 
The Tswana saw their lives as being governed by the availability of water and 
rain. Alongside in importance to the Chief was the rainmaker, there to summon 
rain from the ancestors (Schapera 1971). The importance of water to them for 
cattle and fodder drove the development of a water policy for the use of shallow 
wells and dams and basic rainwater harvesting (Morton 2011). The coming of 
the Christian missionaries brought modern hydrological thinking but did not 
displace within the Tswana their deep beliefs on water coming from the 
ancestors (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). The policies of the Batswana on 
water were to protect the people from starvation. Agriculture was rain fed.  
Whatever was needed to bring rain and to find water was carried out (Schapera 
1938). The Tswana believed that the guarantee of survival could only come 
from working together to ensure the water was there (Schoen 2012; 
Gulbrandsen 2012). 
 
2) The Policy Core Beliefs 
 
The post independence concept was one of political economy bringing together 
politics and economics, focusing on ‘power and resources, how they are 
distributed and contested in different countries and sector contexts’ (Poole 
2011). The leaders were driven by the need to deliver water for all through the 
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combination of deep beliefs engendered by the tribal administration overlaid by 
the economic development objectives of the democratically elected local and 
central government (Sebubudu and Molutsi 2011, 2009; Picard 1987). This 
process is outlined in Chapter Five.  
 
The BDP, led by Seretse Khama, won the 1965 pre-Independence election, and 
have held power since then in open multi-party elections. In the words of former 
President Masire,  
 
‘The policy has been from the very beginning, [to have] a collective 
responsibility for decisions, and we took teamwork seriously. This 
was true of ministers as well as senior officials.... decisions would 
be the outcome of a process, not just a brainwave of one person.’ 
(Masire 2006:87).  
 
‘Our failures came at those times when we lost the commitment to 
teamwork, consultation, consensus and cooperation’ (ibid: 102).  
 
The opposition parties were brought into the coalition: ‘we had extensive all 
party caucus meetings on matters of economic policy’ (ibid: 115). 
 
3) The Secondary Policy Beliefs 
 
Water policy was ‘one of the areas where it was important for experts –
hydrologists, engineers, economists –and us politicians to understand one 
another as we reviewed our options and made decisions on major projects’ 
(Masire 2006:173). As has been seen in Chapter Five, the GOB employed a 
largely expatriate water civil service for many years after Independence to 
deliver WSS levels of 98% potable water and 80% improved sanitation 
(UNICEF 2012). 
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10.2.2 The new Advocacy Coaltion ‘B’ 2009-14+ 
 
1) Deep Core Beliefs 
 
The continued role of the tribal administration and the Chiefs outlined in Chapter 
Eight meant that the old beliefs; a fundamental need to recognise the 
dependence of Batswana on a deity that provided rain, was unchanged, as in 
other African countries (Sheridan 2012). Chapter Six showed the strength of the 
churches’ advocacy in Botswana which made them the pre-eminent NGO on 
discourses on water (Tsuaneng 2010). The beliefs about the healing and 
religious power of water continued262. The giving of rain continued to be seen as 
God’s blessing on Botswana: “we thank God because he listened to our prayers 
and gave our country rain,” said President Khama263. 
 
2) The Policy Core Beliefs 
 
The evidence in Chapter Six analysed the drivers of change which could lead to 
a new coalition of opinion and action, integrating ‘the concerns of ecology and a 
broadly defined political economy’ (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:17). Vision 2016 
was a campaign rooted in the community to establish a consensus on how 
Botswana would be 50 years on from Independence (V2016 2010:79). It 
established the emotional, almost religious, basis for a reappraisal of the 
founding Advocacy Coalition ‘A’. The main NGO movement in Botswana was 
from the churches (ibid: 79) and Vision 2016, and its commitment to WRM, was 
enthusiastically endorsed by them (ibid). 
 
There has been a move to convince the old guard coalition, who had benefitted 
from the total availability of water, of issues of water scarcity and the need for 
WDM. The lead was taken initially by the Ministry of the Environment, Wildlife 
and Tourism (MEWT) with their work on the threats of climate change from 
                                                 
262
 Botswana Monitor 11
th
 March 2013 ‘60,000 for Bishop Zondo holy water’ 
263
 Quoted in Daily News Feb 9
th
 2014 
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1992 onwards. This was then taken up by the Ministers in the Ministry of 
Mining, Energy and Water Resources (MMEWR), supported by both the 
outgoing President Masire and endorsed by incoming President Mogae. This 
was shown in support for Vision 2016 and its targets for WRM and WSS 
reforms (see Box 6.1). The modernisation agenda set by the incoming 1966 
Independence elite group became revitalised by a new generation of leaders, 
educated and influenced by ideas of stewardship of Botswana in the twenty first 
century. These ideas came from the WB, USA, EU, UN institutions and the 
UNFCCC, but were transmuted into Batswana concepts of botho264, of a 
community reappraising its needs. 
 
There was support among politicians of all parties at the all-party caucus in 
December 2010, at which the Researcher was present, for the draft water policy 
proposals, particularly for the WUC to take over sole countrywide responsibility 
for the delivery of water and water borne sanitation, and a progressive WDM 
policy of long-term cost recovery for those water supplies. In February 2012, the 
WUC was given responsibility by Government Decree for all sanitation needs. 
This was not challenged in the National Assembly. The delivery of WSS by the 
WUC has been rolled out as planned (2009-2013) to both rural and urban areas 
and has led to some reduction265 in water loss, together with a level of demand 
management. The AC on WSS held, despite concerns that are reflected in the 
FG data and grey literature cited in this thesis. 
 
3) The Secondary Policy Beliefs 
 
The Researcher met in 2010/11 a large number of Batswana water specialists, 
both senior civil servants and private sector representatives, all of whom had 
trained to a very high level (PhD or Chartered Institutes) often as water 
engineers or hydrologists. They had progressively moved up the GOB civil 
service and private sector water related industries, appointed on merit. They 
                                                 
264
 Respect for all opinions  
265
 Reduced from 40% (UNDP PEI 2012) to 29% as stated in ‘the Gospel according to WUC’ 
Mmegi 22
nd
 March 2013 
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now run MMEWR, MEWT and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the three most 
important ministries on WRM and WSS. They also run the WUC. They are the 
water ‘professionals embedded in deeply political relationships’ (Mason et al 
2013:2.2). They did the fine tuning of the water reforms on an empirical basis ‘of 
their secondary policy beliefs’ at the Kasane meeting (Section 7.6), in response 
to the questions coming from the consultations on proposed water reforms 
(Sabatier 1991). They are now amending their detailed working out, following 
the changes in the AC, following the negotiations in Cabinet 2011-12 (Section 
7.7). The basic tenets of the AC originally agreed in 2012, have been confirmed 
in the final water policy that are to go to the National Assembly in 2014. 
 
10.3 ACT: The System (Weible et al 2009; Figure 3.2). Does it apply in 
Botswana? 
 
In the two previous sections it has been described from analysis of the data how 
the three levels of ACT can be identified in both the original coalition A and the 
new emerging coalition B. The movement across  coalitions of the deep core 
beliefs of the tribal leadership and the main NGO force of the Botswana Council 
of Churches is particularly strong (as described in Section 6.2).The change 
involved in policy core beliefs is identifiable in the analysis of the key GOB 
reports on WRM and WSS (2012; 2010; 2006; 1992). By 2008, the ACT had 
moved beyond the simple three belief systems with linear movement of opinion 
(and feed-back when new evidence came forward) to a more complex model 
shown in Figure 3.2 (Weible et al 2009). To what extent does the data on 
decision making in Botswana on the water reforms support the theory of 
movement from one coalition or ‘Policy Subsystem’ to another, as proposed in 
Figure 3.2?   
 
It is suggested that the left hand side of Figure 3.2 named ‘Relatively Stable 
Parameters’ represents the ‘deep core belief systems’ of the Batswana (1), 
covered in Section 5.1. This underscores (to the right in the Figure) the 
establishment of a ‘Long Term Coalition Opportunity Structure’ covered in 
Section 6.2 on the Drivers of Change that in turn feed into the ‘Policy 
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Subsystem’ mechanism. This decision box can explain the movements between 
pre and post 2009 ‘Coalition A’ and ‘Coalition B’, arising from potentially new 
evidence based, changeable ‘policy core beliefs and resources’ (2), mediated 
by the water scarcity ‘policy brokers’ of Section 6.1, the water experts, the civil 
service and the WB, who have access to the ‘secondary beliefs’ (3). This has 
resulted in two ACs alongside each other, each strategy having guidance 
instruments, the Water Act 1968 in the case of the pre 2009 AC, and a future 
Water Act based on the NWMPR (GOB 2006c) that has arisen from the Water 
Policy 2012 in the case of the post 2009 AC. The GOB Cabinet has to decide 
which Coalition should prevail. 
 
The position in April 2014 is that the GOB has approved the new AC ‘B’ on 
WSS with a staged process of WDM but at present is staying with the pre-
existing AC ‘A’ on WRM, particularly on the use of groundwater. Policy outputs 
and impacts lead to a feedback loop to amend the AC as has happened in 
Botswana 2009-13 as outlined in Chapters Eight and Nine. Further impacting 
the AC, are the short term constraints and resources of GOB/MEWR in dealing 
with the infrastructure backlog outlined in Section 7.2. This in turn is affected by 
the challenges, outlined in the next Section 10.5, initially covered in Chapter 
Seven (the Trade Union strike) and Chapter Eight (the Kgafela action), which 
could be considered within Figure 3.2 as the ‘External (System) Events’. These 
were calmed by the ‘Relatively Stable Parameters’ (1) from the deep core 
beliefs of the Batswana on the need for WRM covered in Chapter Five and Six. 
These ‘Events’ in turn feed into ‘Short –Term Constraints’ that have prevented 
the full plans of ‘Coalition B’ to be implemented... the full draft 2010 water 
reforms. It is proposed that Figure 3.2 shows dynamically how advocacy 
coalitions are formed and re-formed in Botswana. Figure 10.1 is proffered as a 
simplified depiction of how ACT (Weible et al 2009) can be applied to what has 
and is happening in Botswana’s water policy reform process. 
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Figure 10.1 The use of Advocacy Coalition Theory (Weible et al 2009) to explain 
the Water Reform process in Botswana 
 
Source: Researcher’s observational reflections and research data 2010-14 
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10.4 Challenges to the Advocacy Coalition 2009-14   
 
10.4.1 Public Workers Strike 2011 
 
The evidence for the deep core beliefs of the Batswana in the need to preserve 
the availability of water under all circumstances was shown in the decisions of 
Trade Unionists (TU) to support the water reforms during the Public Workers 
Strike outlined in Chapter Seven.  
 
The challenge of the reforms in service delivery was to move the water industry 
from 10,000 employees to 5,000 (GOB 2011) and by 2014 to an even smaller 
number. This was agreed to by the Botswana National Amalgamated Local, 
Central Government and Parastatal Workers Union (NALCGPWU). This Union 
had represented all workers in all the water industry, in the WUC, the DWA and 
Local Government. It accepted the deal. It perceived WUC as not part of the 
civil service and as such had already negotiated separate higher pay packages 
for WUC members. 
 
The Public Sector Unions, the Botswana Federation of Public Sector Trade 
Unions (BOFEPUSO), 93,000 out of the 103,000 Botswana Civil Servants, went 
on indefinite strike on April 18th 2011. They claimed a 16% (subsequently 12%) 
pay increase. The union leaders capitulated for 3% on the 13th June and the 
unhappy rank and file were ordered back, in one case in Gaborone at gun point. 
Those who struck had their pay deducted and were sacked, having to apply for 
their jobs back. 
 
Through all this, the WUC employees, despite being civil servants and 
members of one of the striking unions (NALCGPWU) did not strike. Some 
remaining DWA water employees, in areas where WUC had not taken over, 
struck but they amounted to under 100. Despite the action on health services 
putting lives at risk, there was agreement among TU KI that WSS should not be 
brought down. The Researcher in his meetings with the TUs at this time 
believes that they perceived that society would not support them if they did so. 
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The TUs argued that WUC was a parastatal and thus not part of government. 
WSS reform job losses (over 5,000) were never mentioned in any strike leaflets. 
The TUs did not challenge the WSS delivery reforms. They were part of the AC 
in favour. 
 
10.4.2 The Kgosi Kgafela, Paramount Chief of the Bakgatla, Challenge to 
the Independence Constitution 
 
The Literature review in Chapter Two and the analysis in Section 8.1 have 
provided an overview of the nature of Botswana society and within that, the 
tensions arising from changes post Independence on decision making, involving 
the tribal administration on WRM and WSS. The 1966 Constitution and 
subsequent legislation removed the rights of chiefs to allocate land and water 
rights. The government appointed Land Boards gave a continuing but largely 
ceremonial role to the chiefs in each Land Board District. 
 
In September 2010, at the beginning of the fieldwork period of this thesis, Kgosi 
Kgafela of the Bakgatla authorized groups of his tribesmen to administer ad hoc 
corporal punishment, whipping, on citizens of Kgatleng District. The Chief stated 
that he had the right to authorise these whippings, because his rights as Chief 
had not been extinguished by the Independence constitution as it had not then 
been put to the people for a vote. Thus he said it was invalid and the pre 1966 
rights of chiefs continued unchanged. This included the absolute right of the 
Chief to allocate land and water rights. The challenge to the High Court was put 
forward in October 2011, but was lost in the Courts in June 2012. The Kgosi 
Kgafela’s claim to establish a large game ranch/wildlife reserve in the north of 
the District and by doing so extinguish the water rights over a number of 
boreholes was not accepted (KI TAC 1). An AC agreement post 1966 to curb 
chiefly powers was not overturned. The parallel organisation of water 
responsibilities noted to be de facto 1966-2009, is now clearly the single 
responsibility de facto and de jure of the central government elected elite of 
politicians and civil servants. 
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10.4.3 The BDP Ranchers’ Veto  
 
It was recognised in Section 7.2, that, while the opposition parties, largely 
representing urban areas, had no problem with the WRM and WSS reforms (KI 
CGP3, 4), up to the start of the Election period (March 2013), the government 
party, the BDP, representing rural areas and often with ministers and senior civil 
servants being cattle ranchers, expressed concerns at the meetings the 
Researcher attended at the National Assembly. The replacement of the WAB 
with the WRC/B and the monitoring of boreholes and payment for water use 
from those boreholes were muttered against from the beginning, in the 
presence of the Researcher. The ‘cluster’ policy of the water reforms proceeded 
very slowly with only nine clusters being completed by March 2013 (PQ answer 
reported in the Daily News). The WRM element of the post 2009 AC was seen 
to be delayed in Cabinet by those who had an interest in cattle ranching.  
 
10.4.4 The Delay in Cabinet 2011-14 
 
The Researcher attended a three day meeting with key WRM and WSS 
stakeholders in Kasane June 26 – 28th 2011 and the data from that meeting has 
been analysed in Section 7.6. The meeting did not alter the key sections of the 
reforms. The WSS reforms, which did not require new legislation, were 
endorsed and the roll out continued.  
 
The reform policy proposals on WRM went from there straight to the Cabinet. 
The data used to support the argument of increasing water scarcity was not 
questioned, but the urgency for change was. In the period July 2011 to April  
2014, the water policy was not proposed to the National Assembly and no bills, 
for either the Energy or Water Regulator or for a Water Bill containing the 
powers of the demand-led WRC, were tabled. The draft water policy was sent 
back to MMEWR in June 2012 by the Cabinet for revision: the contentious 
clauses were the principles that a volumetric and increasable extraction charge 
on borehole groundwater should be paid, both by the mines and agricultural 
users, and the removal of power from MoA to MMEWR. The final version 
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agreed by Cabinet in October 2012, circulated to all MPs in December 2012, is 
to be presented to the National Assembly in 2014 (GOB 2012d). The bulk of the 
draft water policy (2010) survived but the final policy replaced the proposed 
volumetric charge on borehole extraction with a five yearly flat charge for a 
maximum extraction license which could be renewed at a flat rate for a 
subsequent five years (and then on). The rate was to be variable (but flat rate) 
according to the licensed use. The MoA retained control over water supply for 
agricultural purposes but the cluster concept was retained. All boreholes would 
be continually monitored by the new WRB/WRC266. This would not now be 
independent of government but chaired by the Permanent Secretary to 
MMEWR (as was the WAB). The latter was not present at the delayed 
groundbreaking ceremony for the BP1.6Bn NSCII in May 2013, the construction 
of which could be seen as a continuation of the Coalition A policies. Nor was the 
President HE Ian Khama present, for what was the largest civil engineering 
project ever in Botswana. But NSCII was necessary for Coalition B for the 
survival of the economy of water scarce Botswana, alongside the water reforms 
bringing in WDM. The final water policy (GOB 2012d) was a Motswana 
compromise that moved towards Coalition B in favour of WDM/IWRM reforms 
but kept Coalition A in play with the contestation over the value of groundwater 
to either the miners or the MoA clients (Grynberg 2013). 
The announcement on 3rd February 2014 by the Minister of Finance in the 
Annual Budget speech in the NA, was of continued support for Coalition ‘B’ on 
WRM. He said:  
‘a comprehensive National Water and Waste Water Policy, which 
represents the first step in a process to ensure that water is 
properly positioned to meet the needs of the nation, has been 
developed and approved by Cabinet in 2012 and will be submitted 
for approval by Parliament during 2014. The Policy will allow for 
                                                 
266
 In the water policy paper sent to Parliament the nomenclature had changed from Water 
Resource Council to Water Resource Board: the powers remained unchanged from the original 
proposals. Perhaps the new name was seen as acceptably close to that of the body it is to 
replace –the  Water Apportionment Board (WAB) 
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development of National Water Conservation Strategy, which will 
ensure proper utilisation of water resources. Government is also 
developing an Integrated Water Resource Management Plan. The 
Plan will facilitate the development of processes, procedures, 
methods and options for full integration of water resources 
management and development options’.   
 A General Election is due in October 2014. The Researcher reflects that 
perhaps the President and his BDP candidates for the National Assembly may 
wish to get re-elected first and then move forward then to complete the 
‘Coalition B’ WDM/WRM reforms after the General Election.  
 
10.5 What insights have come forward on ACT being used in this thesis? 
 
The coalitions are loosely defined, based on multiple sources of evidence; this 
means that they are not fixed and may exhibit patterns of interactions and 
events not always fully consistent with their formal labels. The move between 
coalitions is neither smooth nor obvious in the changes in ACs in Botswana. 
The sharpness of the change in the AC after Independence shown in the 
legislation 1968-72 is belied by the continued power of the chiefs to influence 
the giving of riparian rights well into the 1980s. Similarly, the identification of 
2009 as a breakpoint is false if it is seen as a sudden shift in policy coming from 
nowhere. The head of steam for change had built up since the BNWP of 1992 
and the outside influence of climate change academics that provided support for 
the tribal authorities’ deep beliefs that never went away. ACT as applied in 
Botswana should be seen through a gradualist lens. 
 
10.6 Summary 
 
The movement of the advocacy coalitions on WRM and WSS could be seen as 
being from ‘Coalition A’ to ‘Coalition B’ and back (Figures 3.2 and 10.1).  The 
pre-Independence, chief driven water scarcity model was superseded at 
Independence by a state based political economy technocratic ‘Coalition A’. It 
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was supply-side driven and, achieving high perceived levels of access to WSS, 
could be seen as being successful, but it did not seek to tackle long-term issues 
of WRM and WSS. 
 
The post 2009 ‘Coalition B’ around WDM, based on demand constraints on 
water availability from surface and groundwater sources, within a concept of 
greater understanding of ecological limits, was threatened by the 2011 Strike, 
the constitutional challenge of the Bakgatla chief, and significantly, by the 
infighting within the Botswana Cabinet. The final water policy (2012) endorsed 
to the new WRB the key power of monitoring all water usage and being able to 
introduce WDM. The delivery of WSS by the WUC has been rolled out as 
planned during 2009-2013, to both rural and urban areas and has led to the 
start of reductions in water loss and moves towards long term sustainability 
through cost recovery and demand management.  
 
ACT remains, for the Researcher, as demonstrated in this Chapter, a robust 
framework for understanding the water reform processes in Botswana. Chapter 
Eleven proposes potential answers to the research questions set in Chapter 
One, as seen through the lens of ACT. 
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Chapter Eleven: Conclusions 
 
11.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This final chapter seeks to provide potential answers to the research questions 
(RQ) set out in Chapter One, utilising the data arising from Chapters Five to 
Ten. These are summarised in Section 11.2 in a meta-narrative analysis. The 
Researcher then reflects in Section 11.3 on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the research process in building a coherent triangulated view from different data 
sources. Section 11.4 places this research in a framework of norms currently 
used to apply to WRM in developing countries and suggests areas of further 
research. 
 
11.2 Summary of research findings: opportunities and challenges for 
Water Resource Management (WRM) in Botswana 
 
In seeking to address the question posed by this research project as to the 
extent that the process of reform in Botswana’s water sector 2009-13267 can be 
                                                 
267
The sub questions are: 
  
What was the governance of WRM and WSS in Botswana in the pre-2009 Water Reform 
process? (Chapter Five)  
 
What processes have contributed to the potential for change? What placed reform on the 
agenda? How did the national and international perceptions of water scarcity affect WRM 
decision-making at all levels in Botswana in 2010-2011? What were the underlying drivers of 
water sector reform in Botswana? (Chapter Six)  
 
What were the proposed WRM and WSS reforms during 2009-2013 and how did they evolve 
during the process? (Chapter Seven)  
 
How did traditional forms of government and elected local government react to the change in 
their authority on WSS? How did the traditional forms of government react to the change in their 
authority over land and water brought about by the elected government in Botswana? What has 
been the response of local government to the change in their powers on WSS? How was the 
centralising of power on WSS becoming accepted in Botswana? (Chapter Eight)  
 
What were the impacts on the poor of the water reforms in the post Independence AC and the 
post 2009 AC? To what extent could the new WRM structures have addressed poverty and 
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understood, a meta narrative analysis is undertaken from the range of data and 
insights cited in the preceding chapters and within the themes set out in Section 
2.2. 
 
The process of reform has deep roots in the way Botswana has evolved since 
the nineteenth century and particularly since Independence. The post 1966 
drive for universal WSS could be seen as successful but at a low level of 
performance, through a wholly inefficient range of delivery mechanisms with no 
control over water use. The range of actors involved in driving processes of 
change, first in the 1960s and then in the current phase, has been quite small, 
mainly restricted to civil servants with the support of significant politicians. 
 
The use of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) paradigm, 
outlined in Chapter Two, has been minimised in the Botswana IWRM-WE to 
take account of a rationale of water security not coming from the four Rivers  
that edge Botswana under TRBOs, but what can relied on within the state 
borders. The solution has been supply driven: more groundwater mining and 
more water from tributaries within Botswana, brought down to the main centres 
by 600 mile long pipelines, with subsidised water for the extractive industries 
and potentially for large scale irrigated farming. Growing concerns within the 
elite group of decision makers over the impact of climate change, the increasing 
population demands and the needs of an expanding mining industry, led to the 
2009 proposed reforms, based on a perception of water scarcity, which signals 
a move to adaptive water management (Giordano and Shah 2013). 
 
The lack of knowledge of groundwater availability is recognised as a constraint 
on development (see Chapter Two), and this is true in Botswana (Chapter Five). 
The provision of support from DWA to the new Water Resources Board (WRB) 
is integral in producing for the first time an accurate water atlas for Botswana 
(KIWB1). Metering of all boreholes as proposed would provide a level of usage 
metrics but de-watering for mining will remain a significant unmeasured use.  
                                                                                                                                               
equity in the main locations of Batswana life: in the villages, at the lands and at the cattle posts? 
(Chapter Nine) 
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Discussions over the merits or otherwise of centralisation or decentralisation of 
WSS have been settled in Botswana on the basis of centrally delivering a 
universal provision of piped water to individual yards. The provision of all WSS 
by a single supplier, the Water Utilities Corporation (WUC), replaced a three 
way muddle of providers and was pushed through by a GOB Cabinet decision 
in 2009. It was finally completed in 2013. The problems with the North-South 
water Carrier I (NSC I) in 2013/4, affecting Gaborone water supply, dented the 
image of the WUC in delivering successful change. The takeover by the WUC 
of all sanitation responsibilities from LA and the MLG was supported as 
evidenced in Chapter Eight  but WUC, funded by GOB, have found it difficult to 
catch up on the under- investment in WSS over the last 60 years.   
 
The planned replacement of the national WAB by the independent WRC/WRB 
did not happen. The GOB Cabinet felt it would take power away from them to 
allocate water, and the new WRB is planned to remain under GOB control. The 
proposed introduction of a water regulator, however, could establish an arm’s 
length institution able to take decisions on pricing policy, which could also 
potentially deflect criticism of the cost recovery process from the GOB. 
 
The participation of stakeholders in IWRM decisions was proposed as best 
practice by the GWP (2000). However, civil society organisations engaged in 
water issues in Botswana have not thrived since the withdrawal of most ODA in 
the 1990s, and the decline of agricultural cooperatives. Churches are the main 
NGO stakeholder group. Traditional forms of government had their legal 
responsibility for water removed in the post Independence settlement but retain 
a surprisingly high moral right to consultation on water rights. Local government 
in Botswana were pleased to give up their responsibility for WSS and were 
positive about their role in representing the public to the WUC and DWA. The 
Councillors, male and female, filled the gap left by the failure to establish Water 
User Associations (WUA) and Water Consumer Committees, and provide a 
participative mechanism for decision making in the absence of a wider civil 
society representation. This could be seen as a European approach to 
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participation where political parties vie, at the local level, to be seen as 
responsive to the concerns of their electorate. 
 
The drivers of the policy reforms, recognised in Chapter Two as primarily 
political (Cosgrave 2012), pressed for poverty reduction objectives.  The GOB 
did not imitate the South African example of free minimum water allocation to 
households, fearing their experience of poor collection rates would follow. 
Instead it followed the stepped tariff approach and VAT free charging for the 
first 5000 litres pa for each lapa. National tariffs started in June 2013 and there 
is a commitment to a five year phase-in of cost recovery while protecting the 
poor. The total phasing out of standpipes was opposed, and the GOB relented, 
but made them only operable by prepayment meters with free tokens for the 
very poorest, the destitute. A move to provide water to backyard gardens for 
horticulture provided a way forward for the GOB for poverty eradication. 
 
An important innovation in the initial water reforms was to reticulate, or provide 
by borehole, WUC organised and Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) subsidised, 
water to all masimo268 These were to be organised into groupings to enable a 
single reticulated supply to be used for a number of masimo. But this concept, 
while still wished for by reforming KIs, was not in the final water policy of 2012. 
The decision in March 2013 to allow cattle to be kept at the masimo got around 
the exclusivity of supply at the moraka held by the rich, the owners of the 
syndicate provided boreholes. This elite group, originally targeted by the 
reforms, appear to have seen off the challenge to their near free groundwater, 
but the five year fee system on all boreholes, where off-takes will be measured 
(although this remains to be seen in practice), will start to bite. 
 
The key influences on the process of reforms emerge from elite water and 
social experts from within the political class and civil service, wanting change 
and then driving it. As has been analysed in Chapter Ten, this was through the 
formation of a new Advocacy Coalition (AC), to seek to influence and then 
                                                 
268
 Allocated land outside the village for the growing of crops. 
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change the post Independence AC. The reforms were home grown. Whilst the 
WB was hired to provide expert advice, it was not the driver of the reforms. 
Policy space was used in a way perhaps not available in developing countries 
dependent on donor driven paradigms. The imminence of the 2014 General 
Election at the end of the fieldwork cast a shadow over the 2009/10 WRM 
proposals and slowed their implementation, but the WSS reforms have been 
completed. The completion of the WRM reforms from 2015 onwards will be 
decided by whoever wins the election, but they are likely to go ahead with broad 
based support.  
 
11.3 Study contributions and reflections on the research process 
 
Rich insights to the processes of policy reform in Botswana’s water sector have 
been gathered, by triangulation of multiple sources of data from KIs, FGs and 
the Researcher’s reflections and his involvement in key meetings during 2010-
2011. Whilst the Researcher recognises the need to understand the 
positionality of both himself and the Batswana he listened to, a general 
consensus across the data groups does enable tentative conclusions to be 
drawn. 
 
The KIs knowledge of the reforms was rather patchy. The closer the KIs from 
across Botswana society were to the decision point the more they knew. But it 
was surprising how little interest was taken in how the reforms could impact on 
the KI’s constituency of interest. This was particularly true of the civil society 
representatives. The lack of take-up by stakeholders of opportunities for 
consultation was surprising. There appears to be a high acceptance of and 
confidence in, the ability of the GOB civil servants (and politicians) to deliver 
what is best for society. This was echoed in the FG discussions with poorer 
people who were generally supportive of the changes and had low levels of 
criticism. 
 
The research process on the ground covered 10 months (September 2010-July 
2011) and it was only towards the end of fieldwork that the various pieces of 
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data came together within an overall framework. The return to fieldwork in April-
May 2013 produced new data which enabled the Researcher to understand the 
concerns of the drivers of change269 in a water reform process that had hit 
difficulties, yet a wide- spread coalition of support for the changes remained 
strongly evident.  
 
11.4 Policy implications and recommendations for future research 
 
The policy process of water reform in each developing country is always 
different, but the Botswana experience is a case study that any country 
government looking to develop to a European standard of WRM and WSS could 
reference. The move from local village standpipes/boreholes, giving minimum 
access to potable water under local control, to a centralised parastatal, offering 
reticulated water to each household and livelihood, was the aim of the GOB in 
the reforms. The initial drive for root and branch change has been tempered by 
the difficulties of maintenance of 50 year old assets and the difficulties of supply 
by dams and long distance pipelines. However, the success of the GOB and 
WUC is still considerable; in four years, it has established a single credible 
provider for the whole of Botswana. While the standards have yet to advance to 
the level planned in 2009, the foundations have been laid for higher standards 
post 2014. Implications of these policies on the right to water and the livelihoods 
of the poor will need to be revisited regularly and recalibrated to provide WSS 
affordable for all.  
 
The process behind WRM and WSS reforms elsewhere in developing countries 
should be researched further to build a data base of knowledge about the 
potential barriers to successful WRM and WSS delivery. The Botswana water 
statistics are largely estimates and there needs to be a drive across the world to 
bring estimate acceptability to an end, particularly on groundwater. The 
academic acceptance of poor statistics not just on GDP should be revisited 
                                                 
269
 As defined in Chapter Six 
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(Jerven 2013). Accurate water metrics, with a rapid build-up of in-country 
capacity, should be an early goal to achieve within the post 2015 SDGs. 
 
Donor agencies’ emphasis on the norm of decentralised delivery of WSS and 
basin led WRM at the lowest level of subsidiarity may need to be questioned. 
The coordination role of Central Government is advocated in recent research, 
as in Tanzania (UNWATER 2014).The low population level of 2 Million could be 
seen as a reason for relative success in WSS in Botswana, but the physical size 
of the country and the spread of settlements to be supplied with WSS, make the 
project worth analysing in understanding a way to deliver WSS in other large 
countries with a widespread rural hinterland. The delivery of neighbouring South 
Africa WSS is once again being criticised (SAHCR 2014). South Africa and 
elsewhere could learn from the Botswana experience.  
 
A national borders based IWRM policy may be the norm in developlng countries 
where there is no legal enforceable sharing of trans-boundary river basin water 
(Giordano and Shah 2013:8; Sitorus 2008). Botswana with its four trans-
boundary river basins is not alone with its water problems. IWRM, based on 
basin sharing, may be the right way forward in Europe but it is harder in more 
predatory Governmental  conditions, in Southern Africa, with hegemonic water 
powers dominating basins, both internally and externally (Van der Zaag and 
Bolding 2005). Will a ‘new water architecture’ evolve, connecting country water 
policies with TBWC basin organisations (Van der Zaag 2009:254)? Or will a 
state based water security policy approach, as in Botswana, be the most 
effective way forward (Giordano and Shah 2013)? More qualitative research is 
needed to explore the evolution of the processes of WRM within regional river 
basin organisations. 
 
The 2014 Election looms. Water reform requires political will, not over just one 
election cycle. It took Europe 100 years to develop its WRM and WSS. It 
remains to be seen whether Botswana, with what appears to be a coalition of 
support for progressive WRM, with reasonable levels of political will, can 
achieve those standards much faster. 
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Appendix Two: Existing Laws and Statutory Instruments affecting Water 
and Sanitation in Botswana 
 
Principal Legislation 
Constitution of Botswana: There is nothing explicit in the Constitution 
regarding the protection of water resources, but natural resources in general are 
referred to in section 8(5) in relation to the expropriation of property. By this 
section, any compulsory acquisition of property may be effected by the 
government, but only if it is necessary for soil conservation or for the 
conservation of natural resources.  
01:04 Interpretation Act: By section 17, where an enactment confers power to 
grant a licence, authorization or permit, the power includes the power to revoke, 
suspend or amend the licence, authorization or permit. By section 18(1), where 
an enactment confers a power to appoint a person to an office, the power 
includes power to remove or suspend him, exercise disciplinary control over 
him, reappoint or reinstate him, and to appoint a deputy to act in his stead. By 
section 24, international conventions can be used to interpret national law. By 
section 44(1), in an enactment, words importing the male sex include the female 
sex and vice versa. By section 49, in any enactment (i.e. an Act or a statutory 
instrument):  
• the term “land” includes water;  
• “local authority” means a city council, a town council, a township authority or a 
district council;  
• the term “the Minister” means the Minister for the time being responsible for 
the matter in question;  
• “person” includes a body corporate and an unincorporated body as well as an 
individual; 
 
02:11 Public Authorities (Functions) Act0 
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2:12 Ombudsman Act 
04:01 Court of Appeal Act  
04:02 High Court Act 
04:04 Magistrates’ Courts Act 
04:05 Customary Courts Act. 
05:03 Commissioner of Oaths Act  
06:01 Arbitration Act  
08:01 Penal Code  
 
10:04 Local Authority (Proceedings) Act: By section 2, “local authority” 
includes a land board established under the Tribal Land Act.  
16:01 Customary Law Act: By section 3, customary law (i.e. the law of a 
particular tribe or tribal community so far as it is not incompatible with written 
law or contrary to morality, humanity or natural justice) is to be applied by the 
courts of Botswana in all proper cases. By section 4, customary law is applied in 
all civil cases and proceedings where the parties are tribesmen, unless the 
parties intended the common law (i.e. any law, written or not, in force in 
Botswana, other than customary law) to apply or the transaction is one 
unknown to customary law or the parties consent to the common law being 
applicable. By section 5, subject to any written law, proceedings between 
tribesmen and non-tribesmen shall be regulated according to customary law 
provided each intended the matter to be regulated accordingly. By section 
10(1), where there is a conflict of customary laws in respect of land (and water), 
the applicable customary law is that of the place where the land (and water) is 
situate. 
17:01 Statistics Act: By section 3, statistics may be collected by the Minister 
regarding: (1) (c) the supply of water; and (1)(d) “soil erosion and water 
conservation works and borehole sinking”. 
22:05 Essential Supplies and Services Act: By section 2, an “essential 
supply and service” is one, in the opinion of the President of the Republic, 
essential to the life and well-being of the community. Thus, by section 4, if it 
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appears to the President that, say, the supply of water is in jeopardy, he may 
make such regulations as to him appear necessary and such regulations may: 
ration the supply of water; control the price of water; apply to any area within or 
to the whole of Botswana; apply to all persons, to any group of persons or to 
individual persons. 
 
32:01 State Land Act  
32:02 Tribal Land Act: Land boards are established under this Act and are 
responsible for the allocation and administration of tribal land in the districts in 
Botswana.  
32:03 Tribal Territories Act  
32:05 Tati Concessions Land Act: dealing with existing rights to water, the 
right to pump and conduct water, the right to search for water and erect 
pumping stations  
32:07 Bamangwato Land Grant Act  
32:09 Town and Country Planning Act  
32:10 Acquisition of Property Act: 
34:01 Water Act: By section 2, “public water” is defined as “all water flowing 
over the surface of the ground or contained in or flowing from any river, stream 
or spring or natural lake or pan or swamp or in or beneath a watercourse and all 
underground water made available by means of works, but does not include any 
water which is used solely for the purposes of extracting mineral substances 
there-from or water which has been lawfully appropriated for use”. By the same 
section, “water right” is defined as a right granted under the Water Act and, 
subject to section 10, includes an existing right. Section 2 also defines 
“domestic purposes” as including the watering, spraying and dipping of stock. In 
addition, section 2 includes definitions of the terms “public stream”, 
“underground water”, “effluent”, “well” and “works”. Section 3 empowers the 
Minister to appoint the Water Apportionment Board, consisting of three to fifteen 
 397 
 
persons as the Minister determines. By section 3(3), the Minister appoints a 
Water Registrar who is the ex-officio Secretary of the Board. By section 3(5), 
the Board and the Registrar must “have regard to any relevant international 
agreement regulating the use of water to which Botswana is a party.” By section 
4, there is no right of property in public water and the control and use thereof is 
“regulated as provided in this (Water) Act or in accordance with … the 
Waterworks Act”. By section 5, the casual use of water in a public stream is 
permitted without the granting of a water right. Section 6 provides the regime for 
the use, etc., of water by owners and occupiers of any land who, without a 
water right, may sink or deepen any well or borehole thereon and use water 
there-from for domestic purposes not exceeding such amounts per day as 
prescribed by the Minister in consultation with the relevant ‘advisory board’ 
established pursuant to section 35, provided that no borehole can be within 236 
meters of any other borehole (other than a dry borehole). By section 6(1)(b), the 
owner or occupier of land may also, “without a water right, construct any works 
thereon for the conservation of public water, and abstract and use public water 
so conserved for domestic purposes” subject to certain provisos. Section 6(3) 
deals with the corresponding regime for an occupier of tribal land in accordance 
with customary law or agreement. Section 7 deals with the right to water for 
mining purposes and section 8 with the right to water for forestry purposes. 
Subject to the foregoing, section 9 prohibits the use of water except with lawful 
authority in the form of a water right granted under the (Water) Act and this 
includes a prohibition on diverting, damming, storing, using or discharging 
effluent into public water. Section 10 provides for the extinguishing of certain 
existing rights not brought to the attention of the Registrar. By section 11, there 
are no prescriptive rights to the use of water. Sections 12 to 14 deal with the 
recoding of existing rights. Sections 15 to 18 deal with the granting of water 
rights by the Board. By section 16, the rights may be made appurtenant to land. 
Section 17 sets forth the conditions that are implied in every water right granted 
for mining, forestry or industrial purposes or for the generation of power. These 
include that the water used there under“shall not be polluted with any matter 
derived from such use to such an extent as is likely to cause injury either 
directly or indirectly to public health, livestock, animal life, fish, crops, orchards 
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or gardens which are irrigated by such water or to any product in the processing 
of which such water is used.” Furthermore, the holder of a water right for 
mining, forestry or industrial purposes or for the generation of power must take 
precautions, to the satisfaction of the Water Registrar, “to prevent 
accumulations in any river, stream or water course of silt, sand, gravel, stones, 
sawdust, refuse, sewage, waste or any other substance likely to affect 
injuriously the use of such water.” Section 18 provides the regime applicable to 
water rights made conditional on the construction of works. Sections 19 to 25 
deal with the revision, variation, determination and diminution of water rights 
due to: the inadequacy of water supply; drought; the failure to comply with a 
condition; non-use; or for public purposes. By section 26, the Board is 
empowered to create servitudes. By section 28, the Registrar has the power to 
inspect works, measure the quantity of water abstracted or capable of being 
abstracted and to require repairs, demolitions, modifications or change of use 
as he considers necessary. By section 29, the Registrar is empowered to 
require the demolition of unlawful works. By section 30, the Minister is 
empowered to enter upon any land to make any investigations and surveys the 
Minister considers necessary for “the conservation and best use of water in 
Botswana” and the Minister “may establish and maintain on any such land … 
hydrological stations and other works for the purpose of obtaining and recoding 
information and statistics as to the hydrological conditions of Botswana”. By 
section 31, any person who is aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar or of the 
Board may appeal to the Minister whose decision is final. Section 32 provides 
for the registration of water rights and the right of any person to obtain extracts. 
Section 33(1) permits the Registrar, with the approval of the Minister, to 
delegate his functions to any officer in the public service. Section 33(2) permits 
the Board, with the approval of the Minister, to delegate to any local authority 
the Board’s powers in respect of the construction and enlargement of, and the 
abstraction or water from, wells and boreholes. By section 35, the Minister is 
empowered to make certain regulations. Section 36 provides for the offence of 
pollution of public water, etc, and, by section 37, a person guilty of such offence 
is liable to a fine not exceeding 1000 Pula or to imprisonment not exceeding 
one year, or to both. A person who is guilty of an offence under section 9(2) is 
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liable to the same penalty and a person who is guilty of an offence under 
sections 7(4), 17(2), or 29(3) is liable to a fine not exceeding 500 Pula or to 
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or to both. By section 37(3), in the 
event of a continuing offence, the court may impose an additional fine not 
exceeding 10 Pula per day during which the offence continues.  
34:02 Boreholes Act: By section 2, a borehole is defined as “a well sunk by 
means of a rig, and shall not include a well sunk by persons subject to any 
Botswana customary law, with hand labour only, in any of the tribal territories 
defined in the Tribal Territories Act or on any of the Barolong Farms”. By section 
4, notice of intention to sink a borehole of a depth of more than 15 meters 
belowthe surface must first be given to the Director of Geological Survey 
(‘DGS’) of Botswana and the person responsible for the borehole must keep a 
record of the progress of the work. Section 5 empowers the DGS to inspect 
within one year of the completion of the sinking or deepening of a borehole. 
Section 6 requires the reporting to the DGS of any pump-test made by the 
person sinking or deepening any borehole. Section 7 requires written notice to 
the DGS within ten days of the completion of the sinking or deepening or of the 
abandonment of a borehole. By section 8, for any territories described in the 
Tribal Territories Act or on the Barolong Farms, copies of the documents 
referred to in sections 4, 6 and 7 must, in addition, be sent to the District 
Council having jurisdiction in such area. Section 9 allows records to be treated 
as confidential, except those relating to water. And section 10 provides for 
penalties for failing to fulfill obligations, etc., under the Act.  
34:03 Waterworks Act: By section 2, “waterworks” are defined as “reservoirs, 
dams, tanks, cisterns, tunnels, adits, wells, boreholes, filters, settling tanks, 
purifying plants, conduits, aqueducts, mains, pipes, foundations, stand-pipes, 
hydrants, taps, pumps, engines, and all other structures and appliances for 
obtaining, storing, purifying, conveying distributing, measuring or regulating 
water.” By section 4, the Minister may declare any area a ‘waterworks area’ 
and, by section 5, he appoints a Water Authority for every waterworks area. By 
section 6, the Water Authority is empowered to acquire rights to water and to 
construct and manage works for supplying water. By section 7, the Water 
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Authority has the right to acquire existing waterworks. Section 11 provides for 
payment to be made for such acquisition and the application of the provisions of 
the Acquisition of Property Act in the event of a dispute concerning any interest 
in or right over an undertaking acquired under section 7 or the legality of the 
acquisition or the amount of the compensation. Section 12 provides the basis of 
such compensation. Section 13 empowers a Water Authority to lay waterworks 
in public places. Section 14 empowers a Water Authority to lay any pipe, etc., 
through, across or under any private land. Section 15 provides a Water 
Authority power to enter premises for inspection and to supervise the proper 
use of water service so as to ascertain “whether there is or is likely to be any 
waste, leakage, obstruction, damage or pollution or misuse of water in 
connection with any premises.” Furthermore, by section 15(2), a Water 
Authority may enter premises and take samples of any material or effluent 
which, in its opinion, may cause pollution of such water. Section 16 provides 
power to a Water Authority to curtail or withhold the supply of water. By section 
17, a Water Authority may prohibit the use of water for certain purposes. By 
sections 18(1) and (2), a Water Authority may supply water to any premises in 
the waterworks area and “no such application shall be unreasonably refused”. 
By section 18(3), the applicant may be required to pay the cost of the extension 
of supply if the cost “would be excessive in relation to the moneys that would be 
recovered by way of water charges”. Section 19 provides for the manner by 
which the Water Authority assesses charges for water supplied. By section 20, 
the Water Authority is empowered, with theapproval of the Minister, to prescribe 
charges, etc., whether by consumers generally or any class of consumers. By 
section 21, the Minister may authorize a Water Authority to supply water outside 
its waterworks area. Section 22 provides for a fine not exceeding 2000 Pula or 
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, for negligently or willfully 
injuring a waterworks or any meter installed by a Water Authority or for 
unlawfully taking water from the same or polluting or causing the risk of pollution 
to any such water. By section 23, any person who willfully or negligently 
misuses or wastes water from any waterworks is liable to a fine not exceeding 
250 Pula. By section 24, any person, without the consent of the Water Authority, 
who alters a service through which water is supplied, is liable to a fine of 200 
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Pula or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both. By section 25, any 
person who fraudulently measures water or tampers with a meter is liable to a 
fine not exceeding 100 Pula or, in default, to imprisonment not exceeding three 
months. Section 26 provides for offences in connection with water being used 
for a purpose other than that for which it is supplied. By section 27, the erection 
of buildings or structures over a water mains or pipe is prohibited without the 
permission of the Water Authority. By section 28, the supply of water by certain 
persons is prohibited. By section 29, any person who accumulates or does not 
remove any “foul, noisome or injurious matter or any earth deposit or excavated 
material in such manner or place that it may be washed, fall or be carried into 
waterworks” shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 50 Pula and to a further fine 
of 4 Pula per day for each day during which the offence continues. Section 30 
prohibits bathing or washing in waterworks. By section 31, the Minister shall 
appoint “Government officials as inspectors” to inspect the affairs of a Water 
Authority. And by section 32, the Minister may make regulations.  
34:04 Aquatic Weeds (Control) Act: Section 3 prohibits the importation and 
movement within Botswana of any aquatic weed (as specified in the Schedule). 
By section 5, any person who knowingly or recklessly contravenes section 3 is 
liable to a fine not exceeding 2000 Pula or to imprisonment not exceeding two 
years, or to both. 
35:06 Agricultural Resources Conservation Act: By section 2 “agricultural 
resources” includes the waters of Botswana in their relation to agriculture. By 
Section 16, the Agricultural Resources Board (ARB) is empowered to issue 
conservation orders and make conservation regulations regarding cultivation, 
watering of livestock, the protection of catchment areas, the drainage of land, 
including the construction, maintenance or repair of artificial or natural drains, 
gullies, contour banks, terraces and diversion ditches when required to prevent 
the silting up of dams, to preserve vegetation, to protect the source and banks 
of streams, and to preserve the soil and its fertility, etc. By section 18, the ARB 
may have works carried out so as to dispose of and control water, including 
storm water and drainage water, to protect the catchment, source, course, 
banks or feeders of any stream, and to prevent the pollution of public water. 
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See also Part IV dealing with the Conservation and Improvement of Agricultural 
control of livestock, especially in respect of the number of livestock that can be 
watered at watering points specified in an order of the ARB.  
35:08 Agricultural Management Associations Act: This Act provides for the 
constitution, registration and control of agricultural management associations 
(AMA) and establishes the Commissioner for the AMA with power to control 
AMA and give them directions in the management of agricultural resources. See 
section 3. (See as a potential model for a statute authorizing Water Users’ 
Associations.)  
35:09 Agrochemicals Act: See re: issues of potential pollution and the role of 
the National Agrochemicals Committee appointed by the Minister pursuant to 
section 6 and including the Chief Chemist of the Department of Water Affairs.  
38:01 Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act: See section 2 for the 
meaning of “water installation”. See also section 6(1) re: the construction of 
water conservation works and irrigation works, as well as section 15(3)(f) re: 
boreholes.  
38:03 Forest Act: The definition of “river” in section 2 includes “streams and all 
natural water courses in which water flows or remains either throughout the 
year or at certain seasons”. 
40:01 Local Government (District Councils) Act: By section 32, a council 
must exercise its powers “so as to secure and promote the health … of the area 
for which it has been established.” By section 33, a council may make bye-laws 
in respect of all matters it considers desirable for the maintenance of the health, 
safety and well-being of the inhabitants of the area for which the council has 
been established, including in respect of steps, in addition to those taken by any 
other authority: to safeguard and promote public health; to provide public 
lavatories; and to provide public water supplies outside any area for which a 
Water Authority has been appointed by law. By section 34, no bye-law is of any 
effect until the Minister has given his approval and caused the bye-law to be 
published in the Gazette. By section 44A, a council shall set service and user 
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fees for the services set out in the Third Schedule. These include sanitation 
services, septic tank emptying service, sewer connection services, sewerage 
services, the leasing of boreholes and water connection services.  
40:02 Townships Act: By section 7A, a township authority may set service and 
user fees for services set out in the Third Schedule to the Townships Act and 
these include sanitation services, septic tank emptying service, sewer 
connection services, sewerage services, leasing of boreholes, and water 
connection services.  
40:04 Fire Service Act: By section 5, each Council is required to provide 
adequate water supplies. By section 6, where any person proposes to carry out 
works forthe supply of water to any part of the area of a Council, at least four 
weeks notice of this fact must be given by the person to the fire brigade of the 
area concerned.  
40:06 United Local Government Service Act: The powers of the 
Establishment Secretary to appoint, discipline and remove officers in local 
government service are provided for in section 6. The powers of the 
Establishment Secretary regarding ‘senior officers’ (as defined by section 2) 
may only be exercised with the consent of the Minister. By section 12(3), a local 
government officer who has attained the age of 45 years may, in the discretion 
of the Establishment Secretary and in the interests of the service, be retired 
from local government service. By section 30, the Minister may make 
regulations: (a) to provide for the creation and abolition of local government 
offices; and (b) to set up bodies for the purposes of consultation between 
Government and officers of the local government service and the procedure and 
function of such bodies. By the Schedule, part-time employees other than 
senior officers are not subject to the Act.  
41:01 Chieftainship Act  
42:07 Consumer Protection Act: Section 2 defines “commodity” as “any 
property” (which thus includes water) and “consumer” as “any person to whom 
… a commodity is offered, supplied or made available ….” Section 19(c) 
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empowers the Minister, by Regulation, to prescribe “the minimum specifications, 
performance, quality and safety standards for any type of commodity … being 
offered to consumers.”  
42:08 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act: By section 3, the Act 
applies to all entities of the Central Government (and thus WUC). See section 
26 for the powers and functions of the Public Procurement and Public Asset 
Disposal Board.  
43:08 Control of Goods, Prices and Other Charges Act: By section 2, 
“goods” means “anything capable of being bought or sold” and thus the term 
includes water. By section 3(1), the Minister may make regulations to control: 
(a) the distribution, disposal, purchase and sale of any goods and the charges 
which may be made for services relating to the distribution, disposal, purchase 
and sale of such goods; (b) the supply of any goods to … any person; and (c) 
the quality and standards of any goods. By section 3(2), such regulations may 
provide, inter alia, for the rationing of any goods and for fixing … different 
quantities of such goods to be obtainable in the aggregate or individually by 
different classes of persons.  
43:10 Small Business Act: By section 4(m), the Local Enterprise Authority is 
empowered to “facilitate and coordinate the provision of infrastructure and 
facilities …including serviced land and utility services for Small, Micro orMedium 
Enterprises, in conjunction with local authorities, parastatal organizations, the 
private sector and the Government.”  
44:02 Mines, Quarries, Works and Machinery Act 
47:01 Employment Act: By section 124 which requires the supply of water by 
employers, and protection from pollution, etc. By section 63, “no public officer 
shall recruit … for a private undertaking except where the recruited employees 
are to be employed on works of public utility for the execution of which a private 
undertaking is acting as contractor for a public authority.” Section 2 defines 
“contractor”, “employee”, “public authority” and “public officer”.  
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52:01 Income Tax Act: By section 2, WUC is defined as a “specified 
corporation”. See also Third Schedule - Capital Allowances – Paragraph 1 
Computation of Allowances Deductible for Farmers – (a)(iv) includes any 
expenditure incurred in the sinking of boreholes and wells, the provision of 
piping and pumping plants, or the construction of structural improvements for 
the conservation of water or irrigation channels and water furrows.  
63:01 Public Health Act: Section 46 defines what constitutes a “nuisance” and 
subsection (1)(d), (e) and (m) deal with water, waste water and occupied 
dwellings without “proper, sufficient and wholesome” water within a “reasonable 
distance.” By section 57, health officers have a duty: (a) to ensure the purity of 
any supply of water the public uses for drinking or domestic purposes; and (b) 
to “take all necessary measures” against any person polluting any such supply 
or any streams, etc.  
65:02 Building Control Act: By section 4(1), the Minister may make 
regulations regarding: “sanitary conveniences”; the drainage of buildings, 
including the means for conveying refuse water and water from roofs and from 
yards appurtenant to buildings; cesspools and other means for the reception or 
disposal of foul matter in connection with buildings; as well as wells, tanks and 
cisterns for the supply of water for human consumption in connection with 
buildings; private sewers; and communications between drains and sewers and 
between sewers. Also, by section 4(2)(b), the regulations may include 
provisions as to the testing of drains and sewers.  
65:03 Atmospheric Pollution (Prevention) Act: regarding air pollution control 
and the impact thereof on the purity of rain and surface water.  
65:05 Food Control Act: See section 10(1) regarding clean water supply and 
the duty of every “authorized officer” (as defined in section 2) in these respects, 
as well as section 10(2) in respect of polluters being guilty of an offence. 
65:06 Waste Management Act: By section 2, “waste” includes “the following 
substances and any combination thereof which are discarded by any person or 
are accumulated or stored by any person for the purposes of recycling: (a) 
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undesirable or superfluous by-products; (b) residue or remainder of any process 
or activity; (c) any gaseous, liquid or solid matter. Also, “controlled waste” is 
defined by Section 2 as including household, industrial, commercial clinical and 
hazardous waste. By section 9(3), the Director of the Department of Sanitation 
and Waste Management, in conjunction with the Department of Water Affairs 
“and other relevant Departments”, is obliged to draw up a national waste 
management plan based on the local waste management plan of each local 
authority, which national plan shall then be evaluated and revised at regular 
intervals. By section 10(1), as part of the local waste management plan, the 
local authority must prepare a waste recycling plan covering the type and 
quantity of controlled waste to be recycled, the initiatives the local authority will 
take to encourage recycling, the estimated costs of recycling so as to conserve 
resources and prevent harm to human, animal or plant life. By section 17, the 
Director of the Department of Sanitation and Waste Management must consult 
with Department of Water Affairs “or any other relevant Department” in respect 
of each application for the registration of waste disposal sites and the licensing 
of waste management facilities. By section 23(3)(a), the surrender of any part of 
a waste management facility is not effective until the Director of the Department 
of Sanitation and Waste Management has consulted with the Department of 
Water Affairs. Section 53 entitled “Inspection of land” and its subsections (2) 
and (3) provide measures that must be taken by the Director of the Department 
of Sanitation and Waste Management in consultation with the Department of 
Water Affairs in respect of the pollution of public water.  
65:07 Environmental Impact Assessment Act: The main purpose of this Act 
is to provide for assessments of planned developmental activities in order to 
determine and provide specific mitigation measures for the effects of such 
activities as are likely to have a significant impact on the environment and to put 
into place a system to monitor and evaluate the environmental impacts of 
activities that have been implemented. By section 4(1), no person shall 
undertake or implement an activity unless the environmental impact of the 
proposed activity is fully taken into account in accordance with the Act and 
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authorization has been issued. The impact of the activity could relate to a range 
of factors, including the extent of the pollution of water, air and soil. 
66:01 Mines and Minerals Act  
66:02 Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Act  
67:01 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act: By section 55 regarding 
work practices for the registered holder of a licence and section (2)(f) requiring 
the licence holder to “prevent the pollution of any water-well, spring, steam, 
river, lake, reservoir or estuary by the escape of … any … waste product …”, as 
wellor dispose of it in an environmentally acceptable manner”.  
73:01 Electricity Supply Act  
74:02 Water Utilities Corporation Act: By section 2: “Government water 
undertakings” are defined as “works established and arrangements concluded 
by the Government for the purpose of supplying water to communities and 
enterprises in Botswana”; “undertaking” means “any business for the supply of 
water to the public, whether operated by a water authority or not”; and “water 
authority” means “a water authority within the meaning of the Waterworks Act”. 
WUC is established by section 3 and is deemed to be a water authority “in 
respect of such waterworks areas as may from time to time be specified by the 
Minister by notice published in the Gazette”. By section 4(1), WUC consists of a 
Chairman and between 6 and 8 other members each of whom is appointed by 
the Minister. Section 4(2) provides grounds for disqualification for membership. 
Section 5 provides for the resignation and removal from office of the chairman 
and any other member. Section 6 provides for the tenure of office: three years 
for the chairman with a right to be re-appointed for three further years and four 
years for any other member with the right to be reappointed. By section 7, the 
Minister may appoint temporary and alternate members. Section 8 allows WUC 
to make payments of remuneration, fees and allowances to members as the 
Minister may approve. Sections 9 to 11 provide for meetings and proceedings of 
WUC. By section 12(1), with the approval of the Minister, WUC shall appoint a 
CEO on such terms and conditions as WUC shall determine. By section 12(4), 
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after considering the recommendations of the CEO, WUC shall determine the 
staff deemed necessary to discharge WUC’s functions and the terms and 
conditions of staff employment. By section 12(7), with the approval of the 
Minister, WUC may: (a) grant pensions, gratuities or retiring allowances to any 
officers or employees and may require such officers and employees to 
contribute to any pension or contributory scheme; (b) establish or make 
contributions to any pension, superannuation and medical fund for the benefit of 
its officers and employees; and (c) appoint and employ such agents and 
contractors as it deems necessary. Section 14 sets out the functions of WUC, 
namely (a) to supply water in bulk or otherwise in such areas as the Minister 
may designate; (b) to do all things necessary to secure adequate supplies of 
water “for the performance of its functions”; and (c) to apply for and obtain all 
rights, licences, permits, etc as may be required or desirable. The powers of 
WUC are set out in section 15 and these include the power: (a) to acquire and 
use any kind of property, etc, and to dispose of the same to the Government or 
any person other than a member, employee or agent of WUC; (b) to enter into 
any contract or obligation; and (c) to do all such acts as WUC may deem 
necessary for the performance of its functions. By section 15(2), WUC may: (a) 
acquire, construct or install, whether on land owned by or leased to it or 
elsewhere such works, etc. as it deems necessary; (b) enter into agreements 
for the loan of money to any WUC employee to enable him topurchase motor or 
other vehicles required by him for the purposes of his employment; (c) give 
guarantees for the repayment of money so lent; and (d) give guarantees for the 
repayment of up to 30 percent of the amount lent by a financial institution 
approved by the Minister for the purchase or construction of a dwelling house to 
any WUC employee who is a member of WUC’s superannuation scheme. By 
section 16, in discharging its functions, WUC must cooperate with local and 
other public authorities, including department s and agencies of the 
Government. By section 17, WUC is obliged to keep full and accurate records of 
all of its operations and has the power to engage in research, etc. and to 
publish such records and research. Section 18 allows the Minister to give 
general and specific directions to WUC not inconsistent with this Act or any of 
its contractual or other legal obligations. The principles of WUC’s financial 
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operations are set out in section 19. By subsection (1), WUC’s charges for the 
supply of water must “ensure that its revenues are sufficient to produce on the 
fair value of its assets a reasonable return measured by taking its net operating 
income as a percentage of the fair value of its fixed assets in operation plus an 
appropriate allowance for its working capital.” By subsection (2), “net operating 
income” is defined as “the amount of income remaining after subtracting from 
the total operating revenues all charges which in accordance with GAAP are 
chargeable to revenue account, including appropriate provisions for the 
depreciation of assets, adequate maintenance and taxes, but before deducting 
interest or other charges on borrowing or taking into account non-operating 
income and expenditure.” By subsection (3), all pertinent considerations are to 
be taken into account in determining what constitutes a reasonable return so as 
to ensure that WUC’s net operating income (a) meets interest payments on 
borrowings; (b) provides for repayments each year in respect of loans incurred 
by WUC to the extent such repayments exceed the year’s provision for 
depreciation charged to revenue account; (c) provide a reasonable proportion of 
the funds needed for expanding WUC’s activities and improving its services; (d) 
provides reserves for replacement, expansion, etc. to the extent the “Board” 
[sic] deems it necessary; and (e) makes dividend payment s to the Government 
to the extent deemed appropriate by WUC. By section 20, the assessment of 
charges for water supplied by WUC shall be determined in accordance with 
sections 19 and 20 of the Waterworks Act and section 19 of the WUC Act. By 
section 21, WUC may borrow on such terms and in such currencies such sums 
at it requires and may charge its assets and issue bonds, subject to the 
approval of the Minister of Finance. By section 22(1), “any properties, assets, 
rights, debts, liabilities and obligations of the Government … which are part of 
or concern or relate to the Government water undertakings may, with the 
consent of WUC, be transferred to and vest in WUC. Furthermore, by section 
22(2), the Minister may designate properties, assets, rights, debts, liabilities and 
obligations of the Government … which relate to the Government water 
undertakings and as from the date specified in any such designation the 
properties, assets, etc, vest in WUC. By section 22(4) WUC is obliged to pay 
the Government in such manner and on such date or dates as the Minister, with 
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the concurrence of WUC and the Minister of Finance, may specify, any amount 
expended or advanced by the Government on or in connection with the 
Government water undertakings that vest in WUC. By section 23, WUC may 
invest in securities and property approved by the Minister of Finance. By section 
24, WUC is not liable to pay tax on income but is obliged to pay all duties, rates 
levies or other charges. Provisions relating to the accounts of WUC and to their 
audit are in section 25. By section 26, WUC is obliged to produce an annual 
report which, together with WUC’s audited statements, must be laid before the 
National Assembly by the Minister. By section 27, the operations of WUC are 
deemed to be “public purposes” for purposes of any law relating to the 
compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes. By section 28, if the 
operations of WUC require resettlement of any persons on any communally 
owned land, the terms of resettlement are subject to agreement of the 
Government and the relevant local authority. By section 29, WUC shall cause 
the least damage possible in executing works or interfering with property and 
shall make full compensation to all local and other authorities and other persons 
who have sustained loss or damage and in default of agreement between the 
parties, the amount and application of compensation shall be determined in 
accordance with the Arbitration Act. By section 30, the Minister may call for 
information from WUC regarding its estimates of future revenue and 
expenditure and for such other information from WUC as he may reasonably 
require. And finally, section 31 protects the Chairman, any other member, any 
officer, employee or agent of WUC from any personal liability to any claim if the 
matter or thing is done bona fide for the purpose of executing any provision of 
the WUC Act.  
74:03 Botswana Housing Corporation Act: “For or in connection with any 
house or building or estate owned, developed, constructed or managed by the 
Corporation”, the Corporation is empowered by section 14(2)(i) to “provide and, 
where appropriate, maintain … drains, sewers and water courses other than 
those the maintenance of which the Government or a local authority has 
undertaken or decides to undertake”.  
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74:05 National Development Bank Act: By section 4, the Business of the 
Bank is to provide loans, etc., for providing, maintaining or improving the supply 
of water, whether of a public or private natureSubsidiary Legislation 
(Statutory Instruments/SIs)  
17:01 Statistics (Household Income and Expenditure Survey) Regulations: 
see Schedule Book 1 Information to be collected in respect of every household - 
Section C Housing, Household Possessions and Cattle Ownership – 3 Water 
Supply, and 4 Toilet Sanitary Facility  
 
32:02 Tribal Land – Establishment of Subordinate Land Boards Order 
 
32:09 Town and Country Planning (Declaration of Planning Areas) Order 
Schedule  
 
Town and Country Planning (General Development) Order – By paragraph 
2, the “development control code” is defined as “the code making provision for 
matters mentioned in the Second Schedule to the Act incorporated in the 
relevant development plan”. The Code is to guide plot development in urban 
areas. See also First Schedule – Classes of Development which may be carried 
out without recourse to Board or Responsible Authority – Group XV – Classes 
of development relating to operations carried out by water authorities,  
 
33:02 Deeds Registry (Conveyancers and Notaries Public) (Fees and 
Charges) Regulations See: Schedule Part I Miscellaneous Fees and 
Disbursements - Paragraph 7 (b) re: 600 Pula per hour pro rata search fee in 
connection with rights to water  
 
34:01 Water Regulations: Regulations 6 to 11 provide for the proceedings of 
the Water Apportionment Board. Regulations 12 to 15 provide the regime for 
applications to the Board under the Act. Regulations 16 to 19 deal with appeals 
to the Minister. Regulation 20 allows the Registrar and the Board to request and 
collect information. Regulations 21 to 27 provide for advisory boards created by 
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the Minister to assist the Registrar, Board or Minister. And regulations 28 to 37 
provide the regime for servitudes. See also the various First Schedule Forms, 
including Form W2 Application for Grant of Water Right and Form W6 
Certificate of Grant of Water Right. The Second Schedule provides the Scale of 
Fees. An application for the grant of water rights or servitude is 1 Pula.  
 
The Subsidiary Legislation (Statutory Instruments): 
17:01 Statistics (Household Income and Expenditure Survey) Regulations: 
Schedule Book 1 Information to be collected in respect of every household - 
Section C Housing, Household Possessions and Cattle Ownership – 3 Water 
Supply, and 4 Toilet Sanitary Facility  
 
32:02 Tribal Land – Establishment of Subordinate Land Boards Order 
 
32:09 Town and Country Planning (Declaration of Planning Areas) Order 
Schedule Town and Country planning by paragraph 2, the “development 
control code” is defined as “the code making provision for matters mentioned in 
the Second Schedule to the Act incorporated in the relevant development plan”. 
The Code is to guide plot development in urban areas. See also First Schedule 
– Classes of Development which may be carried out without recourse to Board 
or Responsible Authority – Group XV – Classes of development relating to 
operations carried out by water authorities,  
 
33:02 Deeds Registry (Conveyancers and Notaries Public) (Fees and 
Charges) Regulations:  Schedule Part I Miscellaneous Fees and 
Disbursements - Paragraph 7 (b) re: 600 Pula per hour pro rata search fee in 
connection with rights to water  
 
34:01 Water Regulations: Regulations 6 to 11 provide for the proceedings of 
the Water Apportionment Board. Regulations 12 to 15 provide the regime for 
applications to the Board under the Act. Regulations 16 to 19 deal with appeals 
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to the Minister. Regulation 20 allows the Registrar and the Board to request and 
collect information. Regulations 21 to 27 provide for advisory boards created by 
the Minister to assist the Registrar, Board or Minister. And regulations 28 to 37 
provide the regime for servitudes. See also the various First Schedule Forms, 
including Form W2 Application for Grant of Water Right and Form W6 
Certificate of Grant of Water Right The Second Schedule provides the Scale of 
Fees. An application for the grant of water rights or servitude is 1 Pula. The 
issuance of a certificate as to the granting of a water right is 5 Pula, but half this 
fee is waived if the Board is of the opinion that the right “is of a minor nature”. 
The issuance of a certificate as to the creation of a servitude is 5 Pula. A 
certified extract from the register of water rights or the register of servitudes is 1 
Pula. And an uncertified extract from either of these registers is 50 thebe.  
 
34:03 Prescribed Charges for WUC Supply Areas  
Declaration of Sowa Township Waterworks Area Order  
Declaration of Waterworks Area Order  
Francistown Waterworks (Prescribed Charges) Order  
Jwaneng Waterworks (Prescribed Charges) Order  
Maun Waterworks Area Order  
Orapa and Lethakane Mine Waterworks Areas Declaration Order  
Prohibition of Use of Water in Lobatse Waterworks Area Order  
36:03 Livestock and Meat Industries (Poultry Abattoir) Regulations: see 
Fourteenth Schedule – Paragraph 10 re: Additional Requirements re: water 
supply and treatment  
38:01 National Parks and Game Reserves Regulations: See reg. 28(4) 
which prohibits any person from bringing or causing to bring a boat into a 
national park or game reserve unless in accordance with a permit issued by the 
Department of Water Affairs.  
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40:01 Local Government (District Councils) Southern District Council 
(Public Standpipes) Bye-lawsLocal Government (District Councils) North-
East District Council (Public Standpipes) Bye-laws  
Local Government (District Councils) Kgalagadi District Council (Public 
Standpipes) Bye-laws  
Local Government (District Councils) Kweneng District Council (Public 
Standpipes) Bye-laws: By bye-law 4(1), no person may draw water form a 
public standpipe unless he resides within the designated area in which the 
standpipe is located or has written authority from the Council. Bye-law 4(2) 
requires all water from a standpipe to be used for domestic purposes unless 
otherwise specified in writing by the Council. Any person who contravenes 
either provision is liable to a fine not exceeding 100 Pula or to imprisonment not 
exceeding one month, or to both. Other provisions deal with the use of public 
standpipe water by people other than residents, the use of water to extinguish 
fire, the withholding by the Council of the supply of public standpipe water, the 
inspection of public standpipes to detect unauthorized connections or the waste 
or misuse of water, and, finally, penalties for unauthorized connections, waste 
or misuse of water, willful or negligent damage to a public standpipe or for the 
pollution of any public standpipe.  
Local Government (District Councils) Gaborone City Council (Public 
Standpipes) Bye-laws  
Local Government (District Councils) Selebi-Phikwe Town Council (Public 
Standpipes) Bye-laws  
Local Government (District Councils) Lobatse Town Council (Public 
Standpipes) Bye-laws  
Local Government (District Councils) Ghanzi District Council (Markets) 
Bye-Laws: see First Schedule – Form 3 – Memorandum of agreement of lease 
– Para. 5 42:07 Consumer Protection Regulations: See regulation 13 re: 
Minimum Standards and Specifications  
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63:01 Public Health Regulations: See regulations 9 to 13 regarding the 
pollution of water  
65:02 Building Control (Grade II (i.e. low-cost or self-help) Dwelling 
Houses) Regulations – Paragraph 14(2) (b) requires the installation of a “a 
toilet of a type determined or approved by the local authority, which may be 
housed in separate structures”. Paragraph 17 requires local authority 
determination or approval of the disposal of bathroom wastewater. Paragraph 
19 requires a dwelling house to “be provided with or have access to an 
adequate supply of potable water” (defined, in paragraph 2, as “water which is 
suitable for human consumption”). And paragraph 20 requires “surface water 
drainage” to be “provided to the satisfaction of the local authority.” 
 
Principal relevant policy documents at the national level: 
 
Vision 2016 1997  
National development plans 
Water and wastewater sector tariff strategy 2010 
National energy policy 2010 
National master plan for sanitation and wastewater 2003 
Wastewater and sanitation management policy 2001 
Waste management strategy 1998 
National policy on natural resources conservation and development 1990 
Community-based natural resources management policy 2007 
Game ranching policy 2002 
Tourism policy1990 
Integrated support programme for arable agriculture development 2010 
Livestock management infrastructure development 2007 
National master plan for arable agriculture and dairy development 2002 
Agricultural water development policy implementation guidelines 1993 
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Appendix Three: Data Collection 
 
A) Key Informants  
Consent forms 
 
How are the processes and implications of water sector reform being 
understood in Botswana?  
Batswana ba reng ka diphetogo mo tsamaisong ya kabo le tiriso ya metsi 
mo Botswana?  
What are the underlying drivers of water sector reform in Botswana? 
Diphetogo tse di tsetswe ke eng? 
 
This form is available in both English and Setswana. 
Mokwalo o o kwadilwe ka Setswana le Sekgowa. 
 
Introduction/Madume 
Hello, I am Tony Colman, doing research in Botswana as part of a PhD in the 
School of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia, United 
Kingdom. It is a world class research institution looking at issues such as water 
reform. 
Dumelang, leina lame ke Tony Colman. Ke moithuti ko unibesithing ya East 
Anglia ko Enyelane. Unibesithi ya rona ke nngwe ya di-unibesithi tsa maemo 
lefatshe ka bophara mo go direng ditlhotlhomiso mo dikgangnyeng tsa 
ditlhabologo, go akaretsa le dikgang tsa tsamaiso ya kabo le tiriso ya metsi. 
 
Purpose of the study/ Maikaelelo a ditshekatsheko tsame 
The purpose of the study is to understand how the processes and implications 
of water sector reform are being understood in Botswana? What are the 
underlying drivers of water sector reform in Botswana? The research is purely 
of an academic nature. It is being carried out under a research permit from the 
Government of Botswana, Ministry of Mining, Energy and Water Affairs (GOB 
MMEWR; copy of research permit attached).  
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Ditshekatsheko tsame di itebagantse le diphetogo mo tsamaisong ya kabo le 
tiriso ya metsi mo Botswana. Re batla go itse gore Batswana ba tlhaloganya 
diphetogo tse di raya eng mo matshelong a bone? Gone mme, diphetogo tse, di 
tsalwa ke eng? Ditshekatsheko tsame ke tiro ya sekolo eseng gape. Di dirwa 
jaana ka teseletso go tswa mo Lephateng la Meepo, Kgothetso le Metsi 
(teseletso e e mo tsebeng e e latelang). 
 
Right to refuse or end participation in the study/ Tetla ya ga gana go tsaya 
karolo kana go emisa potsoloko 
If you want to, you can decide not to participate in this study. If you agree to 
participate, at any time you have the right to refuse to answer any question that 
you do not want to discuss, and you can stop an interview at any time. 
Itse fa o na le tetla ya go gana go tsaya karolo mo puisanong e. Le fa o na le 
kgatlhego ya go tsaya karolo, itse fa o na le tetla ya go gana go araba dipotso 
tse o sa batleng go di araba. O ka emisa puisano e ka nako nngwe le nngwe e 
o batlang puisano e e ema. 
 
Study procedures/ Tsamaiso ya puisano ya rona 
If you are happy to take part in this study, I will visit you all at a place of your 
choosing, at a time convenient to you, to spend one hour asking you questions 
in a semi structured way about the study. If you have any queries about the 
interview or my study in general, either now or afterwards, I can be contacted 
on the telephone number written on the bottom of this form. 
Fa ona le kgatlhego ya go tsaya karolo, ke tla go etela ko lefelong le o batlang 
re kopanela ko go lone, ka nako e o e batlang. Puisano ya rona e tla tsaya 
sebaka ya oura. Fa o na le dipotso ka puisano ya rona kgotsa sepe fela se se 
amanang le ditshekatsheko tsame, o ka nteletsa ko mogaleng o o ko bofelong 
jwa foromo e. 
 
The interview will be conducted in English or through a Setswana speaking 
interpreter. The questions can be sent to you in advance if you request it. It 
would greatly assist my research if I could tape record the interview for 
accuracy purposes. The tapes will subsequently be destroyed. Should you 
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object to the recording, responses will be recorded in note format? Either way 
you will be provided with a written summary of the interview.  
Puisano ya rona e tla nna ka Sekgowa, kana ka Setswana, ka thuso ya 
moranodi. Ke ka go romelela dipotso tse re tla buang ka tsone, pele fa re 
kopana, fa o batla ke dira jalo. Ke kopa go dirisa sekapamantswe go nthusa go 
tsaya dikgang jaaka o ne o di bua. Fa ke sena go kwalolola mafoko gotswa mo 
sekapamantsweng, sekapamantswe seo se tla a tshubiwa. Le gale, fa o sa 
batle ke dirisa sekapamantswe, le gone go siame ka ke tla kwala dintlhakgolo 
tsa puisano ya rona fa re ntse re bua. Pele fa ke ka dirisa maikutlo le dikarabo 
tsa gago mo ditshekatshekong tsame, ke tla go bontsha dintlhakgolo tsa 
puisano ya rona gore o netefatse fa ele se o neng o se bua.  
 
Agree to participate/ Tumalano ya go tsaya karolo 
The project information was read and explained to me clearly. Anything I did not 
understand was explained to me and all my questions were answered..Ke 
baletswe ka bo ka tlhalosetswa sengwe le sengwe se se mo mokwalong o. 
Dipotso tsame tsotlhe mabapi le puisano e di ne tsa arabiwa. 
 
Signature of interviewee: _____________________                    Date: 
Monwana wa motsaakarolo 
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Questionnaire on the Water reform process in Botswana 
 
Before every interview, the ethical statement agreed with UEA/DEV ethics 
committee has been and will be read out and agreement sought prior to starting 
the interview. Please state your position and your role in water allocation (if 
any). In the case of each statement that follows, please state on a range of 1- 7 
where 7 is the most agreement with the statement and 1 is the least agreement, 
your own scoring and then go on to explain why you have scored at your 
particular level. 
 
1) I understand the Water Resource Management (WRM) Reforms taking 
place.  
 
2) The WRM Reforms are good for Botswana. 
 
3) I have been consulted on the WRM reform proposals. 
 
4) There is water scarcity in Botswana. 
 
5) There a legal/moral right to water for personal use. 
 
6) There is an economic imperative for the supply of water to be available for 
(a) Mining, (b)Energy/Electricity production, (c) Cattle Ranching, (d) Irrigated 
Agriculture, (e)Tourism, (f) Environment/Ecosystem Protection. 
 
7) The Customary Courts/Kgosi have been important in WRM 
 
8) The Customary Courts/Kgosi are, post reform, important in WRM 
 
9) Local Government/District Councils have been important in WRM 
 
10) Local Government/District Councils are, post reform, important in WRM 
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11) I am aware of the IWRM-WE Botswana process funded by UNDP/GEF 
 
12) I am involved as a stakeholder in the IWRM-WE process. 
 
How do you obtain your water needs?  
From your own borehole resources?  
How is this monitored by the Department of Water Affairs?  
Has this changed?  
Do you have difficulty dealing with waste water from your organisation? If so, 
how?  
Can you provide me with the data for your organisation’s use of water 1970-
2010?  
Is there anything you want to tell me or to ask me about the research?  
 
Thank you for your time 
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 Data summary of Key informants (KI) on a Likert Scale of 0 (total 
disagreement) to 7 (total agreement)  
 
Key Informants Private 
Sector 
(2) 
Civil 
Service 
(6) 
CSO 
(4) 
Local 
Govt 
(5) 
Kgosi 
(3) 
Water 
Experts 
(7) 
Media 
(2) 
Mean 
Average 
(29) 
1.Understanding 
of WRM 
Reforms 
7 7 6 6 6 6 3.5 6 
2.WRM Reforms 
are good for 
Botswana 
7 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 
3.Consulted on 
WRM Reform 
proposals 
7 7 5 7 7 3.5 4 6 
4.Perception of 
water scarcity  
4 5 5 6 7 4 6 5 
5.Legal/moral 
right to water  
7 3.5 5 4 7 5 6 5 
6.Priority for 
Water – Mining 
7 7 6 6 5 7 6 6 
7.Priority for 
Water – Energy 
7 7 6 6 5 7 6 6 
8.Priority for 
Water – Cattle 
ranching 
6 7 6 6 7 4 6 6 
9.Priority for 
Water – 
5 6 6 6 4 4 7 5.5 
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Agriculture (non-
rain fed) 
10.Priority for 
Water - Tourism 
5 6 6 5 4 4 6 6 
11.Ecosystem 
(recharge of 
aquifers/protecti
on of surface/ 
groundwater) 
5 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 
12.Importance 
of Role of 
Customary 
Law/Chiefs: 
Pre-reform 
6 4 5. 4 7 6 5 5 
13.Importance 
of Role of 
Customary 
Law/Chiefs: 
Post-reform 
6 4 4 3.5 7 6 5 5 
14.Importance 
of Role of Local 
Govt: Pre-
reform 
5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 4.5 6 6 6.5 
15.Importance 
of Role of Local 
Govt: Post-
reform 
3.5 5 5.5 4.5 3.5 4 5 4.5 
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16.Awareness 
of IWRM-WE 
process 
5.5 6.5 5 1 0 5 2 4 
17.Stakeholder 
in IWRM-WE 
process 
3.5 6 5 1.5 0 0 0 2 
 
Key  
 
Private: Two Interviewees: Debswana, Kalagadi Breweries 
 
Civil Service: Six Interviewees: MoA, WAB, MMEWR, DGS, DC 
(Gaborone/Mochudi), MEWT 
 
CSO: Four Interviewees: BOCONGO, KCS, Ditshanwelo, Emang Basadi 
 
Local Government: Five Interviewees: BALA, KDC Chair, Vice Chair and 
Deputy CE, Mayor GCC 
 
Kgosi: Three Interviewees, Sub Chief, Elder, Headman 
 
Water Experts: Seven Interviewees: 3 UB academics and 4 independent 
 
Media: Two Interviewees: Voice Newspaper, Mmegi Columnist 
 
The interviews for this chart took place September –December 2010. There 
have been further interviews between January and June 2011 covering all the 
categories covered by the questionnaire but not using the formal marking by 
each interviewee used for this chart. However the later interviews do not 
contradict the category or overall results obtained for this KI chart. 
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Coding and numbers of key informants interviewed in the course of 
fieldwork, and subsequently quoted in the thesis: 
 
Categories    Numbers interviewed and code 
Central Government  6 Politicians (CGP)  
    9 Civil Servants (CGCS) 
Vision 2016   I (V2016) 
Local Government   5 Politicians (LGP) 
    3 Civil Servants (LGCS) 
Land Board   1 Civil Servant (LBCS) 
Tribal Administration 3 Chiefs (TAC) 
District Commission  1 (DC) 
Judiciary   2(J) 
WUC    5 Officials (WUCO) 
Religions   2 Ministers (RM) 
NGO    7 National (NGON) 
Academics   5 University of Botswana (UB) 
    1 BIDPA 
Water Experts  7 National (WEN) 
    1 Namibia (WENA) 
    2 South Africa (WESA) 
    2 UK (WEUK) 
Industry   6 (I) 
Media    3 (M) 
International Agencies 8 (IA) 
Botswana Residents 12 (BR) 
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B) Focus Groups 
In the capital city, Gaborone, two FG locations were chosen: a) Old Naledi, a 
former township with high turnover of occupants and b) Broadhurst, a more 
settled and planned suburb. The locations are shown in Figure A1. 
  
Focus Group at Old Naledi (FGON) 
 
Old Naledi was chosen as an area of study because it was the last area in 
Gaborone to get access to WSS. The ‘township’ area is in the south of 
Gaborone and arose from the labourers’ camp set up in the 1960’s to build 
Gaborone (Gwebu 2003). There were 19,079 (2011)270 inhabitants living in low 
grade accommodation with low levels of services. The land tenure system was 
unsure with squatting and multiple levels of landlords, letting out 72% of the 
accommodation (Kalabamu 2006:227). The area is the temporary 
accommodation point for those coming to Gaborone with no family connections 
that need cheap accommodation. The social workers for the area stated that 
there were high HIV/AIDS infection rates along with high levels of poverty. 
 
The WSS facilities in Old Naledi were installed 2009-13 to supposedly enable 
the close down of standpipes currently used communally and the pit latrines 
which were often overflowing. The standpipes were to be replaced by paid for 
piped water to each lapa (yard), with access to mains water borne sewerage 
system. Old Naledi is within sight of the Gaborone Dam, the main and original 
water supply source for the capital (Figure 4.1). The WSS work was completed 
in 2012 but a number of residents have so far refused to pay the connection 
charges271 to the new system. The last two standpipes remained open and in 
use (May 2013). In January 2013, 505 lapas, each with possibly five residents, 
remained unconnected to piped water, for reasons of cost, uncertain land title or 
                                                 
270
 All 2011 population statistics in this Appendix  are at August 2011 and available at 
www.cso.bw 
 
271
  Charge of BP 1500 = £15 (2011) 
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the refusal of the absentee landlord to take action272. But the number of 
destitutes273 was only 24 reflecting the highly transient nature of the inhabitants. 
The destitutes were to have their WSS costs met by Gaborone City Council 
(GCC). 
 
 
Figure A1 Locations of Old Naledi and Broadhurst in Gaborone 
Source: Kalabamu 2006:218 
                                                 
272
 Mmegi  Thursday, 24 January 2013  Issue: Vol.30 No.11 ‘Over  505 Old Naledi plots still 
without water’ 
273
 Destitutes are identified under 2002 legislation as the very poorest for whom all WSS costs 
are to be met by local councils. This is covered further in Chapter Nine. 
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The Researcher and his assistant met with GCC social workers to discuss the 
research and identify with their help possible interviewees who could represent 
a cross section of the residents of Old Naledi. Thirteen interviewees formed the 
FG which took place on 15th February 2011 (1030-1300) and was held in the 
Kgotla building.  Originally there were 14 in the focus group but one had to 
leave to join a queue by 1200 to collect anti-retrovirals at the FG area health 
clinic. 
 
Focus Group at Broadhurst (FGB) 
 
Broadhurst was chosen as an area where standpipes have been largely phased 
out and connections were direct to lapas. It is an urban area to the north of 
Gaborone and is named after the farm previously there. This is a purpose 
planned area, completed in 1974, for working class accommodation under the 
Self-Help Housing Agency (SHAA), providing owner occupied housing as part 
of the expansion from  the 1960s of Gaborone as the capital. The population 
was 16,257 (2011). Broadhurst has shops, a Police station, schools and a 
hospital nearby. It is mainly housing for the working poor of Gaborone with large 
lapas being filled entrepreneurially with basic additional accommodation units 
for rent. The qualitative data gathered here could be seen as representative of 
the SHAA housing areas across all of the suburbs of Greater Gaborone 
developed from 1960. 
 
Initial provision of water supply had been by standpipes. By 2011, most yards 
had connections for WSS, and standpipes had been largely been closed down 
and removed. Backyard gardens were more widespread than Old Naledi. 
Destitute274 numbers were over 100, receiving their entitlement to food baskets 
which were provided weekly from the Community Hall. There was limited water 
harvesting for backyard gardens (estimated by the Researcher as being carried 
out in less than 1% of the lapas). It is next to the Notwane River, dammed for 
the Gaborone Dam upstream, which has a low continual flow outside the rainy 
                                                 
274
 See footnote 12 
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season, prior to being topped up by the outflow from the Gaborone Sewage 
Works downstream, where it flows on to Kgatleng District. However, there was 
flooding of the River in Broadhurst in the rainy season of 2011. 
 
The FGB took place on 25th February 2011 (1100-1400) and was held in the 
Community Hall with 12 participants invited by the District Development 
Committee (DDC)275. 
 
In Kgatleng District (KD), there were four FG locations: a) Matebeleng village, in 
a peri-urban area; b) Mochudi, main centre of KD; c) Olifants Drift, a riverine 
village alongside the Limpopo River; d) Artesia, a village in the North which is a 
cattle centre and transport stop. The locations are shown in Figure 4.2 
 
Focus Group at Matabeleng (FGMA) 
 
Matebeleng is chosen as a village in change in an area previously supplied by 
Kgatleng District Council (KDC) until October 2011 and then taken over by 
WUC. It has communal standpipes and occasional connections to lapas. It is a 
peri–urban village 20 km north of Gaborone, and 5 km from Oodi, a centre for 
Kgatleng District. The jump in population to 2,196 (2011) from 1,458 (2001)276 
reflects the role of Matebeleng village as a growing peri-urban centre with a mix 
of Gaborone commuters and local villagers working the land.  
 
Matebeleng is alongside the Notwane River, flowing north and now containing 
sewage water treated at the works 15 km away. Water connections were 
available but limited. Water supply came from the nearby Bokaa Dam fed by the 
N-S Carrier (ultimately from the Chobe/Zambezi River system).There was no 
mains water borne sewerage available, so inhabitants were dependent on pit 
latrines with poor emptying timescales. This was said to have led to pollution of 
                                                 
275
 Urban equivalent of Village Development Committees (VDC) 
276
  All  population statistics pre-2011 for FGMA, FGM, FGOD and FGA are from Kgatleng 
District Development Plan 6, Table 1.3 
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the aquifers so that boreholes previously used, had to be shut-off as not fit 
providers of potable water. There is very little water harvesting.  
 
Artesia      Olifants Dift 
 
Matabeleng     Mochudi 
 
Figure A2 Locations of FGs in Kgatleng District 
 
The poor quality water from the river was used, without water rights, for 
agriculture and watering livestock. There was no water user association, 
although the farmers in the Oodi area were starting to organise. They had 
approached WUC for a meeting in 2011 to discuss the water off-take from both 
the river and from the sewage works. The upgrade of the Gaborone Sewage 
Works after takeover by WUC in March 2011, has led to an improvement in 
river water quality. Water from the Sewage works was being used with GOB 
encouragement for irrigated agriculture in the Glen Valley area of northern 
Gaborone. The FG took place in the Matebeleng Kgotla on 15th March 2011 
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(1000-1315) with 12 people brought together as representative by the VDC 
Chair for the village. 
 
Focus Group at Mochudi (FGMO) 
 
Mochudi was chosen for a FG as its WSS was previously provided by the DWA 
and taken over by the WUC in October 2010. The FG was held in Tshukudu 
ward, in the centre of Mochudi, near the main kgotla. Mochudi (see photograph 
4.1) is the capital of KD with a population of 44,815 (2011) a rise from 6,945 in 
1971, and is located 40 km from Gaborone. The area has been settled for over 
100 years and has a mix of Western style housing and traditional huts, often in 
the same lapa. Low levels of destitution are registered but income appears to 
be dependent on public sector jobs, particularly in commutable Gaborone. The 
Harvard Survey of Mochudi277 shows a HIV/AIDS infection rate of 25% (2012). 
WSS was fully available in the area but the take-up on water borne sewerage 
was very low (<10%), said to be due to the costs of water for sewerage for the 
very frequent social events of weddings and funerals where attendance of 
around 1,000 was typical. There was some rainwater harvesting. 
 
The Notwane River flood plain is shown in photograph A1. It originally (up to the 
1960s) provided drinking water via hand dug sand wells at the sides of the river. 
It now provides water for livestock although these were banned from the village 
in 2011. River water quality has been low due to the pollution from livestock. 
The FG took place on 29th March 2011 (0800-1130) in the Kgotla VDC room, 
with 15 people chosen by the VDC Chair. 
 
                                                 
277
  All residents of Mochudi were voluntarily screened 2009-12 by teams from the Harvard 
Public Health Institute, Boston USA for a longitudinal study to 2030. 
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Photograph A1 The River Notwane, Mochudi (May 2013) 
 
Focus Group at Olifants Drift (FGOD) 
 
This location was chosen for the FG because Olifants Drift is a riverine village, 
dependent on the Limpopo River for watering livestock, fishing and, under 
limited water rights, irrigated farming. Potable water has been provided by KDC 
from a local borehole and this has been taken over by WUC in October 2010. 
Olifants Drift is 150 km NE from Mochudi by sand road, on the banks of the 
perennial Limpopo River. It had 925 (2011) inhabitants down from 1184 (2001) 
and up from 386 in 1971 and 332 in 1964. It has a school, police station and 
clinic but is very poor with some 60%+ (District Council Chair’s estimate) living 
below the poverty line. This is reflected in the out-migration shown in the drop in 
population in 2011, compared to 2001. 
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Water flows in the river inundate the areas close to the river each rainy season. 
It is currently dependant on standpipes and the locals are fearful of them being 
phased out, leading to dependence on expensive WUC water piped to each 
lapa. Sanitation is by the use of pit latrines. Olifants Drift is a centre for labour 
for the cattle posts in the neighbouring common lands. There is some rainwater 
harvesting.  
 
Rainfall analysis has shown ‘high rainfall variability in time and also in space’ 
(Cooke 1981:130). There is still only one borehole unchanged from 1981 (ibid: 
124). Again, unchanged is the ‘degradation of the areas’ alongside the Limpopo 
River, from the cattle accessing the river, leading to ‘extensive bare area[s] of 
unproductive rangeland’ (ibid). This is shown in photograph A2 with the cattle 
finding it difficult to extract themselves from the deep mud at the edge of the 
river. Cattle boys278 took it in turn to bring herds to the river. 
 
 
Photograph A2 Livestock drinking from the Limpopo River at Olifants Drift 
(November 2010) 
                                                 
278
 Cattle boys is the term used by Batswana to describe those who look after the livestock 
herds in the common lands 
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Across the river, but not accessible at Olifants Drift, is South Africa with modern 
irrigated farming. The soil appears to be the same on both sides of the river. 
The Limpopo River forms the border with South Africa and is shown in 
photograph A3 at the sole crossing point in KD 50 km south of Olifants Drift. On 
the South African side is Limpopo Province with modern high tech farming; 
however, on the Botswana side of the same river, due to lack of water rights, 
there are scrublands with low level rain-fed subsistence agriculture, mainly 
cattle ranching, and utilising boreholes (see Chapter Nine). 
 
 
Photograph A3 The Limpopo River at the Sikwane border crossing between 
KD and Limpopo Province of SA (April 2011) 
 
The FG took place on 5th April 2011 (0800-1100) held in the Kgotla at Olifants 
Drift. The original group was chosen by the KDC social workers for the village 
but permission was withdrawn at the last minute, due to the demand of the 
social worker for payment. The researcher refused to pay. As the Researcher 
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had already arrived in Olifants Drift, after a four  hour drive on the sand roads, 
the VDC chair then invited 12 people, who were mainly Ipelegeng (workfare) 
workers. 
 
Focus Group at Artesia (FGA) 
 
The Researcher chose Artesia as an area previously supplied by KDC and 
taken over by the WUC in October 2010. The village had standpipes with limited 
connections to government and commercial premises. There was no sewerage 
system. Artesia is a centre for cattle boys of the area to visit at the weekend, 
potentially to catch the bus to either Francistown to the north or Gaborone to the 
south, or just to drink beer or chibuka279. Artesia, with 2,365 inhabitants (2011) 
down from 2,589 (2001) and up from 517 in 1971, is the first main stop 100 km 
north out of Gaborone on the way to Francistown. The drop in population 
(2011/2001) may in part be due to the decrease in cattle rearing, alleged by 
several KI in the area. Its name comes from the springs that once flowed there. 
It is the third centre of KD with a full range of public services. The village has 
good connections in the past to District Council water, which utilises the N-S 
carrier, the pipeline for which passes the village. 
 
There is no river and the landscape is rain-fed savannah. There were said to be 
large numbers of boreholes nearby. The researcher visited cattle posts in the 
area and to the north, and found not only WAB authorised boreholes but also 
some drilled by the MoA. There was very little rainwater harvesting. Smaller 
settlements were continuing to be supplied potable water by KDC water 
tankers. The area is in the centre of the Mmwanawitse coalfield although this is 
yet to be developed. While the WAB authorised boreholes for the project will 
provide some water, the view of the KI was that a separate pipeline would have 
to be laid to access the N-S carriers or a separate dedicated line. The 
development of the Mmamabula coalfield to the north would double this 
                                                 
279
 A local sorghum based alcoholic beverage 
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requirement. The need for water for mining in such a water stressed area as 
Artesia was highlighted by KI. 
 
 
Photograph A4 The FG at Artesia (May 2011) 
 
The FG was held in Artesia 15th May 2011 (1200-1500) outside a hostelry on 
the main North Road with 15 drinkers, mainly young men who worked in Artesia 
or in the neighbouring countryside, as shown in photograph A4. 
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Consent Forms for Focus Group participants 
 
Anonymity/ Leina la gago le sephiri 
The answers you give as part of this focus group will be anonymised and will 
not be attributable to you and will be fully confidential. All members of the group 
should show respect for each other’s views. The views you share together with 
me and yourselves should be regarded as confidential by all members of this 
group.Itse fa leina la gago le sena go supiwa gope kana ka tsela epe mo batho 
ba ka bonang gore dikarabo tsa gago e ne ele dife. Re kopa gore batsayakarolo 
botlhe ba fane tlotlo, ka mmualebe o bua la gagwe. Re kopa gape gore rotlhe re 
itlame gore se re se buang fa, se tla itsiwe fela ke rona, ebile ga gona ope yo o 
tla tlotlelang ope gape gore maikutlo a batsayakarolo ba bangwe mo 
dikgangnyeng tsa rona e ne e le afe.  
 
Focus group themes guiding notes on water reforms in Botswana 
 (Following the group discussion with social workers in Old Naledi, Gaborone 31 
January 2011) 
 
A)  The Spiritual Nature of Water 
1) Where does water come from? 
2) Is water scarce? Why do you think that? 
3) Who ensures we have enough?(Prompt: God, The Kgozi The 
Government, WUC) 
4)  Whom do you go to, to complain about water or sewerage? (Prompt: 
Kgosi, Council, Councillors, MP, WUC, DWA)? 
B) The Cultural Right to Water 
5) Should water be free? If not, why not? What about a minimum 
amount? If so, how much? 
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6) If it should not be free, how much should a Motswana pay for it? If 
you cannot afford to pay, who should pay for it?( Prompt:Landlords, 
Council, Government) 
C) The Water Reforms  
 
7) Has your water supplier changed? Has the supply improved? Do you 
pay the bills? Are there problems with billing? Are you being charged 
more? 
8) Should Standpipes be closed? How will that affect you? Affect other 
people? 
9) How should livestock get water with no standpipes in the villages? 
10) How is/ should water be provided for the farms? 
11) How is/ should water be provided at the cattle post? 
12) Are Pit latrines OK at the moment? Who pays to empty them? 
13) Should sewerage be water borne only? Who pays? How much? 
14) Should sewerage water be purified and reused? For Irrigation? For 
Human consumption? 
Final Questions 
 
15) How many mobile phones have you had in the last 2 years? 
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C)  Mochudi Supermarket Survey 
 
Questionnaire for Water Consumers at a Mochudi Supermarket, Kgatleng 
District   June 2011 No............... 
(The Researcher will be using this sheet to ask the questions in Setswana, and 
circle the replies) 
M      F  
Age:  20-30   30-40  40-50  50-60   60+ 
 
Earns:  <P350      <P500       P500-1000      P1000-5000  >P5000 
 
Lives:   in Mochudi       outside Mochudi 
 
How long have you lived in Kgatleng?     Before / After  September 
 
1) In your view, is there a scarcity of water in Botswana?  
(1 is ‘not scarce at all’....7 is ‘very scarce’)   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
     Has this changed in the last 12 months?  Yes     No 
 
2) What do you use the water for? 
Household    Livestock    Masimo   Cattle Post 
Do you use standpipes? Yes No 
If yes, what do you use standpipes for? ................................................ 
Do you think Standpipes should remain?  Yes    No 
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3) Who is your current supplier?                                                        
DWA,    Kgatleng Council,   Water Utilities Corporation 
 
In your opinion has the change of supplier been: 
  for good,    not for good 
 
4) How would you rate the continuity of water supply in Kgatleng?   
(1 = Bad......7 = Excellent)  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Has this changed in the last 12 months?  Yes   No 
 
5) How do you rank Water Quality in Kgatleng?   
(1= Bad.....7= Excellent)   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Has this changed in the last 12 months?  Yes   No 
 
6) How much should each household pay for its water?  
not exceeding monthly:  
P10  P20  P30  P40  P50  P60  P70  more than P70    
Why?..................................................................................................... 
Should rich people pay more?  Yes No 
 
7) How do you normally pay your Water Bill? 
Queue up at the Payment office  
Send someone to pay  
Pay by Post 
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Pay by Credit Card 
8) As a non-member of a borehole syndicate, how much do you pay each 
year for water at the cattle post (if you have one)? 
<P1000  P1000  P2000  P3000  P4000 
 P5000 P6000  P7000  payment by cattle 
 
9) Are you aware in developed countries recycled treated sewage water is 
mixed in the drinking water?    Yes    No  
Is it OK to drink recycled treated sewage water in the drinking water in       
Botswana? (1 is not agree at all ....7 is strongly agree)    1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
 
Tony Colman PhD UEA/UB under Govt. of Botswana Research Permit 
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The data arising from the analysis of the answers to the survey are in figures 
and tables in Chapters Six, Eight and Nine. Results of Chi Square testing of 
answers where appropriate are: 
 
Q1 Perception of scarcity of water 
 
By Age 
CHI Square Test 0.079924 = Not Significant 
 
By Sex  
CHI Square Test 0.95275= Not significant 
 
By Earnings  
CHI Squared Test 0.038525= Very significant  
 
Q6: How much should you pay?  
CHI Squared Test 0.169549= Not significant 
 
Should the rich pay more? 
CHI Sqared Test 0.000452+Very signicant  
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D) Maun BIWRM Survey October 2010 
Ranking of Stakeholders in IWRM-WE Maun October 2010 Analysis of 
the participants’ response when asked to rank the “importance of various 
Groups in achieving a dynamic plan for a Botswana IWRM-WE”. Maun 
October 7th 2010 
Stakeholder / 
stakeholder 
group  
How strong  
is the 
influence 
(their 
decisions and 
actions) 
(H/M/L)  
How strong  
is their 
interest in 
IWRM  
(H/M/L)  
Comments at the time, 
from the 7 Batswana 
participants, to explain 
the rating. 
OKACOM H  H  Since we are looking at 
the issue  of trans-
boundary rivers,  they 
can influence  
ORASECOM H  H  Same as above  
LIMCOM H  H  Same as above  
ZAMCOM H  H  Same as above  
GWP / Water net  L  H  They cannot influence 
country’s decisions  
NGOs (National)  M  H  They are limited by the 
funds they have  
NGOs 
(International)  
M  M   Survival International (a 
right to water for 
everyone)  
SADC  M  H  They respect the 
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sovereignty of countries  
UNDP/GEF  H  H  Co-funder Of BIWRM-
WE. Interested in seeing  
projects completed 
accordingly  
UB / Research 
Institutions  
L  H  The uptake of the 
research results is not 
guaranteed.  
M of Agriculture L  H  Low economic input  
MMEWR  H  H  High Economic Input 
MEWT  H  H  Because of DEA and 
DWMPC  
MFDP  H  H  Every development is 
dependent on water  
MLG  L  H  Water Sector Reform 
taking water supply from 
LAs.  
Ministry of Lands 
and Housing  
M  L  They allocate the 
surface rights  
Department of 
Women Affairs  
M  M  Interests are on labour 
and social  equity  
African 
Development 
Bank  
M  M  Funding organization 
with interest in water 
project  
Ministry of 
Education  
L  L  Has potential to be high 
influence in terms of 
spreading knowledge 
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but currently ineffective. 
High end user  
Media  H  L  Reaches a greater 
population than other 
outlets; however 
interests vary  
Mining 
Companies  
L  H  High end users. Subject 
to govt regulations hence 
low influence. Operations 
greatly depends on 
availability 
BPC  L  H  High end users. Subject 
to govt regulations hence 
low influence. Operations 
greatly depends on 
availability  
Private Sector  L  H  High end users. Subject 
to govt regulations hence 
low influence. Operations 
greatly depends on 
availability  
UN Water  L  H  Not active  in Botswana 
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E) Data Sources for Chapter Eight 
 
The analysis utilises KII, and FG results from fieldwork carried out between 
September 2010 and June 2011280 and between April and May 2013. The 
Researcher attended the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) 
Southern Africa Local Government conference on ‘Strengthening Local 
Government Capacities in Southern Africa’ in Windhoek, Namibia in November 
2010 and the meetings of the Botswana Association of Local Authorities (BALA) 
and met the senior officers of BALA regularly during his fieldwork. Meetings in 
2010-11 were attended of the National Assembly (NA), Gaborone City Council 
(GCC) and Kgatleng District Council (KDC) and he met with both MPs and 
Councillors and members of the House of Chiefs. Interviews were conducted 
with the Speaker of the NA, Hon Margaret Nasha and the then BDP Mayor of 
GCC, Hon Veronica Lesolle and the then BNF281 Chair of the KDC, Hon 
Stephen Makhura. In addition,  Kgotla meetings in Mochudi were attended, 
addressed by Kgosi Kgafela, and the Secretary of the Kgatleng District Land 
Board (KDLB) and the District Commissioner (DC) (initially in post for Gaborone 
and then for KD) were interviewed. The WUC invited him to be present and 
make notes at the WUC monthly management meetings in Mochudi, January –
June 2011. The reflections of the Researcher take account of this range of data 
for the purpose of triangulation. 
 
  
                                                 
280
 See Chapter Three for explanation of KI and FG citations, and Appendix Two for the key to 
the KI acronyms 
281
 Botswana National Front was one of the opposition parties in Botswana and had been 
traditionally in control of KDC since 1966. It lost power in Kgatleng in 2013 to a non BNF 
coalition which included the national ruling party the BDP. 
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Appendix Four: Setswana Vocabulary  
 
(From Botswana Book Centre, (2009) Setswana-English Setswana Dictionary, 
First Edition 1875 Fourth Edition reprinted 2009, Ed. Z. Matumo, Macmillan, 
Gaborone.) 
 
Batswana:     all citizens of Botswana 
Bogadi (pl.magadi, lobola):  cattle given to a woman's elders as a 
marriage gift; dowry 
Botho:     respect for all opinions 
Dumela:     agree; believe; accept 
Ipelegeng:  ‘people must carry themselves on their own 
backs’ (Selolwane 2012:11) name given to 
those who chose to register for workfare  
Originally from the drought relief funds( see 
Table 8.2 in the thesis) 
Kagiso:     peace 
Kgosi (pl.dikgosi):    a chief; a king 
Kgotla (pl.dikgotla):  originally an assembly of tribal elders; now a 
community or tribal meeting held at the ruler’s 
residence; the place or enclosure where the 
community assembles for any kind of 
business that is of importance to the 
community. 
Kutlwano:     mutual sympathy; concord 
Lapa (pl.malapa);  yard in the village where dwellings are 
erected 
Mafisa:  cattle which have been lent to another; cattle 
kept at another man's cattle post for that 
individual’s benefit  
Malata: serfs;    underlings 
Masimo:  land outside the village used for cultivation of 
crops  
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Morafe (pl.merafe):    community; tribe; nation 
Moraka:     cattle post 
Motse:     a village; a home; a homestead 
Motswana:     individual Botswana citizen 
Pitso:  consultative Meeting of stakeholders often 
called by the GOB  
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Appendix Five: Water tariff comparisons internationally and in South 
Africa, Namibia and Botswana  
 
International comparisons  
 
In the WB analysis of comparison of water tariffs in surrounding countries in 
2009, ‘Botswana water tariffs for 12KL/month of water usage are about half the 
Namibian and USA tariff levels, slightly higher than Zambian tariff levels, and 
24% lower than the average South African tariff levels, despite the fact that 
most South African municipalities provide the first 6KL of water per month free 
of charge. In South Africa, virtually all municipalities increase tariffs annually as 
part of the annual budget process, in line with general inflation levels. This 
practice is also followed by most utilities in Europe and the USA. If Botswana 
had the same policy in the past, its current tariff levels would be comparable to 
South African tariff levels’ (GOB 2010b:26). 
 
Table A 1Water Tariffs in Botswana and International Comparisons 2009-
10 
 
WATER 
KL/Month 5 12 25 
WUC 
Gaborone/Lobatse 11 34 135 
Jwaneng 8 23 76 
Francistown 12 36 137 
Selebi-Phikwe 8 22 63 
Sowa 8 24 89 
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WUC Average 9 25 87 
WUC Average with 20% increase, 2011/12 11 33 120 
DWA 
WUC-supply 10 43 130 
DWA own-supply 6 29 87 
DWA Average 8 36 109 
DWA Average with 20% increase, 2011/12 9 43 130 
District Councils 
Kwengeng, Kgatleng, WUC-supply 13 60 181 
Malotwane 9 40 122 
Central, Ghanzi 5 21 63 
Kgalagadi 6 28 87 
NW 8 34 103 
SE 10 43 130 
DCs Average 8 37 114 
DCs Average with 20% increase, 2011/12 9 43 131 
Botswana Average 8 32 103 
Botswana Average with 20% increase, 
2011/12 
10 39 127 
International Comparisons: 
South Africa, 2009 0 42 123 
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Zambia, 2009 8 27 57 
Namibia (Windhoek), 2010 30 97 229 
USA, Virginia, 2009 43 104 217 
USA, national eastern cities, 2009 45 109 227 
WASTEWATER 
South Africa, 2009 4 33 56 
Zambia, 2009 N/A N/A N/A 
Namibia (Windhoek), 2010 56 56 56 
USA, Virginia, 2009 54 131 272 
USA, national eastern cities, 2009 55 133 277 
WUC, 2011/12 (proposed) 12 29 60 
 
Notes: 1) All amounts in Pula at 15 May 2010 exchange rates. 2) WUC WW 
tariff of P2.40/KL, based on P120 million total WW cost (in 2012 Pula) and 50 
million annual KL sales (100% WUC + 60% DWA billings) 
Source: GOB 2010b:27 
 
The South Africa example: 
 
The post Apartheid Government wrote into the 1996 Constitution a right to free 
water for basic needs. It was subsequently defined in the SA Water Act of 1998 
as 25L282 of water per person per day (or 6KL per month per household). There 
have been court challenges from SA NGOs to have this raised to 50L or more 
                                                 
282
 http://www.dwa.gov.za/dir_ws/DWQR/subscr/ViewComDoc.asp?Docid=406 
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but these have failed283. The Independence movements had encouraged non-
payment of bills levied by the then Government including non-payment of WSS 
bills. Since Independence and the entitlement to free basic water needs, there 
has been difficulty in the collection of water bills, creating a problem for the 
financing of WSS infrastructure and delivery. South Africa Water Minister 
[Asmal] ‘knew there was this huge popular demand for water supply for poor 
Blacks [sic] and that many of the left talked of water being human right, akin to 
the right to life’ (Johnson 2010:103). ‘They would not accept realistic water 
pricing, however inevitable [it had to be] in the long term. The state paid the 
capital costs of the new schemes and the local communities paid for the water 
but no provision was made for payment of depreciation, maintenance and 
repairs. Without this, the new schemes were white elephants destined for 
speedy failure. The schemes proved unsustainable’ (ibid: 104).  
As in Botswana, destitutes (classified as indigents in South African legislation) 
have their water bills paid. The power of disconnection for non-payment by the 
non-destitute was seen as not possible to use due to the right to basic free 
water. Pre-payment metering that shut off water completely when the pre-
payment amount of water was exhausted were not seen as acceptable by 
CSOs in SA284. A method for dealing with this has been the use of trickle feed 
flow restriction devices to give non-payers the free basic water supply but no 
more on a daily basis. At the World Water Week conference event in March 
2011, in Cape Town, South Africa, attended by the Hon Minister for MMEWR, 
the Cape Province Government featured the use of the device. They saw it as 
successful, both in ensuring the poorest get their entitlement and that bills were 
now being paid where the devices had been installed (with residents’ 
agreement after their existing bills had been written off)285. However, the South 
African NGO movement strongly attacked the concept as ‘keeping the poor 
                                                 
283
 http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-
court%E2%80%99s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/ 
284
 At the World Water Day event in Capetown in March 2011, CSOs campaigned against this 
policy. 
285
 Cape Province presentation to the WWW conference Capetown, March 2011 
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starved of water’286. Discussion between the Hon Minister and the researcher at 
the time led to the view by the Minister that, given the different historical and 
social conditions in Botswana, utilisation of such devices was not the way 
forward. This policy was subsequently confirmed during an interview with the 
Permanent Secretary to MMEWR in June 2011. 
 
It has been said that ‘the decision, to ignore the question of affordability of water 
in South Africa quickly, [had] catastrophic consequences, as water providers 
tried to recover the cost from consumers. 10 million South Africans have had 
their water cut off since 1994 and more than 2 million have been evicted from 
their homes. By 2000 there were major outbreaks of cholera directly traceable 
to failures of sanitation and water supplies’ (Johnson 2010:105). The 
redistribution towards the poorest was largely simply because large amounts of 
water and electricity was stolen through illegal connections and because the 
government repeatedly wrote of the bad debts incurred by the refusal of so 
many to pay rent, rates and taxes (ibid 583). Mvula Trust estimates that just 
about 10-20% [of the population] pay for the tariff, to achieve the full operation 
and maintenance which goes beyond the free basic water (WPP/AfDB 
2010:81). There is thought to be a 37% loss of non revenue water.287  
 
Provision of free basic water in South Africa at 25KL per person per day 
appears not to have resolved the issue of pro-poor provision of water in SA. 
Part of the difficulty of affordability was the much higher level of tariffs above 
this level in SA compared to Botswana was shown in earlier in this Appendix 
But this has changed with the Botswana tariff increase of June 2013  moving 
above South Africa(Figure 9.4). 
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 Flyer at the conference quoting Jeff Rudin of the SA Municipal Workers Union, from an 
article in Armandia,13.21 
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 Available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-water-losses-could-fund-20-lesotho-highland-
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In South Africa, irrigated land for both crops and cattle farming had its water 
sources and water quotas registered from the pre Independence government 
controls. However ‘with only a handful of staff members in Water Affairs’ water 
resources department, the challenge of monitoring whether or not 17,000 
farmers stick to their water quotas is huge if not impossible. For that reason, we 
are promoting water–user associations’ (James Perkins of DWAF KZN region, 
quoted in Farmers Weekly 14th March 2008:27). It appears that despite the lack 
of water in SA, there was very little control over the volume of water used from 
either surface or groundwater sources. There was concern at the lack of 
political will to deliver the WRM reforms inherent in the SA Water Act (Schreiner 
2013). The resurrection in September 2013 of the 2007 proposal for a 
parastatal National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency288 could provide a 
centralised control of dams, pipelines and wider water infrastructure.  
 
The provision of water and sanitation in South Africa within its existing three 
level governance structure remains poor (SAHRC 2014). It is likely to remain a 
key political issue for the post 2014 Government. 
 
The Namibian example:  
 
The National Water and Sanitation Policy of 1993 had three relevant objectives: 
   
 Essential water supply and sanitation should become available to all 
Namibians and should be accessible at a cost which is affordable to the 
country as a whole;  
 This equitable improvement should be achieved by the combined efforts 
of the government and the beneficiaries, based on community 
involvement, community participation and acceptance of mutual 
responsibility;  
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 Available at http://www.fm.co.za/fm/Features/2013/08/15/sa-to-form-water-management-
state-firm?goback=%2Egde_4411769_member_266655558#%21 accessed 27
th
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 Communities should have the right, with due regard for environmental 
needs and the resources available, to determine which solution and 
service levels are acceptable to them. Beneficiaries should contribute 
towards cost of services at increasing rates for standards of living 
exceeding the levels required for providing basic needs’ (WPP/AfDB 
2010:78).  
 
The rural water supply plans were for ‘community based management of all 
water points as the strategy for achieving the targets in a sustainable manner. 
By the year 2007 DRWS aim[ed] to have all water points under decentralized 
control of local communities. It is in this way that cost recovery of rural water 
supply, as stipulated in the Water and Sanitation Policy of 1993 will be 
achieved’ (WPP/AfDB 2010:79). Outside the main centres in Namibia, collection 
rates were low. But in towns such as Windhoek, Swakopomund and Walvis 
Bay, water tariffs sought full cost recovery to reflect the scarcity of water and the 
high costs of recycling. For the poor, the stepped tariff was seen as the way 
forward. 
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Table A2 Botswana Water Tariffs from 1st June 2013 
Schedule Current Tariff Schedules Proposed Tariff Schedules 
LA Min 0-5 >5-20 >20-40 >40 Min 0-5 >5-15 >15-25 >25-40 >40 
F’Town, 1 11.20 1.25 3.95 8.15 10.05 11.20 1.50 4.00 9.00 13.00 18.00 
Kweneng, 2 11.20 2.60 8.20 16.90 20.85 11.20 2.00 8.00 11.00 16.90 20.80 
Mochudi, 3 11.20 1.75 5.50 11.35 14.00 11.20 2.00 6.00 11.00 16.90 18.00 
Lobatse, 4 11.20 1.90 5.90 12.10 15.00 11.20 2.00 6.00 11.00 16.90 18.00 
S Phikwe, 5 11.20 1.30 3.95 8.15 10.05 11.20 1.50 4.00 9.00 13.00 18.00 
Ghanzi, 6 11.20 0.90 2.85 5.90 7.25 11.20 1.50 4.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 
Maun, Okav 5.70 1.25 3.20 6.60 8.15 11.20 1.50 4.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 
Maun, Ngami 5.70 1.50 3.75 7.80 9.60 11.20 2.00 4.00 9.00 10.00 15.00 
DWA  
DWA supply, 1 11.20 1.25 3.95 8.15 10.05 11.20 1.50 4.00 9.00 13.00 15.00 
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DWA Maun 10.00 1.40 3.50 7.25 8.95 11.20 1.50 4.00 9.00 13.00 15.00 
WUC supply, 4 11.20 1.90 4.75 9.80 12.15 11.20 2.00 5.00 9.00 13.00 15.00 
‘Old WUC’ Min 0-5 >5-15 >15-25 >25  
Gaborone, 7 11.20 2.10 7.95 10.10 14.00 11.20 2.00 8.00 11.00 16.90 20.80 
Jwaneng, 8 11.20 1.65 4.10 5.35 6.15 11.20 2.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 
F’town, 9 11.20 2.40 7.10 10.40 11.65 11.20 2.00 8.00 11.00 16.90 20.80 
Sowa, 10 11.20 1.65 4.65 6.70 7.45 11.20 2.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 
S Phikwe, 11 11.20 1.65 3.30 4.10 5.35 11.20 2.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 
Government  
LA Min 0-5 >5-20 >20-40 >40 Min 0-5 >5-15 >15-25 >25-40 >40 
All, 12 22.40 6.20 15.90 32.80 40.50 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
DWA  
All, 12 22.40 6.20 15.90 32.80 40.50 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
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‘Old WUC’ Min 0-5 >5-15 >15-25 >25  
Gaborone, 13 22.40 5.45 15.95 20.50 28.00 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
Jwaneng, 14 22.40 3.00 5.90 7.65 9.00 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
Francistown, 
15 
22.40 6.20 14.55 20.90 23.35 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
Sua, 16 22.40 3.00 6.70 9.70 10.75 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
SP, 17 22.40 3.00 4.80 5.90 7.40 22.40 6.00 16.00 21.00 33.00 41.00 
 
 
 
